The Norwegian way: Why Oslo talks with everyone and still believes in multilateralism

We live in a tumultuous world. Wars are raging in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. International law is in peril. Classic power structures are being upended. The United Nations and other multilateral institutions are paralysed by historically low levels of trust. And while the current world is seemingly fracturing, global threats abound. Transborder aggression, climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence, and the proliferation of biological and nuclear weapons are only some of many issues that demand decisive global action.

What is an effective foreign policy in such a world? Norway has chosen a path based on an overarching analysis: that the only way to ensure real peace and stability and overcoming global threats is to engage broadly, enhance international law and rejuvenate global institutions.

Some will likely dismiss this as hopelessly altruistic, detached from any realistic concept of human nature. Nothing could be further from the truth. Norway’s foreign policy is squarely rooted in our national self-interest. But a world order governed by the laws of the jungle or splintering into competing and parallel orders is something we would do well to avoid.

Norway is in many ways a conventional member of the Western alliance. A small state bordering Russia, we are founding member of NATO and have long been a reliable security partner to North American and European allies. We are deeply integrated into the European Union’s single market as a member of the European Economic Area. We have been a steadfast supporter of Ukraine in its effort to repel Russia from its sovereign territory.

But in three broad categories, we also differ from at least some of our peer countries: One, our willingness to undertake partnerships with a diverse range of countries including those whose interests are distinctly at odds with our own. Second, our commitment to international law, including a belief that these norms can only be sustained as a shared vocabulary if states avoid double standards in their invocation and application. Third, a firm belief in rejuvenating global institutions so they can serve as real generators of collaborative solutions. These three facets of our foreign policy have become more pronounced under the current Norwegian government, in which I serve as deputy foreign minister.

Engagement is key. We have been prepared, for example, to pursue regular dialogue with the Taliban, the Houthis, and Hamas as well as other armed groups and states not known for their human rights or international law credentials. Sometimes this has put us at odds with other Western partners. But we believe it is the right path towards a more equitable and peaceful order—Norway is the world’s largest per capita donor to the multilateral system—but also towards greater security at home. It is realpolitik. The influence of non-Western countries is growing. If they ever existed, the days when the West could construct solutions to global challenges and impose them on others are definitively over. Solutions must reflect the world as it is. So, talking to all actors is in our self-interest.

To understand is not to forgive

This reflects a deliberate and principled commitment to fostering dialogue. This strategy is rooted in several interrelated considerations. First, it creates pathways for negotiation and solutions that might otherwise remain closed. Second, such engagement helps us understand the motivations, needs, and priorities of others, including those who present as adversaries. Third, it contributes to a more interconnected and cooperative global society, one that moves beyond divisive notions of “us” and “them,” and fosters shared engagement across diverse perspectives and contexts.

Norway’s approach recognises that the world is simply too dangerous and fraught with problems to engage only with states and stakeholders with which one mostly agrees. This means that our relations with some countries necessarily become compartmentalised. With China, we have developed a strong partnership to identify durable solutions to the climate crisis. Earlier this year Norway and China agreed to establish a formalised dialogue to collaborate on the green transition. We are nevertheless also determined to continue to call out Chinese human rights violations and other breaches of international law.

A low threshold for engaging with other countries makes it easier to grasp others’ decisions. This may seem obvious, but apparently it is not. Some read a statement such as “we need to understand what motivated Hamas to attack Israel on October 7” as somehow expressing sympathy for Hamas. But understanding the motivations of others is a prerequisite for both influencing their behaviour and identifying intelligent policy responses. Many tragic policy decisions stem from unwillingness to grasp the vantage point of adversarial actors. The ability to understand what is driving those with whom you disagree without agreeing or sympathising with them is even more crucial as global affairs become more multipolar and plural.

The Norwegian approach to the Houthis and their attacks on vessels in the Red Sea is illustrative.  As a seafaring state, we have been clear that such attacks, including numerous ones on Norwegian ships, are counterproductive and unjustifiable. Still, we have continued our longstanding and broad engagement with Yemeni actors, including the Houthis.

We have used this channel of communication to condemn, in the strongest terms, the Houthi operations in the Red Sea. We have stressed that it is not only undermining the long sought-after peace agreement with Saudi Arabia; it is also damaging to the Palestinian cause insofar as is deflects attention from the Palestinian plight and gives momentum to those advocating for military solutions, which would only hurt the Palestinian population further. Our discussions with the Houthis have also confirmed that a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is the only way to end the attacks in the Red Sea. It is simply impossible to degrade the Houthis sufficiently through military pressure alone. In sum, our engagement with the Houthis has enabled us to convey salient points, refine our own analysis and adjust our policies accordingly.   

Facilitating peace and de-escalation has become harder in today’s world. Avoiding an escalatory war between Iran, Lebanon, and Israel, which everyone agrees would have devastating regional and global repercussions, now requires that we deal with Hamas, the Houthis, Hizbullah, and various militia groups in Iraq and Syria. These actors are heavily armed; they have their own idiosyncrasies and calculations. Strategies that focus only on degrading them by military means may sound resolute and tough, but very rarely work unless they are complemented by diplomatic efforts. Norway’s approach has therefore been to support military operations which we consider effective but also keeping channels of communication open.

Engaging militias or other non-state armed entities can prove particularly useful when such groups later assume positions of power, which is not unusual. As part of our engagement with Syria during and after the Syrian civil war, Norway established a broad range of relationships with Syrian stakeholders. One of them was with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which now controls most of Syria, having toppled the Assad regime. This has put Norway in a unique position of influence and access, which we can use to foster Syrian inclusive government and regional stability.

Beyond “them and us”

Engagement can also help dispel the so called “attribution error problem” whereby states, just like most people, tend to interpret behaviour very differently based on whether it can be attributed to a friend or adversary. A virtuous deed by a friendly actor is often interpreted as a reflection of that actor’s inherently benign nature or legitimate interests. An unwelcome act is conversely excused and contextualised as an unfortunate error or a misunderstanding. The opposite is true for adversarial actors where we regularly treat acts we consider nefarious as expressions of character, but point to context and tactical considerations as explanations for actions we appreciate.

The dynamics created by attribution error often create tribal connections between groups of states. They also cement adversarial relationships. Engaging directly with a wide range of actors can reveal the complex motivational factors that drive behaviour. This in turn makes diplomatic solutions easier to identify as opposed to when a counterpart is determined to be inherently evil.

The Taliban is a case in point. Norway has lost no time in criticising the group’s dismal human rights record. But we are also convinced that any effective Afghan strategy must involve discussion and dialogue with the Taliban. Since the fall of Kabul three years ago, Western countries have responded mostly with sanctions and isolation. The response by the Taliban has been to ratchet up their repression. But Norway has engaged with them, including by hosting meetings between the Taliban and Afghan civil society and women’s rights organisations. The discussions have been direct and candid, and have often taken place on the request of Afghan civil society groups themselves.

Achieving durable peace agreements between states and non-state actors also requires engagement. Norway has a tradition of facilitating such processes. We typically have two criteria for getting involved. First, the parties to the conflict must want our engagement; second, a positive outcome must be deemed attainable. Throughout the years, Norway has helped facilitate critical peace agreements in the Middle East (notably the “Oslo Accords” between Israel and the Palestinians), Colombia, Nepal, and the Philippines, to name a few examples.

A fundamental insight based on our experience is that repressive states and groups are almost never monolithic creatures. Even the most despotic group is fragmented, with some elements more inclined to compromise and amenability. Our task is finding ways to unlock those positive forces. It is vital to insist continuously on probing all relevant actors, always looking for ways to strengthen reformist elements within the structures of power. Between adversarial parties, we typically strive to create a dynamic whereby one party takes incremental steps towards compromise, which can unlock the other side’s willingness to respond in kind. The objective is to create an atmosphere of trust so that the parties are comfortable taking further steps towards mutual de-escalation and reconciliation.       

Norway is sometimes criticised for engaging with states and groups responsible for grave human rights violations or even atrocities. The criticism is usually that our engagement gives credibility to those we talk to. True, we must be extremely careful not to reward those responsible for abuses against civilians. That can entail skipping the usual pomp and obligatory niceties that often characterise diplomatic encounters. And we always abide by our obligations as a state party to the International Criminal Court and other mechanisms of accountability. But we must also dispense with the notion that direct engagement equals explicit or tacit approval of our interlocutors. In fact, direct communication usually allows for clearer messages of disapproval than does disengagement.

Talking to states and armed groups that are embroiled in conflict does not guarantee a positive outcome. But isolation almost certainly guarantees that nothing will be accomplished.

The shared vocabulary of international law

Talking with everyone and engaging adversaries is critical to solving global challenges, but insufficient without a shared normative vocabulary. That is why this “Norwegian way” also relies closely on the framework of international law. In our view, this shared vocabulary can only be sustained if all states avoid double standards in its invocation and application. We must therefore be consistent in our efforts to abide by international rules, even when doing so is difficult to reconcile with our short-term political interests and priorities. But avoiding so-called double standards is paramount if international law is to remain a credible framework.

What does this mean in practice? It certainly entails that we insist similar cases be treated similarly, and that all states be subject to the same rules. Our support for Ukraine against Russia is based on international law. The same is true of our criticism of Hamas’ terror against Israel and Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and military campaign in Gaza. Norway’s recent recognition of Palestinian statehood should also be seen as part and parcel of a policy of consistent application of the law. A two-state solution requires a Palestinian and an Israeli state, as outlined by the UN partition plan of 1947. Norway formally recognised the State of Israel in 1949 and voted in favour of Israeli membership to the UN the same year. Ever since, Norway has been a steadfast supporter of Israeli statehood and security. Our support for Israel and the two-state solution entails that we now grant the same rights and obligations to Palestine. Under international law, the Palestinian people have a legitimate right to self-determination.  

Some counter that the world is fraught with peril, and all states, perhaps especially smaller ones such as Norway, should be careful not to alienate their allies and partners, even when they act inconsistently with international law. But real security depends ultimately on a peaceful international community equipped to resolve global challenges. That in turn requires that we work to ensure international law is respected. Unless all countries are committed to it, the system will eventually collapse. That would invariably lead to less security and more uncertainty for everyone.

Yet international law is on the back foot. Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and Israel’s illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories are just two of many contemporary examples. To turn this trend around states must put their rivalries, and their narrow national interests, to one side. And states must be consistent in their defence of international law and not overlook transgressions just because they are perpetrated by one’s own “tribe”. For Norway, this has meant condemning Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine but also calling out Israeli violations of international law against Palestinians.

A further part of upholding this shared vocabulary is recognising the basic reality that the current world order is heavily tilted against the global south. Norway takes these concerns seriously and is committed to identifying broad-ranging solutions. A case in point is our openness to a process in the UN to negotiate global taxation rules. This issue has thus far been negotiated primarily within the OECD, an organisation with mostly Western members. It is simply untenable in today’s world for rules governing issues such as taxation, the climate, and artificial intelligence to be developed without all the world’s countries sitting around the same table as participants of equal stature. That neither Africa nor Latin America is represented amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council is perhaps the most obvious example of why we must put institutional reform at the top of on the agenda to sustain multilateralism.

Give speech a chance

Some will see Norway’s emphasis on functioning global institutions and respect for international law as overly idealistic, especially in an age of crisis when states’ natural inclination can be to retreat behind barricades. But we see it as hard-headed pragmatism, as it is precisely in an age of crisis that this is most valuable—and mutual alienation least affordable.

One should also avoid being too bleak about the current situation. International law is still overwhelmingly respected. States continue to use international courts to settle disputes, and most international court decisions are complied with. And states that chose to ignore the law are often met with widespread condemnation, something Russia and Israel can attest to. Countries still look to the UN and other global institutions to resolve global problems. The world order born of the ashes of second world war is not dead. But it is in desperate need of reform. And this time we cannot wait for a world crisis before taking decisive action, which has been the historical pattern.

For a small country like Norway, this continues to persuade us of the value of the Norwegian way: talking to those with whom we disagree, upholding the shared principles of international law and strengthening the UN and other global institutions. That we do so as a proud member of the Western alliance is no contradiction. It is all about sovereignty: shaping our global circumstances both through cooperation with like-minded partners and through upholding that dialogue with others who are far from like-minded—as well as the multilateral and international legal systems that underpin this engagement in the first place.

In politics, and perhaps especially in foreign policy, there is always an impulse to settle for transactional short-term wins, without much regard for principle and law. This impulse is arguably stronger now than at any point in recent history, because of the widespread perception that the current multilateral paradigm is cracking due to intensifying geopolitical rivalries. It is, however, precisely at moments like this, when there is a global tendency to isolate, lean into nationalism and discard the rules, that we must be most ambitious. “Sincere diplomacy”, said Stalin, “is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.” We Norwegians beg to differ.