Priority areas

The following are the priority areas for projects under this Plan of Action:

Spent nuclear fuel from reactors on nuclear-powered vessels
Radioactive waste
Radioactive sources
Co-operation between national authorities and development of legislation
Safety at nuclear power plants
Contingency planning
Non-proliferation
Chemical weapons

1. Spent nuclear fuel from reactors on nuclear-powered vessels

There are substantial quantities of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear icebreakers, nuclear-powered submarines and other vessels in areas adjacent to Norway’s borders. Much of the fuel is stored under unsatisfactory conditions at the Northern Fleet’s technical support bases, on service vessels and on decommissioned submarines. The largest storage facility for spent nuclear fuel is at Andreyev Bay. Substantial quantities of fuel are also stored at the Gremikha base. Many of the decommissioned nuclear submarines are still carrying fuel on board, and some of them are in very poor condition. Many of the service vessels are also in poor condition, including the Lepse, which contains large quantities of damaged nuclear fuel.

Spent nuclear fuel poses a risk of radioactive pollution of the environment in areas adjacent to Norway’s borders. Some of the fuel may be of a quality that under certain circumstances could be used in nuclear weapons, and therefore has to be constantly monitored and controlled.

Since 1998 Norway has been involved in various projects to improve the infrastructure and investigate pollution at the Andreyev Bay base (which is now closed), thus facilitating efforts to secure the spent nuclear fuel and ensure that it is handled appropriately. Norway is represented in an international co-ordinating group for the further work at the base. Norwegian involvement in the dismantling of nuclear-powered submarines carrying spent nuclear fuel began with two pilot projects in 2003-2004. Through AMEC, Norway has contributed to more appropriate handling and transport of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned submarines.

The Government’s goals are to

take part in efforts to ensure the safe handling, storage and transport of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines and nuclear icebreakers in the northern areas
·
provide a framework for safe handling of fuel at Andreyev Bay
·
take part in the dismantling of all decommissioned non-strategic nuclear submarines that are carrying fuel on board and ensure that health, environment and safety considerations are given priority throughout the process
·
take part in efforts to ensure satisfactory physical protection of the fuel until it can be dealt with safely and securely.

2. Radioactive waste

There are considerable concentrations of both solid and liquid radioactive waste in northwestern Russia, generated during the operation, maintenance and dismantling of nuclear-powered vessels. Existing storage facilities are virtually filled to capacity, and large quantities of waste are being stored under unsatisfactory conditions at outdated military and civilian nuclear facilities. This waste can pollute the environment and must therefore be dealt with appropriately.

Norway has provided funds to upgrade two storage tanks for liquid radioactive waste at the Zvezdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk outside Arkhangelsk, and was also involved in the project to upgrade the effluent treatment plant for liquid radioactive waste at the facility serving the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet north of Murmansk (Atomflot). Within the framework of AMEC, Norway has provided funding for a processing and storage facility for solid radioactive waste at the naval shipyard in Polyarnyy. The facility is now fully operational and can handle both military and civilian waste from the region. At Andreyev Bay, Norway has been involved in infrastructure projects and surveys of pollution as part of the efforts to provide a framework for safe handling and storage of radioactive waste.

The Government’s goals are to

take part in efforts to ensure the safe handling and storage of radioactive waste in the northern areas
·
take part in clearly targeted clean-up operations at Andreyev Bay, so that the facility does not pose any long-term safety or environmental risk.

3. Radioactive sources

In Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, there are large numbers of radioactive sources that have been used for medical, industrial and agricultural purposes. After use, many of them have been stored unsatisfactorily or abandoned without being physically secured in any way. Radioactive sources pose health, environmental and safety risks if they fall into the wrong hands.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is co-operating with the US and Russia to secure radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union. The IAEA Nuclear Security Fund plays an important role in this work.

In consultation with the Russian authorities, Norway has decided that the first priority is to secure radioactive strontium batteries from lighthouse lanterns in northwestern Russia. Since 1998, Norway has been funding the removal of strontium batteries and their replacement with solar panels. It is also necessary to gain a better overview of other radioactive sources in northwestern Russia that may pose safety and environmental risks.

The Government’s goals are to

take part in the removal of all strontium batteries in Russian lighthouse lanterns in areas adjacent to Norway (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Nenets) and their replacement with solar panels
·
encourage other donor countries to take part by contributing to the Norwegian-Russian project and/or taking part in similar projects in other parts of Russia
·
gain a better overview of other radioactive sources in northwestern Russia that pose environmental and safety risks, and in the longer term take steps to secure these as well
·
support multilateral efforts to secure radioactive sources in other parts of Russia, for example through the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

4. Co-operation between national authorities and development of legislation

Russian inspection authorities have always had a different role and a weaker position than those in Western countries. This has been a contributory factor in the development of the problems that now have to be dealt with in the Russian nuclear industry and at various nuclear facilities. Through active co-operation between authorities in the two countries, Norway wishes to assist in building up the Russian inspection authorities. The co-operation will be partly linked to specific projects, with the intention of ensuring a predictable and transparent approval process and satisfactory implementation of the projects.

Another objective of the close co-operation between national authorities is to improve levels of knowledge about environmental protection, radiation protection and nuclear safety in Russia generally. This will also be of key importance for Norwegian contingency planning.

The Government’s goals are to

support the development of Russian legislation that is in accordance with international guidelines for environmental impact assessment and standards for clean-up measures
·
support efforts to build up the Russian inspection and control system for nuclear safety
·
ensure that projects are carried out as planned.

5. Safety at nuclear power plants

The risk of radioactive pollution of Norwegian areas would be greatest in the event of an accident at one of the nuclear power plants at Kola, Kursk, Smolensk and Leningrad (near St. Petersburg). The two oldest reactors at the Kola power plant are first-generation VVER (a type of pressurised water reactor), while those at the Kursk, Smolensk and St. Petersburg plants are RBMK reactors (the same type as at Chernobyl). Russia has used substantial resources to upgrade safety at these reactors, and has subsequently decided to extend the operating licences for all operative reactors beyond the original 30-year period. The EU requires new member states to set timetables for the closure of reactors of these types, since it is not considered possible to bring them up to the same safety standard as Western-type reactors.

Since 1992, Norway has been funding safety measures at the Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants. Safety analyses and statistics show that with Norwegian and other Western assistance, the most acute safety problems have now been resolved.

The Government’s goals are to

take part in the implementation of projects that improve safety at nuclear power plants but do not extend their operating life
·
promote the development of a satisfactory safety culture at the power plants
·
support plans for decommissioning nuclear power plants
·
advocate the establishment of an international decommissioning fund for the Kola power plant
·
take part in efforts to promote the use of alternative energy sources, energy efficiency and a more efficient energy sector in northwestern Russia
·
strengthen the system for early notification of nuclear accidents at international, regional and bilateral level.

6. Contingency planning

Contingency planning and the system for notification of nuclear accidents are an important part of the bilateral nuclear safety co-operation between Norway and Russia. Norway and Russia adopted an agreement on early notification of nuclear accidents in 1993. This is based on the IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, which has a relatively high threshold for notification of nuclear accidents. Norway has therefore advocated lowering this threshold, both in contact with Russia and internationally.

Because there are so many possible sources of radioactive pollution in northwestern Russia, it is essential to have means of evaluating the situation continuously and obtaining information on any changes. Bilateral co-operation on monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere and the terrestrial and marine environment provides continuous information on radioactivity levels and time trends, and allows for notification in the event of sudden changes.

The Government’s goals are to

work towards a lower threshold for early notification of nuclear accidents, in accordance with international recommendations
·
maintain an emergency preparedness system to deal with nuclear incidents and accidents
·
maintain a good overview of current and potential sources of radioactive pollution in the northern areas.

7. Non-proliferation

International terrorism makes it necessary to take special measures to secure nuclear facilities and fissile and other radioactive material. This is a particularly urgent matter in northwestern Russia, where it is still unclear how much and what types of spent fuel and radioactive waste are stored at several smaller bases and on board service vessels.

The Government’s goals are to

support the implementation of projects to improve physical security and control at nuclear facilities, both during normal operations and in connection with necessary environmental measures and clean-up operations
·
seek to ensure a closer international focus on the problem and closer co-ordination of projects
·
seek to strengthen the multilateral involvement in non-proliferation efforts, to ensure that IAEA standards and principles for the physical security of facilities and material are followed, and to ensure that nuclear material is accounted for.

8. Destruction of chemical weapons

Russia is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and has thus undertaken a commitment to destroy its stockpiles of chemical weapons by 2012. However, to comply with this, Russia will be dependent on assistance from other countries.

The Government’s goal is to

take part in international efforts to support the destruction of Russia’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, among other things through the UK-managed project to build a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye in central Russia.

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