Utenriksminister Knut Vollebæk:

Security in the Baltic Sea Region.

Innlegg på FAFO/UD-seminar om norsk Baltikum-politikk,
onsdag 5. november 1997, kl. 13.15.

Prime Minister,

Ladies and gentlemen,

Over the past few years we have become accustomed to talking about the changes in the European security landscape. Today's seminar is a timely reminder that nowhere have these changes been greater than in the Baltic Sea Region. I would like to thank Prime Minister Krasts for providing us with an excellent overview of Latvian perspectives.

As we approach the end of the year, I think we may conclude that 1997 will have a lasting impact on European security. Much has been said about the new security architecture. But political architects need building blocks if their plans are to get beyond the drawing board. A number of such building blocks are in the process of being laid. To mention a few: the decisions on NATO enlargement made in Madrid this summer, the EU enlargement to be determined in Luxembourg next month, the process of adapting NATO to new tasks, developing special relationships with Russia and Ukraine, the decision on a Security Model to be taken at the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen next month - these are all crucial elements in the broader picture.

In the wake of the political changes in Europe, conflict prevention has become just as important as crisis management. Our societies are having to deal with a whole range of challenges which have one thing in common: they cannot be met by military means alone. These include securing democracy, safeguarding the environment and creating social and economic stability. New tasks have been added to the agendas of the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the OSCE. And new regional fora such as the Barents and the Baltic Sea Councils are promoting economic prosperity and social stability at the local level. Efforts at the international, regional and national level must go hand in hand.

Norway supports - and actively participates in - the integration efforts in the Baltic Sea Region. The first initiatives were motivated by the need for political integration. We now see economic integration developing its own dynamism through an upsurge in economic activities and trade. This trend will continue.

Small European states like the Nordic and Baltic states have a particular interest in promoting regional stability and predictability. Like Scandinavia, the Baltic states are often regarded from afar as a single area. But like their Nordic neighbours, they are in fact individual nation states with distinct histories, national interests and priorities. The Nordic tradition of cooperating across different foreign policy affiliations has been extended to include new players, and today Nordic - Baltic cooperation in the "5 + 3 format" is applied at all levels. No country can turn its back on geography, much less so countries with large neighbours. On the other hand, geography should not be used as a means of excluding countries from international processes. All democratic countries in Europe have the right to decide on their own how best to meet their national interests and security needs, including applying for EU and NATO membership.

Through its various programmes and instruments and through the enlargement process, the EU plays a crucial role in strengthening Baltic independence and security. A decision on EU enlargement is expected in Luxembourg next month. Six countries have been recommended by the Commission. One Baltic country is among these. This has sent an important political signal with regard to the place of the Baltic States in the new Europe. I would like to encourage all applicants to regard this as an incentive rather than as a discouragement, and to work even harder to rebuild the economic and political foundations of their countries. The process of enlargement should ensure that all applicant countries are included from the start, so that negotiations can be launched as soon as the applicant country is ready. I would be pleased to see you take advantage of Norwegian experience which has been gained in the course of two negotiating processes with the EU. We would be able to provide financial assistance for Baltic representatives to visit Oslo(1) and meet with our experts. Only last week representatives from the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited my own and several other ministries for this purpose. I believe they found it useful.

As you well know, Norway supports and promotes NATO membership for the Baltic states. We therefore welcomed the Madrid Summit as a beginning, and not an end, to enlargement. The debate on the content and scope of this process is likely to continue in NATO in the years to come. It is still too early to predict when the time will be right for Baltic membership. But Norway was satisfied with the Madrid declaration, because it:

• confirmed the continued "open door policy",
• made specific reference to the membership applications of the Baltic states, and
• provided mechanisms for a strengthened dialogue and cooperation with partner countries.

By participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace activities, the Nordic countries and the countries of the Baltic Sea Region are for the first time partners in security in the traditional sense. Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states are all active participants in the PfP. Poland has been invited to become a NATO member. A special relationship is being developed between NATO and Russia. This network of ties contributes to confidence building and - ultimately - to the security of the entire Nordic - Baltic region. The Baltic states have from the beginning actively participated in PfP activities. Several large-scale exercises have been held on Baltic soil ”in the spirit of the PfP”. I would like to encourage our Baltic partners to continue to involve themselves closely in planning and implementing exercises and operations, and to participate in non-Article 5 operations.

NATO's cooperation with partner countries in the Baltic Sea region plays a vital integrating role. It prepares partner countries for membership, and forges close ties with countries which are not seeking membership. At the same time it contributes to building new security structures in these countries. This adds to our collective capacity for crisis management and peace-keeping tasks. We have already seen tangible results of this process in Bosnia, with the NORDPOL Brigade, comprising the Nordic countries, the Baltic states and Poland. Baltic readiness to contribute to European security has been clearly demonstrated in IFOR and SFOR. This is an impressive achievement for countries which have had to rebuild their defence structures from scratch. The fate of SFOR in Bosnia is likely to be a measure of the ability of the "new" NATO to shape Europe's future security. The way NATO and partner countries, including Russia, have joined forces in Bosnia has in fact changed the way we think about security relationships.

The greatest Baltic contribution to European crisis management probably lies in the creation of the peacekeeping force BALTBAT. This battalion has been established in cooperation with the Nordic countries and others, including the United Kingdom and the United States. Equipment, training and English language courses have been provided. Norwegian officers have become closely acquainted with life in the barracks of Paldiski, Adazi and Rukla. BALTBAT is already operational but will mark its "graduation" during the Baltic Trial exercise to be held in Estonia next month. Considerable military capability and peacekeeping experience has been gained along the way, as Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian companies have been deployed in Bosnia and Lebanon along with Nordic peacekeeping units. The success of the multinational project has led to similar initiatives in other areas. A naval squadron (BALTRON) and an air-surveillance network (BALTNET) are currently being organised. Norway is actively participating in these projects.

The rapidly expanding range of assistance to the Baltic states has underlined the need to avoid overlapping. The Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) was established by 13 countries this year to coordinate various activities. Norway has been chairing the process during the initial phase. At the next meeting in December, Baltic representatives will put forward their plans for national defence development and force structures. This will be an important input to the process of tailoring donor assistance. Baltic priorities must reflect Baltic needs. Norway is prepared, as are other partners, to assist the Baltic states in formulating these priorities. Our common objective is to develop national defence capabilities which will ensure national integrity and enable the Baltic states to participate in broader European defence efforts.

The BALTSEA forum provides a practical example of an ad-hoc group set-up to discuss issues of particular interest to the Baltic region. We see the same potential on the political side of NATO's partnership process. Groups on regional security matters are currently being established within the framework of NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Countries from the Caucasus and the Black Sea regions have taken initiatives to establish regional groups focusing on their particular security interests. It is my belief that the broader issue of security and stability in the Baltic Sea Region should be addressed in a similar way. This could be an efficient and effective way of bringing substance to the political dialogue between partner countries and NATO. We must move from abstract thinking to real cooperation. This does not entail any kind of regionalization of security responsibility. None of the partners will be consigned to a regional sidetrack. Nor will any interested country be excluded.

Another aspect of NATO's policies, which supplements the processes of enlargement and of building close relations with partner countries, is development of the relationship with Russia. Security in the Baltic Sea Region and Europe as a whole cannot be built without Russian participation. The new relationship is being greeted with high expectations, and rightly so. Our goal must be to make Russia a true partner. The NATO - Russia Ministerial in New York in September was an important stepping stone in this direction. A detailed work plan has been approved. I believe that extensive cooperation between Russia and NATO and partner countries should be possible in important areas such as nuclear and environmental security, disaster relief and crisis management with a UN or an OSCE mandate. We hope that the SFOR operation will provide a model for peacekeeping efforts in the future. The confidence-building results of such cooperation between former adversaries are greater than any number of summit meetings or agreements.

Integration has been the key word underpinning all Norwegian efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, towards Russia. We cannot allow Russia either to be isolated or to isolate itself from the rest of Europe. As the only NATO country bordering on Russia, Norway has attached particular importance to promoting confidence-building measures in the North. We have sought to actively engage northwestern Russia in regional cooperation within the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. This form of regional cooperation has in no small measure contributed to increasing human contacts at grass-roots level, as well as to restoring historical trade and cultural links in the region. We hope this will have a stabilizing effect in a region of such strategic and political importance during the Cold War. Regional cooperation also contributes directly to the economic growth needed to sustain reforms, and it may in a small way help to demonstrate to political leaders in Russia how local democracy functions. During our presidency of the Barents Council next year we will aim at expanding and enhancing the Barents cooperation, including the political aspects.

However, regional cooperation has proved to be a very effective, supplementary instrument. It helps to meet immediate needs for economic and social reform, generates networks and confidence, and reinforces activities in larger organizations. The Council of the Baltic Sea States has become an additional hub in a reborn region. The Baltic Sea area has taken major strides forward in a short span of time. It has moved from division and lack of development to resume its role as a Northern European economic meeting place of primary importance.

You will be familiar with the various aspects of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (the CBSS), the Action Programme's focus on economic development, democratic institutions and the environment, a "bottom-up" approach, emphasising direct contacts, the combination of a strong focus on practical measures of immediate value to the peoples of the region, and at the same time the longer-term generation of new networks, confidence and stability. The Programme is based on the direct participation of the Baltic peoples, the Nordic peoples, the other Baltic Sea states, Germany, Poland and Russia, and at the same time an openness towards other states and international institutions.

The next summit of Heads of State and Governments in the Baltic Sea Region will take place in Riga in January. Major steps were taken in Visby last year and we look forward to working closely with Latvia and Denmark, who will co-chair the next summit, in giving further impetus to the regional cooperation.

The grass-roots approach to regional cooperation adopted in the Barents area has also been a cornerstone of our bilateral cooperation programme with the Baltic states. This programme has been going on since 1992 and is about to be further expanded. We consider the creation of people-to-people contacts and transfer of know-how to be an important foundation of democracy building. Norway has focused on project related to education, health, infrastructure, the environment, industrial cooperation and energy, among others. Cooperation activities have gone hand-in-hand with, and stimulated, increased trade and investments. Media reports on successful Norwegian business activities in the Baltic states - most recently in Latvia - have contributed enormously to fostering a positive image of, and interest in, this part of Europe.

The regional experience gained from the Barents and Baltic Sea cooperation may provide new input to Norwegian OSCE policy. Although these fora have no explicit security functions, they are developing the foundations of security in their regions. At the meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in December, Norway can expect to be awarded the chairmanship of the OSCE in 1999. This means that we will enter the leadership troika along with Denmark and Poland as early as January next year. More than any other international organisation, the OSCE has come to embody the expanded security concept applicable to the new Europe. It is the primary custodian of fundamental human rights and the rule of law for 55 member states. I regard the chairmanship as a great challenge for Norway and a testimony to our willingness to assume our share of the responsibility for European stability and security. The chairmanship coincides in time with important developments taking place in the EU and NATO. For a NATO country that has chosen to remain outside the EU, it is essential to be able to participate as closely as possible in these processes. The OSCE chairmanship provides a unique opportunity to contribute to preventing and resolving conflicts within the OSCE area.

The OSCE has played and continues to play an important role in the Baltic Sea area as well. It is the only security organisation where Russia participates on an equal footing with the United States and the EU. Eleven countries are currently host to OSCE missions, including Estonia and Latvia. The roles of these missions differ, but common to all of them is that they cooperate with the host countries on implementing OSCE standards. The presence of these missions has in fact lent legitimacy to the democracy-building process in Latvia and Estonia and facilitated Baltic integration with other European structures.

We are pleased to note that the bilateral relations between the Baltic states and Russia seem to be developing along a constructive path. The tensions inherent in border negotiations and citizenship issues appear to have been largely defused. However, we are still awaiting the conclusion of border agreements between Russia, and Latvia and Estonia. The OSCE missions remain neutral third parties and mediators in the event that tensions should resurface. This should be in the interest of the Baltic states themselves. It provides a confidence-building measure for the entire Baltic Sea Region.

Finally, I would like to return briefly to the new security architecture and building blocks I mentioned by way of introduction. Next week's session of the Nordic Council in Helsinki will mark the first time one of our ministers of defence, my Norwegian colleague, addresses the Council on security policy issues. Tomorrow the three Baltic ministers of foreign affairs will meet in Stockholm to discuss Sweden's approach to the Baltic Sea Region. The dynamic of the changes in Europe, and indeed in our part of Europe, is constantly posing new challenges for security policy, trade and cultural links. The Norwegian government intends to play an active role in meeting all of these challenges, in close contact with Latvia, the other two Baltic states and our Nordic neighbours. Seminars such as this serve as an inspiration for us in this work, in particular when it comes to taking an overall view of the many processes, initiatives and decisions.

Thank you

(1) Klarert med EØS-seksj. (innhold) og SØE-programmet (finansiering)