Speech by the Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebæk

How to ensure further nuclear disarmament

Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons 24 October 1998

Translation from the Norwegian

Today we are observing United Nations Day. Ever since the first resolution was passed in January 1946, the UN has been encouraging the member states to adopt measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now, more than 50 years later, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation continue to pose major problems that can only be solved by a concerted effort.

Last summer, the Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons took the initiative for a survey on Norwegian views on nuclear weapons and disarmament. Their findings revealed that the Norwegian public are overwhelmingly opposed to such weapons. According to the figures that have been published, as many as 92 per cent of those interviewed were against nuclear weapons. I am extremely pleased to note that this issue still arouses so much interest and engages so many people.

The Government's goal of eliminating nuclear weapons remains unchanged. In our view the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the nuclear weapon states. However, it is the responsibility of all countries to help to further the process. We take this responsibility seriously, as demonstrated by our efforts through three major channels - through bilateral cooperation programmes, in multilateral fora and in an alliance context. I will revert to this later.

There is no reason why the international community should embark on the new millennium with the notion that nuclear weapons are here to stay. By the same token, we must recognize that the path to our goal is made up of small steps. We must eliminate the reasons why countries possess, or procure, nuclear weapons.

We must also work to ensure comprehensive verification and control regimes as regards both disarmament and non-proliferation, but we will not make any further progress unless the overall political conditions are in place.

In my view, Norway's best strategy is to choose political processes where we can make a realistic, concrete and constructive contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. We will get further with a pragmatic strategy in areas where we can accomplish something than with rhetoric, even though the latter is sometimes called for.

Recently we have witnessed serious setbacks and welcome breakthroughs in these efforts. Today's meeting provides a good opportunity for me to sum up the situation.

Firstly, there has been a substantial reduction in real terms in the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe in recent years. All nuclear medium-range missiles have been withdrawn and eliminated. Russia and the USA issued unilateral declarations in 1991-92 in which they undertook to make extensive reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. Through the START I and START II agreements, the arsenals of US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced from more than 10 000 each in 1990 to 3 500 in 2007. The goal in future negotiations on a START III agreement is to reduce the arsenals of strategic weapons by an additional third.

Norway's hope is that binding agreements on new reductions will be made, eventually with the participation of all the nuclear weapon states.

It should also be noted that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are nuclear weapon-free states today. France and the UK have reduced their arsenals substantially. In the recent Strategic Defence Review, the British Government has also made reductions in the British nuclear programme and provided information on its stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes.

I would now like to turn to the three major channels in Norwegian nuclear weapons policy. I will begin with our neighbouring areas.

On 26 May this year we signed a framework agreement on cooperation with Russia on nuclear safety. This means that the Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Issues has now moved into a far more pragmatic phase. The agreement is an important sign of progress in Norwegian-Russian cooperation on nuclear safety, among other things because it establishes Russia's own responsibility in the event of a nuclear accident. The Russians have previously considered this to be the responsibility of their cooperation partners. The Norwegian-Russian agreement paves the way for similar agreements with other countries, a development that is extremely important if broad-based international cooperation on nuclear safety on the Kola Peninsula is to be achieved.

Since 1992 Norway has financed a number of safety measures at the Kola nuclear power plant. The cooperation project is now entering a new phase which, in addition to safety measures, includes plans for decommissioning the facility and assisting the Russian radiation protection authority.

Media reports this week may indicate that the framework agreement is not working because a Finnish firm is of the view that it does not provide sufficient coverage as regards nuclear liability for their deliveries.

The firm has questioned whether Russia can fulfil its economic obligations in connection with claims for damages in the event of a nuclear accident. Nonetheless, the firm is prepared to continue negotiations on deliveries to Russia.

The purpose of the framework agreement is to remedy shortcomings in Russian legislation. It was drawn up in cooperation with European firms that supply equipment to the nuclear industry. They are of the opinion that it is adequate.

We are also of the opinion that the agreement provides the suppliers with as good a guarantee against claims for damages as is possible to achieve. Thus, the crux of this issue is whether one party is able to fulfil its obligations under the agreement, not the agreement itself.

Now that the Cold War is over, Russia will be getting rid of a large number of nuclear powered submarines. In order to implement a decommissioning programme on this scale, it is essential that there is an infrastructure to deal with the resulting spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. One hundred and twenty-five obsolete nuclear submarines are scheduled to be dismantled by 2010. Together with Russia and the USA, Norway is financing the modernization and extension of a treatment facility in Murmansk for liquid radioactive waste produced by the dismantling process. Work on the facility has been somewhat delayed, but it is expected to be completed in the course of 1999.

Norway considers it important that the dismantling process is conducted in accordance with environmentally sound principles and that satisfactory long-term solutions are found for managing radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

Norway has an obligation to support the nuclear weapon states' disarmament measures. We have been particularly concerned about the effect of the implementation of disarmament agreements on our neighbouring areas. A safe, environmentally sound means of dealing with the process of disposing of nuclear material will be very expensive and quite complicated from a technological point of view. These challenges must be met in a satisfactory manner. Otherwise, the momentum of the disarmament efforts could fail. It is a fact that Russia cannot deal with this on its own at the stage it has reached in the restructuring process. Norway has been at the forefront of international efforts to promote cooperation with Russia on these issues, and we will continue to be. Our goal is to secure international participation and encourage openness on Russia's part.

We have consistently maintained that European security can only be built with the active participation of Russia. A dialogue on nuclear issues has been established within the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Norway is concerned that this dialogue should be open and enhance confidence. We also hope that it will lead to Russia's intensifying its efforts in terms of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the progress made in Russia so far cannot be compared to that made in NATO. This applies to reductions both in the number of nuclear weapons and in the emphasis placed on these weapons. We strongly deplore this state of affairs.

Developments in Russia will be a very important factor in further nuclear disarmament efforts. Unless the political and economic conditions are right, the momentum of future disarmament efforts could be jeopardized. The START II agreement has not yet been ratified by the Duma, and at this point it is uncertain when it will be. The extremely difficult situation in Russia underscores the need for broad political, economic and security policy contacts with Moscow. A democratic Russia will be in a position to conclude and implement agreements on additional reductions in its arsenals of nuclear weapons, and to recognize that such reductions will be to their advantage.

The most recent summit meeting between the USA and Russia, which took place in September, yielded two concrete results which I would like to mention here. Firstly, the agreement reached between the two countries on early warning of missile launches. The purpose of such an agreement is to prevent lack of information or misunderstandings from resulting in a serious situation. The two countries have indicated that they might consider asking other countries to participate in such cooperation on a voluntary basis. The Andøya incident in January 1995 is an example of the importance of this. In that particular case, the warning that a research missile would be launched from Andøya Rocket Range was at first misunderstood. The incident also demonstrated that non-threatening civilian activity has the potential to trigger reactions that can be dangerous in a situation where the level of readiness is high.

The second important result of the US-Russian summit is that agreement was reached on the principles for the management and reduction of stockpiled military plutonium under the two countries' respective military security programmes. Both the USA and Russia are to reduce their arsenals by 50 tons in a step-by-step process within a specified time-frame. At the same time they undertake to develop methods for enhanced transparency, such as standards for accounting for the management of plutonium and international verification measures.

Both the USA and Russia have indicated that other countries possessing similar stockpiles will eventually be able to accede to the agreement. This is a very welcome initiative. As I have mentioned, the UK has made public its total stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Both of these measures are in keeping with the Norwegian call for greater transparency in relation to stocks of fissile material, and illustrate what can be achieved by means of unilateral or bilateral arrangements.

State Secretary Åslaug Haga of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the USA this week, where she discussed our interest in participating in a system of early warning of missile launches. She also conveyed how pleased we are at the plans the USA and Russia now have for reducing their stocks of plutonium and enhancing transparency in relation to these stocks. She also explained how Norway intends to follow up its proposal concerning greater transparency as regards stocks of fissile material.

This brings me to the second major channel for Norwegian nuclear weapon policy, i.e. multilateral fora, primarily the UN and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

India and Pakistan have violated the international norm established when the Test Ban Treaty was adopted in 1996. The strong international reactions show that a large part of the world community condemns such actions. Norway has strongly deplored India's and Pakistan's conduct.

An arms race can only increase the tension in the region and jeopardize the peace. We have urged both countries to accede to the Test Ban Treaty and the Non-proliferation Treaty as soon as possible and unconditionally. The Indian and Pakistani tests have unquestionably put a strain on the non-proliferation regime.

At the same time, these tests confirm the logic and necessity of the non-proliferation regime. Only a generation ago, it was predicted that the world would eventually have between 20 and 30 nuclear-weapon states. Today we still have only a handful of such states. The Non-proliferation Treaty has been more important than any other measure in preventing such a development.

In addition to bringing pressure to bear on India and Pakistan, both bilaterally and internationally, Norway has contributed to a seminar under the auspices of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The seminar, which took place in September, focused on the consequences of the nuclear tests in South Asia both for the non-proliferation regime and for the disarmament efforts in general. The seminar was attended by government representatives, academics and representatives of NGOs from a number of countries. Norway participated actively in the seminar, which provided valuable ideas and impetus for our further efforts.

I am pleased to note the signals from India and Pakistan concerning the possibility of their acceding to the Test Ban Treaty. We will work to ensure that their accession becomes a reality as soon as possible. We will underscore the importance of convincing India and Pakistan that it is in their own interests to discontinue their nuclear weapons programmes and act in accordance with the norms established by the current disarmament regime. This also means acceding to the Non-proliferation Treaty.

One of the main political challenges facing Norway is to take advantage of the widespread international condemnation of the recent tests to create greater momentum in the multilateral dialogue on disarmament and arms control. This challenge can best be met by considering what sort of concrete contribution we can make. In order to achieve results, it is essential that we have realistic proposals and initiatives that are supported by the countries that hold the key to further progress. I will return to this later in my lecture.

The main responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the nuclear powers. Nonetheless, the international community has a legitimate interest in information on the progress of bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons and on the nuclear weapon states' policy in this area. As you know, Norway has not endorsed the Malaysia resolution within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. In our view, this is an unrealistic approach that could undermine the nuclear weapon states' direct responsibility for continuing efforts to eliminate these weapons.

However, we think there is a need for a mechanism attached to the Conference on Disarmament whereby the nuclear weapon states report on bilateral contacts, negotiation results and current policy in the area. This could turn the Conference into a forum for exchanging information and views and provide us with a framework for a dialogue on these important issues. We have advocated such a mechanism in the UN.

The Government will support all political initiatives that are aimed at reducing the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and that are likely to attract support. The initiative that has come from Sweden, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia and South Africa (the so-called "New Agenda Coalition"), will be subject to the same considerations.

Norway supports the main goal in the draft resolution on a nuclear weapon-free world. We also consider it appropriate that the draft resolution expresses general dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the NPT process. We agree that it is important to facilitate a more constructive and effective means of meeting the immediate need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and achieving the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, I must add that the draft resolution in its present form contains a number of elements that are unrealistic in terms of receiving sufficient support. We will not achieve progress by calling into question the nuclear weapon states' willingness to disarm by giving a biased account or advocating a series of proposals that we know are unacceptable to the most important countries in the process.

I am afraid this may serve to consolidate opposition rather than to foster a multilateral dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The political challenge facing us all is to facilitate a more constructive dialogue in this field. The current draft resolution must therefore be extensively amended if it is to create a basis for further dialogue.

The 1996 report of the Canberra Commission contains a number of proposals and recommendations with regard to nuclear disarmament. I consider this report to be an important contribution to the debate on our future course. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided funding for a Norwegian translation of a summary of the report, to which I was happy to write a preface. This does not mean that we endorse all the commission's conclusions, but we do support the step-by-step approach to the problems that is outlined in the report.

One of the proposals is to de-alert nuclear forces in order to improve security in connection with the weapons that will in spite of everything continue to exist in the foreseeable future. This is an interesting proposal that should be considered more closely. I should mention here that independently of this report, NATO has substantially lowered its level of readiness and thus gone some way towards complying with this proposal.

Other recommendations in the Canberra Commission's Report that we feel merit closer consideration are the removal of warheads from delivery vehicles, ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons and ending subcritical testing of nuclear weapon-related equipment.

I believe our views on subcritical testing are known. Such tests are not in conflict with the Test Ban Treaty but they are the focus of growing international attention and could undermine international efforts to promote nuclear arms control and disarmament. We cannot exclude the possibility that such tests may reduce the pressure to ensure increased support for and rapid ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. We have therefore made it clear to both the USA and Russia that we would like to see an end to such testing.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was adopted and opened for signature at the UN General Assembly in 1996. The treaty was the result of decades of unremitting efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. It lays down a prohibition on all types of nuclear testing and represents a milestone in the work to stop the nuclear arms race. Currently an organization is being established to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the treaty.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have not diminished the importance of the Test Ban Treaty. On the contrary, it is essential that the efforts to build up a verification mechanism proceed according to plan and that they lay the foundation for effective monitoring and control in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. This will take place irrespective of the uncertainty surrounding the date on which the treaty will actually enter into force.

The ministry is currently working on a proposition to the Storting on consent to the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, which will be submitted during the Storting's current session. Norway played an active role in the negotiations and will play a significant role in the monitoring system that is being established to ensure the effective implementation of the treaty. We will continually register any events that might indicate violations of the provisions. Six monitoring stations, some of which will be among the largest and most advanced in the world, will be located on Norwegian territory and operated by the Norwegian Seismic Array, or NORSAR, at Kjeller. The mechanisms and expertise we already have in Norway in this field most recently showed their usefulness in connection with the Indian and Pakistani tests.

The Non-proliferation Treaty will continue to play a key role in nuclear disarmament. In 1995 the treaty was extended indefinitely. The need to strengthen cooperation on implementing the treaty during the period between the prescribed review conferences was an important part of this decision. In connection with the new review process, the Government wishes to establish closer contact with other countries to discuss further non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. We have taken concrete steps in this direction and I hope to be able to report on these efforts at a later date.

A number of important goals were set out in the document that was adopted at the Review Conference in 1995. In accordance with these the next step should be to evaluate measures that will oblige the nuclear weapon states to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against states that do not themselves possess such weapons and that have acceded to the Non-proliferation Treaty. Negative security assurances, i.e. assurances to non-nuclear weapon states on non-use and non-threat, could take the form of a legally binding instrument.

The review process gives us an opportunity to make the nuclear weapon states responsible for the promises they made at the Review Conference in 1995 to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. If this promise is to be credible, it must be followed up. The qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons arsenals must stop, and there must be greater transparency in relation to the weapons arsenals and stocks of fissile material. Above all, reductions in weapons must continue.

As I mentioned earlier, we will, in cooperation with like-minded countries, seek methods for exchanging information and views on nuclear disarmament. We will do this within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

The decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament in August was an important and welcome step in the right direction. It was decided to start negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Such negotiations were also a central element in the decision taken at the most recent review conference for the Non-proliferation Treaty in 1995, and Norway has long advocated that the negotiations should start soon. Only now, however, has agreement been possible among the members of the Conference on Disarmament, which include India and Pakistan.

We must bear in mind that the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament depends on its ability to produce concrete results. We therefore hope that the negotiations on a production ban will start early next year and will result in an agreement that will put a stop to the further stockpiling of fissile material. This in turn may result in a more comprehensive arrangement for control of such material. An agreement would not only be important in a non-proliferation context, it would also represent considerable progress in the efforts to reduce and completely eliminate nuclear weapons. Norway attaches great importance to participating actively in this work in the Conference on Disarmament.

In this connection we consider greater transparency on existing stocks of fissile material to be important. Ideally the efforts to enhance transparency should be carried out parallel to the negotiations on an agreement banning the production of new material. One of the first measures for greater transparency could be that the nuclear weapon states voluntarily provide information on their stocks. The next step could be to open their arsenals for inspection in order to make sure that stored fissile material is not being used for weapons. Balanced reductions in existing stocks under international control could be a third step.

The Conference on Disarmament has decided to start negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material. We therefore feel that the time has come for further developing our proposal on transparency. At the same time we will examine in more detail other aspects of non-proliferation and the management of such fissile material. Earlier this month we therefore invited several Norwegian research institutions together with the relevant ministries and other agencies to take part in consultations with a view to having a closer dialogue with the experts on this issue. The purpose was to involve technical expertise in this important and complex field and to lay a foundation for Norway to play an active role when the negotiations start.

If we are to go further with our transparency proposal, it is essential that we have done our homework and are able to present well-founded views and ideas. In our view, the mandate for the negotiations should be confined to the production of fissile material, but the issue of management of previous production and existing stocks should also be considered. The latter issue could be dealt with in a separate, voluntary process, parallel to the negotiations. The purpose of a parallel track would be to ensure openness and foster confidence between the various players.

The technology related to the military use of fissile material is in many ways "old" technology and is unfortunately readily available. In our modern information society international export control regimes cannot entirely prevent this. Control of the material itself is therefore a key factor in preventing proliferation.

Today we lack an international organizational structure. Our control routines are insufficient, and individuals can easily act on their own. This means paradoxically that the head of a missile may be the least dangerous place to store plutonium.

In the wake of the Cold War there have been great changes in the nuclear strategy and policy of NATO, the third of our main channels. It is no exaggeration to say that NATO's nuclear forces have been drastically reduced in recent years. The weapon systems that lent themselves to early use no longer exist. The level of readiness as regards the remaining weapons has been considerably reduced. These factors are reflected in NATO's planning. Today the possibility that NATO would be forced to consider the use of nuclear weapons seems extremely remote.

In their declaration of December 1996, the NATO countries made it clear that the Alliance has no intention of, plan for or reason for deploying nuclear weapons in the new member countries. Nor does the organization envisage any need for this in the future.

The summit in Madrid in July last year resolved to review and update NATO's strategic concept. The work is scheduled to be completed by the NATO summit in April 1999. The summit in Washington will confirm that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are to be the new members of the Atlantic Alliance, and it will also be celebrating the Alliance's 50th anniversary.

The strategic concept is an official document with a broad scope that sets out the overriding goals of NATO cooperation; in many ways it can be regarded as NATO's declaration of principles. In our opinion it will be important that the revised concept expresses the main tasks of the Alliance in the new Europe, and the possibilities provided by the new situation to achieve security together. The concept should confirm NATO's core functions of collective defence and transatlantic cooperation.

The Government also attaches importance to the fact that the sections of the strategic concept concerning nuclear weapons are also subject to revision. The way in which nuclear weapons are dealt with in the revised concept should confirm and further develop the above-mentioned positive trend with regard to the Alliance's nuclear policy. Norway will take an active part in these discussions.

Let me also say a few words about first use. I know that many of you are concerned about this. The function of nuclear weapons is primarily political. They are intended to preserve peace and prevent attack. They are intended to create uncertainty on the part of an attacker about NATO's response to any attack by weapons of mass destruction. The Alliance will therefore have to continue to reserve the right to respond with all available means.

In 1996 the International Court of Justice in The Hague discussed the relationship between nuclear weapons and international law. In its advisory opinion the court stated that there is no basis in international law for determining the question of the legitimacy of using nuclear weapons in situations of self defence in which the very survival of a state is in question. At the same time the court established that there is a binding obligation under international law to conclude negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The problem was thus referred to political fora.

The Government's efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation are based on an expanded security concept. Nuclear weapons policy cannot be seen in isolation from other international issues. Measures for establishing international security and cooperation arrangements over a broad spectrum must go hand in hand with measures in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

The international community must be willing to deal with the underlying political, social and economic problems in areas of conflict. An important condition for non-proliferation is the recognition that nuclear weapons do not serve either a state's security policy interests or its national ambitions. International cooperation and efforts to resolve local and regional conflicts are a major contribution to non-proliferation. Norwegian foreign policy emphasizes that conflict prevention and peacekeeping through confidence-building measures can help to eliminate uncertainty and mistrust.

As you have seen, I have chosen today to emphasize the areas where the Government feels that Norway can make a concrete contribution to international efforts to further disarmament and non-proliferation. There are many aspects of the nuclear weapons issue that I have not touched on.

Our aim is to have a pragmatic and goal-oriented approach. The French have a saying: "Doucement, doucement, on est pressé" - "Slowly, slowly, we are in a hurry". The reason for this approach is that this is our way of taking our responsibility seriously. On a day like today I think it is a good way of paying tribute to the United Nations.