State Secretary Mrs. Åslaug Haga

Norway and Russia - a northern connection

Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington, 19 October 1998

(Introduction)

Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased to have the opportunity of addressing this distinguished audience on Norway-Russia relations and touch upon how the US links into these relations. Allow me to start by relating a personal experience. Thirteen years ago, in 1985, I visited the border between Norway and Russia for the first time. Standing in the tranquil northern countryside of one of Europe’s smallest states in terms of power and population, I looked across the frontier into one of the two world superpowers.

I knew very little about life and people on the other side, what I did know, however, was that not far from me across the border was the main harbour of the Russian Northern Fleet, virtually bursting with nuclear arms and with the world’s greatest concentration of naval power and nuclear submarines. I knew there was a multitude of defence factories and of civilian and military nuclear reactors in the region. Less than two hundred miles away was Murmansk, a bustling, mainly military city the size of the Norwegian capital Oslo.

This scenic border in the High North- -because it is beautiful up there- seemed peaceful and stable. But the border was a part of the Iron Curtain just as impenetrable as the Berlin wall. Its Cold War tranquillity had a frigid quality about it.

I have been back to that frontier recently, and the icy air of superpower confrontation has now given way to the human warmth of cross-cultural interchange. Last year some 90 000 people crossed the Norwegian-Russian border. The 1990s have witnessed a development of people-to-people contacts in the region unmatched since the beginning of the century. People are crossing the border to get to know their neighbours at first hand, and many are learning the other country's language and forming new friendships which will remove barriers of misunderstanding and prejudice. There is a lively exchange of official and cultural delegations as well as a fairly dynamic trade relations and economic co-operation.

During the Cold War, Norway had a particular responsibility for maintaining stability and détente in Northern Europe. Our policy towards our adjacent areas today is even more ambitious. In a concerted effort together with our neighbours and partners on both sides of the Atlantic, we are applying the instruments available to us to achieve a common goal: a Europe in peaceful co-operation from the Atlantic to the Urals. Our objective is a larger community of nations patterned on the last fifty years of co-operation west of the former Iron Curtain. It is within this context that Norway is seeking to play a particularly active role in relation to its neighbouring areas, upon which we are dependent, and which in turn are dependent on us.

We are looking forward to the day when it will be just as natural to act in co-operation with the whole of Northern Europe, with Russia, with the Baltic countries and Poland, as we do today with the Nordic countries and the European Union, and when everyone in our part of the world can live and thrive in viable democracies and sustainable economies. Democratic processes in a well-developed civil society are the best guarantee of stability, freedom and economic growth. Such conditions must be firmly established throughout our part of the world.

Relations with Russia are at the core of Norwegian foreign policy. Our co-operation with Russia has flourished and gained new and broader substance in the last ten years. Norway’s Russia policy forms part of a broad-based international effort to assist Russia in its positive path of development and help her to consolidate the progress she has already made. My Government’s overall goal for its Russia policy is to actively encourage Moscow to become a partner in European and global co-operation. This is what we are pursuing in the Barents and Baltic co-operation arrangements, in NATO, in the OSCE , the council of Europe as well as in our bilateral relations with Russia. The fact that the current crisis in Russia seems to complicate her participation in regional co-operation does not mean that we and others can give up on its efforts. On the contrary.

I want to focus in particular today on the alarming state of nuclear safety in north-western Russia. The problems involved have potentially fatal consequences for the northern hemisphere, including North America.

We all have a vivid memory of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. There are three similarly hazardous nuclear reactors in northern Europe, one on the Kola Peninsula, one near St Petersburg and one in Lithuania. As Chernobyl so frighteningly demonstrated, radioactive fallout from nuclear accidents travels swiftly across enormous distances and has long-term effects far from its place of origin. In addition there is nuclear waste unsafely stored that could have disastrous impact if anything were to go wrong. These are unhappy heritage from the cold war era which we all have a responsibility in supporting Russia to deal with.

Accidents in northwestern Russia could lead to very serious contamination of water, land and air even in the United States. My main message to you today is therefore: Norway, the United States and other western partners must work together to support Russia clean up its nuclear wasteland in the north.

Nuclear safety is not the only challenge we are facing in north-western Russia today. For Russians up there, neighbouring Norway represents prosperity just around the corner. Many northern Norwegians, on the other hand, feel they have chaos just around the corner. The region has more than its fair share of the other problems typical of present-day Russia, such as corruption, organised crime, official inertia and a breakdown of political, economic and social networks. Some of this social confusion is already spilling into Norway and creating new tensions. The busloads of Russians on tourist visas pouring across the border into the local Norwegian communities include numerous Russian women who prostitute themselves for lack of other income, and smugglers of Russian vodka and cigarettes, and I am afraid sometimes even people, guns and drugs.

The fact that Norway is today providing humanitarian assistance to help her big neighbour in north-western Russia get through the winter is somewhat telling. This is happening in a region which used to have such attractive living conditions that Russians competed to settle there. Now the region is faced with a depopulation problem.

What is really happening in Russia, and what can be done? The crisis there is certainly a part of the wider context of global economic turmoil, turbulent financial markets, national governments losing their capacity to lead, and the anonymous forces of globalization. But Russia itself has been in an almost permanent state of crisis of its own making for years.

The current breakdown in the Russian financial market, the collapse of business confidence, the impending default of about USD 100 billion of foreign debt, the devaluation and inflation of the rouble, the protests on the streets on October 7th, the fears about food and fuel for the winter, the grim acceptance of misrule, the agitated political situation in Moscow all mean that Russia is today in one of its worst social crisis since the breakdown of Communist rule.

This is both because living conditions for ordinary Russians will continue to worsen and because the structural weaknesses of Russian society are so strikingly revealed. I am afraid that Russia is still sinking deeper into crisis. The way out will be long and arduous, and permanent improvement will depend on the Russians themselves. What we can do, is to support their own efforts.

I do not want to be too pessimistic. Experience has shown that Russian society is very resistant to crises. An earthquake in Russian politics is not imminent. However, I would not be surprised if we were to see some of the following trends in the near future:

1. Russians could become more concerned with their internal problems. Isolationist and projectionist tendencies could develop in parallel with a greater Russian sensitivity towards the outside world.
2. Russia could start pursuing her great power interests more ruthlessly. Given the current weakness of the Russian state, this would probably constitute less of a threat to the West than to parts of the former Soviet Union such as the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
3. Russia could turn into a less predictable international actor and an even more difficult international partner. Russian politicians could start pursuing their own selfish interests more ruthlessly, without regard for overall national interests. Regional authorities could continue strengthening their hand at the expense of Moscow.

However, one important and encouraging observation which can be made about the political crisis in Russia is that the constitutional rules of the game have so far been respected. This is a considerable achievement for the young and frail Russian democracy. The crisis has also shown that the political power is shifting de facto from the President to the Government and the Duma. President Yeltsin has been weakened by deteriorating health and political isolation, and his popular support is extremely low. The ultimate goal of his opponents, first and foremost the Communist Party and its allies, is undoubtedly to remove Yeltsin from the Kremlin. Their strategy is to make use of impeachment procedures and to increase political pressure through demonstrations and protest actions.

It is, however, doubtful whether these methods will succeed. In my view, Yeltsin is not likely to resign voluntarily. He still has all his constitutional powers intact, but he lacks his previous energy and willingness to confront political opponents, as the compromise with the Duma over the appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov as new prime minister has shown. But Yeltsin's health problems, combined with his weak political position, may cause him to resign at some point before the next presidential election in June 2000.

A weak president and an indecisive government may endanger the ties between Moscow and the Russian regions. One of Prime Minister Primakov's main points in his inauguration speech in the Duma last month was a warning against the prospects of a disintegration of the Russian Federation. Due to the breakdown of the state finances, Moscow is increasingly unable to meet its obligations to the regions. Only about 10 out of the 89 Federal Subjects provide net contributions to the federal budget. The rest depend on subsidies from the centre. When these are not received, the response is more and more frequently to withhold food supplies and the funds from regional taxes. Primakov's inclusion of regional leaders in his government shows his awareness of this problem.

The economic prospects in Russia are bleak. The GDP could drop 5 - 6 per cent this year. Unemployment is rising, and is now for the first time hitting Moscow’s emerging middle class.

There is a risk of outbursts of social unrest such as demonstrations, strikes, illegal actions in the worst hit areas, especially in typical "one-company towns" and mining communities in northern Russian, Siberia and the far east. These are communities which depend on external supplies of foodstuffs and other necessary goods, but which have scarce economic resources and prospects. In this respect, it is not a very optimistic sign, that the Russian authorities have closed some thirty cities for all kind of foreign contact. In our judgement, however, it is not likely that the situation will develop into nation-wide social unrest. Most likely the vast majority of Russians will continue to muddle through. Extreme leftist forces may try to take advantage of the widespread discontent, but are not strong enough to provoke a social explosion.

(Norwegian-Russian relations in history)

The authorities in Oslo and Moscow have at times had widely diverging geopolitical interests and perceptions. Russia’s culture and ideology have differed considerably from Norway’s. In spite of these differences, Norway and Russia have lived at peace with each other for centuries. Overall, Norwegians and Russians have throughout their history had close and mutually beneficial relations, not least in trade, until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The first encounters between Norwegians and Russians happened at a time when written sources were scarce, leaving a lot to the imagination of the historian and the interested layman alike. Norwegian vikings were not only ferocious warriors, they were also traders, adventurers and explorers. Scandinavians sailed their ships to all parts of Europe, including the lands of the Slavs, more than a thousand years ago. One much debated tradition even has it that the first Russian state was founded by men from across the sea to the north.

Flourishing trade and close social contacts developed locally between northern Norway and north-western Russia, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A special language, a mixture of Norwegian and Russian, even evolved as a basis for the interchange.

Diplomatic relations between Norway and the Soviet Union were established in 1924. Trade links were re-established, but never reached their pre-Revolutionary level. But the perception that the familiar neighbour Russia was turning into a distant and frightening Soviet Union could not be halted. Although both Norway and the Soviet Union were part of the anti-Hitler coalition during World War II, and although the Red Army liberated the eastern part of the county of Finnmark in 1944-1945, the mental distance between the two countries grew. In 1949 Norway joined the North Atlantic Alliance, and was henceforth perceived by Moscow as a member of the opposing Western bloc. The Norwegian-Russian border was practically sealed.

(Barents co-operation)

The rise of Gorbachev and the subsequent fall from power of the Soviet Communist Party caused a breakthrough in Norway’s relations with Russia. After an interval of 70 years of mutual suspicion, we could return to pre-1917 normalcy. Russia began to return to Europe, and in the High North one of the main roads led through Norway.

The situation called for a new departure. In Norway, we invented a new vehicle to help foster bilateral trust between Norway and Russia, contribute to Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, and solve the massive problems of its north-western region. In 1993 the Barents co-operation was born. In doing this, we were conscious of serving not only Norwegian and Russian interests, but also Western and, ultimately, US concerns.

The Barents co-operation is an innovation. It has a multilateral backbone called the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which includes Nordic, European, US and Canadian as well as Russian authorities as partners and observers. But just as important is the involvement of subnational regional and local authorities in Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden in the so-called Regional Council. The international component has kept the Barents co-operation from turning into a potentially lopsided Norwegian-Russian bilateral arrangement. The local and regional pillar has made sure that the co-operation would be responsive to people's needs and concerns, and not merely be diplomatic hot air.

The vision for the Barents co-operation is the weaving together of north-western Russia and the northernmost regions of Finland, Sweden and Norway into a region of stability, prosperity and progress. We want the people of the region to be aware and proud of their historical and cultural roots, we want everyone to enjoy the rights and obligations of democracy and equality before the law, as well as a minimum level of social welfare. To achieve this, we aim to remove barriers to trade and investments and we are working to improve local infrastructure. We are promoting contacts in the fields of culture, sport and education. We are carrying out exchange programmes which make it easier for people to meet across the frontier, and expanding co-operation in research and education.

We also aim to strengthen democratic institutions, emphasise the need for local political involvement and stress the importance of an independent press. And not least, we are taking measures to improve health care and environmental standards throughout the region.

The human dimension of the Barents Co-operation, that is the lively interchange between people across the borders of the High North, has clearly been its most successful feature so far. However, I am very hopeful that our other efforts to achieve stability, prosperity and progress will bear fruit in the long term. The fact is that north-western Russia is a rich region, abundant in minerals, diamonds, and forestry and hydropower resources. The waters of the region have rich fish stocks and considerable oil and gas deposits, and the population represents a qualified labour force.

There is a vast potential for trade and investment. Some Norwegian companies have already made some progress in north-western Russia and are taking the long view. Norway’s major oil company Statoil as well as the main telecommunications company, Telenor, are showing the way by increasing their involvement in the region. Since 1992 our exports to Russia have increased fivefold, and imports have doubled.

As I have pointed out, the Barents region is rich in energy resources. Greater efficiency of energy production, the supply system and energy use will be a vital factor in the region’s economic development. Norwegian oil companies are prepared to participate in major oil and gas projects in north-western Russia.

Norway and Russia are the main suppliers of gas to the European market. But even as commercial competitors we have a common interest in ensuring the long-term, stable development of this market. Both Norway and Russia will benefit if gas acquires an even more prominent position in European energy supplies, replacing other, more polluting fossil fuels.

I see considerable scope for a closer dialogue between Norway and Russia on energy issues. Russia’s petroleum reserves are among the largest in the world. The energy sector is thus a crucial part of the Russian economy, and is vital to its transition to a market economy. The collapse of energy supplies is a major reason for the current economic crisis in Russia.

The opening up of Russia towards the West gives Norway a historic opportunity to develop energy ties with its eastern neighbour. Russia is also a potentially important market for the Norwegian petroleum industry. The expertise we have gained on our own continental shelf and from co-operation with neighbouring North Sea countries may be of benefit to the Russian offshore industry. The chief problem today is the inadequate legislative framework for foreign participation in petroleum activities. We therefore make a special point of helping the Russians to develop legislation and expertise for their energy sector.

A main problem is the maddening disarray and bureaucracy on the Russian side. Red tape at customs and border controls has even threatened relief operations. For example, last month the Governor of the Murmansk Region made a formal appeal to his Nordic counterparts for humanitarian aid to institutions such as orphanages, hospitals and homes for the elderly. In Norway the appeal led to immediate action on the part of both the government and voluntary organisations. The response from the Norwegian public, especially in northern Norway, was enthusiastic. However, food and medicine were held up at frontier checkpoints until some of it was in danger of going bad. Fortunately, things were eventually sorted out. I am now confident that we can supply considerable amounts of aid throughout the winter if necessary.

You might wonder why I am talking so much about the Barents co-operation to an American audience. Because it is so important to us that the United States is involved in dealing with the problems of north-western Russia. Fortunately, we have every reason to believe that the US Government will follow up on its commitment as part of the US strategy for the post-Cold-War world. At the last meeting of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Sweden, the US deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, even went so far in demonstrating American enthusiasm that he agreed to ride in a reindeer sledge tucked in reindeer fur.

(Nuclear safety)

In matters of nuclear safety in the Russian north, our time perspective has to be a generation rather than a few years. I have already described how serious the situation is. I would like to give you three specific examples of what we are up against:

1. The main base for storing spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste from the Russian Northern Fleet is Andreyev Bay, located less than 40 miles from the Norwegian border. Fuel is stored under highly unsatisfactory conditions, and the site represents a very real threat to the environment.
2. A small ship called the Lepse, moored in the middle of Murmansk harbour, is being used for temporary storage of highly radioactive spent fuel from the Russian icebreaker fleet. Most of the fuel is damaged and difficult to remove from the ship. The vessel itself is contaminated by radiation, and parts of it must be disposed of as nuclear waste.
3. The huge high-risk Kola and St Petersburg nuclear power plants are being operated far beyond the life-span they were designed for and should already have been closed down. On the Russian side there appears to be little effort to develop plans for future alternative power sources.

In 1995, together with Russia, Norway launched a Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Issues, with its main focus on north-western Russia. We are very pleased that the United States has become actively involved in a number of projects related to this plan. We also appreciate the US commitment to the Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation (AMEC), launched by the US, Russian and Norwegian ministers of defence in 1996. The AMEC has already resulted in specific new measures for the management of nuclear waste from military sources in the High North. It certainly also is important in building bridges between former military opposites.

This trilateral co-operation is unique in the sense that former opponents, Norway and the US on one side and Russia on the other, have agreed to finance in equal parts a programme aimed mainly at the dismantling of Russian submarine carriers of ballistic missiles and protection against radiation at Russian military sites.

The Action Plan for Nuclear Safety Issues and the Barents co-operation have been operating for some years now. This has given Norway considerable experience in dealing with the Russians in a practical, result-oriented co-operation.

Last May this new atmosphere of confidence led to the conclusion of a historic bilateral agreement between our two countries on nuclear safety. This was a milestone, but not because Russia had been opposed to such co-operation earlier. On the contrary, Russia had been eager to attract foreign assistance in the nuclear field. In the Norwegian-Russian agreement, Russia for the first time assumes full responsibility in the event of an accident. Up to now Russia has demanded that foreign partners should take full responsibility in the event of a nuclear accident in connection with international assistance. Therefore, it has not been possible to initiate major co-operation projects. Western companies could simply not afford the risk. Now that Russia has accepted this principle vis-à-vis Norway, the road is open for similar agreements with other countries. This constitutes a very real breakthrough.

We on our side will do our utmost to facilitate broader international co-operation with Russia in nuclear matters, first and foremost with the USA, but also with the European Commission and the other Nordic countries. We are actively involved in a dialogue with all these partners to develop a multilateral agreement which would serve as an umbrella for all nuclear safety co-operation with Russia.

It is imperative that Russia takes the drivers seat in this process, and they are ready to do that. A new multilateral agreement will open up opportunities for an even greater involvement on the part of the United States and other western partners. Norway, with its long and unique experience in working with the Russians in this sensitive region has a special competence to offer in this co-operation. I am pleased to note that the United States continues to express great interest in acting together with Norway in this field.

(NATO and Russia)

Although there is no military threat to Northern Europe today, NATO co-operation continues to be a cornerstone of all our policy. In the current debate about a new European security architecture, my government remains firmly convinced that NATO and the United States' commitment to the alliance are still the core and guarantor of our own and Europe’s security.

The new feature of our security policy approach to Russia is that it is based on the same approach that has made war impossible in Western Europe. We are seeking to create such a strong community of interests that we all have everything to lose and nothing to gain by threatening others.

Russia is, and must be, NATO’s most important partner. A new Euro-Atlantic security architecture cannot be built without active Russian participation. This is why Norway is an active promoter of NATO’s efforts to involve Russia in a new co-operative partnership.

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is beginning to find its form, but the substance of the Council’s work must gradually be extended. Norway is working to this end. Practical co-operation in the military field must be intensified, and an active programme of exercises involving Russia within the context of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) co-operation is an essential confidence-building measure. Norway is seeking to involve the Russian defence establishment in close co-operation, together with our NATO allies and the other Nordic countries. It is important that the forthcoming reciprocal liaison arrangements between the military headquarters should be expanded to include Leningrad military district and the Northern Fleet.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a potentially very useful forum, and we have to give it substance. Obvious tasks include co-operation on peacekeeping operations, crisis management and civilian preparedness.

These co-operative arrangements have helped NATO come a long way towards building a trustful partnership with Russia. But it is evident from Russia’s reluctance to act decisively against the Belgrade regime’s actions in Kosovo that we have not come far enough. The experience we have gained from the Kosovo crisis must lead to renewed efforts at dialogue with Russia on conflict prevention and resolution. The sad conclusion to be drawn from both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is that the potential use of military force is still necessary as a backup to diplomacy in Europe and this again demonstrates the importance of US active involvement in Europe.

Preventive diplomacy is one of the basic tasks of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The OSCE is the only security organization encompassing both the United States and Russia, and has unquestioned moral authority in preventing and resolving conflicts.

When Norway takes over the chairmanship of the OSCE next year, we will make sure that the organization effectively utilises its unique compass from Vladivostok to Vancouver, and from Murmansk to Marseilles, in this endeavour. The OSCE is also a vital instrument for involving Russia in constructive co-operation. The important role the OSCE been assigned in Kosovo will require the organization to engage in the most extensive operation in any conflict area so far. As chairman in 1999 Norway will give the highest priority to this momentous task. Russia’s active involvement will be essential.

According to the declaration from the NATO summit in Madrid last year, NATO enlargement must serve the political and strategic interests of the Alliance and contribute to European security. As you know, the Baltic states are lining up to join NATO, something Russia has so far opposed. The Norwegian Government supports the integration of the Baltic countries into the European Union and other western structures, including NATO. Enlargement continues to be in the interests of the allies and is important for future stability in Europe. All the democratic countries of Europe have a right to decide on their own how best to meet their security needs. I am convinced that the current momentum will lead to an enlargement of NATO beyond the three countries that will be joining next year. This means that we are of the opinion that not only the Baltic states, but also eventually Russia, may join NATO when the conditions are right.

However, we realise that the question of NATO membership for the Baltic countries presents us with important choices. On the Norwegian side, we feel it would be too soon to extend an invitation to new countries to join NATO at the next summit, in Washington in April next year. We need more time to reflect on how and when to proceed.

(Baltic region)

Nowhere have the changes in the European security architecture been greater than in the Baltic Sea region. This region also illustrates better than any other that the security agenda of the 21st century cannot be limited to traditional security policy issues. Security here also depends on environmentally sound economic growth, democratic development, social justice and stability. Our objectives must therefore be pursued and co-ordinated within a broad range of activities and institutional frameworks. There is no simple solution. Our challenge is to make "soft" and "hard" security come together.

Norway feels a strong commitment to the Baltic Sea region even though it is further from our borders than the Barents region. We think of the Baltic Sea and Barents co-operation arrangements as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Both frameworks are important to stability, prosperity and progress in northern Europe. The progress of Baltic and Barents co-operation is a good gauge of the progress of regional co-operation efforts with Russia in general.

Norway is a member of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was established in 1993. We will in fact take over the chairmanship of the Council from Lithuania next summer. Important priority areas for us are environmental protection and efforts to combat organised crime and to ensure a sustainable energy supply around the Baltic Sea. At the Baltic Sea states' summit in Riga in January this year, Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik therefore proposed that energy co-operation in the Baltic should be further developed. A conference on the subject will take place in the Norwegian town of Stavanger later this year.

We wish to help to develop cross-border regional co-operation between Estonia, Latvia, Lithaunia and Russia. In this way, we can help to put co-operation within the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea States into practice in a way that encourages Russia to play a more active role.

(The Northern Dimension)

The government of Finland has recently launched an initiative to give the European Union a so-called Northern Dimension. The intention is to involve the European Union more closely in the co-operation efforts of northern Europe, including Russia. Even though this is a European Union project, it will involve not only the northern European EU members, but also the whole area from Iceland to north-western Russia, as well as the United States and Canada.

Norway very much welcomes this initiative. We hope the Northern Dimension will lead to a significant strengthening of the Barents and Baltic Sea regions and even of Arctic co-operation, and that it will enhance the European Union’s assistance to Russia.

Norway maintains a close dialogue with Finland and other EU authorities on the preparation of the Northern Dimension. On of our ideas is that it should include matters related to the diversification of energy resources. I see considerable scope for a more developed partnership between Western Europe and Russia that will help to meet Russia’s need for long term energy investments and predictable terms of trade. We think it should be possible to identify highly interesting energy-related projects involving Russia, Norway and the European Union that could be included in the Northern Dimension.

(Concluding remarks)

Where is Russia headed? I have no clear answer. What we are observing is a Russia in the midst of an economic and political crisis. The political power in Russia is being redistributed - from the President to the Duma, from Moscow to the regions. The current leaders seem unable to point to a way out of the economic chaos.

1 On the other hand, it is encouraging that the constitution has been respected throughout the crisis. Fortunately, there seems to be no way back to the economic and political dictatorship of the past.

However, to some extent I think we have to accept that Russia is going through a period when her government will prove more internationally assertive and sensitive to real or perceived Russian interests. This requires circumspection on our part. We do not want to kick someone who is already down. When dealing with Russia, it has always been essential to take a long-term view. We must make clear to Russia that our overall objective is to promote stable development and increased security for all. We must convince her to seek joint solutions to joint problems.

From the Norwegian point of view, support from the United States and the European Union for our co-operation with Russia will be even more important than before. Norway, the United States and other allies have to continue our efforts to integrate Russia into regional, European and international co-operation arrangements and to develop bilateral relations.

Co-operation with the great Russian Bear has never been easy, and might never be, but it is even more important today, then ever.

Thank you.