Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk

The transformation of European security - new challenges for Norway

Oslo Military Society, 9 November 1998

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today's topic "The Transformation of European Security - New Challenges for Norway" covers a wide range. I would like to approach it from three different angles.

The first deals with security in Norway's neighbouring areas, with an emphasis on cooperation with Russia, the second with the situation in Kosovo and the increasing demands being made on international crisis management. Thirdly, I will discuss the reshaping of security policy in Europe and the consequences this will have for cooperation within NATO.

The NATO summit in Washington next April will celebrate the fact that it is 50 years since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. But its most important task will be to identify and present NATO's new tasks in a new situation as we approach a new century.

Developments in Russia, the crises in the Balkans and the transformation of NATO must be viewed together. These are all trends of fundamental importance for our own security. My most important message today is that we must give a great deal of thought to what the new challenges will mean for us. We must also do more at the practical level to meet these challenges.

I have chosen to start by discussing the situation in Russia, which gives cause for concern. The transition to democracy and a market economy has proved to be a painful process for the country. Developing new political institutions and a new political culture is complicated and time-consuming.

When the new Russia established itself as a state and entered the international arena almost seven years ago, this was met with great optimism both in Russia and in the world outside. The authorities, headed by President Yeltsin, warned the population to expect a tough period of transition. However, this was to be followed by growth and prosperity.

For Norway and other Western countries, the upheavals in Russia created new opportunities for broad-based cooperation. The new situation was an incentive for a much more focused policy towards Russia, which the Norwegian authorities have sought to follow up in the last few years. Norway's policy has been designed to resolve specific problems, to establish new forms of cooperation and people-to-people contact, and to lay a foundation for stability and security in the north.

The Central and Eastern European Cooperation Programme, the Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Issues and the regional cooperation in the Barents region have been the most important instruments in developing our relations with Russia.

The new situation involved significant changes for the better in a purely military sense as well. In the last ten years, there has been a considerable reduction in military capacity in the Leningrad military district. The conclusion of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) eliminated the capability for major offensive operations and surprise attacks. The Treaty's comprehensive verification and information regime has proved to be very important for stability in all parts of Europe.

However, the area comprising the Kola Peninsula and northwestern Russia is still very important in military terms for Russia as a major power. Russian military interests in the north will continue to influence Norway's situation in the future. But the growth of a democratic Russia has opened up opportunities for more extensive bilateral contacts in the military field as well.

So what have we achieved through our efforts to develop a policy towards Russia in these areas? And what are the prospects for further development of our cooperation, given the economic and social crisis we are now witnessing on the other side of the border?

Since the Central and Eastern European Cooperation Programme started in 1992, the Norwegian authorities have provided more than NOK 2 billion in support of cooperation projects in the Eastern European countries. More than 2 800 projects have been started. The programme has focused mainly on northwestern Russia, with special emphasis on the Barents region and on the three Baltic states. However, it is clear that the size of the Russian bureaucracy poses a major challenge for industrial cooperation. Because of this, there has been a marked increase this year in cooperation measures in the health and social services sector, in exchanges of students and researchers, and in the fields of environmental protection and energy conservation.

The Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Issues marked the beginning of an ambitious effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear contamination from an area with one of the greatest concentrations of nuclear installations in the world. This work is being carried out in close cooperation with the Russian authorities, private companies and international organizations. We have been keen to mobilize international support in carrying out these tasks, primarily from EU countries and the USA. The challenges are overwhelming and it is very difficult to achieve even limited results. We have not achieved everything we had hoped, but we have made a start on a major task. We must remember that this cooperation is based on an openness on the part of Russia which would have been unthinkable only a few years ago.

The Barents cooperation has helped to open up a region that for many decades was marked by isolation and suspicion. Efforts to promote democracy, the rule of law and social security in the region will help to ensure peace and stability throughout northern Europe.

Our defence-related cooperation with Russia has focused on practical cooperation and on developing openness and trust. Our cooperation in this field must be seen in conjunction with the miltary-political cooperation that has been developed between Russia and the other allies and with NATO. Exchanges of visits, cooperation with the border guard, environmental cooperation through AMEC, which involves Norway, Russia and the USA, and cooperation between the Coast Guard and the Russian authorities have all been important elements in our cooperation. Nonetheless, we have not achieved the progress we had hoped for in this field.

As regards foreign policy, Russia has become more concerned about national interests. Some people have called this a normalization of foreign policy, and they may have a point. It is perfectly legitimate to have national interests. The crucial point is whether they are maintained in the right way and by acceptable means.

Norway's bilateral relations with Russia are better than ever, and this is an essential prerequisite for further development of our cooperation. Two state visits in two years clearly demonstrate how close our relations are. I would also like to mention the frequent meetings between our foreign ministers in both bilateral and multilateral fora, for example in the Barents Council.

The crisis in Russia has not altered the basis for the all-round cooperation that we wish to continue to develop in political, cultural and economic terms. There is great potential for economic cooperation, but this will not be exploited as much as it might be as long as Russia is going through a crisis. At the moment, the news is dominated by reports of emergency supplies being sent to Russia before winter closes in. However, we are working to ensure that Russia can surmount the current crisis as soon as possible and fill a position in the international community that befits a country with such vast natural resources.

We have achieved a great deal in a short time in our cooperation with Russia in the Baltic Sea region and the Barents region. If we can act together to consolidate this cooperation, this will promote growth, public welfare and democracy in our neighbouring areas. This is one of the matters we consider an important part of the preparations for taking over chairmanship of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 1999-2000. And the chairmanship will make an important contribution to our own security.

However, there are some difficult issues to be dealt with. The decision to expel five Russian diplomats earlier this year was a hard one. The negotiations on the delimitation of the Barents Sea are progressing slowly. I am sure you also recall a couple of incidents from last summer related to fisheries questions in the Svalbard area. We have also had difficulty in carrying out fisheries research expeditions in the Russian economic zone, even though our respective fisheries authorities have agreed on their importance. These issues have interfered with the otherwise smooth cooperation between Norway and Russia on fisheries management and quotas.

In other words, Russia's economic and social crisis is making it more difficult to achieve results in the short term. However, faced with these challenges and the risk of setbacks, my view is that we should make an even greater effort to speed up a cooperation that is in our own, Russia's and Europe's security interests. We wish to develop specific cooperative measures, resolve any problems that may arise, and promote stability and greater security. In this context, continuation of the Barents cooperation will be an important instrument.

In short, we must expect to continue to encounter challenges in our neighbouring areas. Nevertheless, the potential for instability and conflict is far greater on Europe's south and southeastern rim and the conflicts in these areas will also influence our security. It would therefore be wise to be prepared for the fact that contributions to political, military and humanitarian efforts in new conflict areas will be required of us in the years ahead.

In Kosovo, the agreements reached during negotiations between US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and President Milosevic last month have created a new situation. President Milosevic accepted the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1199 and an international surveillance presence on the ground and in the air under the auspices of the OSCE and NATO. The OSCE is now establishing the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). NATO has started surveillance of Yugoslavian airspace. The international community has already taken steps towards relieving a humanitarian crisis which was threatening to become a disaster.

The withdrawal of Serbian forces and the agreements on international surveillance give us an opportunity to start genuine negotiations on a permanent solution. We have acquired elbow room that can and must be used to start a process leading to a political solution that will provide stability not only in Kosovo but in the region as a whole.

A political solution will include the establishment of democratic institutions that reflect the composition of the population of Kosovo, safeguarding the rights of the Kosovar Albanians, the implementation of fundamental human rights and efforts to bring about reconciliation between ethnic groups. At the same time, the solution must ensure that the goal of maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity is respected.

Perhaps the greatest challenge will be to ensure that all parties participate fully in the process that has been started. We know that there are different interpretations among the Kosovar Albanians as regards the agreements that have been reached. For many, the ultimate goal is full independence for Kosovo. There is a danger that splinter groups will try to provoke renewed fighting. It is therefore of crucial importance to continue to exert international pressure on the parties to start genuine negotiations. This will increase the likelihood of a lasting solution.

If we achieve a peaceful solution in Kosovo, further assistance will be needed for the establishment of an administrative apparatus, a legal system and a police force. Elections will have to be organized. The tasks will be many and complex. I believe that the international community must be prepared to make a sustained, long-term effort to contribute towards the development of democracy in Kosovo. Russia will also have an important role to play in this process.

The mission in Kosovo will be one of the main tasks for the forthcoming Norwegian chairmanship of the OSCE. As a starting point, the verification mission has a mandate for one year, but this can be extended. Any decision to extend the mandate will therefore have to be taken while Norway holds the chairmanship.

As you know, Norway has taken upon itself to play a leading role in connection with the establishment of the KVM headquarters in Pristina. We have provided a chief-of-staff who will be part of the mission's leadership group, and we are responsible for the set-up and operation of the headquarters. A large proportion of the 70 Norwegians who are to join the mission will be stationed at the headquarters. Our participation has been organized in close cooperation with the armed forces, the police and NGOs.

The fact that we can organize the participation of so many highly-qualified people at such short notice shows that our ability to take part in international crisis management has improved dramatically in recent years.

Our forthcoming chairmanship of the OSCE is one of the reasons why we have been asked to play a leading role in this context. At the same time, Norway is an active member of NATO. Moreover, we have traditionally been an important contributor to civilian and military crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. In my view, the request should also be seen as an acknowledgement of Norway as a reliable partner and ally, and of our willingness to give priority to new security policy challenges.

Even though the Serbian authorities have guaranteed the safety of the OSCE verifiers, there will be an element of risk, from extremist groups on both sides, for example. The safety of personnel is something that the Government takes very seriously. In my view, a continued NATO presence in the region will help to raise the threshold for renewed fighting and make a rapid response possible if necessary. We therefore feel it is very important to prepare for deployment of a rapid reaction corps in Macedonia, which will allow rapid evacuation of both mission personnel and personnel from the humanitarian organizations.

It may be that the most important lesson to be learnt from the management of the crisis in Kosovo is that sufficiently strong, credible political pressure is essential. It is of crucial importance that the position maintained by the international community is as united as possible. Russia will continue to have a major responsibility for ensuring a common international stand on the issue. Security Council Resolution No. 1199 provided the necessary political basis for bringing Serbian hostilities to a halt. Without the military pressure from NATO, it is unlikely that President Milosevic would have accepted the demands of the Security Council and entered into the surveillance agreements.

The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo underline the importance of a greater commitment to crisis management. The international community will be faced with new conflicts and greater demands for humanitarian and military operations in the years ahead.

This is because internal and regional conflicts frequently escalate into open warfare, causing widespread suffering for the civilian population, seriously damaging the fabric of government and society and causing regional destabilization.

While the events of 9 April 1940 and 6 June 1944 have shaped the basic concept of security policy in Norway over the last fifty years, the security realities we are now facing bear the imprint of Srebrenica, Kosovo and Rwanda.

Norway's participation in peacekeeping operations and international crisis management is an integral part of our foreign and security policy, and there are several reasons for this. In security policy terms, we contribute to peace and stability in our part of the world. Furthermore, we have a fundamental moral obligation, as part of our global commitment to the promotion of human rights and peace. Norway's involvement in peacekeeping operations all over the world has often been motivated by humanitarian considerations. Norwegian peacekeeping forces and emergency relief personnel have often worked side by side. It is also clearly in Norway's best interests to ensure that international norms are respected and that sanctions are imposed when the rules of the world community are violated.

In this sense, peacekeeping efforts involving military forces are a foreign policy instrument. Mediation, support for peace processes and focused use of development assistance are other tools for international crisis management.

For many years, Norway has been a very active contributor to international civilian and military crisis management, mediation and efforts to bring about peace and reconciliation. We have every reason to be proud of these endeavours. Our chairmanship of the OSCE next year and the establishment and operation of the organization's headquarters in Kosovo are in keeping with this tradition. The KVM will be doing pioneering work in the verification of compliance with international agreements. Its mission lies in a new and demanding borderland between civilian and military implementation of peace agreements.

But as always, the limitations of the KVM lie in the fact that international peace operations can only lay the groundwork for the development of peace. Peace cannot be imposed on people from outside; it must be willed from within and won from below.

Great changes are taking place in NATO in response to the conflicts we are witnessing in the Balkans and in Europe's neighbouring areas in the southeast. Today, crisis management in situations that do not come under the scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, i.e. that do not affect the Alliance's defence commitments, lays claim to a major part of NATO's day-to-day activities. This applies to both political and military activities. Regional instability and conflict are subjects of growing concern to NATO member states, and thus also to the Alliance itself. The danger of proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction constitute a further threat to European security, arising as it does from conflicts in Europe's neighbouring areas.

Thus, we are now seeing a shift in the focus of Alliance activities away from its traditional primary task, which was related to the defence of the territory of the member states. The priority being given to the new tasks is showing a corresponding increase.

In this respect, the NATO summit in Washington next April will be a very important meeting. It will confirm NATO's key role in the preservation of peace and security during the post-war era, but at the same time - and most importantly - it will herald the Alliance's new role.

The review of NATO's stategic concept of 1991 will be a central issue in the months leading up to the summit. As the Alliance's "program of principles", the revised concept will define the Alliance's role in the new situation. The new concept will figure centrally in the commemoration of the Alliance's 50th anniversary.

In the light of the changes in the security policy landscape and the new tasks ahead, there is a definite need for bringing the concept up to date. There is consensus that the revised concept will have to deal broadly with new tasks related to crisis management and cooperation with partner countries. The concept will reflect the major transformation the Alliance is undergoing. At the same time it will have to confirm the main substance of Alliance cooperation, which gives NATO a unique role in European security.

Although there is no immediate or direct military threat to the Alliance today, the security policy situation in Europe is characterized by uncertainty. We are reminded daily of the fact that ethnic and religious differences, territorial claims, violations of human rights and economic and social problems can lead to instability and violent conflict in Europe and its neighbouring areas.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another serious issue. Our security is also affected by threats of a more global nature, such as international terrorism. In revising the strategic concept, we must take into account the problems that might arise in the long term.

Norway's work on the strategic concept will involve striking a balance between maintaining the basic principles of NATO cooperation and adapting to new tasks and challenges. So far there has been little debate in Norway on these issues. I hope, however, that now that we are approaching NATO's 50th anniversary, we will be able to have a discussion on the changes in the Alliance and their implications for us. I would like to say a few words about some of the issues currently being dealt with.

Collective defence has been the cornerstone of NATO. This has been particularly important for us because of our geographical location, which gives us a common border with Russia and places us close to the bases on the Kola Peninsula. Collective defence has also laid the groundwork for the Alliance's ability to take on new tasks connected with crisis management and peacekeeping operations. Norway considers it important that the revised strategic concept confirms the significance of collective defence as a core function of the Alliance.

NATO has helped to link the European and North American allies in a security community. This community is just as important today as it was when the Atlantic Treaty was signed almost 50 years ago. The Alliance's involvement in the conflict in Bosnia - and our current joint efforts to put an end to the violence in Kosovo - illustrate that transatlantic solidarity and cooperation are important preconditions if the Alliance is to be in a position to cope with the many challenges it faces at the turn of the century.

When work on the new concept began, it was established that collective defence and transatlantic solidarity would continue to be core functions of the Alliance.

The concept must also confirm NATO's role as a forum for consultations on security policy issues. This core function is vital, and for us it is extremely important for several reasons, not least because Norway is not a member of the EU.

The concept will have to underline the importance of crisis management and peacekeeping operations in a manner that is in keeping with the significance of these tasks for international security today and the priority they have been given in NATO. We share this view. Most of the allies emphasize that these tasks must be given a much more prominent position than previously. Certain countries have also suggested that these tasks should be placed on a more or less equal footing with the traditional tasks. We envisage difficulties here, but we recognize that important considerations are involved.

Norway has always contributed significantly to peacekeeping operations. We want these tasks to occupy a more prominent place in the revised strategic concept, in keeping with our broad-based involvement in this area. However, there are arguments against equating collective defence with new military tasks that are not based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. One of these is that the new tasks are not binding on the member states in the same way as the collective defence tasks.

In our view, our ability to deal with non-Article 5 tasks is dependent on our ability to deal with those that do come under the scope of this article. We must avoid ending up in a situation where resources are allocated to crisis management at the expense of collective defence.

By the same token, because of the clear desire to give non-Article 5 tasks a more prominent place in the revised concept, we must examine more closely the consequences of this course of action for NATO military cooperation and for the Norwegian armed forces.

The greater emphasis being placed on crisis management is also an indication that the focus of the Alliance is changing. NATO's attention is increasingly being drawn to the challenges in southeastern Europe and Europe's neighbouring areas in the Mediterranean region.

Influential allies attach great importance to transboundary threats linked with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. They want this to be reflected in the revised strategic concept and they want NATO to be given a more clearly defined role in regional conflicts that affect European security. The question is how far we should go in giving NATO such a role.

Norway too sees a clear correlation between security in Europe and in Europe's neighouring areas. The Alliance's role as a forum for consultation should be strengthened by enlarging its scope to include consultation on questions concerning European security. NATO's broad-based involvement in crisis management makes this a natural step. We must, however, be careful not to give NATO a global role.

NATO's involvement in crisis management means that the discussion concerning a mandate from the UN or the OSCE for peacekeeping operations is a central one. This problem will also arise during the work on the strategic concept. Norway has clearly underscored that, as a general rule, a UN mandate is required for operations that do not come under the scope of Article 51 of the UN Charter or Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to emphasize the importance of such a mandate, among other reasons out of consideration for political support for future military operations headed by NATO and their legitimacy. At the same time it is clear that situations could arise where it is not possible to obtain a clear mandate from the UN Security Council, as was the case in connection with the crisis in Kosovo.

In recent years NATO has played a key role in efforts to promote the security policy integration of Europe across the former dividing lines. The increasingly binding cooperation between the partner countries through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace shows that the countries are working actively through NATO to create a broad security community in Europe. These efforts must be given prominence in the revised strategic concept.

In our view, it will also be important to emphasize the Alliance's cooperation with Russia and the potential for furthering this cooperation. It is now one and a half years since the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed. We have achieved a great deal during that time. The monthly joint meetings have provided us with an open channel for discussing pressing issues, such as the situation in the Balkans. Consultations on issues ranging from civil preparedness to weapons of mass destruction have been conducted in the Permanent Joint Council and expert fora under the council at the same time. We have openly discussed issues that were subject to the strictest secrecy only a few years ago. This autumn the Joint Council embarked on a series of consultations in which the various nations present their military infrastructure programmes. Norway will probably make its presentation early next year.

What we are witnessing is the gradual elimination of a number of specific obstacles in relations between NATO and Russia.

During the work on the Founding Act in 1997, concern was expressed in some quarters that Russia would obtain too much influence on allied cooperation. I believe that this view is wrong for two reasons. Firstly, it is based on an underestimation of the strength of NATO cooperation and allied solidarity. The Alliance is not an organization that can be pressured to accept something that is incompatible with its interests. Secondly, it is not necessarily a bad thing for Russia to gain more influence. We must stop regarding Russia as an adversary. It is in our interests to draw Russia into security policy cooperation. This does not mean that I underestimate the conflicting interests that do exist. But one of the major tasks of the Joint Council is to bridge these differences.

We have to acknowledge that cooperation between NATO and Russia is at the moment an uphill struggle. This is not because the differences have grown, although the Kosovo crisis has certainly proved a strain. The cause lies primarily in the deep economic and political crisis in Russia itself.

Russian participation in the entire range of cooperation activities is clearly limited by lack of resources, from exercises under the Partnership for Peace to meetings at NATO headquarters. We see the same problem at the bilateral level in the northern areas. We must therefore be prepared to consider untraditional solutions in order to prevent this problem from weakening the important cooperation that is being built up. Our job is to be as open as possible in relation to Russia and to demonstrate a real willingness to include the country in this cooperation. No other partner country means as much to us and to European security as Russia.

Efforts to integrate Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO are proceeding according to plan. I am looking forward to their joining the Alliance before the summit in April. The enlargement will consolidate the favourable political and economic development that has taken place in the three countries. Together with the cooperation in the Partnership for Peace, the EAPC and with Russia and Ukraine, the enlargement will also enhance security and stability in Europe and will strengthen the Alliance itself.

There is general agreement that NATO should remain open to new members. In our view, the enlargement process should continue as an integral part of the effort to promote deeper security and foreign policy cooperation in all of Europe. The process will be reviewed in connection with the Washington summit, but it is unlikely that any decisions on further enlargement will be taken at the summit.

Norway actively endorses NATO's open door policy, but we see no need to extend new invitations as early as at the forthcoming summit. It will, however, be important for the Heads of State and Government to clearly confirm and amplify the message from the summit in Madrid. This will help to preserve the credibility of the enlargement process and to maintain motivation and willingness to implement reforms in the applicant countries.

Norway is concerned that references to applicant countries of the north and the south at the summit are balanced. The summit should also make reference to the extensive preparations and reforms that have been carried out in several partner countries, particularly in the fields of democracy and human rights. Progress has also been made in neighbourly relations in Europe. The Baltic countries have done a great deal in these areas. We intend to carry out a security policy dialogue with the Baltic countries before the summit in Washington.

We also feel it is important to further NATO's open door policy, including developing the Partnership for Peace. We should consider making more active use of the dialogue between NATO and the respective applicant countries to assist them in their preparations for membership.

The way in which the new security challenges are being dealt with, first in Bosnia and now in Kosovo, clearly demonstrates how necessary it is for Europe and North America to stand together in resolving tasks that require concerted action. By the same token, the European countries will eventually have to assume a greater share of the responsibility for security in Europe and a more prominent role within the Alliance. There has been a gradual trend in this direction during the past few years, as represented by the European Security and Defence Identity. This process has found political expression in EU cooperation within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It has also found expression in the Alliance and in the cooperation between NATO and the WEU.

There still seem to be definite limits as to how far this process can develop. There is, however, little doubt that the emergence of a more cohesive security policy on our side of the Atlantic will continue, particularly as this is in accordance with both European ambitions and North American expectations. Recently we have seen signs of a new dynamism in this area, especially on the part of the British Government.

The efforts to make Europe take a more cohesive stand in the security policy field will be linked in particular to the EU's common foreign and security policy, CFSP. This will obviously present us with a challenge. It is precisely in the area of crisis management that strengthening European responsibility will be particularly appropriate. As I noted earlier, we are a major contributor to international crisis management, in terms of personnel and financial resources. At the same time we have our own interests to safeguard in connection with the transformation of the security policy cooperation structures. This of course means that we wish to participate actively in decision-making processes in this area.

There is no time to discuss the ESDI in more detail today, but I will return to the subject in my statement to the Storting on Norwegian policy towards Europe in January.

When future historians analyse Norwegian security policy in the twentieth century, 9 April will continue to be a significant date. What happened in 1940 has had a fundamental effect on Norwegian foreign and security policy. It has also influenced Norwegians' perception of NATO. The Alliance has provided us with the assurance of allied assistance and support in the event of a crisis or war for almost 50 years.

The Alliance will continue to fulfil this function. But we must to an increasing extent be prepared to accept that NATO has other, new tasks today which dominate the day-to-day political and military activities of the organization. The Washington summit is just the first stage.

We welcome the direction NATO is taking. Norway's participation in the Alliance, our contribution to international peacekeeping operations, our involvement in the UN and the OSCE, and our neighbourly relations with Russia - all these factors put us in an excellent position to take an active part in meeting the new challenges ahead.