Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Historisk arkiv
Publisert under: Regjeringen Bondevik I
Utgiver: Utenriksdepartementet
Tale/innlegg | Dato: 07.10.1999
State Secretary Jarle Skjørestad
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Vienna, Austria, 7 October, 1999
Mr President,
I would like to join the previous speakers in congratulating you on your election as President of this first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Japan was one of the first countries to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty - indeeed it was the first of the forty-four states whose ratification is required for the Treaty’s entry into force.- This reflects Japan’s strong voice and determined efforts in pursuit of nuclear disarmament and against nuclear proliferation.
Norway associates itself with the statement made by Finland on behalf of the European Union. I would like to highlight some points that Norway finds particularly important:
Three years ago the international community rejoiced at having accomplished a long-term goal in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Decades of hard work and unwavering dedication had finally led to the adoption and opening for signature of a treaty banning all nuclear test explosions - the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation continue to be a primary concern of the international community. Our ultimate goal is complete nuclear disarmament. This cannot be achieved without a strengthened non-proliferation regime. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the legal and political core of this regime.
The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is an essential complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a fundamental building block for further efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Testing is a principal engine of nuclear proliferation. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty also acts as a barrier to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening and enhancing the process of nuclear disarmament. Verification of compliance with the Treaty will be of the utmost importance. We must ensure the necessary funding for a continued rapid build-up of the International Monitoring System in order for the verification regime to meet the requirements set out in the Treaty at entry into force.
Achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and securing its entry into force at the earliest possible date must have the highest priority. The global community’s strong reaction to the nuclear tests carried out last year, made it clear that there can be no justification for nuclear testing. While we welcome self-imposed moratoria on testing, such unilateral measures cannot take the place of a legally binding commitment through the signing and ratification of international instruments.
At the same time we must reduce the political and strategic significance of nuclear weapons in international affairs. We have reached a point where it is imperative that we find practical political means to further both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Full implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements, continued reductions in nuclear stocks and the political will to consider further steps are required. The following three steps should in our view be given priority: negotiations on a START III Treaty, negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and agreement on a set of principles that would contribute to the establishment of an international norm regarding existing weapons-usable fissile material.
We do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the political or security interests of a state or is relevant to the protection or furthering of national interests. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery means may have a variety of interlocking causes – the desire for political and international prestige, agressive political ambitions, the desire to use the nuclear-weapons option as a bargaining chip or an unstable regional security environment. Thus we need to use confidence-building measures to prevent conflict and build peace so that we can replace distrust, tension and uncertainty with confidence, stability and cooperation, and create a new security environment in which the nuclear deterrent can become obsolete or irrelevant.
Seventy-one states signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty on the day of its opening for signature, a clear sign of the importance attached to the Treaty. Norway was one of these, and we deposited our instrument of ratification of the Treaty earlier this year. We welcome the fact that (154) States have now signed, and have thus expressed their belief that the Treaty will help to end the nuclear arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons.
We deeply deplore the fact that three years after it was opened for signature, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force. We call upon all states that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular those whose ratification is required for the Treaty’s entry into force. In the interests of international trust, stability and peace, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and its effective implementation are essential, and universal adherence must be secured. We are unequivocally committed to achieving these objectives. The international community expects it of us and has every right to do so.
Thank you.
This page was last updated 14 october 1999 by the editors