Historisk arkiv

Statement at the Bellona International private-public nuclear waste management roundtable

Historisk arkiv

Publisert under: Regjeringen Bondevik I

Utgiver: Utenriksdepartementet

State secretary Åslaug Haga

Statement at the Bellona International private-public nuclear waste management roundtable

Washington, d.c., 25 january 1999

Let me at the outset commend Bellona for its efforts - including that of convening this meeting - to raise public awareness of the challenges posed by nuclear safety and safe management of nuclear waste.

My country's proximity to Northwest Russia - and thus to the highest concentration of nuclear installations in the world - puts nuclear safety and management of nuclear waste high on the Norwegian government's agenda. The numerable nuclear installations represent a huge potential danger of radioactive contamination.

We all have a vivid memory of the Chernobyl disaster. Although close to 13 years ago, we still don't have a clear picture of the consequences. Abnormal cases of cancer and miscarriages are reported these days. Men and women, that have no choice but to live in the area, know that the chances for their baby to bear the consequences of the disaster are great. We must not allow another Chernobyl-like disaster to happen again.

A nuclear accident in Northwest Russia is a possibility which cannot be excluded. Long-term degradation of the extremely vulnerable Arctic environment could be the result. An accident would of course affect the most immediate area most directly. But it certainly also could affect the wider Arctic Area, the rest of Europe as well as the United States and Canada.

To some extent, the nuclear installations in Northwest Russia - mostly a heritage of the cold war - have replaced yesterday's fears of armed conflict with the fear of the disastrous consequences of mismanaged nuclear materials. Such developments remain worst-case scenarios, but we have no choice but to respond with urgency to these challenges. I admit that the costs involved in the "cleaning-up" are considerable - but in this case yet again small - compared to the costs of negligence.

I noted with interest the emphasis placed by President Clinton in his State of the Union Address on the US commitment to increased involvement in the dismantling and safe handling of Russian nuclear weapons. This is indeed one of the most important tasks facing our Russian partners and ourselves today. We are pleased to see the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program making substantial progress in defuelling and scrapping strategic nuclear submarines. At the same time, we must realize that this challenge interlinks closely with the problem of spent fuel and nuclear waste in general. The job is not done once weapons grade material has been removed.

The high concentration of nuclear installations in Northwest Russia constitutes in itself a danger. The handling of spent nuclear fuel and waste represent a further danger of contamination. A completely new infrastructure will be required to bring the radioactive waste situation under control. Facilities for handling, transportation, treatment and storage will have to be built, and contaminated sites will have to be cleaned up. A comprehensive approach is required.

Norway has developed a Plan of Action for nuclear safety issues. The plan covers four areas:

  • Safety of nuclear installations.
  • Management, storage and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel.
  • Radioactive contamination of Arctic areas.
  • Arms-related environmental threats.

The Plan of Action has been in operation for some years now. This has given Norway considerable experience in dealing with the Russians in a practical, task-oriented cooperation. We have learnt to know the Russians, and they us. Mutual trust has been created, even in sensitive questions related to, for example, contamination from military sources.

Implementation of the Plan of Action has been hampered by what I would call "bureaucratic" difficulties. They have amongst others been related to questions of customs duties and taxation on equipment imported to Russia for projects financed by Norway. The issue of nuclear liability has also been a stumbling block.

These "bureaucratic" difficulties were basically solved in what I would call a landmark agreement between Norway and the Russian Federation in May 1998. The agreement provides for free technical assistance to Russia to dismantle nuclear submarines, to ensure proper management of spent fuel and radioactive waste resulting from this activity, and finally to enhance nuclear and radiation safety at nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations.

The agreement contains a number of major projects. I shall mention only a few:

  • Emptying and decommissioning of the storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in the Andreev Bay.
  • Establishment of an interim storage for spent fuel at Mayak.
  • Construction of a vessel for transporting containers with spent fuel.
  • Construction of 4 railway cars for transporting containers with spent fuel.
  • Emptying the vessel "Lepse" of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The project is financed by a number of countries, including the US.
  • Construction of a facility for purification of liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk, together with the US.

Important work is being carried out by the Russians, by the US, Norway, the EU Commission and others, but let me now turn to my main message -- namely to stress the importance of concerted international action to deal with these nuclear waste issues in Northwest Russia. This task is of such magnitude - financially and technically - that joint efforts are absolutely necessary.

The Russians themselves have a main responsibility for the "cleaning-up exercise"; they have to be in charge, they have to be in the driver's seat. The rest of us have a responsibility to contribute.

Norway is pleased with the recent organizational changes on the Russian side regarding management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. We fully appreciate the political attention given to these issues, despite an extremely difficult political and economic situation in Russia.

The difficulties in Russia should certainly not allow the rest of us to reduce our commitment to the cause of nuclear safety. Rather the opposite. We have to be more persistent than ever and also realize that Russia for the time being has limited possibilities to contribute to the financing of projects.

At the same time, Russia on her part has to create a framework which allows for foreign participation. Norway has, for example, made it very clear to our Russian partners that a major undertaking in the Andreev Bay would require access to the site for our experts. As a sign of good will and commitment, Norway has accepted to finance two small projects in the bay based on surveillance by video and photos. However, there is no way we can contribute to the "clean-up" of the bay in a substantive way, if access to the site is not granted.

Let me revert to my message; concerted action: It is a precondition for concerted international efforts that other foreign donors can obtain the same conditions as Norway regarding taxes, duties and nuclear liability. To this end, we have proposed to work out a multilateral framework agreement. We are certainly encouraged by the great interest from a number of potential donors to participate in this process. We are pleased that Finland is prominently flagging the issue of nuclear safety within the context of the Northern Dimension of the EU. We hope to finalize the agreement in the first half of this year.

Russian authorities must realize how important it is to foreign partners to remove obstacles related to taxes, duties and nuclear liability. The need for a solution to the problem of liability is particularly urgent as long as Russia has not ratified the 1963 Vienna Convention. (Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963).

The "Contact Expert Group" under American chairmanship is developing a Plan of Action containing priority nuclear projects which require international financial support. This very important work has to be based on Russian priorities. The Plan of Action would, in combination with the multilateral framework agreement that I just mentioned, establish a good basis for what we are all looking for - actual implementation of projects.

Norway sincerely hopes that the plan of action and the framework agreement on taxes, duties and nuclear liability could be endorsed by the G-7 in June this year. We trust the US would support this initiative and thereby contribute to a major step forward with regard to nuclear safety and radioactive clean-up in Northwest Russia.

I am happy to say that we have found valuable American understanding and support which has resulted in a number of joint, highly relevant projects. I should like to make a particular reference to the purification plant for liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk. Once it is finished, we expect Russia to join the London Convention ban on dumping of radioactive waste at sea. This is an important achievement in the field of environmental protection. The US and Norway are further cooperating on the development of dual purpose transport and storage containers for spent fuel.

Norway, US and Russia have also launched a tripartite Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program which aims at eliminating hazardous environmental consequences of military activities in the Arctic region. The AMEC has adopted both nuclear and non-nuclear projects.

I know questions have been raised as to Norway's commitment to AMEC. Let me underline that Norway's commitment is as firm as ever.

There is an urgency to the matters we are discussing today. I am challenging the US government - and other governments in a position to do so - to contribute further to environmental projects in Northwest Russia. I am challenging us all to constructively engage in the multilateral efforts to hammer out a multinational framework agreement and an action plan.

This should be seen as part of our overall policy vis a vis Russia. We must join hands to overcome the legacy of the cold war.

This page was last updated 12 February 1999 by the editors