State Secretary Ms Åslaug Marie Haga

Statement at the Conference on Disarmament

Plenary, thursday 18 february 1999

Check against delivery

I would like to begin by congratulating you, Ambassador Rodriguez Cedeño, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We look forward to co-operating with you in our efforts to make substantive progress on disarmament issues in 1999. I hope we all will work to facilitate the smooth operation of this body by building on the agreements and compromises that were reached through so much hard work last year.

The last time I addressed the Conference I concluded my statement by saying that we would like to see work started immediately on the reform questions. That was a year ago. Not much has happened since then. Not even a modest expansion by five countries has been possible. This is very disappointing.

The most pressing reform issue continues to be the enlargement of the membership of the CD. As it has been repeated over and over again, the reputation, relevance, political legitimacy and, ultimately, the future of this Conference is closely linked to its membership. Treaties within the framework of the CD are negotiated with a view to universal application and adherence. It follows that the negotiations must be open to universal participation. And no less important, there is nothing to justify that we, the current members of the CD, should exclude other countries that are equally committed to disarmament and peaceful international relations from membership. I deeply regret that the Conference has not been able to admit Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia as members. It is all the more difficult to understand and accept that this decision is being upheld as nobody seems willing to explain what their objections really are.

We would warmly welcome a decision to accept these five countries as new members. This would, however, only be a first and very limited step. The Conference must continue on its way towards universal membership and become open to any country wishing to be a member.

For too long the performance of the Conference has demonstrated that the current working methods of the CD are in urgent need of reform. We recognise that procedural problems or disputes normally stem from political differences. But if the present situation is allowed to continue, the credibility and standing of the Conference will be further undermined.

We would therefore, Mr. President, strongly advise that the excellent and impressive work carried out by the reform Special Co-ordinators, Ambassadors Hofer, Illanes and Naray, be resumed as soon as possible.

I would now like to set forth our position on some of the major multilateral arms control and disarmament issues.

As other parties to the NPT, Norway is deeply committed to nuclear disarmament. Our ultimate goal continues to be the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons states have a particular responsibility for reducing the political value attached to nuclear weapons and thereby the role of these weapons in international politics. They must continue to have this responsibility.

We welcome all practical initiatives and measures that can help to enhance transparency in the nuclear field, that involve new reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, and that help to further lower the existing alert level of strategic forces.

Nuclear issues are a concern to all countries. The international community has a legitimate interest in being kept informed about the progress achieved as well as any difficulties and challenges encountered in the nuclear disarmament process. The CD should not, in our view, be mandated to negotiate nuclear weapons reductions. This does not mean that we see no role for the CD in questions related to nuclear disarmament. By establishing a procedure for reporting on nuclear issues and policies, the CD could serve as an important forum for discussion and exchange of information. This would give the nuclear weapons states an opportunity to supply information both on the results achieved through unilateral and bilateral initiatives and on their nuclear policies, thus demonstrating their commitment to nuclear disarmament. Increased transparency on nuclear issues would enhance confidence and reduce distrust.

This is why Norway, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, has submitted a proposal that the CD should establish an ad hoc working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views on the efforts towards nuclear disarmament. We believe this is a constructive proposal. We hope it could result in an agreement on how the CD could address issues related to nuclear disarmament in a satisfactory way. The proposal solely addresses procedures for dealing with questions concerning nuclear disarmament, and does not presuppose any particular result. It is based on an assessment of what this forum can realistically be expected to agree on. In our view, the proposal offers a flexible approach which will safeguard the interests of all parties.

Further progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is also dependent on our willingness to address the issue of fissile material for weapons purposes. Limiting access to such material is the key to preventing horizontal and vertical proliferation. None of the arms control or arms reduction treaties that have been negotiated so far include particular provisions on fissile material. Time is ripe to make such material subject to strict regulation and control.

Norway was encouraged by the decision last year to establish the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.We are equally disappointed that the CD has not yet been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee. Time has now come for members of this body to move from endless consultations to a concrete decision of an early start of negotiations. From the very beginning of this process, we must demonstrate innovative flexibility so as not to exclude any pragmatic and practical solutions necessary to deal with fissile material in an adequate manner.

In our view the main focus of the negotiations should be on the production of fissile material. But at the same time we believe it is important to address the issue of past production and existing stockpiles in one way or another. The views expressed thus far regarding stockpiles do not always reflect the complexity of these issues. The current discussions on whether stockpiles are to be included in the negotiations will probably not lead us anywhere. We should rather give careful consideration to the question whether certain categories of stockpile material are suitable for inclusion in a future treaty. It is important to consider the options that are available for states to address the stockpile issue in a multilateral framework.

We do not believe that the stockpile issues related to military inventories should be considered in the treaty negotiations. On the other hand, we believe there would be merit in addressing fissile material that has been extracted from dismantled nuclear warheads and other military stocks that are now surplus or in excess of military requirements. Fissile material that has been removed from the military production cycle and is redundant is steadily increasing. It represents increased danger in terms of proliferation. This inventory should no longer have the status of military non-verifiable material. It should gradually be made subject to a transparent, non-military and civilian regime subject to international verification. It is important to recognise that this material cannot be transferred instantaneously from the military to the civilian sector, and that the steps involved in doing so will be complex, time-consuming and expensive. Serious consideration should be given to developing and establishing an international norm for states in dealing with stockpiles of surplus material. Such a norm, developed within the framework of the negotiations, should ensure:

• irreversibility, that is, that none of these stocks are returned or diverted to weapon programmes and that the material is rendered inaccessible to military use as soon as practicable,
• security, that is, that the stocks are made secure from theft and sabotage,
• safety, that is, that the material does not harm human health or the environment,
• national control, that is, the development of an effective international standard for material accounting and self-auditing which will help to improve national control of such stocks.

Norway believes that the treaty provisions regarding production must include a credible verification regime that will provide the same degree of assurance with regard to compliance as other non-proliferation and arms control agreements. Considerations of principle and practical application suggest that IAEA safeguards and existing export control regimes should be used as a basis when drawing up the verification arrangement for this treaty.

When it comes to verification of excess military fissile material, we fully acknowledge the complexity of this issue. In this regard it may be necessary to develop a separate set of verification methods and procedures that will enhance international confidence that fissile material subject to control is not returned to nuclear weapons programmes, while at the same time ensuring that the inspectors do not gain access to classified information. In this context, it may be of interest to look at the Trilateral Initiative by the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA on fissile material that is no longer required for defence purposes, and the ongoing process of drafting a model verification agreement.

Let me briefly refer to a related issue which is important to my country. Highly enriched uranium that is produced for non-explosive purposes, and used as fuel for the propulsion of naval reactors also involves a risk of proliferation and is cause for concern. We should consider addressing this issue in the negotiations with a view to improving safety and the control of such material. We should also consider devising arrangements to ensure that this material is in fact used for non-explosive purposes by confirming both the amount of the material intended for such use and the actual area of use. When confirming the amount of the material, this should be done without specific reference to its design and composition.

We believe that issues not obviously part of the negotiations should nonetheless be addressed in an adequate way. These issues may best be dealt with within a separate framework designed to enhance transparency and build confidence in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Norway has on several occasions presented a four-step proposal for increased transparency and confidence-building measures for such material. The proposal emphasises the importance of establishing voluntary measures that would increase transparency on holdings of plutonium and highly enriched uranium through reporting, inspection and safeguard procedures with a view to introducing agreed, monitored net reductions from these stockpiles. One could consider whether the IAEA should play a role in facilitating a process to this end.

The Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium by the United States and the Russian Federation, agreed at the September summit meeting in Moscow, is a pathbreaking initiative in this regard. It demonstrates what can be achieved through a voluntary process. We would like to see this initiative expanded to the multilateral level, enabling close co-operation with other countries that possess a nuclear capability.

We are delighted that the Convention banning anti-personnel landmines will enter into force as early as 1 March this year. The fact that more than 130 states have signed, and well over 60 have already ratified, is a testimony to the political force behind this Convention. The Convention is one of the more important diplomatic achievements in recent years. But millions of people are still suffering from the threat of anti-personnel landmines. Our efforts have only just begun. We have reached a new stage in the Ottawa process where the emphasis is shifting from campaigning to implementation.

We are grateful to the government of Mozambique for its offer to host the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May. It is highly appropriate for the First Meeting of States Parties to take place in a mine-affected country, which also is a recognition of Africa’s crucial role in bringing about a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. The forthcoming meeting in Maputo will be the first manifestation of the fact that the Convention has entered into force and the successful establishment of a framework for resolving the tremendous humanitarian problems caused by landmines. The meeting will provide an opportunity for States Parties, interested non-States Parties, humanitarian agencies and organisations to discuss in a constructive and forward-looking way initiatives and measures to effectively implement the objectives of the Mine Ban Convention. We appreciate the invitation from Mozambique to an informal consultative meeting here in Geneva on 1 March as part of the preparations for the First Meeting of States Parties. We hope that all interested parties will take this opportunity to contribute positively to a successful meeting in Maputo.

We must ensure the future sustainability of this important process. We must continue to advocate the universalisation of the Convention and to consolidate the norm it has established. At the same time we must make the best possible use of the human, financial and technical resources made available to implement the objectives of the Convention. We should aim to organise the work within the framework of the Convention, in a way which promotes continuity, openness, transparency and inclusiveness. An important element to this end would be to settle for a single venue for future annual Meeting of States Parties, review conferences and other meetings related to the Convention. We should also consider how to structure intersessional work so as to maintain the open-ended and co-operative spirit of the Ottawa process. As a future venue and a focal point for the Mine Ban Convention and the various activities in the field of mine action that it will produce, Geneva would offer a wide variety of diplomatic and technical expertise, a broad representation of diplomatic missions and humanitarian agencies and relevant non-governmental organisations, including the ICRC, the WHO, the UNHCR, and the newly established Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

We are also looking forward to the first annual meeting of the States Parties to the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which will take place later this year. Both the Mine Ban Convention and the amended Protocol II with its consultation mechanism ensure that the landmine issue will continue to be on the international disarmament agenda in the future.

We note that some countries have shown an interest in a separate, limited ban on the transfers of anti-personnel landmines. We agree with those who have suggested that this issue can most appropriately be discussed in the context of the CCW.

In my statement to the CD last year, I highlighted the need for international action to combat the proliferation of small arms. I am pleased to note that a number of important initiatives in this regard have been launched over the last year, and the issue is steadily rising higher on the international agenda.

The moratorium on the import, export and production of light weapons declared in November 1998 by all West African states is the most far-reaching programme to date. It is now up to the international community to contribute to the success of this initiative, both by respecting the moratorium and by contributing resources for its implementation. Norway has supported the development of this initiative for several years. We will co-host an information meeting on the West Africa Moratorium here in Geneva before summer.

Other important initiatives include the negotiation in Vienna of a Firearms Protocol under the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, the ratification and implementation of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, and the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct of Arms Export.

It is clear that without technical and financial resources, many of the promising international initiatives now under way, might fizzle out and become futile. This is in particular true of the many regional, national and local projects in conflict-prone developing countries. Norway recently launched a UNDP Trust Fund for supporting efforts to prevent and reduce the proliferation of small arms. We encourage other countries to contribute to this fund. I am pleased to note that Switzerland has already supported the fund and a number of other countries are looking into the possibility of doing so.

The many initiatives and approaches available make it particularly important to try to develop a common understanding of the main concerns and issues to address. We are already moving towards a more common understanding, but enhanced coherence, better co-ordination and more concerted action are still required. To cite Resolution 53/77 B of the General Assembly, there is:

“…a need to advance efforts towards wider co-operation and better co-ordination in the struggle against the accumulation, proliferation and widespread use of small arms through the Oslo Common Understanding and Brussels Call for Action.”

Our aim is to create a safer environment for those who suffer from the results of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms. The various regional conflicts require different approaches and solutions, but we should seek to include the small arms aspect as part of conflict resolution. We must also find ways to strengthen preventive measures in order to halt the uncontrolled spread of small arms. The complexity of the small arms issue calls for a cautious approach where smaller steps may produce more practical results than too ambitious and perhaps more spectacular endeavours.

The issues of landmines and small arms demonstrate how important it is to address human security. This fact does not exclude the continued relevance of state security questions. Indeed, human security and state security are interrelated. To secure a safer world for all, we must comprehensively deal with the problems related to both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.

This page was last updated March 2 1999 by the editors