NATO Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies in a Changing Threat Environment (Traavik)
Historisk arkiv
Publisert under: Regjeringen Bondevik II
Utgiver: Utenriksdepartementet
Tale/innlegg | Dato: 12.05.2003
Introductory remarks by State Secretary Kim Traavik. (12.05.03)
State Secretary Kim Traavik
Introductory remarks
Soria Moria Hotel, Oslo, 12 May 2003
Conference on "NATO Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policies in a Changing Threat Environment"
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, has become perhaps the defining security challenge of the 21 st> century. This was fully recognized at the NATO-summit in Prague last December. At that meeting, far-reaching political and military measures were adopted to enable the Alliance to counter more effectively the new threats to our security.
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was defined as a principal goal of the Alliance already a decade ago. The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought a new sense of urgency to this effort. The attacks on New York and Washington raised the specter of terrorist groups unleashing weapons of mass destruction on major population centers as the ultimate terror.
NATO’s process of adapting to the realities of the new threats are already reshaping the Alliance in fundamental ways.
We believe that efforts aimed at countering the threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction must be three-fold: first, reducing the vulnerabilities of civilian populations and our armed forces; second, preventing their proliferation; and third, promoting multilateral disarmament. We want to see the Alliance continue and further develop its active role within all these fields.
The urgency of protective measures was illustrated once again during the coalition operations in Iraq. There was a real and justified fear that Saddam Hussein could use weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces as well as against neighboring countries. Against this backdrop, Turkey’s request for allied assistance was understandable.
In light of basic NATO commitments, there was in our view no question that the Turkish request must be acted upon. The Norwegian contribution included, among other things, protective gear against the effect of weapons of mass destruction.
Within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Norway, together with Finland and Sweden, took the initiative last year to develop minimum standards for the protection of civilian populations in the event of use of weapons of mass destruction. It is our aim that these standards will be adopted for the entire Euro-Atlantic region.
Protecting the civilian population from the effects of weapons of mass destruction is also an area of high priority in our cooperation with Russia within the field of civil emergency.
Proliferation-issues have similarly become a key area of cooperation both with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in the NATO-Russia Council, created last year.
NATO has proposed several Confidence and Security Building Measures to Russia with regard to nuclear weapons. We urge greater transparency and emphasis on safety. We hope Russia will be prepared to work closely with NATO on this issue.
The first ever meeting of the NATO Russia Council on Russian soil will take place in Moscow tomorrow. Nuclear and non-proliferation issues will be on the agenda when Lord Robertson and our ambassadors to NATO meet with the Russian Foreign and defense ministers and members of the Duma.
Norway has pushed hard to have nuclear issues in the north placed on the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council. The unsafe storage of nuclear waste and radioactive material on the Kola Peninsula has long been a source of great concern to us all. Since 1995, Norway has spent more than USD 100 million on nuclear safety measures in Russia.
Unsafe storage of nuclear waste materials represents a formidable environmental challenge. But equally it represents a proliferation hazard of the highest order. It is vitally important to prevent fissile materials and nuclear waste from falling into the hands of terrorists or other criminals. Crude, but fatal weapons of terror can fairly easily be manufactured from such materials. The so-called "dirty bomb" is a case in point.
A great deal has been accomplished by the US non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance programmes and by the Norwegian nuclear safety projects – after more than 10 years, much still remains to be done in north-western Russia.
- More than 300 nuclear reactors are located in this area, most of them inside rusting decommissioned nuclear submarines. Some 80 subs are awaiting dismantlement. Many of these boats are in a very bad condition.
- Much of the large quantities of liquid and solid radioactive waste, and spent nuclear fuel are stored under unsatisfactory conditions. It is particularly urgent to clean up storage sites such as Andreyev and Gremikha.
- Along the Russian coastline there are around a thousand lighthouses powered by nuclear strontium batteries. These lighthouses represent a particularly urgent proliferation hazard. The lighthouses are very accessible and the strontium batteries could easily be used to manufacture dirty bombs. Hence, the batteries need to be replaced as soon as possible.
The magnitude of the nuclear safety problem requires a broad-based international effort. Hence it is gratifying to note that the global awareness of the problem is growing. We are extremely encouraged by last year’s decision on the part of the G8 countries to launch the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 initiative. This 20 billion dollar commitment will make a vast difference in our efforts to achieve nuclear safety in the North and elsewhere.
We are also extremely pleased that the EU, with its Northern Dimension initiative, has made nuclear safety - also in Northwest Russia - a priority.
The absence of a multilateral framework agreement with Russia has long been a major obstacle to a large scale international effort. The signature of the framework agreement for multilateral nuclear assistance to Russia, (MNEPR Agreement) in Stockholm on 21 May is a milestone achievement. This means that the implementation of the nuclear window of EU’s Northern Dimension Environmental Program now can start and that the funds under the G-8 Global Partnership can start flowing.
It is encouraging that the G-8 wants to draw on Norway’s long-standing and substantial experience in this field, and we are ready to link up with and contribute to the Partnership. We are already engaged in projects we believe will fit very well with the Partnership’s approach to ssecuring weapons of mass destruction, such as submarine dismantlement, storage site clean up and replacement of strontium batteries.
We need to strengthen the complex regime intended to contain the spread of nuclear technologies. The IAEA safeguard system is at the heart of compliance with the NPT provisions and confidence in the non-proliferation regime. Strengthening the effectiveness of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards system should therefore be a priority for all States Parties.
For years the NPT has been the cornerstone of international agreements on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. However, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is presently under siege. The convening of this conference is therefore particularly timely.
North Korea’s announcement to withdraw from the NPT is a stark reminder of the challenges to international security that we are currently facing. We have called upon Pyongyang to reverse its course of action, and to comply with the provisions of the NPT and to co-operate fully with the IAEA.
India’s and Pakistan’s de facto entrance into the nuclear club undoubtedly served to lower the threshold for obtaining nuclear weapons. The Alliance and Russia jointly condemned the nuclear tests conducted by these two countries.
Iran could very well be on the verge of crossing the nuclear threshold as well. It remains to be seen whether Saddam Hussein continued his programs to develop and possess weapons of mass destruction, in defiance of repeated Security Council demands that he disarm. It is essential that the facts are established as soon as possible. To that end UNMOVIC should play a vital role.
We believe that it is essential to ensure compliance with all the provisions of the NPT. We believe that there should be stronger disincentives for those seeking to avoid complying with their NPT obligations and clearer advantages for those who comply.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an essential element in our overall efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Universal adherence to the CTBT and its early entry into force continue to be a main priority to Norway. We regret that this view is not shared by all our allies.
The third pillar of our efforts to countering threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is the promotion of nuclear disarmament.
The Second Preparatory Meeting for the next Review Conference in 2005 has just taken place in Geneva. At this meeting Norway emphasised the need to increase our efforts in implementing the "Plan of Action" for the systematic and progressive achievement of nuclear disarmament. And we emphasized the need to deal with the new and serious challenges that the NPT is now facing.
Norway welcomes the Moscow agreement between the US and Russia on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. We hope this agreement will soon be ratified and enter into force.
Norway also underlines the need for more vigorous efforts to reduce the arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. We welcome the significant reductions in the numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons held by the US, France and Great Britain. However, this class of nuclear weapons remains outside any formalised arms control treaty. This is clearly one of the key arms control challenges facing us at the present juncture. We need to address it with determination both within NATO and in other proper forums.
NATO is playing an important role in our efforts at halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. However, much more needs to be done. NATO should become an even more efficient instrument for meeting the most pressing security threats of the 21 st> century.
We need to apply a comprehensive strategy and the broadest possible approach in order to effectively counter these threats. We need to apply the broadest range of political, diplomatic, economic and legal measures. Our multilateral approach therefore goes hand in glove with our efforts at strengthening cooperation with our allies and partners.
Ladies and gentlemen,
In conclusion, Norway will continue to pursue the three-pronged approach to counter the challenges of weapons of mass destruction both within the Alliance and elsewhere.
Firstly, we must continue to improve protective measures;
Secondly, we must continue to work for universal adherence to, and full compliance with, the various arms-control and disarmament regimes;
And thirdly, we must strengthen export controls and non-proliferation measures.
It’s a big task. But it is also one of the most important challenges facing the international community. We for our part remain committed to doing our share.
I thank you for your attention.