Mr. Bjørn Tore Godal Foreign Minister of Norway

The Leangkollen Conference

3 February 1997

A new NATO in a new Europe

Five months from now the Heads of State and Government of the sixteen NATO countries will meet at the Madrid Summit. The agenda will cover all aspects of NATO's internal and external adaptation, and European security developments in general.

The Madrid decisions will have wide-ranging consequences, not only for NATO, but for the rest of Europe as well. Some partners will be invited to begin membership negotiations. An enhanced Partnership for Peace will emerge. A charter of cooperation with Russia will hopefully have been concluded. NATO will adapt internally to new requirements. A transformed Alliance will take its place as the main pillar in the new European security architecture.

During the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have been involved in a process of continuous change. The danger of major military conflict is substantially reduced. We are facing new challenges, which are often of a non-military nature. European security has improved dramatically, but at the same time it has become more complex. New approaches are needed if we are to achieve our objective of bringing a divided continent together.

My starting point is that this must be a truly cooperative effort, given that no single institution and no individual country can meet these challenges on its own. The emergence of a new European political order must be characterized by broad processes of openness and integration. I regard the evolution and enlargement of the European Union, NATO, the WEU and the OSCE as elements in these processes. The OSCE has already taken the step from conference to organization. The Council of Europe will soon be truly all- European. These organizations and the various regional arrangements like the Barents Cooperation all point in the same direction and work towards the same goal: enhanced stability on our continent. A Europe without dividing lines is slowly being built.

The attempt to enhance European security is at the top of the agenda for all our friends and allies. It also marks the point of departure for our own priorities and our own efforts. Norwegian security has been and will remain part of the wider European security framework. A comprehensive approach is therefore an important feature of Norwegian foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era.

Continued democratization, social justice, economic development and environmental protection in all of Europe are important for Norwegian security. This does not mean that we will be abandoning long-standing patterns of military cooperation. The framework and the principles on which Western security was based for fifty years form a solid foundation for the new Europe. But they must be adapted to the new situation if they are to meet our present needs.

Ever since 1949, NATO and trans-Atlantic relations have been pillars of Norwegian foreign and security policy. The changes that have occurred in Europe do not alter this fact. We cannot do without the military security represented by the Alliance. Nor can we do without an active American leadership in Euro-Atlantic security issues, and a continued US presence on our continent. These give us a solid platform from which to act. These are features which must be preserved. But the altered nature of the trans-Atlantic relationship and Norwegian-American cooperation reflects the changes that have occurred in the overall security framework.

Some people have wondered whether the USA is withdrawing from Europe, but developments over the past few years have shown that this is not the case. The Americans were among the first to realize that today's challenges cannot be met by yesterday's measures, and have been a prime mover in the efforts to transform European security.

The initiatives to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, as well as the enlargement process itself, originated in Washington. It is my firm belief that this active approach stems from continued conviction that American interests and American security cannot be separated from those of Europe, and that if NATO is to remain an effective instrument for US interests, it must adapt.

The upcoming Madrid Summit is only the last in a series of meetings intended to ensure that the Alliance keeps abreast of developments. During the Cold War summits were a rarity. But the Madrid Summit will be the fifth time that NATO Heads of State and Government have met since the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe began in 1989. This shows the dynamic nature of the recent years.

If we look back on these meetings, we see that NATO responded to the challenge represented by the end of the East-West confrontation. The Brussels Summit in 1989 spoke of "a time of change", of "shaping the future of Europe", and of "overcoming the divisions of Europe". The London Summit in 1990 and the Rome Summit in 1991 gave substance to this, first by originating new contact arrangements with the Warsaw Pact countries, and then by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and agreeing on a new strategic concept which made it clear that NATO is no longer facing a specifically military threat. The Brussels Summit in 1994 continued the process by establishing the PFP and initiating the enlargement process.

The "new NATO" is colored by the fact that the response to the new challenges requires a comprehensive approach. Transforming NATO and making it more of a political organization, does not mean that we are abandoning the military alliance. Military effectiveness forms the backbone of the effort to ensure European security and stability. Without the Article 5 guarantees and the integrated military cooperation, NATO would be a less credible security instrument. But this alone would be inadequate, given the nature of the challenges we face. We need relevant responses to problems which do not pose direct and immediate military threats to our security. Otherwise NATO would soon lose its vitality and the strong public support it enjoys in the member states. This would not be in our best interests, and it would not serve the security interests of our partners.

In the run-up to the Summit three interrelated issues of an internal nature must be resolved: We must implement the Combined Joint Task Force concept (CJTF); we must develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and we must agree on the new command structure. Great strides have been taken on these issues since the Berlin Ministerial last June, and the process is due to be concluded at the Madrid Summit.

The changes in NATO's military structure illustrate how political and military considerations mesh. The old structure was developed with the Soviet threat in mind. The new organization must be prepared for all types of conflicts, and it must be prepared to deal with traditional as well as new security tasks, including peace support operations. It must satisfy the military requirements of mobility and flexibility, and the political need for a greater European role and close relations with non-NATO countries. It must incorporate France as well as the new members. At the same time we cannot justify a new command structure which is more costly than the former one.

The Bosnia experience shows that peace support is most successful if it is carried out professionally. The CJTF concept meets the need for military leadership of such operations. It will also enable us to involve the partner countries in such operations and make it possible for the Western European Union (WEU) to use allied resources in operations where the North American allies choose not to participate. The CJTF is thus a central element in the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance. The same forces can be used by NATO and the WEU, and we avoid double structures, competition and wastage. NATO and the WEU can act in concert, making optimum use of the best qualities of each organization.

The interdependence of the various parts of the post-Cold War security architecture is indeed illustrated by the relationship between the Alliance and the WEU. Increasingly we see two organizations working together in a close relationship towards the same goal and with the same resources.

The Berlin decisions enhanced the position of the associate members of the WEU within that organization. Their formal status has not changed, but as full members of NATO they must also have corresponding rights within the WEU as far as planning and conducting operations where NATO resources are concerned. All European allies should now have the same rights as the full members on these issues, as most WEU member states have acknowledged.

Agreement was almost reached on how to put this into practice at the WEU Ministerial last November. We look to the current French presidency to keep this issue high on the agenda with a view to resolving it before Madrid. Once we have an agreement in place a good portion of the internal adaptation of NATO will also fall into place.

Some partners will probably be invited to initiate membership negotiations with NATO at the Summit. Right now we are preparing for this invitation. A number of analyses of military and economic issues are being launched, covering all partners interested in membership. These analyses will provide a basis for the political decision of who to invite.

No definite conditions have been laid down for the new members. We expect them to abide by the principles on which the Alliance and Western cooperation in general are founded. We see how the prospect of membership has affected the political, military and economic reform processes in the partner countries. Democratic institutions are taking root, and ethnic and regional disputes are being resolved. This is, of course, not only due to the prospect of NATO membership. The desire for EU membership is an equally important factor. It is too early to say that successful reforms are guaranteed. This makes it doubly important to maintain the momentum in the European process of integration.

One issue in the NATO enlargement process is how many new members to invite at this juncture. It will therefore be critical to emit the correct signals concerning NATO's intentions. NATO must remain open after the first invitations are issued. The first to join must not be the last to join. The Summit communiqué must make it crystal clear that enlargement is an on-going process, and that countries that qualify for membership will be invited to join when the political conditions are ripe.

Against this background the Partnership for Peace must be further strengthened as an instrument for enhanced cooperation between NATO and partners who are not invited to join, or who do not wish for membership. The PFP will remain an important fixture in European security.

In my view the PFP+ now being established should be more responsive to partner needs than the existing arrangement. The partners must be given more influence on how it develops. Through the Atlantic Partnership Council (APC), PFP will acquire a political consultative element. I regard this as a very welcome proposal. This coming spring we will be consulting with partners on the content of the APC. The aim should be to reduce the distance between the partners and NATO as much as possible.

The new PFP will cover an expanded range of activities, including exercises, and one of the consequences will be partner presence at the Alliance's military headquarters. These liaison officers will not be integrated into NATO staffs, but will be working in close contact with their NATO colleagues. The natural focus for this activity is NATO's new missions. The partners' presence should be mainly concentrated on those headquarters in the Alliance that are most concerned with these tasks, in particular the CJTF headquarters. This should not exclude some presence at other headquarters, for example in the Nordic-Baltic region, if the partners so desire, and if it serves the purpose of establishing close ties between the Alliance and the partners.

An important question will be whether it is possible to broaden the scope for regional cooperation within the PFP framework. In the military field we have seen regional arrangements developing in a natural way. The BALTBAT project is a case in point. We should seek to build further on practical cooperation of this kind. At the same time the establishment of a political consultation framework raises the question of whether regional elements can be incorporated into the APC.

One of the experiences gained from the NACC is the difficulty of accommodating all desires and needs within a framework encompassing over 40 participants. This may be one of the reasons why the NACC has lost much of its vitality. The APC should be able to accommodate regionally based consultations, and here the Nordic countries could play a role vis-à-vis the Baltic states. But such consultations must be based on openness and transparency. Arrangements of this kind must be tied to the PFP in Brussels. All interested countries must be allowed to participate. We would expect our major allies to take part.

Relations with Russia form an indispensable part of NATO's efforts to ensure European stability. We already have a well-established relationship, where Alliance foreign and defense ministers regularly exchange views with their Russian colleagues. And we have growing practical cooperation. Agreements like the CFE Treaty and cooperation within the OSCE serve to supplement these relations. IFOR and SFOR show how much potential there is in this relationship if we can get it right.

Our aim is to establish even closer relations with Russia. We want institutionalized ties that are broad enough to encompass the evolution of the European security architecture. Consultations have already started with Moscow on the content of these ties, and agreement on the charter should have been reached by the time the Summit is held. This document must have real content, in the form of an enduring, distinct and visible political relationship, as well as a well-defined platform for qualitatively enhanced practical cooperation.

We should be ready to consult on all issues of common interest and take legitimate Russian interests and positions into account. And the Russians on their part must show equal respect for our positions. In view of the importance of the issue, there is no doubt that it will take considerable efforts to reach a successful conclusion.

We have already done a lot to take account of Russian concerns. We are in agreement on the need to strengthen the OSCE as the all-European leg of European security. We are working together with Russia to adapt the CFE Treaty. We have made it clear that the NATO-Russia relations are just as important as enlargement. And in the last communiqué from the foreign ministers, we even laid down the three no's as regards nuclear weapons and enlargement: NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

On the other hand, it must be clearly understood that Russia will not be able to influence the internal decisions of the Alliance. Deciding such issues, including Article 5 questions and enlargement, will remain the sole prerogative of members.

There is scope for enhanced cooperation on a number of practical questions, including defense-related environmental issues and nuclear safety, proliferation, crisis management and peace support operations with a UN or OSCE mandate, and humanitarian action and civil emergency preparedness. I envisage a relationship on such issues ranging from consultations through joint recommendations with regard to joint action. How far it will be possible to go in each case, particularly as regards joint action, will have to be determined in the course of the consultations. We should also expect that with time and experience, the scope of consultations and joint action will evolve and expand. In sum, the NATO-Russia relationship should be put on an entirely new footing. From now on we should be talking about two partners in European security. In institutional terms we could envisage the establishment of a NATO-Russia Council.

I have concentrated my remarks on processes which center on the Alliance. This is natural, given the fact that NATO will be in the limelight during the coming months. But there should be no doubt as to the importance of the other integration processes. The work done in other organizations and cooperation fora reinforces and supplements that of the Alliance. Without this, NATO's own efforts would be less effective and the whole process would be incomplete.

The Inter Governmental Conference of the European Union is scheduled to be concluded in June. Even though we are outside the Union, we are integrated into the European framework of cooperation to such an extent that many of the issues being debated there are of crucial importance to us.

We do not know the outcome of the IGC, but it may well have ramifications in the security field. From a Norwegian point of view, it is important to ensure that an enhanced foreign policy cooperation between the EU members remains open to European allies and partners. Inclusive solutions must be found.

The extended concept of security makes the EU a key security factor. Through its assistance programs, the Union contributes to openness, integration and prosperity. Enlargement is the most important challenge facing the EU today. It represents a historic opportunity to create political, economic and social stability on our continent. In the time until negotiations commence, the applicant countries should be drawn more and more closely into the whole range of EU activities.

Some applicants will have to wait before their desire for membership is fulfilled. But the process of preparation may be more important than the date of inclusion. EU enlargement must be seen in conjunction with the corresponding process in NATO. We must avoid saying a double no to new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe aspiring for membership. To achieve this there is a need for close and open relations between the Alliance and the Union during the coming year.

The EU should include all applicants in the process of negotiation from the very beginning. Such a procedure would contribute to stability and predictability particularly in the Baltic region. This issue has not yet been resolved within the Union. We support the views of the Nordic EU countries on this. Nobody should be excluded when the enlargement process commences.

The OSCE plays an important role at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Through quiet diplomacy, support for democratic institutions, safeguarding of human rights, and efforts to mitigate the effects of ethnic and minority tensions, it is an integral part of the work being done to prevent potential unrest from developing into open conflict. The elections and the arms reduction process in Bosnia are examples of the type of task the organization may be called upon to carry out.

During the OSCE Summit in Lisbon the new European security model was one of the main topics. This model will be further refined. I believe it will be able to influence the way in which institutions and cooperation fora pool their resources in support of a common goal. Building on this will be an important task if Norway takes over the chairmanship of the OSCE in 1999.

The work in the broad organizations is underpinned by activities in regional arrangements. A number of such arrangements have emerged. They play a key role in confidence building in that they focus on issues which do not lend themselves easily to being handled in other fora. The environmental problems in the High North are an example of this kind of challenge. Their trans-boundary nature means that broad solutions are necessary. At the same time their magnitude means that broad participation is necessary in order to find sustainable solutions.

The Barents Cooperation is another example where Nordic and Russian local authorities, organizations and companies are involved in steadily growing practical cooperation, which is gradually serving to lower the barriers between Russia and its neighbors. The involvement of the EU, NATO allies and other countries underscores the inclusive nature of this arrangement.

The Baltic Cooperation has the same effect. We see it evolving as a forum for understanding and cooperation between the Baltic states and Russia. Developing this relationship is the key to low tension in the area. The Nordic countries have an important role in facilitating this. They can point to a Nordic model of how states can cooperate to their mutual benefit. At the same time the Nordic countries can serve as one of the links between the countries of the region and the rest of Europe.

The changes over the past few years have made it possible to build a new foundation for Nordic cooperation. A more dynamic relationship is now developing, based on a joint security agenda. Finland and Sweden are active PFP partners. The Nordic countries stand together in SFOR in Bosnia. They cooperate in the BALTBAT project to support the Baltic states. The possibility of increased cooperation on peace support missions is being explored. There are many new possibilities to be exploited.

In addition to the Barents and Baltic Cooperation, there is the Black Sea Cooperation, and perhaps the time has now come to add a fourth B: the Balkan Cooperation. In order to sustain the peace process in Bosnia, reconciliation and cooperation are necessary. The onus is on the people of the region, but there is also scope for outside assistance. Regional cooperation can help bring people together. The arrangements in Northern Europe cannot be directly transferred to the Balkans. But experience has shown that positive results can be achieved in regional arrangements. In the efforts to ensure peace, stability and economic progress in the Balkans no stone should be left unturned.

Madrid is a preliminary culmination to the process of change in NATO. The Summit in many ways marks the end of the immediate post-Cold War period. But I feel like quoting Winston Churchill: "This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. Perhaps it is the end of the beginning." The stability and permanence of the Cold War period are gone, perhaps for ever. Dynamism and continuous change are defining characteristics of the new Europe. We must be prepared to make further efforts if we are to meet the new security challenges. It will take time to remove the last remnants of the East-West confrontation. Ethnic and regional tension will survive for some years. But I feel that we are off to a promising start.