Check against delivery.

Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal:

Opening address at the Pugwash Conference

Lillehammer, 2 August 1997

It is an honour and great pleasure for me to take the floor as the first speaker at the 47th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. The number of important scholars and eminent personalities present here today is living proof that the Pugwash movement is well and committed to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of the post war period.

The dissolution of the Warszaw Pact and the break up of the Soviet Union brought an effective end to the East - West military confrontation of the Cold War.

The fundamental political changes of the last few years have had a major impact also on the nuclear weapons policies of the United States and Russia, and positive effects on European security.

We have seen significant reductions in the nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia, as a result of arms control agreements and unilateral withdrawals. Readiness levels have been reduced and weapon systems de-targeted. The overall volume of submarines with nuclear weapons patrolling in areas adjacent to the Nordic countries has been significantly reduced.

We have seen a reduction in the political and military importance of nuclear weapo ns for European security leading to increased stability and enhanced security also in the Nordic area. These are highly welcome developments, that we must seek to consolidate and to further deepen. Given the actual political situation in Europe we have now a unique opportunity to further reduce the nuclear weapon arsenals as well as a further reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in European and global security.

The efforts of Russia as well as of the United States will continue to be decisive for moving the nuclear arms control process forward. Developments in Russia will be a very important factor in this context. A democratic Russia, moving towards greater political and economic stability, will be able to agree further reductions in nuclear weapons, and will also see great benefit in such reductions. The development of broad political, economic and security cooperation with Russia, and her integration into the web of Euro-Atlantic and global cooperative institutions will consolidate reform and development within Russia.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris in May is a milestone in the development of cooperative security relations in Europe and a proof that we have come far in developing relations across the old divides. At the same time, the Founding Act is an instrument, that will serve its purpose only when put to active use.

We have from the Norwegian side maintained that security in Europe can only be built with the active participation of a democratic Russia. We have considered a NATO agreement with Russia as a vital contribution to security in the new Europe, no less important than the enlargement of the Alliance. The Founding Act lays the basis for qualitative new relations, and for bringing Russia into the security structures taking shape in the new Europe.

The NATO Russia Joint Permanent Council will have a broad agenda covering all major security issues. Russia will be given an opportunity to influence positively European security. And Russia, like the NATO countries, will have to consult on developments affecting her security. We have agreed to seek common positions and action where that is possible.

The new security structures that are now emerging should lead to further nuclear disarmament rather than the opposite. The recent agreements between NATO and Russia and between the USA and Russia confirm this trend. We are happy to see this development and we support it. Given our long-standing role as the only NATO member country with a common border with the Soviet Union and Russia, we have a strong vested interest in these developments.

The NATO countries stated in December 1996 that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - nor did they foresee any future need to do so. This declaration is an important contribution to the further reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in European security.

The Alliance has also agreed to examine the Strategic Concept both in the light of the new security situation and the challenges ahead. Together with the US-Russian declaration on START III issued at the Helsinki summit in March, this opens prospects for further progress with regard to nuclear arms reductions.

The agreement between the USA and the Russian Federation to embark on negotiations on reduced strategic arsenals beyond the parameters of the START II Treaty is a step in the right direction. Such talks should also involve the other nuclear weapon states. Their particular responsibility for nuclear disarmament should not be diluted. This is why we find it problematic to transfer the responsibility for negotiating nuclear disarmament from the nuclear weapon states to multilateral fora.

In this context, we should continue to stress the need for further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, and for their destruction. We know that thousands of tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn and put into storage. These weapons should be destroyed, and not merely stored. It is important to ensure that this part of the disarmament process is also continued, as proposed in earlier unilateral declarations made by the USA and the Russian Federation.

Several ideas have been put forward as to how we could best proceed on a broad scale in our efforts to address the nuclear issues. We have noted with interest the report by the Canberra Commision and considers its proposals and recommendations to be of great value in charting the course ahead. In particular, we should further look into the possibility of :

• taking nuclear forces off alert
• removal of warheads from delivery vehicles
• ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons
• ending sub-critical testing of nuclear weapon related equipment.

The possibilities of the nuclear weapon states to agree to a reciprocal no first use of nuclear weapons as part of a broader disarmament context is another issue worth giving further study.

The Norwegian approach to the wider problems related to nuclear activities is based on the realization that there are potential risks of proliferation inherent both in military and civilian nuclear activities. In addition we see challenges from the process of nuclear disarmament itself. The international disarmament agenda should in our view encompass a program for managing disarmament. That is why I have launched the concept of a "Management of Disarmament" which addresses the broader problems relating to the implementation of nuclear and chemical disarmament processes in particular, including the secure and environmentally safe handling of material from weapons scheduled for destruction. As a response to the serious challenges posed by these activities, the Norwegian Government has drawn up a Plan of Action on nuclear activities and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our Northern borders. One priority area of this plan is the management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Our goal is, in cooperation with other interested states, to achieve safe, cost-effective operations under independent control and inspection, and in keeping with internationally accepted principles and guidelines.

The successful NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 was a crucial event in the efforts to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Principles and Objectives document from this conference sets out an agenda that aims at strengthening this Treaty. An agreed final report from the NPT Review and Extension Conference would have given clearer guidance for the road ahead. Therefore, it is all the more important to ensure that the follow-up process we are now embarking on, is brought to a successful conclusion at the 2000 Review Conference. A strengthened NPT will ensure non-proliferation and underpin efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

The signing and adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty last year was a milestone in the annals of global disarmament. For the first time since mankind entered the nuclear age, we now have a treaty banning all kinds of nuclear test explosions. This Treaty will facilitate the further implementation of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The conclusion of the CTBT, however, is not the end of the road. Nuclear proliferation will continue to be an important topic on the global multilateral disarmament agenda.

Negotiations on an agreement prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes should be the next priority item on the agenda of the CD. After the conclusion of the CTBT, Cut-off negotiations would be in accordance with the Principles and Objectives agreed at the NPT Review Conference in 1995. A cut-off agreement is an important means of reducing the availability of fissile material. The inclusion of measures to monitor enrichment and reprocessing facilities would strengthen a 'cut-off' treaty.

I propose to work towards greater openness regarding the stocks of fissile material held by nuclear powers. As a first step, the nuclear powers should, on a voluntary basis, provide detailed information on their stocks of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. A second step could be to ensure cooperative measures to clarify and confirm those declarations. As a third step, the nuclear powers could permit international inspection of their stocks, with the aim of ensuring that the inventory in storage can be taken out only for non-weapons purposes. As a fourth step, agreed monitored net reductions from these stockpiles could be introduced. In addition, consistent and stringent international standards of accounting and security for fissile materials should be established.

These proposals were introduced in the first session of the Prepcom for the 2000 NPT-Review Conference held in New York, 7-18 april this year and are now part of the agenda for the 2000 Review Conference.

Furthermore, I would like to reaffirm Norway's support and commitment to the IAEA's "93+2" programme, that aims at strengthening the effectiveness and at improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. I hope that the Protocol, providing the necessary additional authority for the implementation of Part II of the Agency's proposals for a strengthened and effective safeguards system, will be approved by the IAEA Boards of Governors at its next special session. These measures will increase the Agency's capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activities. States and other parties to safeguards agreements should start early negotiations with the IAEA, in order to conclude the relevant additional protocol, with a view to implementing the "93+2" programme.

Multilateral export control arrangements have come to play an increasingly important role in international non-proliferation efforts, by coordinating and strengthening the enforcement of the non-proliferation regime. The Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime have an important function to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material and technology for missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

From the beginning of international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, supplier countries have recognized their responsibility to ensure that such co-operation does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Shortly after entry into force of the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1970, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment of two mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger Committee (in 1971) and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (in 1975.)

The endorsement at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the fullscope safeguards policy already adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992 clearly reflects the conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply policy is a vital element to promote shared nuclear non-proliferation commitments and obligations.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger-committee perform an indispensible function to prevent nuclear proliferation, together with the Missile Technology Control Regime, established in 1987. After negotiations in Oslo in 1992, the scope of this regime was extended so that the control now includes missiles capable of carrying not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological warheads.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group has consistently promoted openness and greater understanding of its objectives. We strongly support the ongoing transparency-process in this regime. In this connection I would particularly mention the planned international seminar on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation in Vienna in October this year, immediately following the forty-first session of the IAEA General Conference. Given the importance of including all actual and potential supplier countries and the wish for a genuine and open dialogue, all states, parties to the NPT or not, will be invited.

There are more tasks to be completed and the international community will have to seek out the most urgent priorities for moving forward. Global security and international stability will benefit from any progress along this road.

A global ban on nuclear weapons remains our ultimate objective.