Mr. Bjørn Tore Godal
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs

ADDRESS TO THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL,
LOS ANGELES, 1 APRIL 1997

The New Europe: An Atlantic Challenge

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to be with you today and an honor to be addressing you from this prestigious rostrum. I would like to thank the Los Angeles World Affairs Council for inviting me and to congratulate it on having lived up to the mission it has had since 1953, that of bringing world affairs to Los Angeles. My admiration for your achievement is in no way diminished by the fact that the media frequently remind us that Los Angeles' affairs are world affairs.

However, since I come from a different part of the world, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some perspectives on a vital component of world affairs over there. As the title of this address indicates, the new challenges facing Europe present a challenge to America as well. We have a common interest in the success of the formidable task that lies ahead, the task of establishing a new security order in Europe.

The outlines of the new order are already emerging, and with them the prospect of a more stable, prosperous and undivided continent. The decisions we are going to make during the next few months, culminating with the NATO Summit in Madrid in early July, will mark the beginning of a new epoch in European history.

Instead of the Cold War and its East-West rivalry, we now face a whole set of new challenges. They are in many ways more complex than the old ones, and cannot be met by military measures alone. Democratization, social justice, economic development and environmental protection are now as important to European security as military defense.

To meet these challenges, all the countries in the Euro-Atlantic region must be integrated into a comprehensive network of cooperation. The network includes organizations, like NATO, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western European Union. And it includes regional arrangements, which supplement the work of the broader organizations. The framework and the principles on which Western security has been based for 50 years remain the essential foundation for the new Europe, but now they are being adapted to meet the new needs.

The transatlantic relationship underpinned European and Norwegian security throughout the Cold War, and NATO and an active US involvement in Europe were the backbone of this relationship. Let us see this in a historic perspective. Until 9 April 1940, when the Germans attacked, Norway felt that it was best served by neutrality. The USA tended to think in a similar way until Pearl Harbor. Traditional neutrality and non-committal attitudes are outdated as foreign and security policy guidelines. The tragedy of former Yugoslavia has taught us that this is equally important in the new Europe. US leadership and close transatlantic cooperation are necessary if we are to find viable solutions to the new challenges.

The US was also among the first to realize that today's challenges could not be met by yesterday's measures. Washington has been the driving force behind the efforts to adapt NATO to the new security situation. The initiatives to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, as well as the enlargement process and the effort to establish a special relationship between the Alliance and Russia, all originated in Washington.

I believe that this constructive approach stems from a conviction that US interests and US security cannot be separated from those of Europe. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was very clear when she reaffirmed America's commitment to Europe during the special ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in February. In terms of security, the US remains a European power, and we welcome its contribution in charting the course forward.

The US has been firm in underlining that this does not reduce the need for a new kind of burdensharing within the Alliance. The European allies have responded to the call to take more responsibility for their own security and decided to further develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). For Norway it has been essential that this should not compromise the transatlantic link and NATO's position as the core institution of European security. We are pleased with the decision to develop the ESDI within NATO.

At the Madrid Summit some partner countries will be invited to begin membership negotiations, a new and more powerful Partnership for Peace will be launched, and the Atlantic Partnership Council - another US initiative - will be established. Far-reaching decisions will be taken concerning the future military structure of NATO. By then we should also have concluded a charter with Russia, which will mark the beginning of a new relationship between NATO and Russia as partners in security. This approach to the new NATO should prevent the renationalization of defense efforts and the reemergence of regional alliances outside NATO that might lead to increased instability and unpredictability.

I would like to emphasize that enlargement must not be seen in isolation from other aspects of NATO's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are two major challenges in this regard. First: How to ensure that countries not invited to join NATO in July can continue their process of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Secondly: How to make sure that our vision of a stable and democratic Russia, constructively cooperating with Europe and North America, comes true.

Madrid should mark only the beginning of the enlargement process. Not all of the 12 countries presently seeking membership will be invited. Some will qualify earlier than others, but all must have a perspective on their future relationship with NATO. The Summit must commit NATO to a continued open door policy.

In this regard Norway attaches great importance to the Baltic republics. They are all eager to join NATO. My recent visits to all three Baltic states left me with a strong impression of their concern not to be left out in the cold when enlargement begins. We must deal with this challenge by developing a comprehensive strategy to ensure their continued integration with the West.

Here much can be done through NATO. The commitment to continued openness is one element in the strategy. At the same time an enhanced Partnership for Peace must provide solid links with the Alliance, and all partners must be given a direct say in how the PfP develops. The proposed Atlantic Partnership Council should serve as a political superstructure above the practical cooperation in the PfP.

Thus, regional consultations should take place within the broader APC framework and be open to all interested partners, including Russia, otherwise such regional arrangements would lose much of their attraction. In connection with the Baltic Sea Region, for example, the Nordic countries cannot assume a special responsibility for that region on their own. We would expect the US and other major NATO allies to participate. Baltic security must be viewed in a broad European and transatlantic context. It cannot be regionalized.

The most pressing challenge to the security of the Baltic states is in the economic and social sectors. This gives the European Union a crucial role in the integration process. If the Baltic desire for NATO membership is not met this summer, it will be all the more important that the Balts receive a positive answer from the EU when its enlargement process is due to begin later this year. Even though Norway is not a member of the Union, we share the Nordic EU members' position that negotiations should begin simultaneously for all applicants.

Regional cooperation has great potential in the Nordic-Baltic area. It supplements activities in broader organizations, meets the immediate need for economic and social reform, and contributes to enhanced openness and confidence. For this reason Norway takes an active part in the work of the Baltic Sea Council, where the Baltic and Nordic countries are joined by Russia, Poland, Germany and the European Union.

The Nordic countries can also serve as a link between the Balts and the rest of Europe. We have developed a strategy for cooperation with other countries around the Baltic Sea. The Nordic-Baltic cooperation, often referred to as "5+3", has replaced or is supplementing a broad range of activities which used to be purely Nordic. The next Foreign Ministers' meeting in connection with "5+3" will take place in Bergen, Norway, in September. We will be inviting the US to take part in this meeting as a tangible confirmation that the integration of the Baltic states is part of a broad transatlantic effort.

The Nordic Council is an example of how established structures are adapted to new challenges. During the Cold War, European security was never on the agenda of this forum, due to different security alignments. Nowadays, an ever closer dialogue and cooperation on security issues is developing. The best example of the new impetus to Nordic cooperation is the Nordic-Polish brigade in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. A military unit comprising NATO members Denmark and Norway, neutrals like Sweden and Finland, former Warsaw Pact member Poland, and small Baltic contingents, all serving in a NATO force under US command, with Russian participation, would have been inconceivable only a few years ago.

The BALTBAT project is another example of the transatlantic dimension of our efforts with regard to the Baltic states. Together with the US and the UK, the Nordic countries have assisted the Baltic countries to establish a joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion, BALTBAT. An Estonian company is right now serving alongside Norwegian troops in the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon.

Stable security in Europe cannot be achieved without Russia. Our second challenge is therefore to establish a strong and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia.

Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is well-known. Moscow is concerned that NATO intends to move its military infrastructure towards Russian borders, specifically through the deployment of nuclear weapons and troops in new member countries. There is no reason for such a concern. NATO does take account of legitimate Russian security needs. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the NATO Foreign Ministers made it clear last December that NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

In the same way, the Alliance has taken seriously Russia's concern about the possible deployment of conventional troops in new member countries. Some weeks ago, NATO unilaterally declared that the security of the new members would be ensured through their integration into the military cooperation of the Alliance. For the foreseeable future, there will be no deployment of major combat formations in new member countries. In today's Europe, there is no need for such deployment.

NATO already has a well-established relationship with Russia. Foreign and Defense Ministers regularly exchange views on issues of common concern with their Russian colleagues. But our ambitions go beyond present arrangements. We must establish a new foundation for the NATO-Russia relationship. The experience in Bosnia shows what potential it has, if we can get it right.

I am strongly in favor of a charter with Russia, which will make Russia a partner in European security. Russia needs a forum for dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO. This means more than just listening to Russian arguments. They must have a real say, and we must look for joint decisions and joint action on a wide range of issues. A democratic Russia should have an influence commensurate with its position, and it must take its share of responsibility. This does not, of course, imply a Russian veto in internal Alliance affairs.

The Russians seem committed to an agreement well before the Madrid Summit, and here active US involvement is a requirement for success. No European ally can influence the Russians the way you can. This is to my mind an excellent example of how important the US is to the future of European security.

The Helsinki Summit last month illustrates my point. Although this event was clearly of a bilateral nature, it formed at the same time a central part of the joint Alliance effort to build security together with Russia, not in isolation from it. Through the efforts made by President Clinton and his team, we may have turned a crucial corner. I do not want to minimize the remaining problems. The road will by no means be downhill from now on. Russia still opposes NATO enlargement. But in Helsinki Russia seemed convinced that long-term stability and security are dependent on cooperation. If we can maintain the momentum of the process, there is a real chance that the leaders of the NATO countries will sign the agreement with Russia early this summer. This will mean an enduring commitment by 17 countries to build European security in a spirit of partnership, not confrontation.

As the only ally sharing a border with Russia, Norway is in a position to forge new relations with Russia. We are focusing on Northwest Russia, where we can make a substantial contribution to drawing Russia into European cooperation. This also serves our own national interests, because it contributes to low tension and successful economic and political reform in areas close to our borders.

The Barents Cooperation, established less than five years ago on a Norwegian initiative, is the best example of our efforts in this regard. It includes the northern counties of Norway, Sweden and Finland, as well as the oblasts of Murmansk and Archangel and the Autonomous Republic of Karelia in Russia. The involvement of the EU, NATO allies and other countries in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council serves to underscore the inclusive nature of this arrangement.

This cooperation encompasses a growing number of practical projects, and through regular contact at the local level it is helping to lower the barriers between Russia and its neighbors. This contributes to low tension and normalization, the opening up of new areas of cooperation, support for economic reform and social development, and the building of mutual confidence; in other words it enhances security in what was one of the Cold War's most sensitive regions.

The uniqueness of the Barents Cooperation lies not so much in its regional character as in the way it is organized. The driving force is a Regional Council consisting of local politicians. Much of the responsibility for a successful outcome thus rests at the local level. Regional priorities predominate. Regular contacts across the border have a socializing effect in the sense that the new Russian leaders can see how local democracy functions in the Nordic countries.

The greatest challenge in the High North today is nuclear contamination. Throughout the Cold War there was widespread nuclear activity in the areas adjacent to our borders. This produced large quantities of waste which has not been satisfactorily stored; more than a hundred nuclear submarines decommissioned due to the START treaties await demolition. The condition of the nuclear power plants is such that we would prefer to see them closed down.

The cost of cleaning up will be high. The main responsibility lies with the Russians themselves, but the magnitude of the problem is so enormous that it cannot be done by them alone. Nor can it be solved by Russia and Norway together. In view of the trans-boundary nature of the problem we feel that other major Western countries and relevant international organizations like the European Union should be closely involved. We consider that we have been fairly successful in this endeavor.

The American authorities have consistently supported our efforts. Concrete assistance is being provided though the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. The trilateral cooperation between Russia, the US and Norway at the military level has resulted in an agreement on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC), an almost unique new type of cooperation between defense authorities. AMEC means direct US military participation in meeting the environmental challenges in the High North. The benefits of this are twofold: on the one hand it is of great practical importance for us and for Russia, and on the other it helps to integrate Russia into a wider cooperative framework.

This is another example of how crucial American interest and involvement are in meeting the challenges we face in creating a new security order for a stable, prosperous and undivided Europe. And I am firmly convinced that such a Europe is also in the interests of America. Of course, I realize that places like the High North, Norway, Russia and even Europe may seem very far away, but institutions like the World Affairs Council can help to bring them closer to home.

I would like to thank you once again for inviting me to this meeting of the Council and to wish you and all the "diplomats" of the International Circle all the best.