Historisk arkiv

Towards a new european security order

Historisk arkiv

Publisert under: Regjeringen Jagland

Utgiver: Utenriksdepartementet

Towards a new european security order

Foreign minister Bjørn Tore Godal`s opening address at the Bolkesjø conference 6 March 1997

Mr. Chairman,

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honored to be invited once again to deliver an introductory speech to the Bolkesjø Conference. The issues that will be discussed here during these two days are at the very top of our agenda. I am sure your discussions will be as fruitful as they have proved to be in previous years.

European security stands at the threshold of a new era. We have gone through a period of transition since the Cold War. We are now moving forward towards a new century, and giving shape and specific content to the security arrangements for the future. This year will witness important decisions on the enlargement of the European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance.

At the same time, we are seeking agreement on NATO-Russia relations. These processes represent our most powerful tools for building long-term security through cooperation and integration. They are being supplemented by other efforts, including regional cooperation. We are seeking to involve all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in a common venture towards truly shared security.

The new Europe has provided each and all of us with greatly expanded opportunities. Norway has taken up this challenge. We have opened a new and promising chapter in the form of the Barents Cooperation with Russia and other partners in the High North. With our Nordic and Baltic neighbors we have helped set in motion a dynamic process of cooperation in the Baltic, bringing new exchanges, growth and stability.

I emphasize regional cooperation because it brings concrete, practical benefits to the peoples in our neighboring countries, but also because regional cooperation supplements and strengthens the efforts in broader fora. State Secretary Siri Bjerke will discuss our thinking and our priorities in this area in her statement tomorrow.

I would like to concentrate my remarks on how we can draw advantage from the process of NATO adaptation and enlargement to provide security and stability for the whole of Europe as we move into the next century. This is a vision I believe we all share.

My contention is that the process now under way will speed up and facilitate the development of cooperative and Europe-wide security structures and practices, and not create new divisions or set-backs in our search for a new security order. NATO is being used as an instrument for political change.

Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance was never exclusively a military instrument. It helped integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the transatlantic community. It promoted reconciliation and close military cooperation between the one-time historical enemies France and Germany. It helped consolidate political change in the new Spanish democracy.

This same political purpose is at the heart of NATO's forthcoming enlargement with Central and Eastern European states and its seeking a partnership with Russia. Security is not a zero sum game. It is my conviction that everyone stands to gain from the massive international effort now under way, including Russia.

Four months from now the Heads of State and Government of the sixteen NATO countries will meet at the Madrid Summit. The Madrid agenda will cover all aspects of NATO's adaptation and European security in general: A number of partners will be invited to begin membership negotiations. An enhanced Partnership for Peace and an Atlantic Partnership Council will be launched.

Discussions are under way on a document on NATO-Russia cooperation and agreement on the foundations for an enduring NATO-Russia relationship, which we hope to see in place before the Madrid Summit. Furthermore, NATO will adapt itself to the political and military requirements set by new tasks; with a new command structure, improved capabilities for carrying out peace operations, and a larger role for European member states.

The Madrid Summit should have a comprehensive agenda. The various elements of internal and external adaptation are interrelated. Together they make up a broad strategy, where progress needs to be made on all major elements. More specifically, I would like to underline two points:

- Enlargement should be accompanied by an expanded PfP, a qualitatively new Atlantic Partnership Council, and the continued openness of the Alliance.

- Enlargement should be accompanied by agreement on relations with Russia.

We expect that membership negotiations will begin in the second half of this year, and that the process of ratification will be completed in time for NATO to welcome new members on its fiftieth anniversary.

How many new members to invite at this juncture will be decided in Madrid. The need for the Alliance to absorb new members without affecting its effectiveness, and the importance of ensuring active partner participation and vitality to the enhanced PfP and the APC, may argue for an initial enlargement of a somewhat limited scope. A more limited enlargement might also be more desirable from the point of view of those applicants not likely to be included in a first round. At any rate, the Summit should give a clear signal that the process of enlargement will continue beyond Madrid.

The momentum in the European process of integration should be maintained. We have seen how the prospect of membership in NATO, as in the European Union, in itself has provided an important incentive for political, military and economic reform in partner countries. Democratic institutions and new habits of working together are taking root, and ethnic and regional disputes are being resolved. We should continue to conduct the enlargement process in such a way that it provides a strong incentive for the changes and the Europe-wide stability we all seek.

NATO's enlargement will also serve Russian security. New NATO members, and indeed others who take an active part in the PfP and other forms of cooperation with NATO, are entering arrangements where the premium on binding cooperation and consensus-building is very high. National ambitions must be harmonized with broader goals. The alternative to mutually binding security and defense cooperation of the kind offered by NATO could very well be re-nationalization of defense policies, or a drift towards sub-regional alliance building. Neither of these would provide predictability or stability. The potentially destabilizing effects of such developments could give Russia, and indeed all of us, real grounds for concern.

We have already come far in developing cooperation between NATO and Russia in a number of areas. We agree on the need to act together to strengthen the OSCE as a primary instrument for conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. We agree that the OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has an essential role to play in the promotion of peace and stability in Europe. Russian participation and military cooperation with NATO in IFOR and SFOR has broken new ground. The Russian participation in Bosnia should also open the way for expanded participation in activities under Partnership for Peace.

We are taking legitimate Russian concerns into account. We are working together with Russia to adapt the CFE Treaty. The communiqué from the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting last December laid down three no's with regard to nuclear weapons and enlargement: NATO countries have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

Our aim is now to establish a qualitatively new relationship with Russia. The institutional arrangements we seek should allow ground-breaking cooperation. And they should have a scope that take into account Russia's position in the evolving European security architecture. The NATO-Russia relationship should be put on a new footing.

I would like to share with you some of the main objectives, as I see them: We seek an agreement on the basic principles of a strong, stable and enduring NATO-Russia security partnership. An agreement should commit both sides to strive for a new quality of security relations in Europe, and to build a common security space, without dividing lines or spheres of influence, founded on shared values, commitments and norms of international behavior.

The key element in such an agreement should be a mechanism for consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. We should build on the experience gained so far, widen and deepen the cooperation we have today, and establish a permanent political dialogue. We should aim to include in this dialogue consultations and exchange of information on security issues of common interest. Timely consultation should be sought, in other words consultation before decisions are taken. There should be no surprises in European crisis management.

NATO-Russia consultations in this framework should lead to increased mutual understanding and to a common approach where possible, so as to facilitate joint decisions or action in specific areas and situations when the opportunity is there. In the case of agreement on joint peace-keeping operations or civil emergency operations, we foresee joint decisions on planning and implementation. If agreement on joint decisions or action cannot be reached, each side will of course act independently, while taking the results of the consultations into account. We can also expect that with time and experience the scope of consultations and joint action will evolve and expand.

We should seek to establish a permanent NATO-Russia Council. This Council should meet regularly at the level of permanent representatives, and at intervals at a political level as well. We foresee the establishment of committees or working groups for specific subjects or areas of cooperation. The Council should be able to convene in the case of an emergency or other urgent need. We should be prepared to consider the establishment of a secretariat to facilitate the work of the Council.

We wish to see consultation and cooperation in a number of specific areas. These include conflict prevention and crisis management, humanitarian action and civil emergency preparedness, arms control issues, including the CFE and chemical and biological weapons, non-proliferation, defense-related environmental issues and nuclear safety issues, and a number of other areas. There is considerable scope for consultation and cooperation on various issues of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area in general. This also applies to the development of cooperative European security structures, issues of strategy and military doctrines, defense policy and defense budgets. These are major spheres of NATO's present responsibility. And they are areas where consultation as well as specific cooperation with Russia can provide major benefits.

The ideas and proposals that I have outlined have far-reaching and historic implications. They are based on the conviction that European security must be built in cooperation with Russia. A democratic Russia should have influence. It must also share responsibility. A Russia which is offered participation of the kind we are considering, must contribute to the joint goals and abide by the rules, based on mutual understanding.

We are now moving into practical discussions with Moscow on the content and form of these arrangements. My talks with Foreign Minister Primakov in Oslo last week confirmed that the process is moving in the right direction, and that there are good prospects for concluding an agreement. Secretary General Solana will go to Moscow again in a few days to continue the constructive exchanges that were held in Brussels 10 days ago.

We are facing very complex issues. But genuine negotiations are taking place. The summit between Presidents Clinton and Jeltsin later this month may add further momentum. The political situation in Moscow in the coming months will be one factor influencing the outcome of the talks. The weight of negative perceptions and the shadow of the Cold War must be overcome. I have no doubt that an agreement will have advantages that will be readily apparent to the Russians. But an agreement with NATO must also be broadly anchored in the Russian political system if it is to survive in the longer term. We should as far as possible give the agreement a form that will facilitate its acceptance.

Over the last weeks I have been visiting the three Baltic capitals. These visits have given me a clear impression that they are concerned not to be left aside as the enlargement process moves on. This leads me to underline the following: The Summit statement must make it clear that enlargement is an on-going process. Those not invited this time should be offered a perspective on their integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structure. Moreover, a special relationship with Ukraine which takes its particular situation into account should be confirmed.

Given the tasks the new NATO will be focusing on, I believe that the distance between partners and NATO will be reduced. The Partnership for Peace should be strengthened, because it will serve as an instrument for enhanced cooperation with partners who are not invited to join or who do not wish for membership. In the military field, the new PFP will cover an expanded range of activities, including exercises, and one of the consequences will be partner presence at the Alliance's military headquarters.

The natural focus for this activity is NATO's new missions. The partners' presence should be mainly concentrated on those headquarters in the Alliance that are most concerned with these tasks, in particular the CJTF headquarters. Sub-regional headquarters could also be employed for implementing PfP activities.

An enhanced PfP should become a dynamic and versatile instrument, adapted to the needs of a changing security situation. We must also ensure that the political profile of the PfP is strengthened. I see the Atlantic Partnership Council as the framework for a stronger PfP, providing a political superstructure and a setting for political consultations.

An enhanced PfP and the political superstructure that the Atlantic Partnership Council will provide have a strong regional potential that we should develop. In the military field we have seen regional arrangements developing naturally. The BALTBAT project is a case in point, as is the Polish participation in the Nordic brigade in Bosnia. At the same time I believe we should actively consider the possibility of establishing mechanisms for political consultations in a regional framework, under the APC umbrella.

I believe regional arrangements have a significant potential, for example in the Nordic-Baltic area. Transparency and solid links with the APC framework are essential, to avoid any notion of regional "decoupling". All interested countries should be encouraged to participate. We would expect our major allies to take part. Such arrangements will be a means of generating confidence and stability in the region, and of giving the links between NATO and the states bordering the Baltic Sea a higher political profile.

The NATO enlargement process is part of a broader strategy for developing cooperation and integration in various areas and drawing on a wide-ranging set of policy instruments. In the same way, NATO's contribution to increased security, mutual confidence and stability in the Baltic area must be part of a broader effort.

We envisage coordinated efforts in a number of dimensions, encompassing political, economic and security aspects, on bilateral and regional levels. The Nordic countries will make a significant contribution to this. At the same time the active involvement of our European partners as well as the United States and Canada is vital. This comprehensive strategy for cooperation with and integration of the Baltic states will be very important in the coming years, given the changes in European security we now foresee.

NATO's role in the new Europe must be seen in the context of the general efforts to consolidate democracy, prosperity and stability. The emergence of a new European political order must be characterized by broad processes of openness and integration. The evolution and enlargement of the European Union, NATO, the WEU and the OSCE all contribute to these processes.

The OSCE is being developed further to undertake conflict prevention and other tasks for which it is particularly suitable, in a pan-European framework. The Council of Europe is well on its way to becoming truly pan-European. These organizations and the various regional arrangements like the Barents Cooperation are all moving in the same direction and working towards the same goal: enhanced stability through cooperation and integration.

The efforts to enlarge and further develop the Euro-Atlantic community are at the top of the agenda for all our friends and allies. It is also our own top security priority. Consolidating democracy, facilitating economic growth, building social justice and ensuring environmental protection are all of growing importance for our own security. Our geographical as well as our geopolitical position means that Norwegian security and security in the High North are closely interrelated with security in Europe and the North Atlantic area.

This was the case during the Cold War, and it is the case today. We have witnessed dramatic improvements in overall European security over the last few years. Equally, we have seen a radical improvement in our own security. The positive developments we continue to see give us a solid basis for our efforts to further consolidate this process, and to anchor as firmly as we can the practice of cooperative security.

Here I would like to add a word on transatlantic relations. The transatlantic relationship has underpinned European and our own security throughout the post war era. In preparing for collective defense and in maintaining political solidarity, NATO has constituted the backbone of this transatlantic relationship. The recent changes in Europe do not alter this fact. The resolution of regional conflicts and other new security challenges will continue to require concerted action from both sides of the Atlantic. So will our efforts to support democracy and reform throughout the continent. However, the altered nature of the transatlantic relationship will reflect changes that have occurred in the overall security framework.

The question of whether the USA is withdrawing from Europe is sometimes posed. Developments over the past few years have shown that this is not the case. The Americans were among the first to realize that today's challenges cannot be met by yesterday's arrangements. Washington has been the most important driving force in the efforts to transform NATO and adapt it to the new security situation in Europe. The initiatives to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, as well as the enlargement process itself, originated in Washington.

It is my firm belief that this active and constructive approach stems from a conviction that American interests and American security cannot be separated from those of Europe, and that if NATO is to remain a relevant framework for transatlantic military and political cooperation, it must change with the times. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was very clear when she reaffirmed America's commitment to Europe in the special ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels last month. In terms of security, the US remains a European power, and we should welcome the contributions it has made and is making in charting the course forward.

Mr. Chairman,

We have passed through a period of extraordinary change, entailing the gradual adaptation of our security instruments. We are now on the high road to a new security order in Europe. We see the contours of security arrangements encompassing the whole of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area.

Our purpose is to build cooperative structures that do away with the roots of insecurity between nations and to further an irreversible process of common security. The ambition that was put on a firm footing in the western half of Europe after the war, is currently being expanded to include all of Europe; eliminating conflict potential by building confidence, and providing strong incentives for cooperation and integration. The processes entailed by NATO enlargement, NATO-Russia relations and an enhanced partnership represent our principal means for developing a new security order for a Europe freeing itself from the legacy of the Cold War.

This page was last updated March 12 1997 by the editors