Mr. President,

May I join the other speakers in offering you my congratulations, Ambassador Baali, on your election as President of this Conference. Under your able guidance I am confident we will achieve concrete results at this conference.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a cornerstone of the international security system. This year’s Review Conference gives us an opportunity to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

In order to succeed we must recognize that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin. If we are to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon states will have to increase transparency on nuclear weapons issues and make further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference was a major success. The Non-proliferation treaty was extended indefinitely. The two decisions on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty represent major achievements that must be upheld. They set clear goals for further steps to promote nuclear non-proliferation and reaffirm the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. My government continues to fully support these goals.

Mr. President,

The events of the past five years show that we have achieved progress in some fields, too little progress in other fields, and no progress at all in some fields.

India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests were a blow to the non-proliferation regime and to the notion that social and economic development should take precedence over military development and national prestige. It has taken more than six years to get START II off the ground. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) continue to be blocked in the Conference on Disarmament, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is still far from entering into force. Nuclear weapons seem to become more important for certain actors in international politics. This is a trend that must be reversed.

We must therefore intensify our efforts to create new momentum in the non-proliferation and disarmament process. Agreed principles and objectives must be translated into concrete action. New measures and initiatives must be developed. This Conference should spur us on to achieve concrete and lasting results.

Mr. President,

Our general objectives for this conference should be:

- to retain and build on the results of the 1995 Review Conference,

- to revitalize and improve working procedures with a view to strengthening the NPT process, and

- to improve the substantive work of the NPT process by initiatives and measures that both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states can agree to.

What then, is a realistic way of pursuing these objectives?

The experience of the NPT process has consistently shown that it is difficult to achieve general agreement on the operation and implementation of the Treaty. However, we must not let our future efforts be hampered by different views on the past. Now is the time to act and this is what we must do:

We must look ahead and concentrate on developing a Programme of Action for the next five-year period.

We must give more attention to regional issues in our non-proliferation and disarmament deliberations. In regions of tension and distrust, it is the underlying causes of conflict that are hampering progress.

We must develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material. The recent pressure on the non-proliferation regime has demonstrated even more clearly that fissile material is a key issue, which must be addressed urgently.

Mr. President,

During this year’s Review Conference, Norway will therefore submit proposals on a Programme of Action for the NPT process, including regional issues, and a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material. The rationale behind these proposals is as follows:

We must acknowledge that the strengthened review process of the non-proliferation treaty has not functioned as it should.

It is essential to improve the operation of the Treaty and maintain its credibility. To this end we should create working procedures that can give new life to our efforts. Appropriate arrangements should be set up to prevent backsliding and facilitate the implementation of agreed measures. Our focus should be on a strategy for revitalizing the review process by making it more operative and forwardlooking.

This strategy should start with the need to preserve the integrity of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review Conference.

With a few notable exceptions, most of these principles and objectives have not been realized. But they are important guidelines that must be retained and not subject to renegotiation.

A mechanism must be developed to transform principles and objectives into action. A Programme of Action for the review process would serve this purpose.

Under such a programme, the parties would commit themselves to a follow-up of the decisions taken by the Review Conference. To make this possible, each of the annual meetings of the review process should be devoted to a limited number of specific issues. The process could also be made more continuous, and hopefully more effective, by extending the number of annual review meetings from three to four.

The Programme of Action should include the following elements:

• developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material, including
• negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes,
• promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
• reviewing information on strategic nuclear arms reductions, including
• the START process,
• promoting transparency in relation to tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of such weapons,
• signing and ratifying the International Atomic Energy Agency’s new additional protocol on full scope safeguards,
• increasing transparency in nuclear-related export controls.

Mr. President,

India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 were a clear reminder of the connection between a volatile regional security situation and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we are to reduce this risk, we must cast our net wide enough to include the underlying causes of conflict and tension – the most important force driving proliferation. Thus, when dealing with regional issues, we must take into account arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The goal should be to use the multilateral dialogue to build confidence and promote security and disarmament.

Today the only regional issue that the parties to the Non-proliferation treaty are obliged to discuss is the situation in the Middle East. The Review Conference should put together a more ambitious package of regional issues to be dealt with at the annual meetings of the review process. This would make regional discussions more balanced and give them a coherent framework. Such a package should in particular include South Asia. We should consider how India and Pakistan could be drawn into the non-proliferation treaty framework for discussions on security issues related to South Asia. At the same time it is important to address regional situations where parties to the non-proliferation treaty fail to comply with their treaty obligations.

Mr. President,

We must achieve further and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals. As part of this effort, we need international assurances that weapon-grade fissile material is no longer being produced. We also need assurances that existing stockpiles are being brought properly under control with a view to net reductions. This means that a coherent strategy is needed for developing an international framework to deal with fissile material. My delegation will submit a proposal for such a strategy to the conference. The strategy has four elements:

Firstly, a ban on the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes as an integral and indispensable part of nuclear disarmament. I am very disappointed to see that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has still not started negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Secondly, the amount of weapons-usable fissile material that is now in excess of military requirements is steadily increasing and represents a proliferation risk. We must ensure that these surplus stocks will not be diverted to weapons programmes.

Thirdly, highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes also involves a risk of proliferation. This issue should be addressed by the international community in order to improve safety and the control of such material.

Fourthly, voluntary transparency measures should be established for military inventories of fissile material. Reporting, inspection and safeguard procedures should first be developed in order to prepare the ground for agreed monitored net reductions in these stockpiles.

The issues of stockpiles related to excess weapons material, highly enriched uranium for non-explosive purposes and military inventories should be included in a process established in parallel with or independent of any negotiations in Geneva on a production ban.

Mr. President,

The nuclear-weapon states have a particular responsibility for nuclear disarmament.

A continual process of reductions in nuclear weapons is essential if we are to improve the working climate for the multilateral machinery in this field. This will signal that the role of nuclear weapons in international politics is diminishing. Given the devastating effect of these weapons, the international community is entitled to greater transparency as regards existing nuclear weapons arsenals, planned and initiated cuts in these arsenals, and nuclear policies.

Mr. President,

We greatly welcome the recent decisions of the Russian Duma on START II and the Test Ban Treaty. It is of great importance that the USA and the Russian Federation now intensify a new round of START negotiations with a view to further strategic reductions. We encourage the Russian Federation and the USA to implement new measures for strategic arms control. One example would be specific measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit in 1997. START III negotiations and specific transparency measures related to strategic and non-strategic inventories could both contribute significantly to a more constructive climate of cooperation. This would demonstrate that the nuclear-weapon states take their obligations seriously.

I would like to add, Mr. President, that it would be unfortunate if current doubts about the viability of the ABM Treaty were to aggravate an already difficult situation. We share the general concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to irresponsible groups and regimes. We hope that the United States and the Russian Federation will agree to retain the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Mr. President,

An issue that should be moved up the international disarmament agenda is tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons should be subject to extensive safeguards and control. Tactical nuclear weapons can be rapidly deployed and play a politically destabilizing role in areas subject to conflict. The handling and reduction of such weapons must be made part of a more comprehensive disarmament process. Increased transparency with regard to tactical nuclear weapons could be a first step, and would be an important confidence-building measure. Next, a programme for warhead destruction could be developed, underpinned by bilateral verification procedures. The unilateral declarations of the USA and Russia in 1991 to withdraw and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons should be reconfirmed and a time frame set for their implementation.

Mr. President,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are closely linked with environmental security. The legacy left by the Cold War needs our urgent attention. I am thinking not only of the enormous stock of weapons of mass destruction that we can now do away with, but also of their means of delivery. There are a large number of nuclear-powered submarines that are now obsolete and decommissioned and are waiting to be scrapped. The former Soviet Union had more of these submarines than the rest of the world put together. Over the years they have produced a lot of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. This not only constitutes a serious threat to the environment, but also involves a risk of proliferation.

The Russian Federation has had to accept this legacy and will have to deal

with it in a responsible manner. This includes building a whole new infrastructure to condition, transport and store these materials in a safe way. This will be a lengthy, costly and complicated process. We have offered to cooperate with the Russian Federation to help speed up the process. However, we realize that this task is so huge that a broad-based international effort will be required if these problems are to be solved in the near future.

In order to facilitate international action, we have initiated negotiations with Russia and a number of potential donor countries that are interested in assisting Russia. We hope that the negotiations will be successfully concluded as soon as possible and that a fruitful cooperation with Russia will soon be under way.

Mr. President,

The non-proliferation regime has been under pressure in recent years. If confidence in the Non-proliferation treaty is weakened, further progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation might be beyond our reach. To combat this, there are a number of things we must do:

We must demonstrate sufficient political will to meet the challenges we are all facing.

We must use this Conference to set out clearly what can and should be done by all states parties, individually and collectively, in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

We must develop concepts and aims built on the foundations laid in 1995.

We must implement already adopted decisions.

We must develop new initiatives and measures.

We must carefully balance global and regional initiatives.

By enhancing the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, we will be strengthening the international security system and at the same time safeguarding our own national security interests.

In the second half of the last century we were haunted by the fear of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons still pose a threat. We all have a responsibility to reduce this threat. Real security can only be achieved through our joint efforts. This conference offers us an excellent opportunity. We must seize that opportunity.

Thank you.