Thorbjørn Jagland, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: The Current Situation and Issues and Challenges for the 2000 NPT Review Conference and Beyond

The Bolkesjø Conference 2000, 5 April 2000

Mr. Moderator,

Ladies and gentlemen.

There are times when events compel us to reassess our thinking. We are living in one of those times.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a transformation that is unprecedented in human history. Particularly if we consider the speed at which these changes are taking place. The world has rapidly become interlinked, politically, economically and culturally.

We are living in a globalized world. Many of the world’s most pressing problems are international in nature and global in scope: environmental degradation and uncontrolled pollution, international crime and terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The purpose of this conference is to put a special focus on one of the global challenges facing us today. But before I address the topic of this conference, I would like to briefly underline some of the main security policy priorities of the new Norwegian government.

The European Union is the leading power in the dynamics of change in Europe, and we want to take a pro-active approach to this cooperation. Norway wants to be a genuine and predictable partner in building a more peaceful and secure Europe. We want an active dialogue with the European Union in all areas, in particular on security policy issues.

We stand ready to contribute substantially and effectively to the development of a European Security and Defence Policy. We believe that we have the resources, competencies and experience that make us a relevant partner in the development of a European role in this area.

Norway also puts great emphasis on an active and constructive policy towards Russia. Relations with Russia will be decisive for long-term stability and peace in our part of the world. The main goal is to integrate Russia into European cooperation. This is of great importance not only for our own security, but for Europe as a whole. My aim is to develop a broad-based partnership with Russia.

But Russia’s present situation also makes this a considerable challenge. It is more important than ever to take advantage of the opportunities available for improving relations and cooperation, and to draw Russia into the political and economic developments currently taking place in the rest of Europe.

In this perspective, the cooperation between Russia and NATO is particularly important. I am pleased that we are now back on track in NATO-Russia cooperation. But there is still much to be done, in Kosovo and elsewhere in building peace, and with regard to arms control, the environment and our common goal to prevent proliferation.

Other important pillars in Norway’s foreign and security policy are of course our longstanding membership of NATO, and our friendship and close transatlantic ties to the USA and Canada.

Mr. Moderator,

Norway’s participation in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts is an important part of our security policy.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is central to these efforts. The treaty is a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and forms a basis in international law for the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduce existing nuclear arsenals.

The NPT review process gives us an opportunity to deal with issues and initiatives that can enhance our common security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the export of missile technology are among the new threats we are facing, as is the transfer of technological expertise on such weapons to irresponsible regimes and groups.

We are now approaching the sixth NPT Review Conference, which will be held in New York later this month. I look forward to participating in the conference and delivering our national statement during the general debate.

In recent years we have experienced a deadlock in the negotiations in connection with the follow-up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This gives cause for concern.

Following a period of great progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation from 1991 to 1996 – when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed – we have witnessed widely divergent trends, some of which are very disturbing.

The negotiations between the USA and Russia on further reductions in strategic forces have come to a standstill. The START II agreement, which was signed in 1993, has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma. This in turn has been an obstacle to further progress in other areas.

At the same time, certain countries have built up their nuclear arsenals. India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in spring 1998 were a blow not only to the non-proliferation regime and international security, but also to the idea that social and economic development should take precedence over military force.

North Korea’s development programme for long-range missiles is disturbing. North Korea has already tested one intermediate-range ballistic missile and seems to be preparing for new tests. The rather unclear situation in the Middle East as regards missile and nuclear-weapons programmes also gives cause for concern. At the same time, China is in the process of modernizing its strategic forces. There are also many indications that Russia is giving more strategic importance to nuclear weapons.

The USA seems to be placing greater emphasis on a unilateral approach in its disarmament and non-proliferation policy. One example of this is the US Senate’s no to approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which makes it difficult to gain broad-based support for the treaty. The lack of support for the Test Ban Treaty in the US Senate is regrettable. The decision is a very unfortunate political signal at a time when the non-proliferation regime is under heavy pressure. However, President Clinton’s efforts to ensure the ratification of the treaty, and his promise to continue the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, are positive signs.

The US plans for a limited National Missile Defence (NMD) to protect US territory against attacks by weapons of mass destruction from irresponsible regimes or terrorist groups are being met with scepticism in Europe, including here in Norway.

As you know, the USA has not yet made any decision to deploy such a missile defence system. We share the US concern about the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology to irresponsible groups and regimes. But at the same time, we regard the Antiballistic Missile Treaty between Russia and the USA as a cornerstone of international law with regard to disarmament and non-proliferation. It would be very unfortunate if the ABM Treaty were to be weakened as a result of unilateral measures.

We hope that any agreement reached between Russia and the USA will retain the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of the international strategic balance. We also feel that it is important to facilitate progress on further reductions in strategic weapons through the dialogue between Russia and the USA.

Mr. Moderator,

I will now discuss a few important aspects related to international disarmament and non-proliferation.

I believe it is clear to us all that the review process has not functioned as intended. We must now search for concrete initiatives that can give the process a new momentum. Our aim should be to make the review process more operative.

In this context, I would like to single out a few elements that could be incorporated into a strategy for revitalizing the review process.

Firstly, it is extremely important to adhere to the objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. These objectives must be retained as important guidelines in our further work, and they must not be renegotiated.

Secondly, there is a need for a better mechanism that can help to transform principles and objectives into concrete action and follow-up. A separate programme of action for the review process could serve such a purpose. In addition to including previous objectives that have not been achieved, such a programme should contain new measures and initiatives.

Thirdly, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests are a reminder of how important it is that the review process also deals with regional issues in the context of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Today it is only the situation in the Middle East that the parties to the NPT are obliged to discuss. In my view the regional discussions should in the future also include South Asia.

Fourthly, it is of great importance that the USA and Russia continue the START negotiations with a view to seeking further strategic reductions.

Russia should ratify the START II agreement as soon as possible. In addition, the USA and Russia should implement new measures for strategic arms control, for example specific measures relating to transparency in relation to their respective strategic nuclear warhead inventories. The START III negotiations and specific transparency measures related to strategic inventories are also initiatives that could contribute significantly to a more constructive climate of cooperation.

Fifthly, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should now be given more focused attention.

In Russia thousands of such weapons have been withdrawn and stored, but their status in Russian defence planning is unclear, as are the circumstances surrounding their storage. Such weapons should be subject to extensive safeguards and control. Thus, it is important to ensure that the handling and reduction of such weapons are made part of a more comprehensive disarmament process.

Sixthly, increased transparency with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons could also be an important confidence-building measure. The unilateral Russian and US declarations on the partial withdrawal and destruction of tactical nuclear weapons should now be reconfirmed and made more specific. The USA has implemented measures, and we hope that Russia will follow suit.

Seventhly, today there are large amounts of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium that are unsafely stored. They pose a major problem in terms of proliferation and are a serious threat to the environment. We need to focus greater attention on these problems as well.

We also need adequate arrangements for the control and proper handling of fissile material. At the same time, it is important to be aware that this will be extremely costly and technologically complex. The problems are of such a magnitude that a comprehensive international effort is called for.

We therefore need to develop a coherent strategy for ensuring better control and greater transparency. Our aim should also be to reduce the stockpiles of such material.

The key element in such a strategy must be a ban on future production of fissile material for weapons purposes. However, this is not enough. Existing stockpiles must also be dealt with. We must find suitable ways of handling the large amounts of highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. This material can be easily diverted and used for weapon production, if this should be politically desirable.

We must also deal with the amount of highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes, such as fuel for the propulsion of naval reactors. Both surplus material from the military sector and fissile material used as fuel involve a serious risk of proliferation.

Moreover, steps must be taken to increase transparency in relation to existing military stockpiles of fissile material. Our goal must be net reductions by means of voluntary confidence-building measures. In order to ensure a coherent approach, Norway has already put forward a number of proposals within the framework of the review process. We will continue our efforts to gain support for the Norwegian proposals at the Review Conference in New York.

Mr. Moderator,

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the only permanent forum for multilateral consultations and negotiations on disarmament and arms control.

The world community has a legitimate interest in being kept informed of the nuclear-weapon states’ policies and the status and progress of disarmament efforts. Even though the nuclear-weapon states are themselves responsible for reducing nuclear arsenals, multilateral arrangements should be established that will ensure increased transparency, closer dialogue and a better exchange of information on such issues.

This would also give the nuclear-weapon states an opportunity to provide information on their nuclear policy measures and various aspects of their nuclear doctrines. Increased transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon states in relation to these issues is important, especially for the climate of cooperation in international disarmament fora. Together with Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany, Norway has therefore put forward a proposal in the Conference on Disarmament on dialogue and the exchange of information on nuclear disarmament. The proposal has so far been received with great interest.

We are also involved in the effort to reform the Conference on Disarmament with a view to making it as representative and effective as possible.

Mr. Moderator,

The Summit in Washington in April 1999 gave NATO a mandate for a new, broad review of its efforts to promote nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

NATO is currently conducting a comprehensive review of its policy options in support of various confidence and security-building measures, verification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament.

Norway would like to see a coherent approach and visible results. The goal must be to arrive at specific areas where NATO can and should play a more active role. A number of committees in NATO are currently preparing their contribution to this process. In the course of the year, NATO will assess the Alliance’s contribution to the entire set of issues on the disarmament agenda. A report on this process will be submitted to the NATO ministerial meeting later this year. It is important that the process lead to greater transparency. We also wish to make clear what the Alliance will do to intensify its efforts to promote arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Perhaps NATO has failed to provide sufficient information about the substantial reductions that have been made during the past decades. For example, the Alliance has reduced its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by more than 85 per cent.

Mr. Moderator,

We are living in a world that is undergoing dramatic changes. Dealing with security issues is becoming increasingly complicated. Future security will depend on a combination of carefully balanced regional and global initiatives and measures. It will depend on the success of our international cooperation on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Our goal must be new, concrete, lasting results that enhance our common security.

As I have already said, the non-proliferation regime has been under pressure in recent years. The forthcoming Review Conference will undoubtedly be a very difficult one. This should inspire us to intensify our efforts to find solutions on which everyone can agree.

Norway is determined to do its utmost to maintain what has already been achieved, and we will seek to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament. In this way we hope to strengthen the international security system and at the same time safeguard our own national security interests.

Finally, I wish you all interesting and fruitful deliberations.

Thank you for your attention.

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