State Secretary Siri Bjerke

A norwegian perspective on european co-operation.

Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 3 November 1995

It is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to address you here at the Institute of European Affairs today. Over the years the Institute has acquired a distinguished reputation for providing a valuable forum for discussion of European matters. Given the challenges facing Europe at the dawn of a new century, and the interests shared by Norway and Ireland on a wide range of European issues, I am very pleased to speak to you today on the Norwegian perspective on European co-operation.

Even though Norway and Ireland are both small countries, I am convinced that we share a common commitment to the development of a stable, secure and democratic Europe. Different histories, traditions and geostrategic locations have shaped Norway's and Ireland's foreign and security policies and made us take different choices. Norway is one of the founding nations of NATO, while Ireland has chosen neutrality. Norway decided in the referendum last November not to become a member of the European Union, while Ireland has been an active member since 1973. Both our countries have contributed to the enhancement of collective and co-operative security through the United Nations and the OSCE. We also share a commitment to global co-operation in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to strengthen co-operation on conventional weapon exports and to strengthen preventive diplomacy and crisis management. Both our countries have been motivated by a shared interest in contributing to a better, safer future for all.

The Norwegian no to membership of the European Union was not a no to close co-operation with the European Union and its member countries. It should be well known that Norway's long-standing foreign policy tradition, as a founding father of NATO and of EFTA, as a member of other European organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE, as associate member of the Western European Union and as active participant in initiating the European Economic Area, is one of active commitment to international co-operation.

In this perspective, I think it is right to say that the Norwegian referendum symbolises the scepticism of the Norwegian public to the prospect of transferring power to a body outside Norway taking decisions in vital policy sectors. Many voters saw it as a paradox for Norway to join a community comprising only the most prosperous countries in Europe, in a period where profound changes in Europe call for close co-operation across the former dividing lines. In addition, the present privileged economic situation in Norway made it difficult to convince the public opinion of the benefits - in economic terms - of membership. Considering whether to vote yes or no, many felt that the future would be more safe and stable by choosing the status quo. Voting in favour of membership was viewed to be more uncertain than voting against.

The future development of EU co-operation and the experiences of the new member countries will have an impact on the Norwegian public opinion and is being followed closely. Unlike the period after the referendum in 1972, when the European Community was a non-topic in Norwegian public debate, the European question remains prominent on the Norwegian agenda. Today Norway is part of the internal market through the EEA Agreement and has developed close working relations with the European Union, in particular as regards the Common Foreign and Security Policy and in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Even if we are not a member, the development of the European co-operation is of great importance to us. I am therefore pleased to have the opportunity to contribute a Norwegian perspective on certain issues related to the future European co-operation.

The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, at which the member countries of the European Union are to discuss the further development of EU co-operation, will be of the utmost importance to the Europe of the future. The discussions will create a framework for the next round of enlargement of the EU, in which co-operation may expand to include as many as 25-27 member states. New tasks and new member states will pose new challenges to EU co-operation.

The EU faces several challenges that the IGC must try to solve. One important challenge is to create the framework for future enlargement towards the east and south. Another is to deal with the popular support and thus the legitimacy of EU co-operation in the eyes of the people of Europe. The EU must show that it can deal with the challenges which require a joint effort at the European level. Parallel with the IGC and the subsequent accession negotiations, the EU member states also have to deal with other difficult issues, such as reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and a new financial packet, including the structural funds. The main challenge for the EU when dealing with these difficult issues, will be to maintain the overriding political perspective of enlargement and to view the different issues in this context.

Enlargement of the EU to the east is one of the most challenging tasks in the history of European integration. Europe has never been united under democratic rule. Today we have a unique opportunity to establish co-operation across Europe based on the rule of law, governed by the same rules for all, where problems are solved at the negotiating table and where compromises are found in co-operation between several parties. In this process the European Union has become the key institution and should play a leading role in the further development of democracy and prosperity on our continent.

It is also in Norway's interest that the new democracies in Europe are gradually drawn into EU co-operation and ultimately become members. Although accession to the EU necessarily lies several years ahead, enlargement negotiations should start soon after the conclusion of the IGC and at the same time for all associated countries, including the Baltic states. The conclusion of the negotiations and the subsequent accession would of course depend on the progress made in each candidate country's reform programme. As we see it, the enlargement process should be transparent and every country should be considered individually.

However, full integration into every aspect of EU co-operation will, naturally, take time. An important element in the preparation for future membership is the national process ensuring necessary adjustments of national legislation to EU legislation. In Norway we started this process in 1988-89, preparing for the EEA negotiations between EFTA and the EU. We experienced that this process, even if it was complicated and lasted for some years, gave us valuable and necessary knowledge of EU legislation and the working system of the EU institutions before we entered into accession negotiations. With this in mind, I think the most important advice to the associated countries is, on a systematic basis, to continue this process.

Another important issue for the IGC is to deal with the popular support of the EU and thus the legitimacy of the co-operation. In Norway as well as in the member countries, there is criticism of the democratic decision-making process of the EU. Unless there is a firm democratic mooring, increased influence by national parliaments and an open and transparent relationship to the general public, co-operation will lose its support and legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

The Nordic EU countries have taken efforts to promote greater transparency and to improve the democratic decision-making processes. Norway also welcomes the steps recently taken by the Council to ensure transparency and openness in the Council's decision making process, especially when it comes to discussions and adoption of community legislation. Further reform in this direction should be pursued at the IGC.

How to promote higher employment is one of the major challenges of the 1990s. In Western Europe alone, more than 20 million people are out of work. There is a clear need for more co-ordinated international and European measures - in addition to national policies - if we are to increase employment. Naturally, the EU is already focusing attention to the problem of unemployment, but the issue should be given even higher priority on the EU political agenda. Norway has shown an active interest in this and took the initiative in 1993 for regular meetings between the Ministers of Economy and Finance of the EU and EFTA countries to discuss employment issues. Norway appreciates the co-operation already established between EFTA and EU ministers of finance and economy to strengthen employment in Europe and will continue to contribute actively in this field. At the joint meeting on 18 September this year, Norway presented the report "Put Europe to work", which emphasises the need for a joint European strategy to increase the level of public and private investments in Europe, to strengthen the investment in knowledge and education and to promote an active job creation policy supporting restructuring and increased expertise.

Sweden has put an interesting proposal on the table - to include a new chapter on employment policy in the treaty. This can be a useful step in the direction of strengthening political commitment in that regard. The Danish proposal made at the Essen summit to explore possibilities of an enhanced co-ordination of economic policies should also be carefully considered. Following these proposals, the IGC could give a clear and important political signal that the member states separately and as one will actively support and work together by means of a joint strategy to reduce unemployment. In our view, progress in the fight against unemployment would also benefit the success of EMU and further economic integration in Europe.

The Maastricht Treaty introduced important environmental principles. The IGC should make sure that these principles are incorporated into important policy sectors such as agriculture, transport and industry. This could form a basis for a more ambitious environmental policy in the EU and EEA area. Binding minimum environmental requirements by using qualified majority voting is a natural follow-up. Minimum requirements for environmental taxes is an example of an important issue that should be resolved by using qualified majority voting.

The EU foreign and security policy agenda is wide-ranging and includes all key foreign policy areas. The construction of the future security architecture of Europe, the development of the Western European Union, the enlargement of NATO, the transatlantic relations, relations with Russia and the integration of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are all being discussed within the EU. For Norway, geographically located in the strategic cross-roads between the transatlantic, European and Russian ties, co-operation on these common challenges is of vital importance. The Norwegian Government attaches great importance to developing the closest ties possible with the EU in all areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is all our interest that this co-operation be strengthened.

As a NATO member and an associate member of the Western European Union, Norway will continue to play an active role in the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. As a non-member of the EU, we have a particular interest in discussions at the IGC that may have consequences for the WEU in its double role as the European pillar of NATO and as the manifestation of the European Security and Defence Identity. The WEU supplement efforts in the Alliance and the EU as far as integration of the Central and Eastern Europe countries are concerned. The division of roles and responsibilities between the WEU, NATO and EU which is currently being discussed is of great importance. In our opinion the WEU should be able to shoulder the responsibility for a specific European response to crises that require peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue tasks, in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration.

The future of the WEU will be substantially affected by the outcome of the IGC. The main task of the IGC in this respect will be to combine the further deepening of co-operation within the EU with a realistic view of future security needs. We feel that European security would best be served by retaining the autonomous status of the WEU. The WEU should retain its worthwhile role in European security. This does not preclude strengthening its links with the EU and NATO. There is room for significant advances in WEU-EU co-ordination within the present WEU organisational framework. But an inclusion of security and defence matters in the EU would raise a number of complicated and unnecessary problems, in particular the future status of WEU Associate Member Countries and Observers. Modifications in the institutional relationship between the WEU and the EU must take into account the need for extended co-operation between WEU associate members such as Norway and EU co-operation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The on-going discussion regarding the future and role of the WEU clearly reflects the fact that a post Cold-War security architecture for Europe has yet to be worked out. The transformation of the political landscape has also resulted in a shift in the burden of responsibility between North America and Europe. Europe must now take more responsibility for its own security. However, Europe alone does not have the political, diplomatic or military weight needed to resolve all conflicts. Transatlantic solidarity and US participation is necessary to resolve regional conflicts, prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, to achieve disarmament and reduce the danger of radioactive contamination. Norway faces a special challenge in maintaining and developing close relations both with North America and with Europe. Our foreign and security policy puts a parallel emphasis on keeping close ties with the USA and the closest ties possible with European countries. It is therefore also in Norway's interests that the basis of the transatlantic dialogue be broadened and strengthened.

Norway shares a common border with Russia and is the only NATO member to do so. This basic fact implies that developments in Russia have to be taken into close consideration in the pursuit of our foreign and security policy. Russia's position and the nature of our relationship with Russia are also essential factors in European security. Without active participation of Russia in the broad Euro-Atlantic network of co-operation, there can be no long-term stability in Europe. Russia's central role in the pursuit of a common security must be well defined and understood. She must have a position in the European security architecture which reflects her size and status. NATO has a special responsibility in this regard. The Partnership for Peace ( PFP) and the North Atlantic Council are the main instruments in this endeavour. But we are also committed to the development of close relations outside these fora. The EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the various regional arrangements, have a role to play in this connection.

During the past few years an increased understanding of the importance of regional co-operation has emerged in Europe as well as in Norway. The promotion of political, economic and practical co-operation between regions and across borders has become an important instrument in the process of creating a secure and stable Europe. In this context I would like to share with you some of Norway's experience from the regional co-operation in the Barents region.

The Barents Co-operation, initiated by former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, was formally launched by the Kirkenes Declaration of January 1993. It was signed by foreign ministers or representatives from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Iceland, Denmark and the Commission of the European Communities. Several European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom as well as USA, Canada and Japan, participate as observers. The region encompasses the Northern counties of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Northwest Russia.

The Kirkenes Declaration called for expanded co-operation in the fields of environment, economy, science and technology, regional infrastructure, indigenous peoples, human contacts and cultural relations and tourism in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.

In addition to promoting economic and social development in the Barents region itself, an overriding objective of the Barents Co-operation is to contribute to the integration of Russia into European structures of co-operation. It can also serve as an instrument for the European Union in its policy towards Russia. Norway's aim is to broaden the European dimension in the Barents co-operation in the years ahead. We therefore appreciate EU involvement, and in particular the Commission's initiative to use the INTERREG-programme actively in the Barents region. The accession of Finland and Sweden to the EU will hopefully contribute to further strengthening of EU participation in the co-operation.

The Barents Co-operation has existed for nearly three years, and it has developed into a stable regional co-operation with a high level of activity both at the central, inter-state level in the Barents Council and at the regional level. A special feature of the Barents Co-operation is the establishment of political institutions at the regional level - the Regional Council - where leaders of the counties involved regularly meet to draw up guidelines for the co-operation. This means that the representatives of the peoples of the region have a considerable influence on the substance and direction of the co-operation.

However, the potential for developing the Barents Co-operation is far from exhausted. There are considerable challenges facing us, especially in the areas of the environment and economic development. Successful co-operation is dependent on the involvement of countries and institutions outside the region itself.

At the foreign ministers' meeting in Rovaniemi in October, Russia assumed the chairmanship of the Barents Council. This presents us with an interesting new situation. For the first time Russia is chairing an international organisation where all the other members are Western European states. This underlines a main point in our approach to the Barents Co-operation: It should be considered to be part of the process of building a new, integrated Europe. The Baltic and the Black Sea Co-operation, as well as the Central European Initiative, are other elements in this process.

Relations with Russia will continue to be the most important foreign policy aspect of the Barents Co-operation. However, the most important task to be dealt with in the Barents co-operation in the years to come is environmental protection.

The Kola Peninsula is the site of one of the largest concentrations of civil and military nuclear activity in the world. The area is also suffering from a high concentration of industrial pollution. In many of the industrialised parts of the Barents region, the price of economic growth may become so high in terms of degradation of the natural and human environment that it both limits further development and necessitates restructuring.

As countries with extended coasts,with an important part of our national income based on the catch of living resources from the sea, Norway and Ireland share a common interest in protecting our waters and land from industrial and radioactive pollution.

We are now beginning to gain a reasonably good overview of the magnitude and extent of the environmental problems facing us. Several short and long term action plans and projects have been put into action. But I would like to stress that the problems are of such an extent that international co-operation and funding is imperative.

The Environmental Action Programme, adopted in 1994, provides a framework and clear guidelines for formulating specific tasks, focusing on, inter alia, radioactive contamination and nuclear safety, measures to reduce industrial emissions and protection of the flora and fauna. It emphasises the importance of strengthening environmental management and co-operation between local and regional environmental authorities. The European Commission participates in the "task force" under this action programme. A report will be presented to the Ministers of the Environment in the participating countries in December this year.

Further, Norway submitted a Plan of action on nuclear activities and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our northern borders earlier this year. The plan covers both current and planned projects in Russia within four main areas: safety at nuclear installations, safe management and storage of nuclear waste, problems associated with the dumping of nuclear waste, and arms-related environmental hazards.

International action will be required to solve the environmental problems of this area. Structures for international co-operation on radioactive waste management projects are presently being shaped under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Terms of reference for a IAEA Contact Experts' Group have been drafted and will be submitted to the relevant governments for approval. The overall objective will be to enhance the safety of radioactive waste management in Russia. Norway welcomes active participation by the European Union as well as by individual countries and intergovernmental organisations.

The Norwegian Government also views the participation of our traditional partners in co-operation on nuclear issues in the north as important. The USA and Norway are now implementing a joint project with Russia concerning an effluent treatment facility for low-level radioactive waste in Murmansk. Together with France, we have appointed a separate group with a broad mandate to examine nuclear contamination in our part of the world. An international Advisory Committee for the safe handling of the vessel "Lepse" , which is used as a storage facility for radioactive waste in the harbour of Murmansk, will be established by Russia, the USA, France, the European Commission and Norway. Norway and Russia have also recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding, aimed at strengthening co-operation on nuclear safety between the two countries.

Norway welcomes the summit on nuclear issues in Moscow 1996, and we are ready to contribute to this effort. We would like to keep close contact with the G-7 countries and Russia in this regard.

Russia itself is making efforts to solve the problems related to the management and storage of nuclear waste, but the country's economic situation and the magnitude of the task make international participation. We must not lose sight of the fact that we are also dealing with problems of security, non-proliferation and the enormous economic and social task of conversion from military to civilian activities. Norway attaches great importance to further developing our and co-operation with the European Union and its member countries on environmental issues.

Europe is facing enormous challenges. The creation of a democratic, stable and secure Europe will take a lot of hard work and resources, and must be based on specific projects of co-operation. We have to join forces and grasp this opportunity. Co-operation has to take place at the governmental, regional, European and international levels. Norway is both willing and interested in assuming its share of the responsibility associated with the European challenges.