State Secretary Jan Egeland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Conflicts in the Caucasus - Challenges and Opportunities

Conference on Conflicts in the Caucasus, 24-26 November 1995

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the three Caucasian states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have faced tremendous challenges on several fronts. The region has witnessed a number of internal conflicts over territories and borders. Complex internal claims and disagreements, disputes over sovereignty, and growing antagonism between the regions and their political centres, have dominated the political agenda. The absence of constructive policies and political will to implement them have in some areas led to violent open conflicts.

Because of the diverse geopolitical, economic and social conditions in the Caucasian states - and because of their diverse histories - the challenges faced by each have been unique in scope and character. Nevertheless, these challenges are in many respects similar: ethnic unrest, political and administrative structures yet to be established, problems related to the process of economic reform, and finding ways of dealing with the outside world, including Russia. The conflicts in which the countries are involved absorb much of their energy and limit their capacity to make use of international assistance. As a result of this, the process of nation-building has been significantly delayed.

Not only are there similarities between the three Caucasian states; their situations are in many cases also clearly interrelated. The conflicts of the region should therefore be analysed at all levels in order to understand them fully and prevent worst scenarios from developing. The search for new national identities has given rise to conflicts which affect all kinds of interrelationships, including relations between groups within each territorial unit, relations with neighbouring republics, regional relations and international relations.

Georgia is the scene of two major conflicts. Abkhazian separatists, speaking on behalf of an Abkhazian population which was a minority even within their own republic, wanted to loosen ties with the Georgian rulers in Tbilisi and sought allies abroad, notably in Russia, to realize their goal. In Southern Ossetia the Ossetians wanted to be reunited with their relatives in Northern Ossetia, a part of the Russian Federation.

As a result of these conflicts, a large number of people have been displaced. Politically Russia has reinforced its position in the area. In Ossetia, the fighting was formally ended in July 1992 when Russia signed a tripartite peace agreement with Ossetia and Georgia and peace-keeping forces which included Russian troops were formed. The Georgian military defeat in Abkhazia in September - October 1993 was followed by ethnic cleansing that left more than 200 000 Georgians homeless. Since Shevardnadze's decision in October the same year to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russian troops have been in place as peacekeepers in Abkhazia.

Mr. Edouard Brunner, the UN Special Envoy to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, reported recently on developments in the region. In his report he underlined that the peace process remains deadlocked and that there has been no progress in the talks regarding the three fundamental issues: the safe and early return of refugees and internally displaced persons, maintenance of the terriroial integrity of Georgia and a special status for Abkhazia.

The responsibility now rests with the parties to the conflict to indicate clearly that they are ready and willing to reach and implement a comprehensive settlement, based on the three essential elements I just mentioned.

In an attempt to share the practical responsibilities facing the international community in Georgia, the UN has consentrated its efforts on the Abkhaz question while the OSCE has focused on the conflict in Southern Ossetia. The OSCE mission in Georgia has worked actively to promote negotiations between the Ossetian separatists and Georgian authorities, but so far the conflict remains unsolved and the parties seem to be far apart on essential issues.

Russia is actively involved in the current peace negotiations concerning Ossetia as well as Abkhazia. Georgian authorities, headed by President Shevardnadze, realize that solutions must be sought in cooperation with Russia.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian-populated enclave on Azeri territory, has reached a similar impasse, with no simple solution in sight. Here again, the absence of actual fighting at a given moment should not be mistaken for peace in the true sense of the word. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is a formidable challenge and a threat to peace and prosperity in the area.

In the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the international community has for some time been involved in peace-making efforts through the negotiations in the so-called Minsk Group. True, the efforts of international mediators within this framework have so far failed to produce a final settlement of the conflict. However, there is little doubt that by providing a forum for negotiation and subjecting the parties to constant pressure to talk rather than fight, the Minsk Group has played an important part in containing this conflict and bringing a peace arrangement closer. The prospects of introducing an OSCE-led peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh presents us with a double challenge and redoubled hope: We are about to employ an instrument which is known to have reduced the risk of renewed fighting elsewhere and which may create a climate conducive to talks. At the same time, we will be extending the activity of the OSCE to a sphere which has so far been the preserve of the UN, and which will make an important addition to the instruments available to the OSCE.

No other conflict in the Caucasus has attracted international attention on the scale that we have seen in the case of Chechnya. Whereas most other Caucasian conflicts disappeared from our front pages fairly soon after they broke out, Chechnya has remained a focus of international attention since open war erupted nearly a year ago. Why is this so? Part of the explanation is probably the scale and intensity of the conflict, and, not least, the fact that one of the major actors in the drama is the Russian army. In several of the conflicts on the territory of the former USSR, there have been claims that Russia is in one way or another playing a part. In Chechnya there is no need for speculation, this being a conflict within the territory of the Russian Federation.

There is no denying that, for the time being, Chechnya is the must acute trouble spot in the Caucasus. A civil war has been going on for nearly a year. Thousands have been killed. Hundreds of thousands have had to leave their homes in the course of the conflict. Human rights have been grossly violated. As we approach the first anniversary of the outbreak of open war, the picture is not encouraging as the parties prepare for another winter without peace. Negotiations have stalled. Tens of thousands are still living as refugees in neighbouring areas; many of them have little or nothing to come home to. And on the main issue, the question of Chechnya's future status, twelve months of reciprocal violence, death and suffering on a massive scale have not brought the parties any nearer an agreed solution.

At the same time, we should not close our eyes to certain elements in an otherwise gloomy picture which may, after all, inspire some hope. First, the central authorities have, with some exceptions, over the past few weeks shown relative restraint in their response to continual attacks on federal troops and attempts on the lives of high-ranking federal representatives. This may indicate that at the highest levels of federal authority, an understanding is taking hold that violence is not necessarily the best answer to violence.

Second, there are signs of new dynamics in the internal political situation in Chechnya. New figures have entered the political stage, figures that may be in a better position to promote intra-Chechen dialogue and reconciliation than their predecessors.

The third element is not new, but is nevertheless important: the acceptance by both main parties in the war that the international community may have a part to play in the efforts to manage this conflict. The on-site presence and active efforts of the OSCE mission to promote negotiations and dialogue have no doubt been instrumental in containing the conflict. The fact that the implementation of the 30 July agreement on the block of military issues has all but stalled does not, in my view, detract from the accomplishments of the OSCE mission.

Hence, despite the rather grim picture of the present situation in Chechnya that I just outlined, I prefer to cling to these elements of hope. The same applies to other conflicts in the Caucasus where the military situation may at the moment be less tense than in Chechnya, but where the underlying conflict in some cases remains equally unresolved.

It is my hope that this conference will not only give us new insight into the important questions "what has happened?" and "why did it happen?", but also encourage us to think about the questions "what should be done?" and "what can we do - as third-country governments, the UN, the OSCE, NGOs?" The situation in Chechnya shows that the international community today has the chance to play a role even in the resolution of domestic conflicts in this region, a role that would almost have been unimaginable until recently. This places a great responsibility on government and non-government actors and organisations in the rest of the world: - without limiting our efforts to provide humanitarian aid to remedy the consequences of the conflicts, we must do something about the causes of violence and suffering. This is an opportunity we cannot allow ourselves to miss, and it is a challenge for all of us to contribute to the search for new ways of addressing old conflicts.