Unofficial translation

Foreign minister Bjørn Tore Godal

Statement to the Storting on nuclear safety issues

29 October 1996

Madam President,
Nuclear contamination in Russia and the Eastern European countries represents one of the greatest environmental and security policy challenges we face today. There is widespread nuclear activity, both civilian and military, in the areas adjacent to our borders, and particularly in north-western Russia. This has resulted in large quantities of radioactive waste that are not being satisfactorily stored, decommissioned nuclear submarines that are awaiting demolition, and nuclear power plants whose condition is such that we would prefer to see them closed down.

This is a situation that gives grounds for concern and that directly affects our security. The cost of cleaning up and removing radioactive waste and nuclear fuel will be high. The main responsibility for dealing with the problem lies with the Russians themselves, but the problems are so enormous that they cannot be solved by Russia alone. Norway's geographical proximity means that we must concern ourselves with improving nuclear safety and reducing the risk of radioactive contamination.

One of the Government's overriding goals is to protect human health, the environment and people's means of livelihood from radioactive contamination and pollution from chemical weapons. The efforts to deal with the problems of radioactive contamination in north-western Russia have become one of our main foreign policy tasks and represent a central element of our relations with Russia. Cooperation on nuclear safety issues will also help to strengthen our neighbourly relations with Russia and involve the Russians more closely in European cooperation. The new security challenges should be an important element in the further development of relations between NATO and Russia.

Although we feel that significant environmental benefits can be obtained if we focus our efforts on selected projects in certain important areas, we cannot achieve very much on our own. Thus an important part of our work on nuclear safety issues is to involve other major Western countries and relevant international organizations as closely as possible. Nuclear safety issues figure prominently on the agenda in our contacts with EU and NATO countries. State Secretary Siri Bjerke, for example, is in Paris today for this purpose, and will be travelling to Bonn later this week.

The environmental situation in north-western Russia requires commitment and it requires action. The problem is not primarily that we lack information about the various environmental hazards, it is that we need to start implementing specific measures to combat the dangers represented by radioactive contamination. We will not always be able to find the ideal solution. We will encounter problems and setbacks. And we must continue to press for a more open attitude on the part of the Russians.

Against this background, the Government has drawn up a Plan of Action for the implementation of Report no. 34 (1993-1994) to the Storting on nuclear activities and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our northern borders. The Plan of Action has four priority areas: 1) safety measures at nuclear facilities, 2) management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, 3) the dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas and inputs into the sea via Russian rivers, and 4) arms-related environmental hazards.

The implementation of this Plan of Action has an impact in a number of areas, including foreign and security policy interests, environmental protection and business and industry. A committee of state secretaries and an interministerial group of senior officials have been appointed to coordinate the work. The committee draws up guidelines for Norwegian efforts in this field and makes decisions on the use of funds. NOK 230 million has been allocated to the Plan of Action for 1995 and 1996, and the Government has proposed the allocation of a further NOK 100 million in the 1997 budget. So far, a total of about NOK 110 million has been disbursed or pledged for various projects. The remainder of the funds allocated for 1995-96 has been earmarked for projects that are being planned or project proposals that are under consideration. It is expected that these projects will be started later this year or next year. Most of the projects are being focused on defence-related nuclear problems in north-western Russia, where the problems are serious and extensive. The projects are very complex in both technological and administrative terms.

The problems we are dealing with are huge, but in spite of this we have made considerable progress. Cooperation with the Russian authorities is proceeding satisfactorily. We have built up a relationship of trust in a very sensitive field with central decision-makers. During the first phase of this work, there was an urgent need to survey the situation and gather information. We are now entering the next phase, when we can implement specific measures. We are dealing largely with sensitive military issues, and we must be prepared for setbacks. Delays have arisen in the joint environmental surveys of marine areas along the coast of the Kola Peninsula and in visits to Novaya Zemlya and the nuclear facilities at Krasnoyarsk. However, in my opinion this does not alter the main trend of our cooperation, which in recent years has been developing satisfactorily.

Norway's most important task is probably to play a catalytic role in the international arena and thereby raise political awareness of and encourage financial support for projects in the field of nuclear safety. The funds allocated to projects within the framework of the Plan of Action make it possible for us to play such a role. The close cooperation between Norway and Russia in this field has attracted attention, and a number of other countries are interested in becoming associated with the Norwegian programme. Together with France, we have established a separate working group for nuclear issues, and we are in close contact with the European Commission and the USA concerning the waste and nuclear fuel problems in north-western Russia.

At international level, a number of bilateral and multilateral programmes have been set up to improve safety standards at nuclear power plants with reactors built by the Soviets. The Nuclear Safety Account of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is playing a central role in this process. Norway takes part in this work, together with 13 other industrial countries and the European Commission.

When the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was formed, Norway, as a member of the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, initiated a study of radioactive and chemical pollution from military sources. The study is being chaired by Norway, and a network of environmental experts and military authorities from about 20 participating countries, including NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries and partner countries, has been built up. The study has helped to focus attention on the risks of radioactive and chemical pollution. It is now being continued with a strong emphasis on safe management of radioactive waste and on risk assessments of nuclear submarines that have been taken out of service.

On Norway's initiative, a trilateral Memorandum on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) was signed by the Norwegian, Russian and US defence ministers on 26 September 1996. Cooperation of this kind between defence authorities is almost unique. Several meetings have been held and have provided an important incentive in efforts to improve environmental security in connection with the dismantling of nuclear submarines. Initially, the AMEC cooperation on radioactive contamination issues will be focusing on four joint projects, i.e. the review of technologies and procedures for interim storage of solid radioactive waste and development of a storage facility in Andreev Bay, the development of new Russian technology for the treatment of liquid radioactive waste, the review and implementation of technology for reducing the volume of solid radioactive waste, and the development of a prototype container for interim storage of spent nuclear submarine fuel. Norway has undertaken to contribute NOK 3.3 million to the first phase of the AMEC projects. This will be followed up as the projects progress.

AMEC has resulted in direct military participation by the USA in this type of project, which is of great importance for both radiation and environmental protection. Until now, bilateral American-Russian cooperation has concentrated mainly on security policy aspects such as the removal of nuclear weapons and the dismantling of the weapons sections of nuclear submarines.

The Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, NEFCO, was asked by the Nordic ministers of the environment to identify suitable environmental investment projects in Russia, for instance projects dealing with the problems of radioactivity. NEFCO's report includes many of the same recommendations as we have made in other connections. The Corporation may be an appropriate source of funds for a number of projects. We expect the new, large-scale environmental loans scheme of the Nordic Investment Bank to be another source of funds.

Norway has called for greater commitment on the part of the G 7 with regard to the problems associated with radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The Moscow nuclear safety and security summit in April this year made a number of important statements of principle in its declaration, but our proposal for an international plan of action and a fund was not reflected in the outcome of the meeting. Our efforts are now primarily directed towards strengthening the Contact Expert Group (CEG) on international radioactive waste projects in Russia. This group was established under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a result of a Norwegian and Swedish initiative, and is making good progress. Our intention is that the CEG should serve as a forum for contact, coordination and information, where participants can coordinate their individual programmes and pool their efforts to solve high-priority problems. In addition to Norway and Sweden, a number of other countries including Belgium, Finland, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the USA and the European Commission have joined the group.

Now I would like to discuss each of the four priority areas of the Norwegian Plan of Action in turn. As regards the first of these, safety measures at nuclear facilities, we are particularly concerned about activities at the Kola, Leningrad, Ignalina and Chernobyl power plants. The Chernobyl accident in 1986 demonstrated that these facilities also threaten health and the environment in Norway in the event of an accident. We expect the Chernobyl plant to be closed in the year 2000 in accordance with the declaration made by Ukraine, the EU and the G 7. A binding agreement on the closure of the plant is now being negotiated between Ukraine and the Nuclear Safety Account of the EBRD.

A project involving cooperation between Norway and the Kola nuclear power plant has been in progress for several years, with the objective of improving safety standards pending closure of the reactors. This is the largest project included in the Plan of Action. It had a budget of about NOK 25 million for 1993-95, and a further NOK 44 million is earmarked for 1995-97. The safety measures financed by Norway include an emergency generator for the circulation pumps, emergency communications equipment, computer equipment for secure storage of technical data, vibration detectors, equipment for surveillance of water quality, evaluation of fire safety systems, and improvements in critical safety functions in the control room. None of these measures involve nuclear technology that will prolong the operational lifetime of the reactors. It has at times been a demanding task to reach agreement on technical specifications and on the necessary customs procedures, but the situation has gradually improved. The same is true of efforts to provide indemnity for Norway and Norwegian suppliers in the event of a nuclear accident.

I would like to emphasize that Norway is concerned about the possibility that the four VVER-440 reactors at the Kola nuclear power plant may be replaced, even though the replacement reactors would be new, up-to-date and safer than the old ones. The Government will insist that before taking an irrevocable decision the Russian authorities make a long-term assessment of the energy situation in north-western Russia, including the possibility of gas supplies from Siberia or the Barents Sea and the impact of energy efficiency measures.

The Norwegian safety project is being coordinated with international efforts, for instance through the Nuclear Safety Account. We are supporting the latter's persistent efforts to ensure that the Russians meet the safety obligations they have undertaken, and to ensure that the oldest and most unsafe reactors, in particular, are closed down as soon as possible. The two oldest reactors at the Kola nuclear power plant are especially important here, but we are also concerned at the Russian plans to restart a reactor at Kursk, in contravention of the agreement with the Nuclear Safety Account. The Government expects the Russian authorities to comply fully with this agreement, and to otherwise ensure that the nuclear power plants are operated in accordance with the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, to which Russia, too, has acceded.

The second priority area of the Plan of Action, the management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, represents a "stealthier" risk of pollution than nuclear power plants. Most of the waste is generated by the operation of nuclear-powered submarines and when submarines are taken out of service and dismantled. There is also a substantial risk associated with the large quantities of spent nuclear fuel still on board decommissioned submarines. The Russian Northern Fleet has about 90 decommissioned nuclear submarines, some of which are in very poor condition. About 70 of them are laid up in fjords around the Kola Peninsula and in the White Sea, still carrying dangerous spent fuel. The number of decommissioned submarines is constantly increasing, and they represent a real threat in terms of pollution.

Russia alone cannot deal with this problem in the short term. Norway has therefore proposed broad-based international cooperation on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Purely organizational changes by the Russians can improve the situation to some extent, but the most important task is to find acceptable, cost-effective solutions which will gain international support. Otherwise the result may well be serious pollution of the northern seas, which will require far more costly clean-up operations.

For some time we have been giving priority to gaining an overview of the situation and of Russian plans and systems for dealing with decommissioned submarines. This process is now largely completed. About a year ago, the Norwegian company Kværner Maritime and the Russian company RSC Energia carried out a study of the Russian programme for the disposal of decommissioned nuclear submarines and proposed several joint projects that would remove various environmental bottlenecks during this process.

Russian procedures involve removing the high-level spent nuclear fuel from the submarine reactors. After being cooled and stored for a period of time, the waste is transported to Mayak in the Urals for reprocessing. The reactor section is cut away from the rest of the hull and stored separately. According to Russian plans, the reactor sections will later be stored in tunnels in the rock near Ara Bay on the Kola Peninsula. The large amounts of solid and liquid radioactive waste generated during the dismantling process are to be treated and kept in interim storage facilities until they can be moved to a repository which the Russians are currently considering constructing on Novaya Zemlya.

As a near neighbour of these activities, Norway has a vested interest in their being carried out in an environmentally safe way. We are in the process of establishing seven joint projects that will help us to deal better with problems that are a source of grave concern. The first four can be started fairly soon, but the remaining three require further evaluation. These seven projects, for which Norwegian assistance will be provided free of charge, are as follows:

• the construction of a specialized vessel for the transport of spent nuclear fuel,
• the building of four railway trucks for the transport of spent nuclear fuel,
• the upgrading of storage tanks for liquid radioactive waste in Severodvinsk,
• the construction of a mobile concentration facility for liquid radioactive waste,
• the emptying and closing down of the storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in Andreev Bay,
• the building of an interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Mayak plant,
• the building of a storage facility for solid radioactive waste on the Kola Peninsula.

These are major tasks in themselves, but they are only part of a much larger Russian programme for the disposal of nuclear submarines and the management of radioactive waste. We are not involved in the actual demolition process, but are participating in areas of the Russian programme that are expected to provide substantial environmental benefits and that have direct environmental significance for Norway. Severe pollution of the Barents Sea would be a disaster that we must make every effort to prevent.

Kværner Maritime has been commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue working on the details of these seven projects. The projects will be included in a cooperation agreement on nuclear safety issues. I expect this to be signed around the new year. When this happens, Norway will be the first country to have reached such an agreement. The cost of our involvement in these projects is under review, but we expect to spend NOK 150-200 million over three to five years from the start of the projects. We attach great importance to obtaining foreign participation in the financial and technological fields.

I would now like to discuss some aspects of the submarine projects in more detail. The Russian programme involves the building of a specialized vessel for collecting high-level spent nuclear fuel from areas along the coast of the Kola Peninsula where fuel is stored or decommissioned submarines are laid up. We have no wish to have decommissioned submarines containing spent nuclear fuel towed to shipyards along the Kola coast which have little experience of this type of problem. Instead we will provide support for the building of a specialized vessel for the transport of this dangerous cargo and any other radioactive waste to a few centralized sites on land, where they can either be placed in secure interim storage facilities or be transported further for safe handling and storage.

It has been claimed that the specialized vessel may also have an operational significance for the Northern Fleet. I feel this is a very hypothetical possibility. The vessel will only be able to handle spent nuclear fuel that has been through a cooling process, and will not be able to fulfil any natural function in the removal of spent nuclear fuel from operative nuclear submarines. Spent fuel from operative submarines is hot and has to be cooled down and handled in special support/depot vessels used by the Northern Fleet for this purpose. It would also be meaningless to use the vessel for the transport of unused nuclear fuel, which does not require special shielding. There will also be inspection arrangements for the transport vessel, as for other Norwegian-financed infrastructure, so that Norway can ensure that it will only be used for the purpose for which it was intended. Russia has accepted this. We expect that the transport of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned nuclear submarines will require the entire capacity of the vessel for at least 15 years.

The Russians are planning to transport this fuel in special casks by rail from the centralized sites on land to Mayak for reprocessing. I realize that there are arguments against transporting spent nuclear fuel to Mayak, but the actual transport can be carried out safely. The advantage of transporting this dangerous material to Mayak is that it will permit the submarines and the storage facility for hazardous waste in Andreev Bay to be emptied relatively quickly, since this operation will be based on existing Russian plans, which can be further developed with foreign assistance. The Mayak plant already has the expertise needed to deal with the waste, either by reprocessing or by special treatment for the purpose of long-term storage.

We have reason to believe that much of the fuel from nuclear submarines needs to be reprocessed for reasons of nuclear safety. This applies primarily to uranium-aluminium fuel, which corrodes relatively rapidly. Mayak is the only place in Russia where fuel from ship reactors is reprocessed. Our view is that other fuels which corrode less readily should be placed in secure interim storage facilities until Russia has built a repository for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

The Russians have asked us to take part in reviewing the plans for a main interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at Mayak, where a basis for construction already exists. The alternative is to find a suitable location on the Kola Peninsula, but in this case deciding on the location, design and engineering, and obtaining a licence can be expected to take a long time and cause delays. We will, however, continue to cooperate with the Russians in reviewing storage possibilities at both these places.

Extracted uranium and plutonium can theoretically be used in weapons production or other activities that Norway would be unable to support. Considering the substantial quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium that Russia has already "inherited" from the Soviet Union, it does not seem probable that military applications will be sought for uranium and plutonium from submarine reactors. Extracted uranium will probably be recycled in the form of low-enriched nuclear fuel for civilian purposes, while plutonium will either be stored on a long-term basis or where appropriate used for the production of MOX fuel. It should also be noted that much smaller quantities of plutonium are produced in ship reactors than in reactors at nuclear power plants. Plutonium "produced" in submarine reactors with medium or highly enriched uranium contains relatively large quantities of plutonium-240, which is not the type of plutonium that is most suitable for weapons purposes (Pu-239). It therefore seems unlikely that the fissile material will be used for weapons purposes. Our main concern in this regard is physical safety, i.e. the risk of the substance falling into the wrong hands. These issues are being discussed with the Russians and will be clarified before the project agreements are concluded.

Our cooperation on certain aspects of the submarine disposal programme is based on the assumption that it will result in better environmental priorities. We will proceed on the basis of the decisions already made by the Russians, and gradually try to exert a positive influence. Our goal is to achieve safe, cost-effective operations under independent control and inspection mechanisms, and in keeping with internationally accepted principles and guidelines. We feel that the best way of achieving this is for us and other Western countries to take part in key projects in which we can make sure that the Russians themselves give priority to these areas, and take into account factors they might not otherwise have considered. We do not take responsibility for particular solutions, nor do we become involved in projects that in our opinion do not meet the necessary standards. The Government has made sure that the cooperation is subject to certain definite conditions, two of which are that the assistance must not have military significance for Russia or the operation of the nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet, and that the activities do not result in greater environmental stresses at Mayak or at any point in the process.

Norwegian involvement with regard to radioactive waste and the safe management of spent nuclear fuel from submarines has improved coordination on the Russian side. We can see evidence of this in the Russian project team, which has a highly varied composition. The Russian Government has also adopted a special programme for the handling of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel until the year 2005, at an estimated total cost of USD 2 billion. Even if the allocations do not measure up to this level, we have noted that the Russians have drawn up plans in this connection, which is positive in itself.

I would also like to say something about other measures that are part of the overall strategy for dealing with pollution from military sources and encouraging international efforts. Two of these are the Norwegian-American-Russian cooperation on an effluent treatment facility for liquid radioactive waste in Murmansk and the project for removing damaged nuclear fuel from the vessel Lepse, which is currently being used for storage. The treatment facility has been funded by splitting the total cost, about NOK 28 million, into three parts. We are cooperating with France, the USA, and the European Commission on the Lepse project and have taken the responsibility for coordinating it. Initially we are dividing the cost of removing the damaged fuel from the Lepse, which amounts to about NOK 70 million, with France and the EU. NEFCO may also contribute part of the funding. Both these projects are developing in a satisfactory way and have direct application to environmental problems associated with military activities, such as effluent treatment of liquid radioactive waste from naval vessels and methods for handling damaged nuclear fuel.

And now to the third priority area of our Plan of Action: for many years Soviet radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel was dumped in the northern seas. The extensive nuclear activity in Siberia means that there is a real possibility of radioactive contamination of northern seas via river systems. This is a matter of concern. For Norway, ensuring that the northern seas continue to be among the cleanest in the world is an immutable goal. The Barents Sea, for example, plays a very important role in world food production.

The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, together with the Institute of Marine Research and the Radiation Protection Authority, have been carrying out important environmental studies in the north for many years. Three joint Norwegian-Russian scientific expeditions have been sent to the Kara Sea and the bays of Novaya Zemlya. They concluded that the level of pollution from dumped material is very low. Elevated levels of radioactivity can only be measured close to some of the dumped objects. The general level of radioactivity in the northern seas is low and is primarily due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests, emissions from European reprocessing plants, marine transport of radionuclides from the Chernobyl accident and transport of radionuclides from Siberian rivers.

An assessment of the future risk to humans and the environment of pollution from dumped radioactive waste is being carried out under the auspices of the IAEA. The preliminary conclusions seem to agree with those of the Norwegian-Russian studies. Thus raising or moving dumped waste and reactors containing spent nuclear fuel seems to be neither necessary nor advisable.

The Government will continue cooperating with Russia in surveying and assessing the risk of radioactive contamination in the northern seas, primarily from unsafe storage facilities and activities on land. We will also continue surveying and evaluating the pollution situation at Mayak and the danger of inputs to the sea of radioactive contamination from former Soviet nuclear weapons production plants at Mayak, Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk via the rivers Ob and Yenisey. Preparations are under way for a programme to monitor the environmental situation in the northern areas.

Some years ago there was much concern about the nuclear submarine Komsomolets, which sank in the North Atlantic in 1989 and is now lying at a depth of about 1700 metres south-west of Bjørnøya. Experts have concluded that neither the plutonium nor the fuel in the reactor represents a real pollution threat. However, the waters around the wreck are regularly monitored for leakages.

The Norwegian authorities are completing an extensive study of the state of the Arctic environment, which has not found that levels of radioactivity give cause for any special concern. Provided that there is no nuclear disaster in the area, other sources of pollution, such as hazardous organic substances (pesticides and tars), heavy metals and acidification caused by sulphur dioxide emissions, constitute the greatest threats to the Arctic environment. These findings have also been supported by the conclusions of the monitoring and assessment work being done as part of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, which will now be integrated into the Arctic Council.

With regard to the fourth priority area of the Plan of Action, arms-related environmental hazards, it has been an important task for Norway to contribute to the following objectives: achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, investigating the consequences of earlier nuclear tests and of any dumping of chemical weapons in northern areas, preventing illicit trafficking in fissile materials and promoting high physical safety and control standards. We also consider it essential that weapons of mass destruction are destroyed in environmentally safe ways and that the expertise available within the former Soviet nuclear weapon complex is put to civilian use.

The radical reduction in arsenals of nuclear and chemical weapons that is currently under way is a very positive and welcome development. At the same time, however, it is both costly and difficult. Norway's main concern is that disarmament and the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons should take place under safe and environmentally sound conditions. Many of these weapons are stored in areas adjacent to our borders.

The only remaining Russian nuclear testing site is on Novaya Zemlya. We estimate that approximately 130 nuclear tests have been carried out there altogether, constituting an obvious risk to health and to the whole Arctic environment. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that was signed in the UN earlier this year was therefore more than a milestone in the efforts to stop the nuclear arms race, it was also a guarantee that no more nuclear tests would be carried out in areas adjacent to our borders. A system of verification and control is essential if the Treaty is to be implemented in accordance with its objectives, and Norway has been actively involved in the development of an international seismic monitoring system. The network of seismic stations set up by the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) forms an important part of the global monitoring system established by the Treaty.

The Government regards it as a natural follow-up to the Treaty that the nuclear weapons states dismantle all their nuclear test installations. France is to close down its testing site on Mururoa in the Pacific. Similar measures should be taken by the other nuclear weapons states. Norway has raised this question at this year's UN General Assembly. It will be of great interest to assess the extent of the environmental impact of the nuclear tests that have been carried out on Novaya Zemlya, and Norway is prepared to contribute to an international study for this purpose in cooperation with Russian experts and authorities.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is expected to enter into force early next year. It requires all chemical weapons to be destroyed in an environmentally safe way within ten years. Russia probably has over 40,000 tons of such chemicals in storage, some of it in areas adjacent to our borders. The implementation of the Convention will be a very costly and difficult process. International cooperation with Russia is currently being developed for the purpose of ensuring an up-to-date and environmentally safe way of destroying chemical weapons. We have agreed in principle to participate in this cooperation. Norway plays a special role in these efforts because of its position as chairman of the organization that is preparing the implementation of the Convention. At present there is no organizational framework for the Western assistance that is being planned, and we are advocating better coordination in this field, preferably within NATO.

Norway is currently becoming affiliated with the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow, which provides civilian employment for former Soviet nuclear weapon experts. The Centre is an important forum which will serve to make contact with and open up the previously secret military-industrial complex. The largest contributors are the USA, the EU and Japan. Norway's efforts in this connection will be focused on environmental and radiation problems in north-western Russia.

If fissile material, i.e. uranium and plutonium that can be used for weapons purposes, should fall into the wrong hands, this could have very serious consequences. Norway takes an active part in international cooperation for preventing the removal of such material from storage facilities and for preventing smuggling and illegal trafficking. We have also started a project for improving control and physical safeguarding of fissile material in north-western Russia. In addition, we play an active role in the prevention of smuggling across the Norwegian-Russian border and other illicit trafficking in radioactive substances and nuclear material. We have not encountered any cases of such trafficking in Norway, but we cannot exclude the possibility that attempts will be made to use Norway as a transit country. Our police, customs, defence and radiation protection authorities have therefore made joint efforts to tighten up contingency plans for dealing with such activities. These efforts include closer cooperation with the authorities in Russia and neighbouring Nordic countries. I would also like to mention that the Government welcomes the programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials adopted by the Moscow nuclear summit, and has noted the invitation to other countries to take part in its implementation.

Madam President,
In its efforts to promote nuclear safety, the Government has focused on action, on devising practical solutions to specific problems, and on encouraging Russian efforts and international participation. The projects in which Norway is participating are designed to deal with a few critically important aspects of the nuclear problems on the Kola Peninsula which may have direct consequences for Norway. Difficult decisions will of course have to be made. Every proposed technical solution has its positive and negative aspects, but we have to begin somewhere. We are confident that we are on the right track, but at the same time we wish to encourage the development of alternative, even more effective solutions. We wish to be a driving force that will encourage Russian activity to take place in accordance with internationally recognized principles and guidelines, and that will strengthen independent control and inspection arrangements. It is quite clear that a more open attitude on the part of the Russians concerning their civil and military nuclear activities will improve our prospects of solving nuclear safety problems in the north. As a neighbouring country, Norway has a very strong interest in the success of these efforts.