Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal

Western European Union
Council of Ministers, Birmingham, 7 May 1996

WEUs Role in Crisis Management

Introduction by Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for this opportunity to present Norwegian views on this important topic.

Let me start with some basic observations.

European security has changed radically.
The end of the Cold war drastically reduced military confrontation, and brought an end to the divided Europe.
It opened the door to common security, across the old divide.
But it also brought the post cold war challenges to the forefront:
Old conflicts rooted in minority and nationalist differences.
New and potentially explosive threats, such as weapons proliferation and environmental degradation.

The geographic focus has also changed.
European security is today directly affected by both internal and regional instability in surrounding areas; in the Middle East, in North Africa, and in the newly independent states - in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Russia.
Weak democracies and economic stagnation breed instability and regional conflict. Democracy and prosperity generate security.

A real offer of close and binding cooperation is the best investment in common security that we can make. We need a broad concept of security. The new democracies should be given the opportunity to join in cooperation of the kind we have developed in Western Europe over the last fifty years. We must reach out to a large group of states, although their potential and the character of the arrangements that can be made will differ. We should also devote more attention to sub-regional cooperation, which offers a very useful framework for cooperation.

There must be no new dividing lines.
There must be a place for each - and security for all.
This investment in common security, is our first line of defence against crises and conflict.

Mr. Chairman,
The best crisis management is crisis prevention. And crisis prevention requires common political resolve. More political energy should be devoted towards the early prevention and limitation of conflict. We must break the dangerous spiral of escalation, and nourish the reverse logic, where compromise and solutions feed confidence and trust. We know that it is possible. It is in this perspective, that Norway will continue to invest considerable efforts in sustaining the Middle East peace process. We all know that preventive efforts are cost effective - in political, human and financial terms.

We will welcome an effective European Common foreign and security policy. But the EU Common foreign and security policy should deal with the political aspects of crisis prevention. Other organisations, NATO and the WEU, posess the competence required for the military aspects. We should also continue to strengthen the OSCE's crisis prevention capabilities.

The role of the WEU and the contribution that it can make to European crisis management, must be seen in the light of the range of resources and instruments necessary, and the contribution of other organisations, notably NATO.

A few points should be kept in mind:

First: Europeans must increase their share of responsibility for the new European security challenges. At the same time, a substantial American participation will continue to remain essential.The conflict in former Yugoslavia brought home a fundamental lesson on this point. It remains valid. Where there is no direct American military participation, European action should be able to draw on transatlantic solidarity and backing.

Second: We should, to the extent possible, provide for participation and active involvement by Central and Eastern European states, Russia and others. The IFOR model is a blueprint: The participation of non-NATO states in the NATO-led operation lends political and military strength to the force set up to solve the immediate task, ensuring peace implementation in the war-ravaged region. But IFOR may be even more important in pioneering cooperative security arrangements across the old divide. IFOR is a flexible, innovative arrangement, which helps solve a pressing problem, but at the same time, generates increased trust and security over the longer term.

Third: The challenges are diverse, and the potential areas of conflict numerous. Successfull crisis management will require a complicated mix of non-military and military capabilities, as in the former Yugoslavia. This argues for a pragmatic and flexible approach, and the use of a combination of institutions and instruments. NATO has shown its operational strength with the IFOR-operation. The EU and the OSCE are both undertaking major tasks with regard to non-military efforts and reconstruction. We must ensure that each organisation acts according to its strengths. We should strive for close and pragmatic cooperation between the various instruments.

What role for the WEU ?

WEU relations with NATO are being developed. The NATO -WEU security agreement and agreement on putting CJTF into effect are necessary for WEU operational capability. Together with the operational efforts of the British Presidency, this should allow the WEU to undertake smaller scale Petersberg-operations. We should continue to strive for close political and operative relations between the WEU and NATO, and avoid all duplication of effort. Relations between the WEU and the EU have benefited from the pragmatic approach of the Italian and UK Presidencies.

We should strive for real involvement of the WEU 18, and gradually all 27 WEU-nations, in both political and operative matters. The WEU should be an inclusive, not an exclusive organisation. Broad participation will provide increased resources and political strength. That will also allow the WEU to contribute to the integration of our partners into the new European security architecture, and thus supplement our efforts within NATO and Partnership for Peace, and the EU.

In sum, the WEU can become a useful vehicle for Petersberg-operations, on a smaller scale. On the basis of close and pragmatic coordination with NATO and the EU, the WEU can realise its potential and become an important link in the web of mutually interlocking instruments serving European security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

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