Afghanistan: Winning the Conflict

 

Introduction

Allow me first to thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. This is a great opportunity to discuss current security challenges, focusing on ways in which to better our understanding of how to contribute to security, development, peace and stability in Afghanistan and beyond. International peace support operations continue to be a core theme when discussing the future development of our security environment. This also holds true for the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan.  Peace operations are evolving into a practical international policy tool both for ending wars and for building stability, democracy and economic growth.

I am particularly honoured to have the opportunity to speak on the important topic of Afghanistan: Winning the Conflict. This is unquestionably a challenging topic, let alone a complex undertaking for the international community. We all knew from the outset – and realise even more so today – that succeeding in Afghanistan is a complex task.  However, I think the developments over the last year give us reasons to be optimistic and that there is currently a new sense of momentum.

What I would like to do in this opening address is to first give a brief account of my reading of the current state of affairs in Afghanistan as it has developed over the last year up until the present. Then I will put main emphasis on future challenges and opportunities for the international community’s efforts to support the Afghan Government and its people.

I will focus attention on three areas of particular relevance in terms of challenges and solutions. First, there’s a need to strengthen the role of the UN in Afghanistan. The ultimate success of our efforts in Afghanistan will depend on the effective leadership from the UN, in close partnership with the government and people of Afghanistan. The UN must be in lead as the main coordinator of international efforts and the main provider of strategic guidance to the Afghan government. At the same time the UN’s strategic role must be enforced by a robust ISAF-operation. Reconstruction and development cannot take place if ISAF does not succeed in providing security and stability. In this regard, we must implement a comprehensive approach in which military and civilian instruments are applied in a coordinated way.

Secondly, and what I believe is the key to success – there needs to be increased “Afghanisation” – i.e. capacity building and Afghan ownership at all levels of our efforts. Finally, the challenges we face in Afghanistan must be seen in and dealt with in a regional perspective. Let me now elaborate on these issues.

State of affairs and way ahead

Following the terrorist attacks against the USA on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war against the Taliban rule, there was broad international consensus to engage in Afghanistan. We must not forget that a promise was made that the international community would not forget Afghanistan yet again. Consequently, we have a commitment that we must fulfil.

A mixed picture unfolded on the political arena in 2006, with both progress and setbacks. On the one hand, there was the Loya Jirga, Parliament and stronger central government. On the other hand, old warlords remain influential, and political structures at the local level have limited capacity. In addition, corruption permeates much of the government apparatus, and a culture of impunity has continued.

The economic situation in Afghanistan is still a major challenge. Despite increased development efforts, there has been a limited real improvement in living conditions. The country is among the five poorest in the world, the infant-mortality rate is the highest in the world, and the infrastructure is extremely weak.

The drug economy is rapidly growing and has strong political links. This relates not only to the global drug scene, but also to the local political scene. If the Afghan Government can not cope with the drug-lords it will not be possible to establish good governance, and effective governance is a prerequisite for successful rule by law and reconstruction. In addition, local powerbrokers see reconstruction and development as a threat. Therefore, what we do now will influence people’s perceptions of and the level of support for the new political order, thereby determining the chances it has of succeeding.

2006 was also a difficult year for NATO. ISAF – NATO’s most important operation – was facing grave military challenges from Taliban offensives, and NATO needed to put its main effort on responding urgently to the offensive and to generate additional forces.

As a consequence of the deteriorating security situation, the military dimension of our efforts dominated the agenda. Ultimately, there was a lack of political and development considerations taking the centre stage of our efforts in Afghanistan.

Half-way into 2007, however, I think there are reasons to be optimistic. Several countries have increased their financial contributions to civilian development. The UN Mission (UNAMA) has been authorized to deepen and expand its work, and the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) provides better coordination on the ground in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

Following NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006, there has been recognition of the serious challenges and dilemmas we are facing, and NATO’s most important mission – ISAF – has been strengthened. ISAF now covers the whole of Afghanistan. Some 40,000 NATO-led forces are assisting the Afghan government in extending and exercising its authority. The job being done by our troop contributing partners in Afghanistan is of tremendous value, and demonstrates the commitment of the entire international community. Partners make substantial and important troop contributions to NATO-led operations. I want to emphasise that there is only one ISAF operation. There seems to be a perception in some quarters that NATO has several different operations in Afghanistan. But NATO has one mission – with one purpose – that of assisting the Afghan government in extending and exercising its authority across Afghanistan. Differences in tactics and management across different regional commands are first and foremost a consequence of variations in the level of resistance to ISAF’s presence from one region to another.

Furthermore, there is now a particular emphasis on the importance of effective coordination of civilian and military efforts. As a result, we are witnessing a stronger role for the UN, the EU, and the World Bank to deal with the overarching challenges in Afghanistan.  Finally, the importance of building Afghan capacity, both on the civilian and military side, is increasingly recognised.

Strengthening the role of the UN – comprehensive approach

The UN has played a crucial role in Afghanistan in terms of formulating the Afghan Compact and in guiding reconstruction, governance and development efforts. However, the effort of the international community in Afghanistan still is too fragmented. There are two, closely interlinked, challenges in this regard. First, there are several actors side by side and a lack of balance between political, military, developmental and humanitarian efforts. Secondly, there is no clear lead agency responsible for strategic guidance and coordination of efforts. I am pleased to see, however, that the need for a more integrated, strategic and multilateral effort is increasingly recognized among all actors involved in Afghanistan. It is urgent that we now implement a comprehensive approach on the ground.

Sometimes the concept of a comprehensive approach is referred to as civil-military cooperation. However, we are talking about much more than that. A truly comprehensive approach entails the application of a wide spectrum of instruments – economic, political, developmental and humanitarian – in an integrated and coordinated manner. Such an approach will create synergetic effects in promoting an overall political strategy, within a framework of realistic ambitions. This will be essential to ensuring success in the years to come.

We need to strengthen the role of the UN in Afghanistan, in close cooperation with the Afghan government. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) must be used actively in this regard. The UN must be empowered and take on its role as the main strategic coordinating agency through which guidance, direction and authority is exercised. I think it is necessary to appoint a special envoy responsible for the overall political and strategic guidance in Afghanistan. This would contribute to a much needed focal point for coordination of efforts and providing strategic guidance and support to Afghan authorities.

Furthermore, we also need to enhance UNAMA’s role in Afghanistan. In this regard, I highly welcome the recent UN Security Council Resolution (S/2007/169) which stresses a more prominent role for UNAMA. We need to expand UNAMA’s role both at the provincial and local level by expanding its regional offices. This entails more personnel and funding for the organisation.

Reinforcing the role of the PRTs is one area in which NATO makes a difference in terms of civil-military coordination. The PRT concept underpins the authority of the Government of Afghanistan, also in remote parts of the country. The concept is a key element not only in improving the security situation, but also in enabling ISAF to interact with the local population and local authorities. Our support to Afghan authorities through our PRTs should be long-term, promoting continuity in the area of reconstruction and development.

NATO has shown important military progress in Afghanistan over the past six months. We are still facing great challenges, but we are better prepared and more coordinated. A solid military strategy is a necessary part of a holistic, strategic approach.

Through proactive stabilisation we can provide a much needed foundation for development efforts, and we must not shy away from robust action when such action is called for. Then again, the military action must be conducted in a manner in which Afghan support for the operations is not jeopardised. Therefore we must strive to minimize collateral damage. Such damage only undermines the overall message and makes the local people more resentful of the international community’s actions. Furthermore, civilian casualties undermine public support of ISAF’s mission and efforts in troop-contribution nations.

We should also refrain from using and communicating body counts as a measure of success.  First, it is not a goal in itself, and second, it might lead to the false assumption that you have 100 enemies less, when in fact you might have created a situation in which Taliban recruitment is increased.

Afghanisation – building Afghan capacity

A key measure of progress and long-term success in Afghanistan depends on growth in Afghan capacity. The importance of “Afghanisation” is solidly embedded in the Afghan Compact. The Afghan Government keeps repeating the call to the international community to commit to increased “Afghanisation”, with a particular emphasis on strengthening the role of the Afghan security forces – i.e. the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police ( ANP). This entails increased training and as well as equipping the Afghan security forces.

Furthermore, there is an urgent need for capacity building on the civilian side – i.e. promoting good governance based on the rule of law and human rights.  We need to strengthen the authority of the central government throughout the country, building Afghan capacity and we need to work actively to develop solutions that are suited for local conditions.

A milestone that is central to all other reconstruction activities is the development of good governance. We need to focus our efforts on this important issue. Without good governance we will not be able to establish law and order, and reconstruction efforts will give little effect. We must place a stronger emphasis on engaging the Afghans and promoting good governance.

On the positive side, there is now a strong focus in the UN, NATO and the EU, as well as among other actors in Afghanistan, on the importance of a joint effort to increase assistance and facilitate in building Afghan capacity. Today, Afghan authorities have the full responsibility towards its citizens, however, they do not have sufficient means to assume that responsibility.

Therefore, we must strive to correct this imbalance and demonstrate readiness to unite behind Afghan ambitions, plans and priorities, while at the same time increasing the pressure on the government in Kabul to live up to the responsibilities it has pledged before the Afghan people.

First, with UNAMA in the lead, the international community should help facilitate capacity building in the political field, promoting good governance. As such, there needs to be an emphasis on improving both the central institutions in Kabul as well as in the provinces, taking into consideration the local and tribal structures across the country. It is crucial that we help building legitimate and well-functioning political structures at all levels able to promote social and economic development.

Secondly, capacity building in the judicial sector is vital in order to establish justice and respect for the rule of law. Particularly, reform of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary is of critical importance. 

Thirdly, an overriding principle for our efforts is the creation of a security framework that has a clear Afghan ownership, and that can be handed over to and sustained by the Afghans themselves.

NATO is now ready to take on a greater role in training and supporting ANA. I am pleased to see that a number of countries are willing to send additional mentoring and liaison teams.

We should also better facilitate training of Afghan Security Forces at the local level within the framework of our PRTs. Training at the provincial level yields significant effects in the local environment.

There is also a need to develop initiatives that ensure effective coordination of training and support to ANA. In this regard, the NATO Training and Equipment Support Directorate is important.

ISAF should assume a larger role in the area of military education. The basic training being led by the US is showing good progress. Branch schools for specialized training are a further enhancement on the part of ISAF. We should look at ways in which ISAF could assume a larger role at the staff-college level, where there also appears to be gaps.

I highly welcome the EU’s planned police operation in Afghanistan.  While ISAF is only in the facilitating role concerning training of the Afghan police forces, it is important that we implement good mechanisms for coordination between ISAF and the upcoming ESDP police operation. We must make full use of the opportunities that these operations provide to strengthen all aspects of EU-NATO co-operation.

Regional approach

My final point is that issues connected to security and economy are cross-border challenges. As a result, the challenges we face in Afghanistan must be seen in and dealt with in a regional perspective. For example, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in influencing the situation in Afghanistan, and the situation of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan must be addressed. Another important factor is Iran, who not only is anti-Taliban, but also sceptical of the U.S. role in the region. In addition, the recent development in the Middle East further complicates the picture. 

The security challenges in Afghanistan can not be solved inside Afghanistan alone. The Taliban is a combined Afghan – Pakistani challenge that must be addressed as a whole. And we need a political solution. Military force and reconstruction are only elements in developing a solution.

Major regional powers like India have significant influence over the development of Afghanistan. As long as Pakistan views Indian reconstruction efforts, witch are huge in Eastern-Afghanistan, as a threat we will not be able to create a stable environment. And we see the same issue in Western-Afghanistan concerning Iranian interests.

We need a regional political solution if we are to find good solutions for Afghanistan. However, ideal solutions do not exist and we need to work with what we have. The important part is to work for better common ground and solutions, and less mistrust between neighbouring counties.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say that the completion of our mission – the success of our mission – depends on the awareness of and the ability to both manoeuvre in and deal with the complexity of the underlying issues in Afghanistan.

Our prime focus should now be on a common strategic approach combined with realistic ambitions. This applies to the need for a more integrated approach on the strategic level, which requires strengthening the role of the UN and implementing a comprehensive approach on the ground.

Our common efforts rests on the recognition that improving the situation in Afghanistan can not be done for the Afghans, it can only be done with the Afghans. Consequently, building Afghan capacity is crucial for succeeding in our efforts.

The Afghan Government stated in the JCMB that it is now time to “go from the Compact to Impact”. Therefore, the international community must stay firm in its commitment to contribute to security, political, economic and social development in Afghanistan.