Why is Norway in Afghanistan? How can we best complete our mission?

Introduction
Thank you very much for inviting me to address the distinguished audience at this conference, with a focus on thinking strategically about the future. In a long-term strategic perspective, there are many interesting and challenging topics to address. In this context, international peace support operations continue to be a core theme when discussing the future development of our security environment. This also holds true for the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan, and I would like to commend the Atlantic Committee for recognizing this by devoting the first day of the conference to this crucially important issue. 

Background 2001-2006
Following the terrorist attacks against the U.S.A. on September 11 2001 and the subsequent war against the Taliban rule, there was broad international consensus to engage in Afghanistan. In fact, in light of past international neglect and mismanagement, a promise was made that the international community would not forget Afghanistan yet again. At first, the international effort concentrated on Operation Enduring Freedom. ISAF was established by UNSCR 1386 on December 20 2001 as an independent, UN-mandated peace operation. It is only since 11 August 2003 that ISAF has been supported and led by NATO.

Let me take this opportunity to underline that there is only one ISAF operation. There seems to be a perception in some quarters that NATO has several different operations in Afghanistan, but in fact ISAF is one mission, with one purpose – that of assisting the Afghan government in extending and exercising its authority.  Differences in tactics and management across different regional commands are first and foremost a consequence of variations in the level of resistance to ISAF’s presence from one region to another.

In frankness, we should start by recognizing that Afghanistan remains a very difficult challenge, something that not least the events of last year showed us in dramatic ways. With the benefit of hindsight, it may be true that in some quarters, success was declared too early.  The conclusions at NATO’s Riga summit in November 2006 however sows that the alliance recognizes the serious challenges and dilemmas we are facing. As a result there has been increasing efforts to engage much more closely with the UN, the EU, and the World Bank in order to achieve a more integrated and holistic approach to the overarching challenges in Afghanistan. 

This is the Alliance’s first operation outside Europe, and it is a strong demonstration of unity immediately following the intra-NATO division over the war in Iraq. From its modest inception, ISAF has become the most demanding operation in NATO’s history. Its course will heavily influence the further development of the Alliance, which obviously matters greatly to us all.

The conflict in Afghanistan is fundamentally different from the Iraqi conflict, but developments in Afghanistan have been subject to spill-over effects, and for several years developments in Afghanistan has been overshadowed by the developments in Iraq. In comparison, the situation in Afghanistan may have looked less gloomy to key decision-makers, and hence less in need of urgent attention – but then again, the situation in Iraq is not a very high standard to measure by. During the past year, Afghanistan has returned to the top of the international agenda. Regardless of the reasons, I believe that that is a welcome development, as Afghanistan in many ways is the key to stability in a highly volatile region.

State of affairs 2007
When taking a closer look at the current state of affairs in Afghanistan, we saw a mixed picture  on the political arena in 2006, with both progress and setbacks. On the positive side we saw the establishment of a democratically elected Parliament and stronger central government whose ministers are now “vetted” by the Parliament. These developments – which follow on from the Lloya Jirga constitutional process some years ago – are promising, because they lay the foundations of representative governance at least at the central level. On the other hand, old warlords remain influential across the country, the government structures are weak, have limited capacity, and a limited presence outside of the main cities. In addition, corruption permeates much of the government apparatus, and a culture of impunity has continued, illustrated most recently by the draft law about amnesty for war crimes. We all recognize the need for reconciliation in a war-torn society, but this should not come at the expense of justice.

The economic situation in Afghanistan is dismal. The country is among the five poorest in the world, it is marked by three decades of civil war, the infant mortality rate is the highest in the world, and infrastructure is extremely weak. The drug economy is rapidly growing and has strong political links. This relates not only to the global drug scene, but also to the local political scene. If the Afghan Government cannot cope with the drug lords, it will not be possible to establish good governance, and effective governance is a prerequisite for successful rule by law and reconstruction. In addition, many local powerbrokers actually see reconstruction and development as a threat to their own power base and will actively try to resist it.

With this as the backdrop for 2007, it should be clear to all that this is a decisive year for the future of Afghanistan.

Despite relatively extensive development efforts, there has been a limited real improvement in living conditions so far. Rough estimates suggest that only 10-20 % of the Afghan population is overtly in favour of the new political leadership. 10 % are overtly opposed, while the rest – that would be the 70-80 % majority – is still sitting on the fence, waiting to decide. This is actually quite understandable. With the personal experience of war and shifting political alliances among ordinary Afghans, this may actually be a quite rational behaviour on the individual level. Therefore, what we do now must influence people’s perceptions of the country’s future and their own place in it, which again influences the level of support for the new political order. The sole most dangerous challenge to the success of the Karzai government, the UN and NATO would be that the majority of the Afghans lose faith in the current political project. This is probably a more important strategic challenge than the military capacity of the Government’s adversaries – although the two issues are closely intertwined.

The PRT concept, with light, stabilization-focused teams, is supposed to underpin the authority of the Government of Afghanistan, also in remote parts of the country. The concept is a key element not only in improving the security situation, but also in enabling ISAF to interact with the local population and local authorities. The main purpose of their presence is to facilitate and protect development activities, humanitarian aid, and to support the establishment of Governmental control over the entire territory. During the summer and autumn of 2006, ISAF expanded to phase 3 South, and phase 4 East. Even though there are many regional variations, last year saw the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan since 2001. The Commander of ISAF at the time, General Richards, said in September of last year that “Afghanistan is at a tipping point.” I think he was very right in that assessment.

While ISAF is one operation, it is important to keep in mind that the challenges within the area of operations vary. Today, there seems to be a largely permissive operational environment in the North, the West and in Kabul, while the environment is more non-permissive in parts of the South and Western parts of the country. 

In the face of the resurgence of Taliban in the East and the South, it is important to mobilise a strong military response. In a “non-permissive” environment like Southern Afghanistan in the autumn of 2006, more force must be applied in order to support the same reconstruction effort. When Taliban and other armed groups wanted to test NATO’s resolve, it was necessary for NATO to send a strong signal back.

Although there have been improvements in the security situation lately, it remains to be seen how long it will last. It also remains to be seen if the Northern Alliance will continue to be relatively quiet, or if they are simply awaiting developments, ready to side with what will be perceived as the “winning” part.   

At the same time, there are strong indications that the influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is growing, and in the face of Taliban’s resurgence it is important neither to overstate nor to deny their role. With the majority of the population still undecided, there is no blank check in support of the Karzai government or the international community.

In order to curb this tide, military action must be supplemented with a much more solid effort to include larger components of the Pashtun population into the structures of the new Afghanistan. Today, the Pashtun population experiences a sense of exclusion from the ongoing processes designed to shape the future of Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban are in a position to exploit a mix of uncertainty about the future and the conservative, traditional values of the rural Pashtun population.

It is also necessary to keep in mind both the possibilities and the limitations of military power. When intelligently applied, military force can be used to deny other certain (negative) options as well as to provide a certain level of stability, but it can hardly dictate progress. This is often better understood by generals than politicians. A military presence is in cases like these a sine qua non for all the other efforts to succeed – but it is hardly ever the solution in itself. Only integrated packages of security, development and governance can make the “overall” effort work. This is increasingly recognized in the United Nations, in the EU in NATO. Unlike the UN and the EU, however, NATO is a sector-specific, politico-military alliance, hence integration in a NATO context must mean integration and cooperation with other key players. 

International community organization
Unfortunately, at present the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan are far too fragmented.  A plethora of multilateral and bilateral actors work side by side, not necessarily at cross-purposes, but without a clear lead agency. The UN plays a limited role, as it was not asked to take the lead in the field after the very important UN-lead Bonn process. All in all, the way the international assistance is organized in Afghanistan is clearly sub-optimal. It is in many ways a relic of the peculiar zeitgeist existing in 2001-2002 with its very limited belief in multilateral organizations. It is difficult to envisage that a similar system would have been introduced today, or for that sake, in the late 1990s, when a number of operations had actually been designed to address this very issue (i.e. the relationship between UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo and several of the more modern UN blue helmet operations).

The PRT concept is one example. All PRTs are supposed to provide military support to civilian reconstruction efforts, but how the job is done, is left to national interpretation - and there are 13 PRT lead nations, each with its own interpretation. The pillar structure from the Bonn agreement has proved to be a limited success, and the five G-8 countries that took on the five pillars of Security Sector Reform could probably have had more success in linking these efforts to each other.

A more integrated, strategic and multilateral effort is urgently needed, and this is also increasingly recognized. Sometimes this is referred to as “civil-military cooperation”, but we are talking about much more than that. We are talking about the need for using all available resources in order to create synergetic effects in promoting an overall political strategy, within a framework of realistic ambitions. 

Recent progress include promises of the U.S.A. and the EU’s of increased aid to Afghanistan, and the establishment of the “Afghan compact”, the common 5-year framework for the UN, the international community and Afghanistan.

Challenges
If we take a closer look at the challenges facing us in Afghanistan, it is apparent that we need to focus much more on state-building and governance. In fact, capacity-building within Afghan government institutions is of pivotal importance, as it is a prerequisite for being able to extend the government’s outreach beyond the capital. At the same time, we need to include the gender perspective in our efforts, in order to contribute to the empowerment of Afghan women. 

Another challenge we need to address is how we can best help Afghanistan in moulding their future security sector. This includes assisting Afghan authorities in building a larger and more capable Afghan National Police force. This is also why Norway supports the EU initiative in this area.

One of the relative success stories in contemporary Afghan security sector reform is the Afghan National Army (ANA), which has absorbed much of the Islamic Front forces from the Northern alliance, which was predominantly made up of Tadjiks, Hazara or Uzbeks. This positive development is important not only in connection with the fight against the Taliban, but ANA is also an important nation-building institution.

Issues connected to security and economy are cross-border challenges. As a result, the challenges we face in Afghanistan must be seen in and dealt with in a regional perspective. For example, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in influencing the situation in Afghanistan, and the plight of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan must be addressed. Another important factor is Iran, who not only is anti-Taliban, but also sceptical of the U.S. role in the region. To further complicate the picture, the general situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly complicated.

In light of the described set of challenges we must to a greater extent adapt a holistic and strategic approach, while at the same time maintaining a realistic set of ambitions. One necessary precondition for success is that we must be able to maintain our focus on what we want to achieve, and not fall into the trap of focusing on how to exit. We must discipline ourselves into clearly stating what the most important objectives are, and then prioritize them.  Which is easier said than done.

One of the very top priorities must be to ensure Afghan ownership in both the underlying processes and in the solutions. Enhancing the credibility of the central government is a part of this, but it is demanding since Afghanistan has no tradition of an effective central government. Whether or not we reach this goal is to a large extent up to the Karzai government, and it can only be reached if rules are predictable, appointments are followed up and anticorruption-work is given adequate attention.

The international community must strive to appreciate the nuances of Afghan society, to include the importance of both ethnic and cultural factors. In this way, we can signal that we understand the many underlying questions which must be taken into consideration when working towards a solution. In this way we can contribute to strengthening the ties between the Government of Afghanistan and the traditional decision-making structures across the country.

Military strategy
A solid military strategy is a necessary part of a holistic, strategic approach. Through proactive stabilization we can provide a much needed foundation for development efforts, and we must not shy away from robust action when such action is called for. Then again, the military action must be conducted in a manner which does not jeopardize Afghan support for the operations. Therefore we must strive to minimize collateral damage, as such damage only undermines the overall message. We should also refrain from using and communicating body counts as a measure of success.  First, it is not a goal in itself, and second, it might lead to the false assumption that if you kill 100 Taliban you have 100 enemies less, when in fact you might have created a situation where Taliban can get a hundred or more new recruits.

It is also pivotal to engage with traditional power structures when applicable. Important lessons were learned and to a certain extent implemented under the leadership of General David Richards. It is our hope that the new ComISAF will build further on these.

The road ahead
Norway, along with the rest of the international community, recognizes that we must have a long-term perspective on our commitment in Afghanistan. Let there be no doubt – we are in for the long haul, and we will stay the course. We neither can nor will turn our backs on Afghanistan. If we are to make the required progress, however, necessary adjustments in our approach must be implemented this year. This not only applies to the need for a more integrated approach on the strategic level, which requires a strengthening of the role of the UN and the UNAMA, but also underlines the need to reduce caveats – also on the economic donor side.

So why is Norway in Afghanistan? We see our presence there as part of our support of a UN-led world order. Furthermore, as a NATO member, we have a shared responsibility in living up to our joint promise of assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country. In other words – our presence in Afghanistan is based both on the solidarity with the Afghan people and on our international responsibility. Norway remains committed to assisting the government and the people of Afghanistan in building a better future.

This is why participation in ISAF is Norway’s primary international military commitment. Currently, we have a total of 530 troops in Meymaneh, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul. From April this year we will also take over as lead-nation for Kabul International Airport, KAIA. For a country of our size, this is a substantial contribution. We are currently considering extending our military commitment beyond this level, possibly through the use of Norwegian special forces.  

Norway places great emphasis on seeing military contributions in an integrated perspective, where civilian and military efforts are coordinated in order to optimize the overall effect. Therefore, we also have a substantial civilian component in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan will be the second largest recipient of Norwegian development aid in 2007, where our increased development effort is approaching 75M U.S.D. We also have an important police and justice sector presence, which we are aiming at doubling in the near future. We support the establishment of a Civil Service Institute, and we work to assist Afghan authorities in the administration of oil and gas reserves.

In order to achieve a high degree of internal coordination across the sectors, we have a political-level Afghanistan Forum where the Deputy Ministers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister’s Office meet regularly. This forum has already conducted two “integrated field visits” to Afghanistan within the last twelve months. The purpose of this body is to ensure unity of effort, cross-fertilization of sectorial commitments and information sharing, while we do keep in mind that the different actors have separate roles on the ground and that the integrity of these roles should be respected.

Conclusion
In conclusion let me say that the completion of our mission – the success of our mission – depends on the awareness of and the ability to both maneuver in and deal with the complexity of the underlying issues in Afghanistan.

Securing a positive long term development is a challenge not only for Norway, but also for NATO, the UN, the entire international community, and most importantly for the people of Afghanistan themselves. Our common efforts rest on the recognition that improving the situation in Afghanistan cannot be done for the Afghans, it can only be done with the Afghans.

We need a strategic approach combined with realistic ambitions. These are two parallel imperatives if we are to succeed in Afghanistan: We need to strengthen the authority of the central government throughout the country, and we need to work actively to develop solutions that are suited for local conditions.

This is no easy undertaking, but the international community must not shy away from Afghanistan just because it is proving to be more challenging than before. Indeed, we all knew it would be challenging when we set out on the mission to help the people of Afghanistan build a better future, and we will continue to support them in their efforts to establish a stabile and secure society based on principles of good governance. Not only is this our moral obligation, it is also a part of our extended security interest. This way we also help to secure success for the multilateral institutions which are so important to us, like the UN and NATO.

Editors note: a few days after the speech was held, it was announced that Norway was to send an additional 150 troops from its Special Forces.