Defence Minister’s address Afghanistan seminar in Berlin

Defence Minister’s address Afghanistan seminar in Berlin 09.09.08

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me first to thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. 

“History repeats itself” is a common saying, and historians tend to look at Afghanistan as “mission impossible” – based on - well – history! Again and again the world has witnessed how the Afghan warriors have succeeded in conquering invaders, and the historians are awaiting a new chapter in the same book. All but a few. And personally, I tend to agree with the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad, when he states that it is not history that repeats itself, but historians repeating themselves! 

However, trying to put a false gloss on the situation in Afghanistan would serve no-one’s interests. During my seven visits to Afghanistan I have experienced that the situation is demanding, and I believe that it is likely to remain so for a considerable time. It would therefore be wrong to downplay the problems or to appear too self-congratulatory. I am deeply concerned by the demanding security situation, widespread corruption and the growth of narcotics based crime. This is a huge obstacle for the development of good governance and the rule of law. 

The development and reconstruction of Afghanistan is a national responsibility where the Afghan Government needs to show strong leadership and deliver better results.

I would also like to say that it is totally unacceptable that terrorist killing ISAF-soldiers have been pardoned by Afghan authorities. This is undermining everything we are trying to do in Afghanistan.

But it would be to paint a false picture of the realities to say that nothing has been achieved seven years after the Taliban were driven from power. Afghan and international forces from 40 countries are working shoulder-by-shoulder and creating security conditions that make this progress possible. Together we are doing a lot of good work and visible progress is being made every day. Access to health care has increased tenfold; access to education is up six times and women again have rights protected by law.

The most important question now is not: When shall we be going home?

The most important question now is: How can we create more progress?

We have three important tasks ahead of us. Or, I should rather say, there are three important tasks that we are in the process of executing:

-          Firstly we have to ensure that the Afghan people feel that they have a stake in everything that we are doing.

-          Secondly, all parts of the international community have to pull in the same direction.

-          And thirdly, security and development must go hand in hand. 

To start with the last: Unless the ordinary Afghan citizen has a roof over his head and food on the table, we risk the possibility of the population turning against us.

I believe that the problem in Afghanistan is not that we have spent too many resources on sending international forces to Afghanistan. 

The international military presence is both indispensable and insufficient. 

Indispensable because were it not for the presence of the stabilising force, civil war would still be ravaging the country. 

Insufficient because military force alone cannot bring about the conditions for development for an Afghan population enduring massive poverty.

The problem is rather that the international community has contributed too little to the cause of civil reconstruction, and that the aid that has been given has not been targeted and coordinated well enough. All development aid needs to be linked with broader development strategies. Furthermore, we need to channel a greater proportion of the civil aid through the Afghan authorities for use in accordance with their priorities.

Norway’s development strategy is now in line with this policy. We have a strong military contribution in Afghanistan, and simultaneously we have increased development aid with 50 percent, now committing to assist the Afghan government with 150 million dollars annually over the course of the next five years.

This brings us to the second important aspect of the new international strategy; all parties engaged in Afghanistan must ‘Afghanise’ their activities.

Our common efforts rest on the recognition that improving the situation in Afghanistan cannot be done for the Afghans, it can only be done by the Afghans. We must demonstrate readiness to unite behind Afghan ambitions, plans and priorities. At the same time we must increase the pressure on the government in Kabul to live up to the responsibilities it has pledged before the Afghan people.

Training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and support to the Afghan National Police (ANP) are high priority capacity building activities and prerequisites for the afghanisation of security. That is why Norway and other countries are now increasing the number of mentors to help train the Afghan army. 

We should look into options for Afghan security Forces to assume leadership and responsibility for security in provinces where conditions permit. It is encouraging to see that these security forces now have assumed the responsibility for the security in parts of Kabul. Other areas should follow. We must avoid a static situation.

The international community and ISAF must not shy away from robust action when this is called for. At the same time the recent loss of civilian lives is deeply tragic. We will make sure that this is on top of NATO’s agenda in order to prevent unnecessary civilian casualties. Otherwise this could undermine both international and Afghan public support for our important mission.

2 500 years ago the Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu, wrote that “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” 

And this leads me to the third and perhaps most important point regarding what is required in order to make further progress, the need for a unified international long-term political strategy.

In order to arrive at a more comprehensive unified strategy backed by all sections of the international community, we have to strengthen the role of the UN. I am therefore pleased that Kai Eide now is in post in Kabul as an energetic special representative for the UN Secretary General, with extended and far-reaching powers to coordinate actions on the UN’s behalf. I am also very pleased with the fact that there is strong support within the Alliance for this comprehensive effort.

How, then, should he and we go about achieving a comprehensive approach for Afghanistan? 

Firstly, we need to ensure the implementation of the renewed and enforced mandate for UNAMA. Secondly; we must respond to the SRSG’s call for more resources and personnel to fulfil the mandate. Thirdly; we must ensure that UNAMA’s presence in the provinces and districts is enhanced. And not least, we must not only call for greater coordination, but we must also be willing to be coordinated.

With 25 PRTs in Afghanistan, we may be interacting with the Afghan authorities, UNAMA and other international actors in 25 different ways. A more unified approach to the operation of PRTs is essential to even out the differences between regions.

It is vital that we avoid a situation where the PRTs become a substitute for Afghan capacity. We should initiate a process where PRT functions are transferred to Afghan authorities, where and when possible. I believe that the relative stability in parts of Northern Afghanistan should be used as an opportunity for a gradual transfer of responsibility.

Our idea is to maintain a high level of military and civilian engagement, but gradually redirect our efforts more into supporting Afghan military and civilian authorities. As a start, Norway is willing to support an early transition of the PRT in Faryab province to what we would call a “Provincial Support Team” (PST). 

A truly comprehensive approach is impossible without a broad regional perspective. We see this not at least when it comes to Pakistan who plays a pivotal role in influencing the situation in Afghanistan. It is obvious that many of the most pressing security challenges in Afghanistan are facilitated by the porous borders between the two countries. 

Up to the present time the degree of overall coordination between the military, political and economic processes has been inadequate. We have seen that the way in which the international community has organised itself has failed to strengthen the central authorities to a sufficient extent. This is something that means that local unofficial bodies and traditional warlords still have too much influence in the provinces. We will not make progress in the provinces without giving sufficient consideration to the effect that this can have on the country as a whole. Taken to an extreme, this could even contribute to the fragmentation of Afghanistan rather than strengthening the process of nation building.

When all is said and done, what matters are the people. The people of Afghanistan. The young boy who no longer needs to go to war, the young girl that can get an education, the widow that is capable of earning her own living.

This coincides with my guiding principle in all politics; mankind itself makes its own history. Or to paraphrase one of Nordic politics most visionary of Nordic politicians, the late Olof Palme: “Politics is about will”

And we need to ask ourselves what is it that we want in Afghanistan?

My answer to that is:

-          We want to bring together all the international efforts in Afghanistan in a single unified long-term strategy led by the UN.

-          We want to be in Afghanistan and we want to stand with Afghanistan through a strong and broadly based programme of International civil and military assistance.

-          And we want to stand with Afghanistan, and we want to remain in Afghanistan not just near future, but for the long term. 

Thank you.