Norway's security outlook - strengthening the relevance of NATO

 

Address to the Defence and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Oslo 23 May 2009 

 

It is truly a pleasure to address you here today, and to welcome you to Oslo. Spring is the season for celebrations here in Norway. Last weekend we celebrated our National day, and also, as it turned out, Norway’s victory in the Eurovision song contest. 

 

But there is another important reason to celebrate this year. Last month we celebrated NATO’s 60-year anniversary with a Summit meeting on both sides of the Franco-German border. The meeting symbolized the historical origin of the Alliance, a hugely successful organisation, still highly relevant, still playing a crucial role for the security of its members and working hard to extend security and stability also beyond Europe.

 

In my mind the most significant outputs of the Summit were
the accession of Croatia and Albania, the broad agreement on the way forward in Afghanistan, the decision to begin normalising the relationship with Russia, and, finally, the Declaration on Alliance Security which formally sets the stage for the start of the very important work on a new Strategic Concept for NATO. I also believe the announcement of France to return to full participation in NATO’s defence planning and integrated military structures will serve to further strengthen the cohesion of this Alliance. We were also pleased that agreement was reached regarding a raised profile for NATO concerning its role in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. This is something that my government will follow up actively.

 
In addition, we are pleased that consensus was reached regarding the appointment of a new Secretary General, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen.   

 

The Strategic Context

Let us step back and take a broader look at the range of security challenges NATO and its members are faced with today. I think there are two rather different sets of challenges facing us – while for some years, we have only focused on one of them. The first is familiar, and characteristic of the transitional period of the 1990s as well as the post-9/11 period. We are still faced with challenges stemming from intra-national, ethnic and religious conflicts.  The increasing pace of globalisation and its consequences, in terms of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are still highly relevant. It also pertains to challenges such as pandemics.

 

These so-called asymmetrical threats also include challenges like cyber threats and organised crime. In addition, environmental challenges with potential security implications, poverty and increased competition over strategic resources are becoming more apparent. While the phenomenon is well recognized, we are still trying to come to grips with our collective responses to them.

 

At the same time, however, we are witnessing new trends in the geopolitical landscape of the world. China is emerging as an increasingly important global player, alongside a number of other great Asian powers. Russia has re-emerged as a dominant regional power and an important player in world politics. The steady rise of regional powers like India and Brazil is also an important part of this picture. From a global perspective, the relative economic and political power and influence of “the West” is declining in favour of Asia. The geopolitical centre of gravity is shifting. I think it is a fair assumption that the current global financial crisis is likely to further strengthen this trend, although most nations will be hit hard by its consequences.

 

In some ways the map of Europe today looks more like that we saw before World War One than that after World War Two. On the eastern side of the current membership of  NATO, Europe now consists of many small states, many of which have become weaker and some have unresolved border issues. There is little left of the clarity of the Cold War stalemate – and at the same time, the “end of history” promises of eternal liberal peace seems unfounded, less than two decades after this optimistic perception of the future was heralded by the end of the cold war.

 

One consequence of this new emphasis on geopolitics and great power relations is the renewed possibility for inter-state conflict, also in Europe. Indeed, this is more than a possibility – we just saw one, in Georgia, less than a year ago.

 

 In sum, we are facing an even more complex security environment than ever before. Our work on transformation must be updated to cater to both trends, the asymmetric and the potential of symmetric. It is not any longer true that all potential conflicts NATO members can become involved in are asymmetric and far away from the home turf.

 

Strengthening the relevance of NATO  

In spite of all these demanding challenges, there are reasons to be optimistic on behalf of the Alliance and transatlantic relations. The new American administration has resulted in a new optimism in transatlantic relations after years of strain due to differences, primarily over Iraq. President Obama’s administration has moved impressively fast to re-establish the pre-eminence of key universal values and norms as the basis of America’s foreign policy. This is a development we fundamentally applaud and which we are confident will strengthen the cohesion and strength of the transatlantic alliance.

 

We also welcome the Obama administration’s stated willingness to engage in dialogue with all sides.  This is fully in line with Norway’s approach to international problem solving based on multilateralism. 

 

NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly is one example of how NATO can play a role as a forum for dialogue between its members. From the Norwegian government’s perspective, it is important that NATO continues to be the main multilateral forum for dialogue between the US, Canada and Europe and the primary instrument for Europe to influence the US. The Alliance must be more than just a “tool box” of military capabilities. NATO has illustrated time and again that it is just as much a political organisation and I believe it should and will continue to be so in the 21st Century.

 

Over the last years we have seen NATO’s capacity to contribute to broader solutions to crises on several occasions. In almost all forseable future crisis management situations, the Alliance is going to work with others, be it the UN, the EU or the African Union. Sometimes NATO will be in the lead, sometimes it will be in support of the leadership of others. Hence inter-institutional links should be further developed, so that every organisation can do what it does best without unnecessary duplication of effort. Time is of the essence here, and it’s my hope that we will be able to move out of the stalemate that characterizes some of these relationships, capitalizing on the new mood of transatlantic unity that recent changes have accommodated.

 

"At home" and "away"  

The Alliance has a mission and a role to play “at home” as well as “away”. For a number of years, and for understandable reasons, the “away” mission has dominated the agenda, not least because it has been perceived as more urgent than the long-standing commitment to collective defence enshrined in Article V. We think the time is ripe to readdress this balance.

 

Therefore, Norway initiated an important discussion in the Alliance last year, by highlighting the need for renewed focus on security challenges on NATO territory and in our immediate neighbourhood. We believe that by responding to these concerns, public support for operations outside NATO territory will also increase.

 

We believe that the Alliance should be the primary organisation for dealing with the full range of security issues for its member states. Norway therefore sees a need for NATO to raise its profile in relation to missions “at home” and to improve capabilities in this respect.

 

For this purpose, we presented a paper in the Alliance last autumn with a number of proposals to meet security challenges in and around the NATO area.
These proposals include

·        The need for reform of NATO headquarters and the command structure,

·        improving geographical expertise and situational awareness, which has become less evident,

·        developing closer links between national- and NATO headquarters,

·        re-introducing regional responsibilities to NATO commands (Brunsum and Napoli),

·        improving intelligence exchange and analysis,

·        increasing NATO involvement in training and exercises,

·        and expanding the role for Allied Command Transformation

 

These measures are important in and by themselves. However, they are also important because the public support for NATOs “away” missions will be more solid if NATO is perceived to be vital to the security of the member countries themselves.

 

The “home” mission relates both to issues emerging on the territory of the member states but also the alliance’s immediate vicinity. It’s about the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, the Baltic sea, and, of course, the High North.

 

The High North  

Let me now turn to the High North. In the foreseeable future, we will see the Arctic Ocean free of ice during summertime. This illustrates the need to address the global challenge of climate change through solid international cooperation and commitment. The melting of the Arctic ice – which is happening – combined  with technological advances will also make this region accessible to large-scale economic activity to a degree never experienced before. This is a fundamental change effecting countries in Europe, North-America and Asia. And with a new set of challenges and opportunities that will demand our attention.

 

So what are the security challenges in all this?

·               First of all, there are existing and potential conflicts of interest in the area which could undermine the stability in the area. Our security policy aims to build confidence and prevent negative developments in the High North.

·               Second, the Northern Fleet’s continued role in the Russian nuclear triad and the sheer weight of the Kola military infrastructure are of vital strategic importance to Russia.

·               Third, the Barents Sea continues to be a training ground for military forces and a test bed for new weapon systems.

·               Fourth, new sea lines of communication will enhance the High North’s military-strategic significance. When – not if – the Arctic is free of ice, the sailing time between North-America and Asia will be reduced by 40%.

·               Fifth, the possibility of deteriorating relations between Russia and the West could also influence relations in the Arctic negatively.

 

Russia in the High North - cooperation or confrontation?

Russia is the only non-NATO member of the five Arctic Ocean states. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the state of High North security in the long run will be a function of the bilateral and multilateral interaction between Russia and the other states. 

 

Over the last years, Russia has shown an increased willingness to engage in political rhetoric and even use of military force. The “zero-sum” approaches in Russian security thinking are a challenge for the West, including the increased tendency on the part of Russia to think in terms of geopolitical spheres of influence.

 

In the High North, this political rhetoric has over the past couple of years been accompanied by the renewal of training sorties of strategic bombers across the Barents Sea into the Norwegian- and North Sea. There has also been an increase in naval exercise activity and deployments.

 

On the other hand, we have an active and constructive bilateral dialogue with Russia, and Russian foreign policy statements and strategic documents regularly emphasise the primary role of international law and multilateralism in international relations. This is reflected in the new Russian Arctic strategy from 2008, where maintaining the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation is highlighted as one of four main policy aims.

 

So, Russia is sending mixed signals. We nevertheless choose to be optimistic regarding future relations in the Arctic. The reason is simply that Russia and Norway have a shared interest in maintaining the High North as an area of cooperation and absence of military confrontation.

 

This does not mean, however, that we discard altogether the possibility of  tension in the future. Potential points of dispute exist, and the Kola military complex with its inherent activities will always be a factor in Russian-Norwegian relations.

 

A role for NATO in the High North?  

So what about NATO? Is there a role for the Alliance in the High North?

 

Absolutely! NATO has a very important role to play and Norway has argued the case for a long time. The Alliance is at the core of the security and defence strategies of all but one Arctic Ocean state. It therefore cannot avoid defining its role in this area. The challenge will be to devise policies that address fundamental security interests of the Member States, while at the same time recognising concerns of others, including Russia.

 

NATO already has a certain presence and plays a role in the High North today, primarily through the Integrated Air Defence System, including fighters on alert and AWACS surveillance flights. Some exercise activity under the NATO flag also takes place in Norway and Iceland, but to a large extent such activities are bilateral or multilateral by invitation.

 

We would like to see NATO raise its profile in the High North. As I have already outlined, we believe there is a need for a renewed focus on security challenges in and around Allied territory. In this context, regular activities in a NATO framework would demonstrate collective solidarity.

 

An increased NATO profile in the Arctic should be tailored not to provoke Russia, but to demonstrate Allied interest in the area. This could be done by establishing a presence sufficient to act as a stabilising factor in conceivable crisis scenarios and provide opportunities for interaction with Russian counterparts. Key words here are confidence building, cooperative activities and the development of common procedures. Such a presence would not necessarily have to be permanent and threatening in the shape of military hardware and personnel, but should be linked to planned training activities, exercises and visits.

 

The Alliance should also actively search for arenas of cooperation with Russia.  Challenges related to the new Arctic sea lines of communication are amongst the many areas were cooperation could be of mutual benefit, for example with regards to surveillance and patrolling.

 

Also, NATO should take a comprehensive approach to challenges in this area. We especially need to ensure that NATO develops a good working relationship with organisations like the Arctic Council, the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the EU.

 

Afghanistan

It is impossible to discuss Norway’s security outlook and the challenges facing NATO without mentioning Afghanistan. The ISAF operation will continue to dominate the agenda for years to come and constitutes the main challenge for NATO now and in the coming years.

 

The Norwegian government believes that a broad and comprehensive approach to the challenges in Afghanistan is needed.

·                                First, we need to engage in a broader regional dialogue with Afghanistan’s neighbours.

·                                Second, we need an increased state-building effort through close cooperation between different international actors and Afghan authorities. Such an approach will ensure that the whole spectrum of instruments be brought to bear through a coordinated strategy.

 

I will not go into a detailed analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, but limit myself to the following observation; NATO’s presence is crucially important. The Norwegian government has a strong and long-term commitment to Afghanistan, but the goal for the international community should be an Afghanistan where our military presence is redundant.

 

The PRT concept, which at the outset was intended to be a temporary solution, should be revised. The current set up at times adds international fragmentation to an already fragmented Afghan state. Norway is engaged in a constructive dialogue with key partners both in NATO and the UN to address this problem.

 

Afghan capacity and ownership after all is a key part of our exit-strategy. We must ensure that our efforts end up supporting, rather than substituting, the legitimate governance structures we aim to build. This entails an even stronger focus and effort on building sustainable Afghan Security Forces. It is encouraging to see that Afghan security forces now have assumed the responsibility for security of Kabul. Other areas should follow. We must avoid cementing of static structures, tasks and mindsets. We have a long way to go to achieve this.

 

Concluding remarks  

To conclude, NATO will continue to be the cornerstone of Norwegian security. I also believe the Alliance will remain the primary multilateral security forum for dialogue between the US, Canada and Europe.

 

It is important that NATO focuses both on the challenges facing us at strategic distances and on those confronting us closer to home. We regard this as a prerequisite for maintaining the required political and public support in all Allied member states.

 

The ISAF operation will continue to dominate NATO’s agenda for years to come and Norway will remain engaged, militarily as well as through civilian and diplomatic efforts. There is an urgent need for a more effective comprehensive approach in Afghanistan and a coordinated strategy between international actors and Afghan authorities.

 

We need to readdress the broad set of issues pertaining to NATOs tasks and responsibilities closer to home.

 

The situation in the High North is at the top of the Norwegian government’s policy agenda. We believe the High North should be on NATO’s agenda and will argue for an increased focus on this vital area of interest. A more active role for the Alliance must balance the signal of solidarity with cooperation, and lay the ground for interaction with Russia. This is also relevant for many of the other areas in the vicinity of NATO. The challenge will be to devise policies that address fundamental Western security interests, while at the same time recognizing Russian concerns.

 

And finally, I would like to thank you for your attention and wish you a fruitful session here in Oslo.