The Minister of the Environment and International Development Speech at the meeting hosted by "Lofoten mot Sellafield"

Ladies and gentlemen!

I would like to thank Lofoten mot Sellafield  for hosting this meeting and providing another opportunity for dialogue with  representatives of Sellafield and its new Parent Body Organization, Nuclear Management Partners (NMP). 

I am pleased that you have taken the time to come to Oslo to listen to our concerns regarding Sellafield, and to update us on the latest developments and plans regarding Sellafield and THORP. As I hope you will realize from this seminar, this is a very broad-based concern in Norway.

Apart from two research reactors, Norway has no nuclear installations of its own. But there are many nuclear installations and other sources of pollution risk in our neighbourhood.

Some of these installations are of particular concern to us, because they represent a huge potential for radioactive releases, because of concerns over safety, and due to their geographical position and potential to cause air- and water-born pollution in Norway. 

We consider Sellafield, and in particular the storage facilities for liquid High Level Waste, to be such a high risk site. Others include the remaining Chernobyl-type reactors and the Kola Nuclear Power Plant close to our border with Russia.

Sellafield has a clear potential to cause transboundary radioactive pollution in the event of a major accident or incident. Prevailing winds and sea-currents make Norway the closest neighbour downstream. Both the history of acid rain and that of discharges from Sellafield demonstrate that Norway is at risk if a major release of radioactivity should occur.

As the Norwegian minister for the environment, I seek close dialogue with those responsible for the regulation and management of sites which pose a risk for radioactive contamination of Norwegian territories and waters. While our approach to sources of risk in Russia has been project cooperation and funding, our approach to Sellafield is political dialogue.

Our main concern regarding Sellafield is the highly hazardous High Level Waste from reprocessing at Sellafield. The last time we were informed about the quantity of this waste, the volume was 1300 m2, with an amount of radioactive caecium and strontium corresponding to 80 times the releases from Chernobyl.

It goes without saying that if just a fraction of this liquid waste is released to the atmosphere, the consequences could be serious also for neighbouring countries like Norway.

 As the Norwegian radiation Protection Authority  just informed you, we are now assessing the potential impacts on Norway in terms of radioactive pollution and doses to man. This assessment will be made public when it’s completed later this winter or early spring.

Hopefully, this study will give us a better picture of potential impacts on Norway in the event of a major release from the High Level Waste stored at Sellafield.

How likely is a major release from Sellafield?  Our access to information on safety issues is limited, so probabilities will be mere guesswork.  But neither the track record of incidents at Sellafield, nor the assessment of safety culture made by UK Authorities after the 2005 leak is reassuring in this regard.

My message to you is quite simply: Do whatever is possible to reduce the hazard related to nuclear waste stored at Sellafield, and do it fast!

This means quick reduction in the stored volumes of liquid High Level Waste. This should be done much faster than the reduction to 200 m2 by 2015 required by UK Authorities. This also means that measures to further improve safety should be identified and implemented.

To assess the risks we are facing, Norwegian Authorities depend on transparency and access to relevant information. We need such information to get a realistic picture of the potential for accidental releases as a basis for our impact-assessments, we need it to make informed decissions when we plan our emergency preparedness, and we need it to direct our efforts to reduce risks. We also have a legitimate need to be consulted in advance of decisions which may expose Norway to transboundary impacts.

In my opinion, the dialogue between UK an Norwegian authorities over Sellafield is constructive and useful. So far, however, we have received very limited information from the UK on which to base scenarios for accidental releases of radioactivity from Sellafield. We therefore have to rely on publicly available information. I believe we have a common interest in improving this situation, in order to secure a sound and realistic basis for further assessments of potential impacts on Norway.

From a Norwegian point of view, the operation and decommissioning of Sellafield is an issue of great political and public concern. It is my sincere hope that Nuclear Management Partners taking over this responsibility will mean improved safety, lower pollution risk and due consideration of the views and interests of stakeholders such as Norway.  Hopefully, this meeting will contribute to these ends.

Thank you for your attention!