Biotechnology – opportunity, risk, and responsibility

26 March 2007

Contribution to the book (*) “Living with biotechnology. Norwegian scenarios”. 

Secretary General, The Norwegian Red Cross.
Today he is Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(* Translated from the Norwegian: ”Bioteknologi – muligheter, risiko og ansvar” from the title “Leve av, leve med, leve for. Vår bioteknologiske fremtid”. Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, Oslo 2005).

The humanitarian challenges we face the world over are enormous, and the needs of those who suffer are far greater than attention they receive. Every year a vast number of people die from natural disaster, from a lack food and clean water, and from disease. In addition, there are those who must suffer the direct consequences of wars and conflicts – for which humanity cannot blame nature. Developments in biotechnology may help us address humanitarian needs, but at the same time, we must consider the risk that some of knowledge we acquire may be dangerous and have the potential to create further suffering.

Since humanity is the driving force for all our efforts at the Red Cross, we have great hopes for what biotechnology may bring us. Currently, one person dies of starvation every five seconds. If biotechnology lives up to its expectations – especially those voiced by biotech researchers, some of the new knowledge we acquire may help us resolve the current food shortage – although we must bear in mind that is not necessarily a global shortage of food, but rather the global distribution of food that is at the heart of the problem. If developments in biotechnology are to benefit humanitarian efforts, the advances being made in this area must be made available – and put to use where the needs are greatest.

Access to clean water is not an issue for people in the developed countries, and few of us even give this a thought. In other parts of the world, a shortage of clean water is the primary cause of disease and death. Advances in biotechnology MAY lead to new ways of cleaning water that are cheaper and more efficient – and will thus make clean water available for everybody. This would be particularly useful in the aftermath of natural disasters where providing clean water is typically a major challenge, and could lead to many lives being saved.

Research on this type of application may require some form of financial incentive to attract industry – as the purchasing power in areas where this type of technology is most needed is weak compared to that of Western markets. Norway currently spends almost one percent of GDP on foreign aid. Directing some of this support towards contract research aimed at developing solutions that would aid humanitarian efforts might provide increased long-term humanitarian benefits.

Most people associate biotechnology with the pharmaceutical industry, where these strategic priorities are particularly important. We might already have had a vaccine against malaria – developed through biotechnology, if sufficient funds had been made available for a targeted research and development program. There are currently between 300 and 500 hundred million people afflicted with malaria, and 3000 children die every day from this disease – 90% of them in Africa. A vaccine would save many lives, and improve the quality of life for many more. The pharmaceutical industry is making great advances in the fight against diseases that are typical for the developed countries. However, it is a sad fact that only a fraction of the research being carried out is related to the many diseases that represent a major global health threat, as remedies for these diseases would not be as profitable.

However, even though developments in biotechnology may be a humanitarian blessing for a large part of the world’s population, there is every reason to be concerned that some of these advances may lead to the development of even more efficient and deadly weapons. The fact that the international community has so far been unable and unwilling to enforce legal and practical restrictions on weapons development serves to heighten our concerns. In line with its mandate to help and protect victims of war, the Red Cross is expected to enter areas of conflict where biological weapons have been deployed. This is a task that neither the Red Cross, nor the international community, is prepared for.

History shows us that important technological advances are often used for less than honorable purposes. Examples of advances in chemistry, airplane technology, electronics, and nuclear physics being used in ways that are harmful to humanity, are plentiful – it is in fact more difficult to think of revolutionary scientific discoveries that have not at one time or another been used for hostile and aggressive purposes.

Bases on information provided by government authorities, the UN, research and medical groups, and by industries, we have compiled a long list of current and future ways of misusing advances in biotechnology.

Among these we find:

Spreading pathogens, such as typhoid, anthrax, smallpox – to spread disease and terror in populations.

Manipulating existing medicines to give them dangerous side effects. This has already occurred, albeit unintentionally, during work on smallpox in mice.

Creating extremely dangerous viruses from synthetic materials, as a scientist did in 2002, using a recipe from the Internet and segments of DNA ordered via mail, to create a polio virus.

Developing biological weapons designed to target one ethnic or racial group.

Developing new types of biological weapons and a vaccine against them – that could be used to protect the aggressors’ own population or troops. This would increase the appeal of deploying such weapons.

Designing new methods for covert deployment of existing biological substances designed to affect psychological and/or physical process in the target population – e.g. level of consciousness, behavior, and fertility. These effects could take place over a period of many years.

Development of biological substances aimed at the industrial or agricultural infrastructure of a target country. Even accidental spills of these agents can cause major, and often uncontrollable, damage to the environment.

Development of biological warfare agents that would affect the makeup of the human gene itself – and that could conceivably affect people for generations to come and interfere with evolution.

These examples provide evidence that biological weapons may become more appealing to use – as well as deadlier and more difficult to detect. Moreover, this being the information age, this type of knowledge may be spread quickly.

By their very nature, these weapons are excellent methods of creating terror. In 1995 a Japanese cult sprayed Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system, killing twelve and injuring thousands. This act did not require large bombs or missiles – they use small canisters that exploded and released the gas. The anthrax attacks that took place in the US in 2001 spread fear far beyond US borders. It is notoriously difficult to defend against chemical agents – it is simply not feasible to equip an entire population with protective suits and gasmasks.

The parallel has been drawn between the current situation with significant advances being made in biotechnology, and the development of nuclear physics in the 1940s. The world faces a vital choice: either adopt measures to control or prevent developments that may have hostile uses or, allow this technology and these lethal substances to be spread uncontrollably.

There are existing treaties designed to prevent the spread and use of toxins and the deliberate spread of disease: The Geneva Convention, The Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. While the Convention on Chemical Weapons does have an authority charged with control and inspection, the Biological Weapons Convention has no such authority that could ensure that treaties are honored – negotiations among member states broke down completely in 2001, following the anthrax attacks in the US.

The breakdown in negotiations was a direct precursor to the appeal launched by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) in 2001 to the international community – on Biotechnology, Weapons, and Humanity. The message in this appeal is straightforward: we ask governments, the industry, and the scientific community to assume individual and collective responsibility for ensuring that advances being made in biotechnology are used solely for the benefit of humanity.

There is a long list of measures – at the individual and institutional level – that need to be implemented to create a safety net that can prevent future human tragedy.

We could use fire prevention as an analogy to this safety net:  the use of fire is an essential part of our lives – but fire can however become potentially dangerous when it is abused, as is the case of arson. The image of firefighters combating fire provides a dramatic, and highly visible, picture of society’s efforts to limit damage caused by fire. However, in most cases, the risk of fire is substantially reduced through the use of a number of almost imperceptible measures: smoke detectors, emergency exists, fire extinguishers, sprinkler systems etc.

Most of these fire safety measures are rather dull, and do not intrude on our daily routines. Today, architects need to design fire safety into any new building they plan. Throughout its entire existence, the inhabitants of these buildings will have to go through fire drills, and all the safety measures will be regularly inspected to ensure that they remain operational. From time to time, fire inspectors will examine the building to make sure that emergency exits remained accessible, and that no obvious fire hazards appear. 

No one is suggesting that we ban the use of fire – but we are all aware of the risks involved in using fire and accept the need for practical measures that will reduce the risks involved with using fire. These measures serve to prevent fire and also to limit the consequences if fire should break out. This is the approach we should adopt for biotechnology.

It is our belief that greater knowledge of the risks involved with biotechnology, as well as of regulations and responsibilities, would encourage individuals to act wisely. Specific measures aimed at limiting the spread of toxins and disease are only effective when responsibility is assumed by all involved parties: authorities, research communities, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries.

We promote a sense of responsibility using three steps:

Making sure that involved parties – also at the individual level, recognize their responsibility to limit the risk of technological advances being used for hostile purposes.

Identifying and implementing preventive measures within one’s own sphere of responsibility.

Making public one’s own preventive measures, as well as publicly supporting measures implemented by other relevant parties.

Viewed separately, each individual measure may seem trivial, but when taken together – these measures may become highly significant. They need not be complex, or expensive and grand – but they must reflect the gravity of this issue.

Some examples of specific measures we believe should be implemented, both in the short and long term:

Reviews of all research programs with potentially dangerous applications, as well as thorough and independent peer reviews.

Implementing Codes of Conduct in relevant environments – in both research and industry – that seek to prevent the misuse of biological agents.

Ensure effective regulation of research programs, equipment, and biological agents that can be misused.

Thorough supervision of all individuals with access to sensitive technology.

More support for both national and international programs designed to limit, and respond to, the spread of contagious disease.

Make sure that information on the risks, regulations and responsibilities involved with biotechnology becomes a mandatory part of training for all relevant personnel.

This is just a small selection of conceivable measures. However, regardless of whether you are a politician, a soldier, a researcher or doctor, the president of a biotech company, or a parent or student – we all have responsibility to prevent the use of biotechnology for hostile purposes.