Introductory remarks at Roundtable on Afghanistan

The Minister’s talking points. Check against delivery.

Introduction

• Thank you, Mr Carlos Pascual, for your words of welcome. It’s good to see you all. And I appreciate this opportunity to exchange views on such an important issue as Afghanistan.
• The timing is also apt. In a few days’ time, NATO will hold a summit in Bucharest, where Afghanistan will be at the top of the agenda. The NATO Heads of State and Government will meet President Karzai, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and EU High Representative Solana.
• On 20 March, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to strengthen the role of the UN in Afghanistan. The mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was sharpened, emphasising the need for closer civil-military cooperation between UNAMA and ISAF and better coordination of international aid. Kai Eide was appointed as head of UNAMA on 10 March.

Short historical context

• Step 10-15 years back in time – as we all did when we read the novel and now recently watched the film of The Kite Runner – when the whole of Afghanistan, apart from a small area in the north, was ruled by the Taliban – a regime that shocked us all.
• Daily, there were brutal violations of basic human rights: people stoned to death in public, assaults on women, girls and women excluded from schools and universities, bans on pictures of people and television programmes, the destruction of historical and religious monuments that are part of our common cultural heritage.
• We have achieved a lot in Afghanistan since then. Must not forget that. The country is now on the path to a better future. Today it has to be said that the effort to build a stable Afghanistan has been more difficult than many envisaged. However, we must remember that:
• Afghanistan is the world’s fifth poorest country. The country’s infrastructure was in ruins after almost three decades of war and conflict.
• Government institutions were either non-existent or non-functioning. The health and education sectors were devastated.
• Millions of people have been in a precarious humanitarian situation. Afghanistan’s most highly educated people had left the country.

The situation today. The many and complex challenges ahead:

• Underestimation of the ability of the Taliban – and other insurgent groups – to regain a foothold in parts of Afghanistan and in Pakistan.
• Formidable humanitarian challenges.
• Weak government institutions.
• Widespread corruption.
• The world’s largest opium producer.
• Weak judicial system.
• Serious human rights violations.
• Stronger insurgent groups, challenging the authority of the Afghan Government and the international community in large parts of the country.

So the situation in Afghanistan is precarious in terms of: security, rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian needs.

Four main challenges – or rather observations:

1. International coordination
2. Afghan ownership
3. Reconciliation
4. A regional approach to Afghanistan.

The Norwegian efforts are based on the following principles:

• Afghan development plans and priorities. All work and efforts through and with Afghans.
• Ensuring space for development: security, stability, justice and accountability.
• Links between security and development. But just as important are the links between the rule of law, good governance and security. Long-term perspective needed.
• Competence-building to strengthen government accountability. The Government’s ability to provide services and security.
• Nurturing a civil society. Critical voices and advocates of human rights. Example: the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
• Our emphasis on the civilian sector does not mean that we are ignoring the military sphere.
• Basic principles of our presence: continuity and long-term engagement. Enhancing the security situation in the capital is vital.
• Increasing our support for the training of the Afghan army.
• The need to contain and reduce the Taliban in the south and east. Appreciate the efforts being made by the US and others in those parts of Afghanistan. The challenges elsewhere in Afghanistan include a resurgence of the Taliban in the area where Norwegian troops are operating. The links between the Taliban and organised crime are a serious problem. Military force is required.

First main challenge: Coordination of international efforts

• There is no denying that an overall strategy or plan has been lacking for too long.
• Only the UN has the international legitimacy and the broad expertise needed to take on the task of coordinating civilian and political efforts.
• After the UN High Level Meeting in Afghanistan in September, the UN launched a debate on improving coordination through UNAMA. This debate in the UN runs parallel to the debate in NATO on a more comprehensive approach to civil and military efforts.
• In his recent report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General underlines the need for what he calls a “common approach [that] integrates security, governance, rule of law, human rights and social and economic development”. The Security Council renewed UNAMA’s mandate on 20 March (resolution 1806).
• The main task of the military forces is to create a secure environment for political, humanitarian and development actors to operate freely and safely.
• This is an area where we can do better. Military and civilian actors are part of a greater whole, but their roles are different. ISAF and UNAMA have separate Security Council mandates. The challenge to us as providers of both development and military contributions is to ensure that the tasks of civilian and military actors are coordinated but at the same time kept separate.
• Forthcoming NATO summit – declaration on Afghanistan. I expect it to be unambiguous on the need for a clear division of labour between the international actors in Afghanistan and to underscore the lead coordinating role of the UN. 
• Accepting the lead role of the UN also means that all players, both institutions and nations, must be willing to be coordinated. Still some way to go before this principle is widely implemented.

Second main challenge: Afghan ownership – Afghan “foot print”

• Our contributions in accordance with Afghan priorities.
• Afghan ownership must guide all activities. And form the basis of our exit strategy.
• Too much civil capacity-building and administration carried out by foreign experts. Many of Afghanistan’s most highly educated people have left the country. But purchase of expertise is a short-term solution.
• Dual consequences: too little transfer of expertise, despite the urgent need for this, and too high a degree of alienation between the local communities and the Kabul Government.
• All projects should fly the Afghan flag.
• Building Afghan capacity puts the Afghan Government in a position to extend its authority, and deliver services that are visible throughout the country, gaining the trust, loyalty and support of the average Afghan citizen.
• The country has never had a strong Kabul-based government. Ethnic diversity and geographical barriers favour decentralisation.
• The police and the judiciary have a key role to play.
• The new independent directorate for local government (supported by Norway) established by the President is tasked with strengthening leadership in the provinces and developing a closer network between the Government, provinces and local communities.
• Let me underline that good governance efforts depend on Afghan authorities showing greater ability to stand by their own commitments to build a state based on the rule of law, to respect basic human rights and to fight corruption.

Third main challenge: Political reconciliation

• International efforts must support an Afghan-led process that leads to political reconciliation.
• Sometimes this is interpreted as “negotiations with Taliban”. This is misleading.
• Experience shows that if the number of groups and individuals with a stake in the future development of a country is maximised, this increases the likelihood of sustainable peace.
• This also holds true for Afghanistan. The insurgents are a diverse group, from Al Qaeda elements working against international presence, through organised criminal gangs to local tribes.
• Political reconciliation - the Government can broaden its base and increase its legitimacy.
• President Karzai is also concerned about this. A political reconciliation process must be under Afghan leadership, in keeping with Afghan traditions.
• Must not take place at the expense of elected Afghan institutions, constitution or freely elected representatives.
• We look to the UN’s good offices in supporting the reconciliation efforts of the Afghan Government.

Fourth main challenge: Regional perspectives

• Relations with Pakistan crucial. Afghanistan and Pakistan have a strong common interest in combating extremist groups in the border areas. Much of the insurgent activity has links to Pakistan.
• Arguably, in the past Pakistan was part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Changing now? Growing recognition that the two countries share a strong common interest in combating extremist groups in the border areas.
• The role of Iran slightly more controversial. A dialogue with Iran is needed. We need to engage the Iranians constructively. For several reasons:
• Firstly, most of the drugs exports pass across Afghanistan’s southern borders into Iran. Iran has a considerable domestic drug problem.
• Secondly, over the years Iran has received millions of Afghan refugees.
• Thirdly, Iran has the potential to foment unrest in Afghanistan, even though only parts of the Iranian establishment consider this to be in their interest.
• We should enter into a dialogue with Iran to persuade the country that instability in Afghanistan is not in Iran’s interests, and a stronger Taliban even less so.
• In view of Iran’s important role, we must prevent Afghanistan from becoming a proxy battleground where Iran and others are allowed to squabble over unrelated issues.
• The ongoing dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme should not be allowed to negatively impact the overall issue of establishing a democratic and peaceful Afghanistan.
• The UN also has a role to play in supporting regional cooperation. UNAMA has liaison offices in both Islamabad and Teheran.
• Closer regional cooperation will be important for economic growth in the region. The countries in Central Asia can play a more active role. Afghanistan is at the centre of a region where cross-border trade has flourished.
• A stable Afghanistan will not only be open for business for all, it will also facilitate trade through the development of roads and energy pipelines that benefit the whole region.

Conclusion

• We need a dialogue in the international community and with the Afghan Government about what “success” really means. Through such a dialogue a future “exit strategy” can be devised. What are your views on this?
• The objective of this strategy is to enable the Afghans to govern Afghanistan. A long-term task. We must accept the fact that the Afghans want to govern themselves in accordance with traditions and norms that differ from our own. We must respect this, but at the same time we must insist on the universality of human rights.
• In sum, our efforts in Afghanistan are aimed at preventing the country from once again becoming a hotbed of international terrorism. Our efforts to improve security in the broadest sense will be decisive. If we are to succeed, the military effort must be continued. An effective ISAF is vital.
• But just as important is the need for international development efforts to be intensified - and better coordinated.
• The Security Council has given the UN a stronger role in Afghanistan. This raises expectations, and we – international donors and actors – must help the UN to meet these expectations. We must be willing to cooperate and to be coordinated.
• Together we must promote Afghan ownership and responsibility.
• The political dimension of our overall effort – in Afghanistan, in the region and at home – must be strengthened.
• We must succeed in promoting Afghan governance and building Afghan institutions, based on the Afghans’ own needs, with their active participation, and more closely in keeping with Afghan traditions.
• We must also explain better to the people in our own countries why we are in Afghanistan, and why we have to stay there for such a long time. We have to explain why our young men and women, in uniform and civilian dress, have to risk death and serious injury. 
• Our efforts are vital if the people of Afghanistan are to dare to rely on the Afghan Government to safeguard their interests and turn their backs on the insurgent groups.