Intervention by Norway on Article 3, Storage and Stockpile destruction

Thank you Mr Co Chair

The large numbers of stockpiled cluster munitions today are of great concern with regard to the risk of proliferation. Robust and realistic provisions for safe storage and stockpile destruction will be our principal tools to ensure that cluster munitions will not be used in the future. Rapid implementation of this article will be a guarantee against use by actors who do not regard themselves obligated to respect the convention.  It will also be a manifestation of the commitment of states parties to the convention, by destructing their own stocks, both towards other states parties and also to the rest of the world.

On this provision it is vital to the credibility of the convention that parameters for its implementation are both ambitious and realistic. We must avoid defining the deadlines for its implementation too short – as too many request for extension will undermine the convention. On the other side – too long deadlines will create an impression that speedy stockpile destruction is of less importance to the convention, while the opposite is true. Norway believe that the 6 year deadline contained in Article 3, paragraph 2, will be more than sufficient, and probably too long.

Destruction of cluster munitions represents more complicated technical challenges than destroying certain other types of explosive weapons, for example most types of landmines. This means that there will be both financial and logistical challenges for states parties when implementing these provisions

However, these challenges are in many respects not insurmountable, and as more experience from several states destruction programmes is gained and shared, we are confident that estimates of costs and time-use will be significantly reduced.

It has been argued that the safe storage and destruction of cluster munitions have a very high cost side. This may be correct if those costs are seen in isolation from the costs that in any case would incur for stockpilers of these weapons. In reality it is not possible to separate these costs from each other. Any stockpiler of cluster munitions will have costs connected to safe storage, maintenance and final destruction of the stocks. High storage costs is in fact argument for destruction sooner rather than later as this should bring the total costs down.

Mr Co Chair, allow me to share some of our national experiences with destruction of cluster munitions. 

In 2003 Norway decided to destroy our stockpiles of air delivered ROCKEYE cluster munition due to their completely unacceptable failure rates.

The destruction is done by the Norwegian Defence Logistic Organization, in defence facilities, in accordance with national and environmental regulations.

The process included disassembling, transport and destruction. An estimated cost for disassembling and destruction was calculated to approximately 80 Euros per unit.

According to the Defence Logistic Organization, the destruction was not a complex operation.

The estimated cost for destruction of our current stocks of 155-millimetre cluster munition  - similar to the M85 - is estimated to 40 Euros per shell. The lower cost is mostly because there is no need for disassembling.

Some has called for the inclusion of an exception to the prohibition of cluster munitions in order to retain a number of cluster munitions for research and training purposes. Experience from other treaties, notably the Mine Ban Convention, has demonstrated all too clearly to us that such exceptions may easily become a means to circumvent the treaty obligations. When we are discussing retention of cluster munitions, we therefore need to ask ourselves whether retention is really needed.

What kind of research and training are we actually referring to and for what purposes? Is the retention of complete, live cluster munitions, as defined by a future convention, really needed to conduct these activities?

Another element in this discussion is that with the proposed time limits for destruction, any state party holding stocks of cluster munitions will have an opening for retaining cluster munitions for a period of up to six years after entry into force, without a retention clause in the convention. This time period should be adequate for research and training purposes.

We have seen how a retention clause in effect can become a loophole for keeping large numbers of prohibited weapons in stock. We must avoid such a situation by carefully, and realistically, considering the needs for training and research and identify how these needs can be met.

Thank you, Mr Co-Chair