Historisk arkiv

Innledning om nordområdepolitikken for herværende og sideakkrediterte ambassadører

Historisk arkiv

Publisert under: Regjeringen Stoltenberg II

Utgiver: Utenriksdepartementet

Oslo, 16. mai 2008

I den årlige briefingen av sideakkrediterte ambassadører innledet utenriksministeren med en omtale av regjeringens arbeid for å få på plass et realistisk, internasjonalt forbud mot klaseammunisjon. Utenriksministeren fokuserte ellers i sin innledning på regjeringens nordområdepolitikk og på utfordringene knyttet til Arktis.

Utenriksministeren baserte sin innledning på følgende momenter

 

Bakgrunnskart:

 

  • I would like to extend my appreciation for this opportunity to address a set of issues which lie at the core of my Government’s interests. Many of you have shown great interest in taking part in discussions and deliberations concerning High North issues. For Norway it is important that all our partners and allies are familiar with and interested in the challenges facing us in the High North.
  • Over the last years we have witnessed a tremendous increase in the international interest for the Arctic. Example: For many years already, China has been present in Ny Ålesund, Svalbard, with a research station. China now wants to extend its bilateral engagement with Norway to Arctic issues.
  •  In contrast, cooperation in the High North is a long-standing part of our bilateral and multilateral engagement with Russia. It will be one of the main topics during my meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov in June.
  • The High North is not an outpost beyond normality. In the days of the cold war, it was an area of tension. It still poses security challenges, but now to a greater extent related to environmental and economic issues, such as energy development, management of marine resources, sea routes and climate change.
  • These are security issues in a wider sense that can be resolved only in close cooperation between the parties concerned.
  • These challenges have to be addressed. Norway is a coastal state in the Arctic, a major supplier of energy, and Russia’s Arctic neighbour to the West. We discuss these issues with our close allies, with EU, with our Nordic neighbours – and with Russia.
  • We rarely miss a chance to touch upon the issues in our bilateral contacts. Institutional frameworks are equally important: Last autumn I presented the challenges and potential of the High North to the NATO Council; recently I did the same to the European Parliament. This line of engagement lies at the core of our High North Policy.
  • Cooperation with Russia is a key issue in our High North policy. For geographical, ecological and geological reasons, we need Russia to engage in common challenges.
  • The cooperation we have with Russia is good, but Russia is also a demanding partner. Our bilateral relations with Russia are asymmetrical in terms of power and influence. But we share a common interest in developing our relations further – not least to strengthen sustainable resource development.
  • One of my visions for the bilateral cooperation is that the Norwegian-Russian border would be like any other European border. A bridge, not a barrier. The ultimate goal should be to abolish the visa regime. In the meantime we implement a range of measures to ease border crossing, decrease migration bureaucracy and stimulate cross-border employment.
  • Improving nuclear safety is another important example of cooperation with Russia. This cooperation is embedded in the G8’s Global Partnership, where the UK is a particularly close partner to Norway. A safe environment is a prerequisite for sustainable, long-term development of resources and society in the High North. Eliminating the nuclear legacy in the Russian High North is therefore an important and truly international endeavour.
  •  With the huge potential for Norwegian-Russian industrial cooperation as a backdrop, we proposed the establishment of a cooperation zone (“Pomor zone”) across our bordering regions. Twin cities-arrangements are also a central part of the cooperation, between Norway and Russia in the North.
  • It is equally important for us to base our policies in multilateral structures like the Barents Cooperation, the Arctic Council, the Nordic Council, the Baltic Council and the Northern Dimension cooperation.
  • Our membership in NATO is key. We emphasise dialogue with close partners (e.g. Germany, France, the UK, Canada, USA, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland) and strengthening of bilateral relations to communicate our High North policy.
  • The Arctic Council has been a vehicle for addressing climate issues during the recent Icelandic and current Norwegian chairmanship periods. The new Northern Dimension is becoming an increasingly important cooperation, involving EU, Russia, Iceland and Norway alike.
  • Paired with the practical approach of The Barents cooperation, also comprising indigenous peoples’ issues, these bWhile it is still early days, I think it’s fair to say that energy is one of the obvious prime drivers in the geopolitical dynamics of the High North. Therefore it is also of equally high importance to develop our perspectives and efforts for meeting this development with due consideration to the Arctic environment.
  • The global challenge of increasing the security of energy supply has contributed to greater interest in the vast oil and gas resources in the Arctic. Widespread exploration has been taking place for a long time. On the Norwegian side, the Snow White gas field is now producing, and LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) is now exported to the global market from the Melkøya plant.
  • Norway and Russia already have a close cooperation on energy issues. Former President Putin took the initiative to establish a strategic partnership with Norway on oil and gas extraction in the Barents Sea.
  • Russia’s decision to develop the Stockman gas field in partnership with our StatoilHydro and the French company Total increases significantly the international interest in the High North as an energy province. This gas field opens great perspectives for the development of the Barents Region, both in terms of economy and infrastructure.
  • These perspectives are based on today’s perceptions of what is possible to achieve in ice-free waters. But the perspective of a melting Arctic ice cap also expands the perspective. Less sea ice could open new areas to the exploitation of petroleum and other natural resources.
  • With increased activity comes an increased need for knowledge, civilian surveillance and emergency preparedness. We are now engaging broad knowledge communities in projects to improve and integrate different systems for knowledge of the High North. It is equally important to establish good cooperation with the EU and individual countries which are already engaged in the same quest. This is particularly important in relation to Iceland, Denmark and Russia.
  • We are all affected by developments in the High North. The Arctic is getting warmer and wetter; snow, and ice and permafrost are melting.
  • The projections are complicated and difficult to make. What we do know is that climate change is happening twice as fast in the Arctic as elsewhere on the globe.
  • Rapid melting of the ice cover will have significant implications for vulnerable ecosystems and the livelihood of local inhabitants in the Arctic. It will have an impact on the distribution of fish stocks – with potentially significant effects on commercial fisheries. And it will affect maritime transport in the Arctic – with extended navigation period and new shipping routes.
  • The Svalbard archipelago has become a central observatory of climate change. We see increasing interest from the international scientific community to use Svalbard as a base for climate change studies. Although the basic reason is a negative one, this interest in Svalbard is very welcome. Observing and assessing the causes and consequences of climate change is a key political priority. Svalbard will continue to play an important role in these efforts.
  • We want to see Svalbard become one of the world's best managed wilderness areas. The pristine natural environment of Svalbard is referred to in the Svalbard-treaty. The treaty explicitly stipulates a right for Norway to take suitable measures to ensure the preservation of the environment. We remain confirmed that environmental considerations should prevail in the event of a conflict between environmental targets and other interests.  
  • In this situation of continuous change, questions have been posed regarding the governance of the Arctic. How should the Arctic be governed and by whom? Is the international legal regime governing the Arctic adequate? Or is the melting ice revealing a similar fluidity of legal norms and boundaries? In short: do we need an “Arctic Treaty”?
  • The international legal regime governing the Arctic region is a combination of global, regional and sub-regional agreements. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – often referred to as the Constitution of the Oceans – is at the core of this regime.
  • The Law of the Sea Convention contains detailed provisions on the protection of the marine environment, the management of living marine resources, the freedom of navigation, and marine scientific research. These rules are all applicable to the Arctic.
  • Ice melting and temperature changes will also impact significantly on the distribution and migration of fish stocks, which in turn could impede sound fisheries management and lead to uncontrolled harvesting.
  • Fortunately, robust regimes are in place for managing the living marine resources within and beyond the economic zones. We have to make the best use of these regulations in order to address the changes.
  • In October last year the legal advisers/experts of the five coastal states bordering the Arctic Ocean therefore concluded that there is no need for a new legal regime for the Arctic.
  • The planting of a Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole last year sparked a debate over an alleged race for the Arctic. But – and let me underline this – it did not alter the rules and legal norms governing this area. Both Russia and Norway agree on proceeding by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the rules it sets out.
  • The Law of the Sea is also complemented by other agreements and international regimes concerning climate change, biodiversity, trade, maritime transport, and environmental protection, which have relevance to the Arctic.
  • As I have tried to illustrate, our policy on the High North carries a wide spectrum of knowledge development, issues concerning indigenous peoples, civil cross-border cooperation, environmental protection, marine resource management, maritime transport, energy perspectives and economic development.
  • This policy will be defined by our ability to continue sustainable resource management, predictable execution of jurisdiction, and close cooperation with neighbours, partners and allies.
  • In the end of this month I will go to Greenland to meet representatives of the 5 coastal states. A main objective will be to reconfirm circumpolar agreement on the main norms and regulations of the Arctic.
  • I said at the outset that we are all affected by developments in the High North. I might add that the High North is affected by all of us. Reducing climate change is a global challenge. Managing the effects of climate change in the Arctic Ocean is a major regional challenge for coastal states and others. Fortunately we have a robust legal regime in place to guide us as the Arctic Ocean opens.