A Statesman Dialogue

The Minister’s talking points
(check against delivery) 

• Dear friends. Thank you very much for inviting me to this exclusive gathering. I am indeed very honoured to meet the four statesmen who wrote the now famous Op-Eds in The Wall Street Journal of 4 January last year and 15 January this year.
• Secretary Shultz, Senator Nunn and several others of you attended the conference in Oslo last Tuesday and Wednesday. It is good to see you again. We may not be able to meet several times a week in the future, but I hope we can continue to cooperate closely in order to achieve our shared short-term and long-term visions. 

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• In closing the Oslo conference, I outlined five principles and ten conclusions or recommendations that could help guide our future efforts. I will briefly touch upon these and welcome your comments and questions.
• The five principles for progress are: 1) committed leadership at the highest level; 2) concrete steps to build momentum behind our vision; 3) the need for a joint enterprise among all states (both nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear-weapons states); 4) disarmament agreements that include all states; and 5) transparency in order to build confidence. I will briefly elaborate on these principles.
• First, achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons demands committed leadership at the highest levels. Our discussion in Oslo made it clear that we have to re-think key elements of our international security architecture if nuclear weapons are to be abolished. In order to do this, national leaders must be personally committed to abolishing nuclear weapons. And they must engage with key domestic stakeholders, including security establishments, the scientific community, and in particular, the general public.
• Second, taking disarmament seriously means that we have to start taking concrete steps now to sustain our vision and build momentum behind it. This involves taking meaningful unilateral action and commencing the negotiations necessary to make deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. It means reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines and in operational status. It means fulfilling the promise of long-sought agreements – like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the development of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) – and outstanding commitments made in 1995 and 2000. And to insure necessary confidence in these and other steps, we must be willing to undertake binding agreements with credible verification. Taking disarmament seriously also means taking regional conflicts seriously. International efforts should focus as much on regional conflicts that have not ‘gone critical’, as much as they do on those that have.     
• The third principle is also a remarkable opportunity. Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons must be a joint enterprise among all states – nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike. Article VI of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) places the obligation to bring about disarmament on all states. No doubt, states with the largest arsenals have a leadership role to play. But only by advancing non-proliferation and disarmament together, and by working together on reliable verification tools and collective security arrangements, will our vision be achievable. If we draw on a common purpose to work together with militaries, with scientists, with diplomats and with governments, the benefits could be felt in many other fields as well.    
• Fourth, we should be faithful to a key principle of effective multilateralism – non-discrimination. Our discussion has confirmed that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, we face collective dangers. We will be well-served by non-discriminatory approaches to these dangers. We must confront proliferation with unity and resolve, wherever it occurs. We must fashion disarmament agreements that include all states. We must acknowledge that fuel cycle assurances will succeed only with a non-discriminatory approach that recognises the right of all states to peaceful uses and the need of all states for energy security. And it is in this spirit that we should approach the establishment of a fuel reserve under the aegis of the IAEA.       
• Finally, transparency should be at the heart of our global effort. It is required from both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. While it is a vital starting point for many of the practical steps we must take, it also is a means of building the vital elements of trust and confidence, without which our efforts to reach zero cannot succeed. Greater transparency does not necessarily require legal instruments that can take months or even years to negotiate. It can be implemented by all states, unilaterally, starting today. 

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From these principles follow a number of conclusions. In Oslo we drew up ten conclusions, or recommendations, on which I would very much like hear your views:

1. National leaders in all states should engage personally in – and make a national priority – the efforts to realise a world free from nuclear weapons. They should seek to involve key domestic stakeholders – the general public in particular – at an early stage. Moreover, disarmament is an inter-disciplinary endeavour and national leaders should also seek to engage experts from all relevant areas including science, diplomacy, politics, law and the military.
2. The United States and Russia are encouraged to reduce the size of their arsenals significantly so that the number of nuclear weapons is measured by the hundred, and not by the thousand. This should be achieved by means of a verified, legally-binding treaty. It is also important to engage China, and any other states that possess nuclear weapons, in a strategic dialogue to develop a cooperative approach to nuclear security.
3. In order to pave the way for even deeper cuts, non-nuclear-weapon states should cooperate with nuclear-weapon states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament. Nuclear-weapon states should seize the opportunity presented by reductions in nuclear weapon numbers to demonstrate this technology.
4. All states that possess nuclear weapons are encouraged to make every effort to reverse their reliance on such weapons as a step towards their elimination. These states are also encouraged to change the operational status of their nuclear weapons, to increase decision time in the event of use being considered, and to take other steps to promote strategic stability.
5. Entry into force of the CTBT is crucial to prevent a new nuclear arms race. Until the treaty enters into force, the existing moratorium on nuclear testing should be strengthened. Each state that has tested nuclear weapons in the past should pledge that it will not be the first to restart testing. In addition, funding for the CTBT’s International Monitoring System must continue.
6. Developing the FMCT is vital to advance disarmament and prevent proliferation. In addition to starting negotiations on the FMCT, the international community should consider the creation of a voluntary Fissile Material Control Initiative to enhance the security and transparency of all nuclear material – including material that may not be subject to the FCMT. This should entail nuclear weapon states accepting more comprehensive safeguards on their civilian nuclear facilities than they do at the moment.
7. Eliminating nuclear arms requires a robust and credible non-proliferation regime. All states that have not yet done so should adopt a Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and an Additional Protocol. In addition they should sign, ratify and implement all relevant multilateral instruments to enhance the safety and security of their nuclear materials.
8. In order to help avert the awful prospect of nuclear terrorism, all states that possess nuclear weapons are urged to take all necessary measures to ensure that their weapons do not fall into unauthorised hands.
9. We should aim to create a non-discriminatory system of nuclear fuel supply in close collaboration with the IAEA. In this regard, a serious and sustained dialogue between producer and consumer is needed so that consumers have an opportunity to explain their needs and suppliers have an opportunity to tailor arrangements and incentives accordingly.
10. We should consider convening a broadly-based high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to advise governments on the core requirements for abolishing nuclear weapons.

Ladies and gentlemen, I realise that a lot of work is needed to identify the means necessary to achieve our goals.

However, I hope these five principles and the ten conclusions will be a useful contribution to the discussion.

I am thus eager to hear your comments on these principles and conclusions, as well as your views on how we can use the Seven Nations Initiative to move our agenda forwards. 

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• Members of NATO may see a need for the Alliance to provide nuclear deterrence. However, that does not go against working for multilateral nuclear disarmament. Norway remains committed to the approach enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is still the cornerstone of the non-proliferation architecture, but it is under growing pressure, in particular from states that want to develop their own nuclear weapons in breach of or outside the Treaty, most notably Iran and North Korea.
• Nuclear-weapon states have taken some important steps towards disarmament. Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear arsenals across the world have been slashed. In the UK, for instance, cuts have been made of 75% in terms of explosive power. By 2012, the overall US nuclear stockpile will be one quarter of its size at the end of the Cold War. France has removed four complete weapons systems. But it is important to demonstrate the will to move further forwards.
• It is crucial to reinvigorate our vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Again I would like to commend the Kissinger-Nunn-Perry-Shultz initiative. Nearly three-quarters of America's living former Secretaries of Defence, National Security Advisors and Secretaries of State now support the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
• We must strengthen the international agreements that limit the opportunity of states to build new nuclear weapons. We must break through the diplomatic stalemates of the last decade, which have obstructed progress on major multilateral treaties. The two key ones are the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the development of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that would stop states from producing more of the fissile material that goes into nuclear weapons. 
• We must create international agreement on how we can ensure that the spread of nuclear power does not lead to a spread of nuclear weapons. Under the NPT, states have an inalienable right to research, produce and use civilian nuclear technology. But the same technology that produces fuel for nuclear power can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. We need to know that the one will not lead to the other.
• Norway has established the Seven-Nation Initiative (Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom) to promote an international agenda which embraces both disarmament and non-proliferation. The Initiative calls for practical, systematic and progressive efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons, but equally demands tougher measures to stem proliferation. We hope that the Initiative can play an important role in building a global consensus by 2010, when all the states parties to the NPT will meet to review the implementation of the Treaty.
• Because the US and Russia still have the largest arsenals, it is to them that the world looks for leadership. The arms control treaties that have driven major reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals will expire over the next few years. Successor arrangements are urgently needed.
• We must openly address the challenges of moving towards zero. We can start by addressing the technical requirements. It is possible to foresee now, for example, a need for declarations on warhead numbers, and for verification of both declarations and dismantlement. All entail complex challenges that we can begin addressing now. The UK and Norway are already working together on verification of warhead dismantlement, and UK Defence Secretary Des Browne announced earlier this month that the UK is willing to host a conference of nuclear-weapon states to examine some of these issues in more detail. 

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