Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers

The Minister’s talking points for his address and remarks.
Check against delivery.

 

NATO Enlargement and the Western Balkans

• Important to maintain a regional approach. Parallel integration of all countries in the region is key to removing barriers of separation. 
• Norway favours an invitation to Albania, Macedonia (FYROM) and Croatia. But invitees must commit to reform, also beyond Bucharest. 
• At the same time, we are concerned about the discussion concerning Macedonia (FYROM). Of these three countries, the inclusion of Macedonia (FYROM) will clearly contribute most to regional stability. If it remains outside NATO – this will have implications for the stability of the whole region – at a time when stability is needed more than ever.  
• With regard to NATO's relations with Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, I think we can safely say that Montenegro and Bosnia have made good progress. In keeping with the regional approach, the right message to them is to upgrade relations with NATO to Intensified Dialogue (ID). 
• It is important for the Alliance to be constructive towards Serbia. Serbia must not be abandoned. It remains a key to stability in the Balkans. However, an ID invitation to Belgrade at this time would provoke acrimonious discussions among Serbs rather than bringing them closer to the Alliance. We do not want deeper political dividing lines in this region.

MAP for Georgia and Ukraine

• Georgia and Ukraine are valued partners. It is important to continue support for political and military reforms. But the MAP issue is difficult. Norway is positive to the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of both these countries. However, it is probably wise to let the issue mature. The MAP issue can better be dealt with in 2009.

NATO’s Operations in Afghanistan

• On Afghanistan, we have to give a convincing message in Bucharest. I feel we are not there yet, and the paper we have received needs further and serious work. This document should help us solidify support among the general public in our various countries for continued military and civilian efforts.
• It is a question of formulating our strategy so that that it meets the challenges of the situation today and the next couple of years. The situation has changed and we must adapt. We have difficult but crucial crossroads ahead of us, including the upcoming election process. The main messages should be the following:
• First of all, we should emphasise that our presence is firmly based on a UN mandate. We are there because the UN has repeatedly characterised the situation as a threat to international peace and security. And because the Afghan Government has asked us to assist.  
• Second, we must make it clear that our priority now is to enable the Afghan army and police to handle the security challenges themselves. The concept of Afghanisation must be at the core of what we say and what we do. And it is working.
• Third, NATO enjoys the support of the great majority of the Afghan population. We will work to maintain that support, and do our utmost to avoid civilian casualties. 
• Fourth, it is not up to NATO to formulate the wider, integrated strategy we need. But NATO will do its utmost to be a loyal partner in developing and implementing that strategy. The civilian efforts must now be adequately coordinated. But the civilian and military dimensions must also work hand in glove and reinforce each other without confusing mandates. 
• Fifth, we call on all actors to seek coordination and be prepared to be coordinated. And to express our full support for the new UN representative when he or she is appointed. 
• And sixth, in order to play our role fully, we must – of course – be ready to make the resources required available to ISAF and to the Afghan Government. 
• We must make it clear that our work must be accompanied by a convincing effort by the Afghan Government to promote reconciliation and good governance, and to fight corruption and drugs. The Afghans must play their part to make our investment sustainable.   
• And finally, Norway supports the French initiative for a conference in June. More than two years after the London conference, there is a need to inject energy and a clearer sense of direction into our overall efforts to support the Afghan Government.   

Kosovo and KFOR

• We have all condemned the attacks against Western embassies two weeks ago. However, let us be pleased that so far there has been no inter-ethnic incident in Kosovo since the declaration of independence.  
• We will soon enter a new stage of implementation of Kosovo’s new status. Then the diametrically opposed positions, that we have so far witnessed around the negotiating tables and in statements, will be transferred to the ground.  
• The strength of the international community will then be of critical importance. The EU’s new mission is controversial, so is the OSCE. The UN mission is weakened and on its way out.  
• KFOR will therefore have the key role. It is the only actor enjoying confidence both among Kosovo-Serbs and in Serbia, and able to play an impartial role in protecting minority rights. Furthermore, KFOR’s actions will shape Belgrade’s attitude to NATO. It is of utmost importance that we maintain the confidence of both major population groups.  
• We should therefore think twice before we move into new and status-related tasks. It would have an impact on the way we are perceived and on the confidence we enjoy. We should find ways to combine meeting the requirements of the Athisaari plan with the need to maintain the confidence that Serbs and Albanians have in the Alliance today. 

Disarmament

• I look forward to an ambitious and comprehensive report on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament in Bucharest, in accordance with the task assigned at our meeting in December.  
• It is important to raise NATO’s profile in this field, and this work should be duly reflected in the summit communiqué.

Missile Defence

• We appreciate the thorough discussion on missile defence within the Alliance. However, we still believe that a number of issues related to the threat assessment, command and control, financial implications, technical issues and implications for the offence-defence relationship have not been adequately addressed. 
• Norway’s position therefore remains unchanged. We are still not convinced about the need for such a system, and whether this is the right or best response to current and foreseeable threats. 
• We need to continue discussions on this issue in the lead-up to Bucharest. And we will need to discuss it after Bucharest. Open dialogue with Russia continues to be crucial. And we appreciate the US efforts to engage the Russians to find cooperative solutions.  
• Let me, however, underline that Norway is firmly attached to the principle of the indivisibility of security. It is a fundamental tenet of this Alliance and must remain so.

NATO–EU Relations

• Jaap [Secretary-General], I have read your letter on NATO-EU relations. I agree with you on the importance of getting this relationship right. NATO and the EU are facing the same challenges and have the same strategic interests.   
• It is common sense to discuss issues of common concern. Kosovo is an obvious case in point. NATO and the EU are the two main international actors, and should discuss both strategic and technical issues.  
• Together with my Swedish and Finnish colleagues, I have circulated a letter suggesting that third countries should have a role in the decision-shaping process in operations in which they participate, on the basis of reciprocity. This would in no way reduce the decision-making autonomy of either organisation. In my view we – both NATO and the EU – should now consider measures to strengthen the role of third countries.