Disarmament as a globale change

The Minister based his address on
the following points (check against delivery).

Ladies and gentlemen,

1.

• I very much appreciate being invited. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been pivotal in shaping German politics over the last six decades. Your analyses are thorough, leading and set the agenda. 
• As a student, I was greatly inspired by leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. They represented social democracy and international solidarity at its best. Basic values.
• I became Foreign Minister in 2005 at the same time as Frank-Walter Steinmeier came into office. We both shared the same perspectives on many global challenges, and I appreciated the close cooperation we had on disarmament issues. Among other things, we managed to bring disarmament back onto NATO’s agenda, which – in 2007 – was a rather tall order. This morning I had a good meeting with Guido Westerwelle, and I am glad that our close cooperation continues.

2.

• This brings me to today’s topic: disarmament as a global challenge.
• For me the very notion of disarmament represents more than anything an opportunity to enhance security.
• And enhancing security is all about credibility and relevance: We must make the best use of the opportunities at hand, in order to reduce armament levels, and in order to eliminate weapons that weaken security rather than strengthen it.
• In my view: All countries have a responsibility to forge an international environment that is conducive for disarmament. There is no good reason to let the disarmament agenda be dominated by a handful of countries, or to let those who want to achieve the least set the pace.
• Unfortunately, this is precisely how the institutionalised intergovernmental disarmament agenda has been working. For nearly 15 years, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) has delivered nothing at all of practical value.
• If this situation continues, we should reconsider whether the current CD (as well as other intergovernmental disarmament institutions) is the best response we can come up with to today’s challenges.
• For one thing, we know that there are alternative approaches:
• Firstly. In the field of humanitarian disarmament, multilateralism has been working: We must learn from the experiences from the Mine Ban Convention and the Cluster Munitions Convention.
• Secondly. A renewed intergovernmental machinery is needed. This should:
  o be inclusive and open for all interested states;
  o be much more transparent, and open for active participation of civil society (and other relevant actors);
  o have a clear orientation towards practical on-the-ground impact; and most of all
  o be structured so that the spoilers cannot set the agenda.
• Now, these points should be taken into account when we consider how to make use of the window of opportunity we now have - so we can move closer to a world free from nuclear weapons.
• The window is open, but could shut again, just as the optimism of the 1990s was followed by some very difficult years.   

3.

• Let me illustrate this by focusing on three main areas or arenas:
  o First: the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
  o Second: the role of NATO.
  o Third: the concept of humanitarian disarmament.
• First: my views on a very topical issue – the NPT.
• For nearly ten years, we have been accustomed to bad news when it came to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
• Many factors contributed to a deep sense of pessimism, and many of them are still valid:
  o North Korea’s announcement in 2003 of its withdrawal from the NPT created a genuine fear that other countries would follow suit. North Korea’s behaviour, building up its nuclear capacities and its possible international proliferation activities, is a grave challenge in itself.
  o Iran’s blatant refusal to comply with clear and legitimate demands by the international community has raised questions about how we can deal effectively with potential breakouts from the non-proliferation regime.
• It is further cause for concern that these two proliferation challenges (and possibly others, like Syria) have emerged at a time when we are seeing what has been described as a civilian “nuclear renaissance”.
• We may like it or not, but it is expected that more countries, particularly in the South, will develop nuclear energy in the decades to come. This is already happening on a large scale in countries such as China. Partly, of course, in response to the legitimate need for energy sources to fuel economic growth.
• But we should not overlook the challenge represented by sensitive technologies being made more widely available worldwide.
• Alongside the proliferation challenges, it is also a fact that many countries, especially those in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), find that nuclear weapons states have not delivered on their disarmament pledges.
• To understand this, we should take a closer look at the NPT and its history.

4.

• The NPT was negotiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Its underlying principle is that countries that did not already possess nuclear arms would pledge not to acquire such weapons, provided that they were ensured the right to nuclear energy for peaceful uses, and that nuclear weapons states committed themselves to nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of their nuclear weapons.
• The NPT is a product of the Cold War. Today, it is highly unlikely that an agreement would be reached under which five states are given the exclusive right to possess a particular weapon such as the nuclear bomb.
• Many of us remember the freeze movement in the 1980s, the peace camps and massive demonstrations against the deployment of new US nuclear weapons in Western Europe to counter the Soviet SS20 missiles.
• The NPT was originally given a duration of 25 years. When the question of extension came up in 1995, the world had changed dramatically. While nuclear deterrence could have been justified during the East–West confrontation, it was harder to explain why certain states were still to maintain large stockpiles of nuclear arms in the absence of any obvious enemy.
• In short, the credibility and relevance of nuclear weapons were questioned in a way never done before.
• In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely, with the following provisions:
  o that nuclear weapons states committed themselves to disarmament with a view to elimination of their arsenals;
  o that nuclear weapons states gave guarantees that – under specific conditions – they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states;
  o and that the international community would aim to set up a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The last of these was essential for securing the continued support of Arab states to the NPT regime.
• These disarmament commitments were further elaborated by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, through the adoption of 13 practical nuclear disarmament steps. And most importantly the nuclear weapons states committed themselves “unequivocally” to eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
• However, as it turned out, the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked the end of the immediate post-Cold War era of optimism on arms control.
• There had been many achievements in a short period of time:
  o In addition to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995,
  o the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been opened up for signature in 1998.
  o The IAEA Model Additional Protocol, which provided enhanced IAEA verification of civilian nuclear activities, had been adopted in 1997.
  o The Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force in 1997.
  o The same year, the Mine Ban Convention had been negotiated in Oslo.
  

5.

• But: the tide turned. Already in 2001, there were clear signs that the nuclear weapons states were distancing themselves from their commitments. This became even more apparent in the aftermath of 9/11.
• The Bush administration made it plain that it did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The US withdrew from the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty with Russia.
• And, the new security doctrines of the nuclear weapons states put more - rather than less - emphasis on nuclear deterrence (contrary to the 13 practical steps I mentioned earlier).
• The set-back in nuclear disarmament was matched by a definite lack of progress in strengthening the non-proliferation regime:
• In addition to the unresolved cases of Iran and North Korea, it was not possible to achieve a common understanding that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be universally applied, and that the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies should be prevented.
• The lack of a common vision on how to move the NPT process led to increased polarisation.
• The low point was 2005, when the NPT Review Conference failed miserably, followed by an inability to reach consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the UN World Summit.
• So, when I became Foreign Minister in the autumn of 2005, I was struck by the sad state of affairs in nuclear arms control. It was imperative to move out of this impasse.
• The alternative would have been a continued weakening of the NPT regime’s credibility, and the danger that more countries could chose the nuclear option.
• So, the German Foreign Minister and I published articles in our national newspapers, advocating renewed efforts to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and calling for concrete steps to reduce their role in security policies.
• In parallel, there was growing awareness of the threat of nuclear war, and the need to aim - not for constraints on the nuclear arms race – but for a world free of nuclear weapons. A focus on this vision.
• The election of Barack Obama as President and his Prague speech last year were important events that gave this zero option more political clout.
  

6.

• It was indeed a great change to see a world free from nuclear weapons enter the general political vocabulary.
• Over the last year, I have seen that many countries are moving towards firmer commitments, and that the general view is that we need to engage actively in setting up a roadmap to eliminate nuclear weapons.
• Here again (and my point, again, is) the credibility issue: Once it is made clear for all that we would actually be safer without nuclear weapons, it is very hard to find good arguments for keeping them.
• The successful outcome (in my view) of the NPT 2010 Review Conference a few weeks ago has provided us with additional tools for this work.
• I know that some NGOs, observers and others are disappointed that the outcome document did not set up timelines for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, or initiate a process to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention. I too, would certainly have welcomed a more ambitious outcome.
• But, the fact that the outcome succeeded in salvaging the credibility and relevance of the treaty is in itself of great importance. The alternative would have left us with little to build on and greater challenges to overcome. As for the outcome itself, it went very far in restoring the underlying compact from 1995 and 2000.
• Looking at what was actually adopted I see the glass as “half full” rather than “half empty”. Let me explain:
  o The Review Conference agreed on 64 concrete actions along the three pillars of the NPT,
  o as well as steps to be taken with respect to the Middle East.
  o In this sense, it was more comprehensive than the 2000 outcome.
  o The Conference strongly emphasised the overall objective to eliminate nuclear weapons.
  o It explicitly brought the concept of international humanitarian law into the discussion of nuclear weapons.
  o It made clear that a convention (or other legally binding arrangement) was the ultimate objective of the disarmament obligations under the NPT.
  o It addressed all categories of nuclear weapons, and not least the question of their location. This may be of particular interest for a country like Germany.
  o The Conference brought forward the question of negative security assurances.
  o And although no deadlines have been set for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Conference agreed that nuclear weapons states should report back by 2014 on their progress in implementing their commitments.
  o The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of the disarmament commitments. 
  o The final document also contains clear non-proliferation obligations. All states parties are encouraged to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol.
  o Furthermore, the Conference paved the way for more discussion on cooperative arrangements on production of nuclear fuel for civilian reactors and handling nuclear waste. Germany and Norway strongly urged that we should find ways to ensure that countries producing nuclear energy have access to fuel - without having to develop their own capacity.
  o And finally, the Conference clearly called for continued efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear research reactors, and to convert these reactors to run on low-enriched uranium.
• So, the way I see it, the nuclear weapons states have been given a short “delay” by the vast majority of NPT states parties before moving to zero.
• There is no doubt that the division between the small number of nuclear weapons states and the much larger number of non-nuclear weapons states is not sustainable in the long run. My view, if the nuclear weapons states do not live up to expectations, it is likely that the political pressure to move faster towards a legally binding instrument will be significant.

7.

• As non-nuclear weapons states, we have a responsibility to do our part so that the outcome of the NPT Review Conference is implemented. One arena where Germany and Norway could make a footprint is NATO.
• I fully recognise that NATO is a security organisation and not a disarmament agency. Yet, NATO acknowledged already in the Harmel Report in 1967 that arms control was part of its security policy.
• Indeed, the best safeguard against any use of nuclear weapons is undeniably their full elimination. When former “cold warriors” such as Henry Kissinger and George Schultz have called for a world without nuclear weapons, they have done so out of security concerns.
• In the coming months, NATO will give shape to its new strategic concept. One of the key issues is the nuclear doctrine.
• In February, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway asked the Secretary General of NATO to put nuclear issues on the agenda of the informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April. It was encouraging that our initiative received widespread support, but judging from our discussions in Tallinn, it is evident that we are far from consensus on the future nuclear policy of the Alliance.
• The report from the group of experts appointed by the NATO Secretary General on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, could also have been more forward-looking with respect to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security posture. And it could have been more up-to-date in integrating the disarmament perspective into the security policy framework of the Alliance.
• Furthermore, it is important that NATO takes fully into account the commitments made in the NPT Review Conference. There should be less emphasis on the nuclear component in NATO’s deterrence policy, and a readiness to expand the scope of negative security assurances.
• Here I fully share the US view that the only condition for non-nuclear weapons states to obtain guarantees should be compliance with their NPT non-proliferation obligations.
• Nuclear deterrence only makes sense in deterring others states from using nuclear weapons against us. Using nuclear weapons to counter other threats, such as conventional weapons, would in the long run lead to further proliferation.

8.

• The debate has just begun. Few countries support NATO as strongly as Germany and Norway do. It is all the more important that we join other like-minded allies and consider seriously how to develop NATO’s strategy in a way that is credible and relevant in view of today’s security challenges. This involves reconsidering the role we have given nuclear weapons.
• Knowing the immense destructive power of such weapons – the horrendous humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences – it is very difficult indeed to contemplate any situation where they might actually be employed. They are simply not very relevant from a military point of view. This will eventually have a negative spin-off effect on their political relevance.
• For NATO, it would make good sense to find a means of withdrawing all sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe and subsequently eliminating them. It is also vital to engage Russia on sub-strategic nuclear weapons. This should be on the agenda in the next round of negotiations between the US and Russia, the follow-on to the new START. In the meantime, these negotiations could be facilitated by enhanced dialogue with Russia on these weapons systems.
• Norway and Poland have just called for such a step-wise and balanced approach, starting with increased transparency and confidence-building measures. I am pleased that this initiative has received widespread support.
• But, while both Germany and Norway are committed to reducing and eventually eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security policy, it is apparent that some allied countries do not share our view. This was clearly illustrated at the recent meeting of ministers of defence, where France blocked all language on nuclear disarmament in the final communiqué.
• It is also a fact that some of the new members of NATO consider the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons as a transatlantic “superglue”, a fundamental bond.
• I do not see nuclear weapons, or the Alliance for that matter, in this way. In my view, the cohesion of NATO is founded on a joint commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, political solidarity and joint decision-making - and not on the continued presence of a particular category of weapons of mass destruction.
• Therefore, from my perspective, the Strategic Concept should not stand in the way of the NPT objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is important that NATO’s new nuclear posture is changed to reflect new realities.

9.

• Finally, let me add some thoughts on what I call new arenas – new methods or new partners.
• While NATO and the NPT are important forums, I do not believe it will be possible to reach the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons unless we engage a much broader spectrum of society.
• In sum, it is crucial to involve humanitarian actors. They were key partners in the process that led to banning anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, as they will be in our efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
• The Norwegian Government has over the years developed a comprehensive approach to what I call humanitarian disarmament: recognising disarmament as a humanitarian and developmental imperative, in addition to being a security issue.
• Our engagement in the fields of landmines, cluster munitions, small arms and other related areas is motivated by the unacceptable harm to civilians caused by the use of these weapons.
• Armed violence caused by conventional weapons is an important part of this picture: Every day more than 2 000 people die as a direct or indirect result of armed violence. It is a global problem that cuts across all levels of development. Armed violence:
• prevents development,
• causes human rights violations and individual trauma,
• creates an atmosphere of fear and insecurity,
• fosters a culture of impunity,
• undermines trust in key public institutions,
• and undermines development efforts and the fabric of society.

 

• The endorsement of the so-called Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence by more than 60 states in Geneva in May, proves that targeted efforts to address armed violence are beginning to bear fruit.
• In partnership with other states, the UN, civil society and organisations such as the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC), Norway will give top priority to working towards preventing and reducing armed violence.
• We have asked ourselves: What must be done over the next five years if we are to achieve our goal of protecting civilians from armed violence?
• There is already a legal framework for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. However, while both the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions strengthen international humanitarian law, the legal framework of international humanitarian law has come under pressure. Core obligations are circumvented, unilaterally redefined or simply ignored, and conflict zones are sealed off to avoid public scrutiny.
• One important challenge is the upcoming negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The international arms trade must be controlled and regulated because of the human suffering caused by the use of conventional arms, including small arms. The ATT must be designed to prevent and reduce violations of international humanitarian and human rights law caused by the use of such weapons.
• The abolishment of nuclear weapons would be a major preventive humanitarian action. For this reason, I am pleased that the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) has raised awareness about the humanitarian dimension of nuclear arms. Nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhuman and indiscriminate weapons ever created.
• International humanitarian law has evolved dramatically since the end of World War II and the Cold War. We have banned the two other categories of weapons of mass destruction: biological and chemical weapons. We have prohibited certain conventional weapons that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. In the long run, it is hard to justify an exemption for nuclear weapons. 
• It is therefore encouraging that the humanitarian dimension was included in the final document of the NPT 2010 Review Conference.

10.

• We should also forge new partnerships with the business community. Obviously, any use of nuclear weapons, intentional or by accident, would have devastating effects on economic activity. It is perhaps no coincidence that the famous articles by Kissinger, Schultz, Nunn and Perry on this subject were published in The Wall Street Journal.
• Lastly, as I have underlined, we need the critical and impatient voices of the NGO community. We should support international networks of NGOs that monitor the implementation of the outcome of the NPT Review Conference. They hold us accountable.
• In concluding, my main message is this:
  - Nuclear disarmament is essential for building and sustaining a robust non-proliferation regime.
  - While nuclear deterrence might have worked – albeit uneasily – during the Cold War, it is very difficult to argue in its favour today. It will be even more difficult in the future. Besides, a race is already on, between disarmament and proliferation.
  - The choice is not, as some seem to think, between status quo and proliferation, but between a world with many more nuclear weapons states and none at all.
  - Disarmament will enhance European security and global security. We have a common interest and obligation to engage in the NPT, the UN, NATO and other, new arenas, to create the conditions that will enable us to abolish the nuclear threat.