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Dear friends of the Convention,

It is an honour for me to welcome you to this event - and this debate on the occasion of the launch of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research’s book Unacceptable harm – A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won.

Let me start by expressing my gratitude to the book’s author Mr John Borrie for providing us with valuable insights and analyses of what “disarmament as humanitarian action” really means. It is a great pleasure to have you here.
As you probably all know; we are now very close to reaching the necessary 30 ratifications of the Convention, and thus knowing the date of its entry into force. That is a huge inspiration for us in our preparations for the First Meeting of States Parties.

When the Oslo Declaration was adopted by 46 states almost 3 years ago, our mandate was clear: to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

We all know what happened next. A series of international meetings and conferences was held, and then we met in Dublin for the final negotiations in May 2008 where the Convention was adopted by consensus.

Thinking back – it is incredible that we actually, in such a short period of time, were able to achieve the Convention.

And for me, that raises the question: Why did the Oslo Process succeed?

I believe, first and foremost, it was because throughout the process, it was based on facts and realities from the situation on the ground.

And those facts clearly showed the inaccuracy and unreliability of cluster munitions in operational conditions.

And – the facts showed the unacceptable harm they cause during and after use.
The humanitarian consequences of the use of cluster munitions – in affected areas and as experienced by the victims – became the main point of reference.
This was important, because it created a shift with regard to who bore the burden of evidence – and I would like to quote directly from Mr Borrie’s book here – with the talks

“moving away from a situation in which cluster munitions users, producers and manufacturers could make any claims they chose without really being called on to justify these assertions, to a discourse in which they were increasingly called upon to demonstrate that their weapons did not cause unacceptable harm.”

There are two more key aspects that I would like to raise in my opening comments about the Convention, and the process that led up to it.

First: How the Convention has become a norm

As I have already mentioned, we are waiting for four more countries to ratify the Convention so that it can enter into force. While this will be an important milestone from a formal, legal perspective, we have already seen how the Convention has become a new benchmark for assessing how states conduct warfare.
The use of cluster munitions now entails major political risk for all states, whether they join the Convention or not.

The Convention reinforces the international norm regarding the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. This norm extends beyond the provisions of the treaties underpinning it, such as the Geneva Conventions.

And it extends beyond the states that choose to join the various relevant treaties – such as the Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
So even though the Convention has not yet been put into force –we already see that it works.

Secondly: How the Convention is the result of strong partnerships

Undoubtedly, one of the keys to the success of our work so far has been the partnerships between states, civil society, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, all of which were accepted as full participants in the process.
Let me say something of the different parties’ roles:

The states
A vital element in this context was the effective cross-regional partnership between affected and non-affected states, including states that have stockpiles of cluster munitions.

The leadership shown by states from all regions of the world was crucial to achieving the strong result in Dublin and continues to be essential in the important work ahead towards the First Meeting of States Parties.

The UN
The active participation and valuable contributions from the UN field organisations were also crucial.

UNDP had and still has a special role as the lead agency in the UN on cluster munitions. UNDP also effectively facilitated the participation of states wanting to take part in the process.

The ICRC
The ICRC has a special role in any work aimed at strengthening international humanitarian law.

Its particular strength is the combination of its bottom-up field perspective, due to its presence in virtually all conflict zones in the world, and its role as custodian, promoter and developer of international humanitarian law.

The Cluster Munition Coalition
The CMC, a coalition of several hundred humanitarian and human rights organisations from around the world, has been and continues to be a central partner in the process.

In addition to the important advocacy work undertaken by civil society and the CMC, the humanitarian field organisations in the CMC provided substantive expertise on all relevant aspects of cluster munitions.

To sum up on this point: If it had not been for this partnership, both the process and the result would have been different.

By this partnership we’ve ensured that what we achieved will make a true difference for the people and communities affected by these weapons.

But – as we focus on the results so far, and what we were able to achieve – we must also focus on the way forward. So let me conclude with some comments on that.

The Oslo Process came about in response to a humanitarian problem caused by the use of cluster munitions.

Therefore, the real measure of the success of our work is the actual difference the Convention on Cluster Munitions makes on the ground in affected communities.

The Convention is a framework for effective action

• to clear affected areas,
• to assist victims
• and to destroy the enormous stockpiles.

By making it work, by implementing its obligations to destroy stockpiles and to provide clearance and victim assistance, new humanitarian crises will be prevented.
Thousands of lives and limbs will be spared, and resources will be freed for meeting other pressing needs.

Indeed, the only way to avoid a similar global problem to the landmine crisis is to ensure rapid entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and full compliance with its obligations.

We will work closely with the other parties to the Convention to make sure that that happens.

But as we focus on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Convention, we all know that we face other global challenges similar to those addressed by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Convention.
Armed violence causes unacceptable harm to civilians all over the world, every day. We need to act on these challenges – together.

Therefore, let me be clear on this point: Our government will continue to focus on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Convention. But we also stand ready to cooperate with our partners in a broad range of arenas to
continue working for the reduction and prevention of armed violence in the years ahead.

We will have more time to speak about that later, but let me now introduce the next speaker, Mr John Borrie of UNIDIR, and thank him again for providing us with insights of great value for our future work on humanitarian disarmament, armed violence and human security.

Mr Borrie, you now have the floor. Thank you.