Part 1
Historical Overview

3 Afghanistan, the international community and Norway, 2001–2014

On 11 September 2001 nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists attacked iconic landmarks in the US. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, sending shock waves throughout the US and the rest of the world. Uncertainty and the fear of more attacks gripped much of the world in the weeks that followed. The following day, US President George W. Bush announced that the American people were at war. The enemy was not only those who had planned and carried out the attacks, he said, but also those who harboured them. Although no Afghans were directly involved in the acts, Afghanistan became the prime target of the US-led ‘war on terror’.

Bush’s declaration was the prologue to a massive international civilian and military engagement in Afghanistan, with the US exerting the most influence on the agenda. Norway’s contributions comprised only a small part of the overall effort, and thus Norway largely had to work within a framework set by others. Nevertheless, there was some scope for independent action in designing its civilian and military contributions.

This chapter presents a general overview of the engagement in Afghanistan in the period 2001–2014, outlining the evolution of the broader international effort within which Norway’s activities unfolded. The purpose is to contextualise the Norwegian engagement, with a focus on important choices the government made.

The Commission has divided the international engagement from 2001 to 2014 into four partially overlapping phases: an initial build-up phase with a ‘light footprint’ (2001–2003); a second phase with growing ambitions for state-building (2002–2006); a third phase dominated by increasing resistance (2006–2011); and a fourth phase of preparing for withdrawal by transferring responsibility to Afghan authorities (2010–2014). This division is based on a relatively widely accepted understanding of the changes in the approach to Afghanistan by the international community, and by the US in particular.

3.1 Norwegian objectives

The Norwegian government had three explicit, overarching objectives for its engagement in Afghanistan. The first and most important of these throughout was the Alliance dimension: to support the US and safeguard NATO’s continued relevance. The second objective was to help to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for international terror activities. The third objective was to help to build a stable and democratic Afghan state through long-term development cooperation and to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict. The emphasis on each objective varied over time. Overall, the Norwegian authorities presented the engagement in Afghanistan as a battle fought together with the US and NATO, against international terror and for a better Afghanistan.

Supporting the US and NATO was the most important objective during the Norwegian engagement. This was especially evident in the decisions taken by the Norwegian authorities regarding military contributions. However, Alliance commitments and Norway’s bilateral relations with the US were also important factors in shaping Norwegian civilian efforts in both development assistance and peace diplomacy.

Early in the conflict, the Norwegian authorities gave high priority to supporting the US-led ‘war on terror’. This was in response to concerns about new attacks, possibly on Norway, and a strong sense of the need to show solidarity with the US, Norway’s foremost ally. After the military actions of 2001–2003 drove al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership out of Afghanistan, there was less danger of the country once again becoming a safe haven. As a result, the focus on combatting international terror became too narrow a basis for justifying the continuation of a comprehensive Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan.

The ‘war on terror’ quickly became controversial, partly because it was presented as a war on an unknown enemy without boundaries in time or place. The US attack on Iraq in 2003 eroded some of the initial sympathy for and solidarity with the US. Revelations of prisoner abuse at Bagram and other bases in Afghanistan, the establishment of the Guantánamo Bay detention camp in Cuba and prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq provoked further debate about the American methods being employed.

The security situation in Afghanistan in 2002–2003 appeared to stabilise fairly quickly. The Norwegian government began to attach greater importance to its third objective, state-building and civilian development. This objective became particularly important for the second Stoltenberg government, a coalition of the Labour, Socialist Left and Centre parties. In 2006 this government launched what it called a taktskifte (literally, ‘change of pace’) – a revised approach that emphasised the need for a significantly stronger Norwegian civilian effort in helping to build a democratic, independent Afghan state. When the security situation deteriorated dramatically towards the end of the period the Commission is assessing, despite the comprehensive international development aid programmes and military engagement, ambitions for the state-building project were reduced.

3.2 History and Afghanistan in 2001

For more than a thousand years, Afghanistan has been part of multiple civilisations with origins in, among others, Buddhist, Persian and Turkish cultures. The borders of today’s Afghanistan were drawn in the late 1800s, based on the economic and strategic interests of the Russian and British empires. Many Afghan leaders have subsequently proven skilful at using the country’s strategic significance to garner external political and financial support. Historically, revenues from foreign sources have been more valuable to the public finances than mobilising local resources.

The country emerged as a more prominent global political player after WWII. Afghan authorities capitalised on the rivalries between superpowers by playing both sides to gain economic and political support. Eventually, Afghanistan itself was drawn into the Cold War, with serious ramifications for the country. The Soviet Union’s invasion in December 1979 triggered a war lasting until February 1989 – nearly a whole decade. Throughout the course of these years, Afghanistan became an important stage for the power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. The US provided weapons, money and equipment to Afghanistan via Pakistan to ensure that Afghan guerrilla warfare against Soviet forces was as effective as possible. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet financial contributions to Afghanistan’s President Mohammad Najibullah ceased and the Communist government collapsed.

But the victors of the coup – known as the mujahideen (people engaged in Jihad, a struggle) – could not agree on power-sharing in the country. A new, brutal civil war erupted in Afghanistan, pitting shifting alliances and ethnicities against one another.

The lawlessness in many parts of the country resulting from this war was the backdrop to the Taliban’s gradual takeover of power from the mid-1990s. Much of the country’s infrastructure lay in ruins and the people had little trust in their political leaders. Many felt that the Taliban regime offered more security than they had experienced during the mujahideen period (1992–1996). The Taliban’s brutality, however, made the group unpopular with parts of the population, especially those in urban areas. The regime’s leadership was condemned internationally, particularly for its human rights violations (its treatment of women and inhumane enforcement of criminal law) and for harbouring international terrorists.1 When the regime was toppled in 2001, Afghanistan was an impoverished, isolated country, with little in the way of functioning infrastructure or government administration.

Within a national context the Taliban’s main opponents had been the Northern Alliance. While the Taliban had their strongest backing among rural Pashtuns in the south and east, the Northern Alliance found its primary support among other ethnicities, such as Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks. These factions were led by warlords with different regional power bases and interests, but who presented a united front against the Taliban. During the Taliban period the Northern Alliance had cultivated relations with several foreign governments, including that of the US. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, however, the US did not much involve itself in Afghanistan. In the autumn of 2001 the Northern Alliance leaders had control over just a fraction of the country, mostly in the northeast. The alliance was further weakened when its main leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated by al-Qaeda just two days before the attacks on the US in September 2001.

The American attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October 2001 was not intended to be an invasion with large military units. Seeking to avoid the Soviet mistake of being drawn deeply into Afghan conflicts, the US authorities wanted a brief offensive with few forces and thus made the Northern Alliance their main ally. A large cash injection from the US government enabled significant militia forces to mobilise quickly. With support from the CIA, US air power and special forces, the militia captured first Kabul and then Kandahar. The Bonn conference in December 2001 formalised the new balance of power in Afghanistan and gave the Northern Alliance control of the most important government ministries.

3.3 First phase: the build-up – OEF and a ‘light footprint’

The first phase (2001–2003) was marked by the US-led ‘war on terror’ and the military operations to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The political pillar of the Bonn Agreement supported the establishment of an interim Afghan administration and a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) that would elect a new national head of state and a transitional government, the Afghan Transitional Authority. The Assembly convened in June 2002 and elected Hamid Karzai as president.

The main actors, particularly the US and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN SRSG) for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, did not wish to become deeply involved in Afghanistan. The fall of the Taliban regime and the Bonn Agreement gave the Northern Alliance, as well as other warlords and militia leaders with established positions of power, a new opportunity to become part of the political development.2 Several of these actors had been accused of serious human rights violations and war crimes. Toward the end of this phase, the US scaled back military operations in Afghanistan and turned more of its attention to the Iraq War, which started with the US invasion in March 2003. Meanwhile, NATO assumed a larger share of responsibility for the military engagement in Afghanistan.

The UN Security Council, on which Norway held a seat as an elected member in the period 2001–2002, reacted quickly to the 11 September attacks on the US. On 12 September Resolution 1368 was adopted unanimously.3 This resolution confirmed the US right to self-defence, but did not mention Afghanistan. Chapter 10 discusses the basis in international law for the subsequent operations.

NATO also swiftly expressed its support for the US. On 12 September the North Atlantic Council stated that it considered the attack against the US to be an attack on all NATO member countries and, for the first time in Allied history, invoked the Atlantic Charter’s collective defence clause, Article 5. The decision was contingent on the attack having come from abroad, which NATO confirmed on 2 October. It was not clear how the Alliance was going to follow up the decision, however, so considerable uncertainty reigned at NATO Headquarters.

President Bush sought a quick, effective operation without the involvement of NATO.4 The experience of coalition warfare in the Balkans just a few years earlier had shown that collaborating with Allied forces was time-consuming and politically complicated. However, for both political and practical reasons, it was impossible for the US to wage war in Central Asia alone. From a political perspective a greater number of countries supporting the operation brought increased legitimacy. The US had already won the support of the UK and invited other countries to take part in a ‘coalition of the willing’ if they could contribute militarily. Since Afghanistan is landlocked, all military movements would also be dependent on the consent, and preferably the support, of neighbouring countries.

The reaction in Norway to the terror attacks against the US was also strong. A few hours after the attacks, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg issued a press release extending his condolences to the American people and expressing Norway’s willingness to contribute:

‘This is an attack against the USA and the American people. But it is also an attack against open, democratic society. All democracies now have an obligation to join in an uncompromising struggle against international terrorism.’5

Like other countries in Europe, Norway implemented wide-ranging security measures to increase national security in the days following the terror attacks. The diplomatic missions of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs around the world reported continually on international reactions to the attacks.

Photo: Kelly Guenther/Polaris

3.3.1 Change of government, decisions to contribute and opening an embassy in Kabul

In the autumn of 2001 there was broad political agreement in Norway to support the US after the attacks of 11 September. The Labour Party government, losers of the Norwegian parliamentary election of 10 September 2001, signalled early on that Norway, as a member of NATO, would contribute to the ‘war on terror’. A week after the attacks, outgoing Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg pledged ‘Norway’s full support, both politically and practically, to US actions to combat terrorism’.6

Meanwhile, there was considerable uncertainty as to how the US would respond and what would be expected militarily from its European allies. In preparation for potential requests from the US, the Norwegian government assessed over the course of a few weeks what kind of military contributions it could make.

On 7 October 2001 the US, together with the UK, launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). President Bush’s original plan was a brief military action to find those responsible for the attacks on the US and to deter other regimes that harboured terrorists with international ambitions. At the time, the US had no plans for a comprehensive state-building project.

When Norway’s new coalition government, led by Kjell Magne Bondevik, took office on 19 October 2001, the US had not yet requested Norwegian assistance. This new government, too, considered security policy relations with the US and NATO to be of major importance and sought to contribute as quickly as possible. Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold later said, ‘It was important to signal our support to the Americans by deploying forces quickly. To be relevant, we needed to be over there by Christmas.’7

Concerns began to emerge in the civil service that Norway was late in offering help. In a memorandum to its minister on 15 October, the Ministry of Defence stressed that Norway had a ‘very low military profile’ in the ongoing international struggle against terror. Several countries, including the UK, France, Canada, Australia and Germany, had already provided or offered forces to OEF. The memorandum stated: ‘The low military profile may become a political problem in relations with both NATO and the US, and furthermore may lead to limitation in our access to information about Operation Enduring Freedom.’8 The first formal US request for Norwegian military contributions came in mid-November and was for air transport for UN humanitarian efforts. At this point, thirteen other countries, ten of them NATO members, had already offered the US specific support for OEF.

On 8 November Prime Minister Bondevik addressed the Storting (Norwegian parliament), portraying the terror attacks against the US as a declaration of war ‘against the international rule of law, against international cooperation, against free and open society, against tolerance and against human dignity itself’.9 He stressed there was a broad political consensus in Norway to support the US ‘war on terror’. Internally within the coalition government, however, there were tensions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen and Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold (both from the Conservative Party) saw bilateral relations with the US as a fundamental political priority that made it incumbent upon Norway to contribute militarily to the US as quickly as possible.10 The Christian Democratic and Liberal parties preferred a more cautious approach. These tensions within the coalition government became palpable two years later when the US asked Norway to contribute to the war effort in Iraq.11

On 30 November 2001 the Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee held a closed meeting in the Storting on potential military contributions to Afghanistan.12 The Progress and Socialist Left parties stated that the decision to offer forces was so important that the Storting had to debate it in open session. Thus on 5 December Minister of Foreign Affairs Petersen and Minister of Defence Krohn Devold gave an open address to the Storting. As soon as political agreement was reached, the Norwegian armed forces acted quickly and made a variety of high-profile contributions, including a C-130 transport plane and F-16 fighter aircraft, as well as forces with specialities in which Norway had comparative advantage, such as mine-clearing and special forces with winter and high-altitude experience. Norway’s military contributions are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Although Norway was relatively late in submitting a specific offer in the autumn of 2001, forces were on the ground in Afghanistan quickly once the decision was taken.

While the Norwegian government was discussing military contributions to Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the first Norwegian Embassy on Afghan soil in December 2001. (Up to that point, the Norwegian ambassador in Islamabad had dual accreditation to include Afghanistan.)

Natural disasters and the long civil war had left over five million Afghans in need of emergency aid, and emergency stockpiles were at risk of depletion or of being looted. The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul was to assist in dealing with this humanitarian crisis. For many years the Norwegian authorities had been supporting Norwegian NGOs, such as Norwegian Church Aid and the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, which carried out projects in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Over the previous two decades, Norway had contributed approximately NOK 1 billion (USD 160 million) in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, most of which was channelled via the UN. On 12 October 2001 Norway tripled its annual humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan to roughly NOK 300 million (USD 48 million).13

Early in 2001 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had agreed to assume the chairmanship in 2002 of the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG), the international donor group for humanitarian efforts. The Embassy was also to assist the Norwegian authorities in performing this task. The ASG chairmanship laid a good foundation for Norway to become an important civilian actor in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

In its first reports about the opening of the Embassy in December 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised the need for a long-term political solution in a country with enormous humanitarian needs and unresolved internal conflicts.14 Chapters 6 and 7 discuss Norway’s participation in development aid activities.

Photo: Knut Falch/SCANPIX

3.3.2 The Bonn process: the basis for a new Afghan state

The foundations for a new Afghan state and democratic institutions were laid at a major international conference held in Bonn from 27 November to 5 December 2001 under the auspices of the UN. The conference was attended by representatives from the international community, as well as 25 Afghan delegates from four main political groups, and negotiations began even before the Taliban had been defeated. The Taliban themselves were not invited: after the terror attacks, the US was unwilling to allow their inclusion; nor did the UN make much effort to invite them, due to pressure from the US and assumptions within the UN itself that moderates in the Taliban could be reached at a later juncture.15 At the time there was also a question as to the extent to which the Taliban as a political movement would survive the military defeat. UN SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi and many others have looked back on this as a missed opportunity to achieve an early political solution.16

Norway did not participate directly in the negotiations that led to the Bonn Agreement. Oslo followed the process closely, and Norway’s Permanent Mission to the UN in New York had been reporting frequently on developments in preparation for the Bonn conference. The Norwegian authorities paid particularly close attention to the inclusion of traditionally important Norwegian policy areas, such as the rights of women and children.17 The signed agreement was viewed in Norway and most other countries as a diplomatic breakthrough. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs used the success in Bonn as a basis for asking international donors to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.18 From the Norwegian government’s perspective, state-building would be pivotal if efforts to combat terror were to succeed. The Bonn Agreement’s three pillars – institution-building, security and development – clearly expressed the close link between the objectives of state-building and combatting terror.19

First pillar: institution-building

UN SRSG Brahimi stressed from the outset that the UN and the international community should have a ‘light footprint’ in Afghanistan. This meant that the Afghans themselves should lead the reconstruction, with aid from the UN and the international community. Unlike other international state-building projects of the time, such as in East Timor and Kosovo, the UN did not itself head a temporary civilian administration in Afghanistan.

The Bonn Agreement established an interim Afghan administration headed by Hamid Karzai, who was from a prominent Pashtun family in Kandahar. The agreement also stated that an emergency Loya Jirga would be convened to elect a new head of state and transitional government. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held within two years after the establishment of the transitional government. The assembly called for in the Bonn Agreement convened in June 2002. The international community, and especially the US, exerted heavy influence on the emergency Loya Jirga.20 A number of such assemblies were held in the years that followed, intended to solidify the authorities’ legitimacy among the people.

Many Afghan and international decision-makers, including UN SRSG Brahimi, believed that a centrally governed state was the preferable option. There was concern that, without it, local warlords would grow even stronger and, in the worst case, bring about a new civil war. Instead, the warlords were to be incorporated into the central governance apparatus. Information about the serious crimes committed by certain warlords was withheld by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), among others.21

It has been pointed out in retrospect that the choice of a centrally governed Afghan state combined with the continued existence of informal power structures gave rise to a number of problems in the state-building process. Former warlords appointed to positions in the government or parliament worked simultaneously to further their own interests and strengthen their alliances in the provinces. This enabled some of the Afghan central government’s own members to oppose government policies through political manoeuvres that were beyond the control of the central authorities and international community. The president, too, increasingly manipulated complex national alliances in order to secure his own power base. All this undermined the broader processes of democratisation that the international community and Afghan reformers sought to implement.

Second pillar: security

The Bonn Agreement also had a security pillar. This was realised in the UN Security Council’s establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001. ISAF was placed under UK leadership. The UK had originally accepted command for three months and the plan was for ISAF leadership to rotate between countries willing to assume responsibility. ISAF’s mandate was to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, running in parallel with OEF. Since the Bonn Agreement’s political objective was for Afghans to take responsibility for rebuilding the state, it was important for ISAF to assist in building competent Afghan security forces. In practice this did not become ISAF’s most important task until 2010–2011; US forces had started training them earlier under OEF.

Third pillar: development

Over 60 countries and twenty international organisations endorsed the Bonn Agreement and the interim Afghan authorities. International donors pledged a total of USD 5.1 billion in development aid in Tokyo in January 2002.22 The Tokyo conference was the first in a series of annual donor conferences in which the international community and Afghan authorities drew up guidelines and plans for development aid for the state-building project. By that point in time, Afghan Minister of Finance Ashraf Ghani had already sought to increase the amount of development aid that was being channelled through the Afghan government in the hope of strengthening its legitimacy and thereby enhancing stability in the country. Norway, as chair of the Afghanistan Support Group, argued in favour of giving the Afghan government the opportunity to administer the funds to the greatest possible extent. However, due to weak Afghan administrative structures and the desire of international donors for political visibility, nearly 80 per cent of the international aid funding was channelled outside the Afghan national budget. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss Norwegian humanitarian efforts and development aid.

A fragmented international effort

Inadequate coordination between the donor countries and Afghan authorities, weak formal Afghan institutions and the need of donor countries to increase their political visibility led to the fragmentation of international development aid early on. An example of the lack of cohesion in state-building is seen in the approach to the security sector. Five countries assumed responsibility for different sectors of the security structure: the US took charge of building up the Afghan army, while Germany dealt with strengthening the police force; Italy took responsibility for the legal system, the UK for counter-narcotics enforcement, and Japan was in charge of demobilising and reintegrating the armed militia groups. Most of these countries had no particular qualifications for dealing with their allotted sectors and there was little effort to coordinate their activities. Afghan authorities were thus often left out of fundamental processes relating to the building of their own state.

3.4 Second phase: state-building with rising military and civilian ambitions

The second phase (2002–2006) was dominated by political optimism and an increasing level of ambition for state-building in both military and civilian circles. The Norwegian public debate was also positive. The most difficult part of the military action appeared to be over and what now remained was reconstruction. As early as 5 December 2001, before Kandahar had fallen, Minister of International Development Hilde Frafjord Johnson stated in the Storting that ‘the US and allies are in the process of winning the war in Afghanistan. Now we must do our best not to lose the peace.’23

During this phase NATO assumed responsibility for ISAF and the UN approved the expansion of ISAF to encompass all of Afghanistan. The instrument NATO chose for this expansion was the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). International and Norwegian development aid increased. However, the reality on the ground during this period often belied the optimistic outlook. In 2002 and 2003 both the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Service reported troubling security developments and serious Afghan internal conflicts. These concerns were also shared by diplomats from the US and other countries.24 After many years of civil war, local Afghans had little faith in local powerbrokers and, as it turned out, expectations as to what an international presence could accomplish were unrealistic.

3.4.1 NATO assumes ISAF command, ISAF expands and Norway leads a PRT

When the first Norwegian units began to operate in Afghanistan in January 2002, the US-led coalition had already achieved one of its objectives: the fall of the Taliban regime. The remaining objectives were to find Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, and to ensure that Afghanistan would never again harbour terrorists. Thus, Operation Enduring Freedom continued unabated into the spring and summer of 2002, particularly in southern and eastern Afghanistan. After the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, however, the US had neither the time nor resources to continue the operation across all of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, NATO was increasingly recognising that rotating the leadership of ISAF was impractical: Turkey needed support from NATO during its command period and it was difficult to get allies to take charge of an operation that was not NATO-led. The leading ISAF-contributing nations of Germany, the Netherlands and Canada thus requested increased NATO involvement in Afghanistan.25 This was to culminate in NATO taking responsibility for ISAF in August 2003.

In 2002 and 2003 ISAF was still a limited operation comprising roughly 5,000 soldiers, with a mission of stabilisation restricted to Kabul and its immediate environs. Norway’s military engagement in Afghanistan in 2002 and the first half of 2003 was concentrated in OEF. The Norwegian contributions to ISAF in the same period were small. The initial Norwegian prioritisation of OEF must be seen in the context of NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5: the government had strong national security interests to demonstrate solidarity with the US, its closest NATO ally.

Prior to the meeting on 16 April 2003 of the North Atlantic Council, during which the request for increased NATO involvement was to be discussed, Norway’s policy was to support a stronger role for NATO in ISAF. The Norwegian government had been through a difficult domestic political debate on Norway’s involvement in the Iraq War. In late autumn 2002 the US Embassy in Oslo had contacted the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request Norwegian military contributions to a war against Iraq. The discussion put relations in the coalition government under strain. The Conservatives believed Norway should contribute, arguing that rejecting such requests could have negative repercussions for relations with the US. The coalition partners, the Christian Democratic and the Liberal parties, and the opposition did not favour participation in an operation that lacked a UN mandate and was perceived as not being in accordance with international law.26

The Norwegian government saw NATO’s leadership of ISAF as an opportunity to demonstrate NATO’s relevance in the face of the unilateralism of the Bush administration and the difficulties in transatlantic relations that had arisen from the Iraq War in 2003. A NATO-led ISAF would enable Norway to contribute the ‘war on terror’.27 Norway therefore reinforced its military contributions in order to strengthen NATO and to try to prevent a ‘coalition of the willing’ from becoming the most attractive alternative for Washington.

For other European countries, too, contributing forces to a NATO-led, expanded ISAF operation represented an opportunity to maintain good bilateral relations with the US without deploying troops to the war in Iraq. Thus Afghanistan remained a common, relatively uncontroversial project.

According to the Ministry of Defence, NATO leadership of ISAF would make the efforts to promote security in Afghanistan more predictable.28 The Alliance took on much of the responsibility for promoting stability and peaceful development in Afghanistan. There would no longer be talk of time-limited involvement of certain allies, but of a long-term commitment by all NATO member countries. The Norwegian Delegation to NATO also stressed that a failed NATO operation in Afghanistan would be harmful both for Afghanistan and for the future of the Alliance. The member countries, therefore, had to give high political priority to ISAF and set aside necessary resources for the mission.29

Photo: Torbjørn Kjosvold/Norwegian Armed Forces

3.4.2 Expansion of ISAF through PRTs

NATO assumed leadership of ISAF on 11 August 2003. At the same time, President Karzai requested an expansion of ISAF’s mandate to apply outside the immediate Kabul area. UN SRSG Brahimi, who at the outset had sought a light international footprint, now also believed that ISAF should expand the geographical area of its operations. In many provinces former militia commandants either wrested power or were installed by US forces after the Taliban’s fall.30 Local conflicts made it difficult for humanitarian organisations to gain access to a civilian population in great need of help. A number of NGOs, several of which were Norwegian, sent letters to NATO ambassadors in 2003 and 2004 calling for NATO forces to be deployed out into the provinces of Afghanistan in order to provide security for their work.31

The solution was an expansion of ISAF through a number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which initially were to consist of smaller military units and civilian elements. The main purpose of the PRTs was to help strengthen the Afghan central government’s control in the provinces.

Expansion through the PRTs contributed to the fragmentation of the international effort. With an enlarged presence of international forces in the PRTs, the military increasingly set the terms for development aid and some military forces undertook aid activities directly. Each country approached the PRT concept in its own way, and many chose to invest large resources in ‘their’ respective provinces. As a consequence development efforts were not evenly distributed and often the most conflict-ridden provinces received more aid than the more peaceful areas. This created dissatisfaction and agitation among the populace, undermining the centralisation project supported by the international community. As the PRT structure grew, it minimised the UN footprint, overshadowing civilian efforts and contributing to a more military-oriented leadership of the international engagement. Chapter 8 discusses the PRT structure in more detail.

Norwegian assessments of participation in PRT

The Norwegian authorities sought to influence the shaping of the PRT concept in the North Atlantic Council. The model was only loosely defined, and NATO planned it as a flexible approach that could be adapted to the economic and resource-related requirements and aspirations of the different contributing countries.32 The Norwegian authorities were concerned that the PRT concept would entail the armed forces carrying out development aid activities.33 This was not something Norwegian authorities wanted; in their view, reconstruction and aid efforts required specialised competence that the armed forces did not possess.34 The PRTs could lead to an unwelcome mix of military and civilian roles.35 This in turn could threaten the security of humanitarian organisations and the humanitarian space (see Chapters 6 and 8). In the summer and autumn of 2003 the Norwegian authorities had been heavily criticised by humanitarian organisations for using development aid funding to finance a Norwegian contingent of military engineers to clear mines in Iraq. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the PRT was the most relevant contribution to ISAF in the short term, one reason being that the training of an Afghan army and police force would be dependent on support from the PRTs.36

In the autumn of 2003 the Norwegian government advocated a unitary model for the PRTs and for NATO to change the designation to Provincial Stabilisation Teams, which would more accurately represent a process in which the military would provide the stability and security necessary for independent development through civilian efforts.37 Norway’s proposal won the support of several allies, but the concept of the PRT was already well-entrenched in the Alliance. Although the US had first introduced the model within the OEF framework, Germany in particular actively sought agreement to base the expansion of ISAF on the PRT structure. The Norwegian authorities in the end supported this decision.

When the request came for contributions to the PRTs, participation was viewed as part of Norway’s obligations to the Alliance.38 Norway had supported the ISAF expansion, for which the PRTs were a vehicle. The Ministry of Defence asked Norwegian Joint Headquarters to assess logistics capacity and medical services and to carry out threat assessments for several areas where PRTs were located, including Meymaneh, Jalalabad and Ghazni.39 The armed forces gauged the provinces in the east and south as entailing the highest risk and, based on threat levels and logistics, they recommended participation in the north rather than south.40

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was positive about PRT participation, but emphasised the need for a clear separation between military and civilian tasks. An internal memorandum in the Ministry pointed out that, given the choice of contributing to the UK-led PRTs in either Mazar-i-Sharif or Meymaneh, the latter was preferable, since that province faced genuine security challenges.41 Thus the Norwegian forces would be occupied with military tasks within its area of responsibility and would avoid, in the absence of other tasks, getting involved in development activities.42 In the summer of 2003 the UK authorities reassured the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they did not consider reconstruction efforts to be a task of PRT military forces.43 This may have helped to convince the Ministry of the usefulness of the PRT concept and of supporting a UK-led PRT.

On 6 May 2004 the Norwegian government announced that Norway would be contributing up to 30 soldiers to the UK-led PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab province.44

Norway takes over the PRT in Faryab

In 2003 the US had already begun to call upon allies to assume leadership responsibility for a PRT. On several occasions in 2003, the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan Francis Vendrell and UN SRSG Brahimi also called for Norway to take responsibility for one of the PRTs. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence advised against this, as it would entail large costs in the form of personnel and materiel. Any future involvement in PRTs should, it said, be limited to participating in a unit that was under another country’s command.45

In September 2004 the UK contacted the Norwegian authorities to propose that Norway assume responsibility for the PRT in Meymaneh. The ISAF expansion was fully underway, new PRTs had been established and the UK authorities were preparing to transfer soldiers and materiel to the south. Norway’s military leadership remained critical of taking on such a responsibility, as it was not something Norway had ever attempted before and this, together with the cost, would make it very difficult to provide adequate forces for a PRT. Although the security situation in the north in 2004 was considered to be better than that in Kabul, Norwegian Joint Headquarters stressed that this could change if the establishment of a PRT began to challenge ‘conditions regarding smuggling, narcotics production and the power structures of local warlords’.46 Having individual responsibility for a province would make it difficult for Norway to withdraw from the mission, should this become necessary.47 Joint Headquarters instead recommended continuing the efforts in Kabul, as discussed in Chapter 4.48

Despite the military’s clearly expressed view, the government decided that Norway would take command of the PRT in Meymaneh. Norway’s initial force was a smaller military outfit than Joint Headquarters had recommended. The view of the Ministry of Defence was that Norway would have to ‘contribute constructively to the expansion of ISAF by participating in a PRT and to other capacities needed for NATO to succeed’.49 By taking leadership of a PRT, Norway could demonstrate its clear support for NATO.50 The desire to maintain good bilateral relations with the UK also played a part in the decision.51

The requests to take over a PRT coincided with Norway’s developing plans to pull out of OEF and concentrate its efforts on ISAF.52 It would have been possible at the end of 2003, once the Norwegian special forces had been withdrawn (see Chapter 5), to interpret Norway’s efforts as diminishing. Contributing forces to a PRT was a means of remedying this.

3.4.3 Change of government

The 2005 parliamentary election in Norway led to a change of government, with a new coalition headed by Jens Stoltenberg that consisted of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Centre Party. With the Socialist Left now in government rather than in opposition, some of the more heated public criticism of Norwegian military involvement in Afghanistan subsided. This was one reason as to why no serious objections were raised regarding governmental support for participation in ISAF and for NATO, even though opinion polls showed that the public was divided on whether Norway should remain engaged militarily in Afghanistan (see Chapter 11).

Norway’s military participation in Afghanistan was a source of internal discord within the Socialist Left and of tensions within the second Stoltenberg government. When in opposition the Socialist Left had criticised OEF and what the party termed a US ‘war of aggression’ in Afghanistan. It had, however, supported ISAF’s stabilisation mandate. As part of the government coalition, the party therefore demanded that all Norwegian military activity be under ISAF. The phasing out of OEF contributions was formally set out in the new government’s policy platform, known as the Soria Moria declaration. The controversial aspects of how the US conducted international counter-terror were among the reasons why the second Stoltenberg government decided to terminate Norway’s involvement in OEF.53

This was not a difficult decision for the government to reach. In practice the Norwegian authorities had increasingly focused more activity towards ISAF before the change of government in 2005. Despite reports from the Norwegian Embassy in Washington prior to the change of government that the US administration would express disappointment if Norway were to pull out of OEF in Afghanistan and Iraq, in actuality these decisions had little impact on bilateral relations.54

3.5 Third phase: insurgency escalates, a comprehensive approach and Norway’s ‘revised approach’

In the third phase (2006–2011) it became clear that the Taliban had once again built up significant military capacity with support from parts of Pakistan’s security force. ISAF’s expansion into southern and eastern Afghanistan was met with unexpectedly fierce opposition. Back in 2002–2004, US counter-terror operations in cooperation with local Afghan partners had already triggered resistance, which intensified in the years that followed.55 A lack of coordination between civilian actors, combined with ever-larger sums of development aid, was creating serious problems of corruption and parallel bureaucratic power structures. The situation deteriorated as time went on. The UN remained marginalised and its activities were, in practice, constrained by the military agenda. Presidential and parliamentary elections were tainted by electoral fraud and deepened the growing pessimism among the Afghan population and international community alike. NATO began promoting a ‘comprehensive approach’ to involve more civilian resources and to limit expectations for the outcomes of purely military operations. Norway also intensified its civilian effort. The years from 2009 to 2011 were characterised by a surge in both military and civilian activity, inspired by US experiences in Iraq.

The expansion of ISAF’s area of operations and the increased numbers of international and Afghan soldiers raised the level of conflict, first in the south and east and later in the north as well. The Taliban developed a parallel shadow structure of governors in the provinces. NATO called the escalating resistance to allied forces an ‘insurgency’. Many Pashtuns in the south believed they were fighting an occupation by foreign forces. Furthermore, local conflicts were easily linked to the increasingly complex national conflict and given an ideological spin.56

The insurgency had support from neighbouring Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities wanted a regime in Kabul that they could influence, even if that regime also caused trouble on the Pakistani side of the border. Despite its complicated relationship with the Taliban, Pakistan therefore sought to keep the movement as a political actor. The Taliban used Pakistan as its main hub for strategic planning and training. More and more diplomats, journalists and decision-makers began to believe that the key to resolving the insurgency in Afghanistan lay in Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities and military still viewed Afghanistan as a strategic area where Pakistani forces could retreat in case of a war against India, and they disliked the increasing Indian presence in Afghanistan. The length of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border also made it easy for insurgents to cross without being apprehended.

As violence escalated and ISAF sustained ever more casualties, the US and NATO could no longer ignore Pakistan. In 2007 NATO discussed regional issues, with an emphasis on how to improve cooperation with Pakistan.57 Pakistan was a nuclear power where elected officials did not necessarily have control of the insurgents or parts of the government administration. Thus it was difficult for the US and its allies to gauge how far Pakistan could be pressured before risking further destabilisation in the country. In the North Atlantic Council, Norway supported regional cooperation, which also included Iran.58

3.5.1 Comprehensive approach

In the spring and summer of 2006, ISAF carried out its first lengthy offensive operation, Operation Mountain Thrust.59 The operation’s objective was to drive out the insurgents and prepare the ground for ISAF to stabilise the area.60 The operation lasted several months, encompassing a number of southern and eastern provinces. Several hundred insurgents were killed, but the effect was short-lived. The Taliban demonstrated a strong ability to withstand losses and to recruit new forces, including from among local inhabitants.

It was becoming more and more clear that economic and social development, along with a well-functioning government administration, were preconditions for success in defeating the Taliban. This was not a new insight. The importance of coordination between the civilian and military efforts for a successful outcome in Afghanistan was set out in the Bonn Agreement. Up to this point, however, it had been difficult to achieve, and international activities were, at times, internally conflicting. The UN Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme and the work on transitional justice, for instance, were in part undermined by the US arming of militias and warlords in order to fight the Taliban.

A ‘comprehensive approach’ was one of the main topics at the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006. The previous April, Norway had supported a Danish proposal for better coordination of civilian and military measures.61 The proposal argued that the planning and execution of NATO military operations needed to include close consultation and coordination with other international actors, including the UN, the EU and NGOs. Norway’s position was distinct from that of Denmark in that it placed priority on protecting humanitarian space and emphasised coordination not by NATO, but between NATO and various civilian organisations such as the UN and the EU. It was a stated Norwegian wish that NATO should not develop a strong, separate civilian dimension.62

The US eventually sided with this position. The declaration from the 2006 Riga summit stated that a ‘comprehensive approach’ was necessary, but did not specify how the Alliance should achieve this. The debate within NATO over a comprehensive approach revolved largely around relations between itself and the EU and UN respectively. The US, France and especially Turkey had different ideas about how close the cooperation with the EU should be. At the 2008 summit in Bucharest, NATO approved a framework for a comprehensive approach that was the product of internal compromises and that entailed far less commitment than the view promoted by Norway in 2006. The comprehensive approach, as it stood in 2008, mainly addressed the internal organisation of NATO rather than its relations to other external actors such as the UN and the EU.

Parallel to NATO’s internal attempts to coordinate civilian and military tasks, the international community in Afghanistan sought to introduce the position of a high-level coordinator for the overall effort. President Karzai was against this, fearing that such a position would undermine Afghan ownership of the state-building process and the president’s legitimacy among his people. The alternative was to strengthen UNAMA’s coordinating role. UN Security Resolution 1806 of March 2008 set the stage for further expansion of UNAMA’s responsibility for coordinating civilian efforts and for greater cooperation with ISAF. UNAMA was charged with assisting Afghan authorities in coordinating the activities of international donors in accordance with national development plans, such as the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and through coordination mechanisms such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). See Chapter 6 for further discussion.

The Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide headed UNAMA in this restructuring phase. His task proved to be a very difficult one. Internal bureaucracy and political wrangling in the UN tied up scarce personnel resources at the UNAMA office in Kabul.63 In addition, the number of actors to be coordinated was vast. The JCMB functioned poorly as a coordination mechanism. The donors primarily attended to their national priorities and desire for political visibility rather than demands for joint coordination under UN and Afghan authorities. The US was particularly sceptical of the UN’s role. Even Afghan authorities considered ISAF, not UNAMA, to be the most important international decision-maker.64 UNAMA stood in the crossfire between President Karzai and ISAF on issues regarding the exercise and control of military planning. It was difficult for UNAMA to strike a balance and, in practice, it became marginalised in the face of ISAF and US dominance. At the time, the Afghan government, UNAMA and ISAF had agreed to coordinate efforts in selected districts, but the problems in cooperation between these organisations undermined this ambition.

3.5.2 ‘Revised approach’ (‘taktskiftet’)

Norway used the growing international attention on civilian efforts to showcase and promote the Norwegian civilian engagement. It became especially important to focus on the civilian effort at a time when the military campaign was failing. This was also the case within the coalition government, where the Socialist Left was dealing with agitation within its ranks over the war in Afghanistan. In his address to the Storting on 24 October 2006, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre argued that a taktskifte (‘change of pace’) was called for in the international and the Norwegian effort.65 A comprehensive strategy was needed that placed security, development and institution-building in the same overall context, together with the objective of promoting Afghan ownership. The Norwegian authorities attached particular importance to the UN’s coordinating role and contributed financial support to the establishment of new humanitarian positions at the UNAMA office in Kabul.66 In addition to maintaining Norway’s military contribution, the civilian contribution was to be increased.67 The government’s signals regarding a revised approach were well-received by the political opposition in Norway.

As part of this revised approach to the civilian effort, the Norwegian authorities continued to increase development aid to Afghanistan. Eventually it became a stated government objective that financial expenditure for Norway’s civilian support should equal that for military operations in Afghanistan.68 In December 2007 the coalition government decided to increase its total development aid to Afghanistan to NOK 750 million (USD 119 million) annually, starting in 2008 and originally intended to apply for a period of five years. In contrast to the military effort, where disagreement reigned from the start, the government was easily able to agree on an increase in civilian funding. The decision was politically motivated and was not founded on assessments of the recipients’ ability to make proper use of the aid or of the Norwegian authorities’ capacity to administer it. Chapter 6 discusses the decision-making process and impacts of this increase in development aid.

A need also arose for better coordination between the different elements of Norway’s military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan. This became particularly important after Norway took command of the PRT in Faryab in 2005.69 In early 2006 the coalition government established the State Secretary Committee for Afghanistan, also known as the Afghanistan Forum, whose objective was to coordinate Norway’s Afghanistan policy. Members of the committee were the state secretaries of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (from both the foreign affairs and international development sides), Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Justice.70

A key component of the attempt to achieve a comprehensive approach in Norway was maintaining the principle of separation between military and civilian activities. The State Secretary Committee for Afghanistan, also called the Afghanistan Forum, held regular meetings and took several trips to Afghanistan up until January 2013, but it functioned mainly as a forum for information-sharing and less as an arena for discussing how to strengthen coordination between the different areas.71

3.5.3 Controversy over contributing in the south

The expansion of its mission in 2006 to include southern and eastern Afghanistan meant that ISAF, too, became part of the war effort. This affected Socialist Left support for Norwegian participation in ISAF. The apparent political agreement on concentrating military effort in the north gave way in 2006 to a debate as to whether Norway should participate in the south. Like most other NATO member countries, Norway was repeatedly encouraged, as well as more directly requested, to deploy forces to the south, where allies such as the UK, the US, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada were sustaining heavy losses.

In the summer of 2006 the Ministry of Defence received several requests from NATO to transfer the Norwegian quick reaction force (QRF) from the north to the south. Based on consultation with the military, the Ministry recommended against complying, on the grounds that Norway needed this force in the north.72 The Norwegian QRF provided daily support to the PRTs in northern Afghanistan, and the Ministry believed that the unit’s absence would weaken the PRTs’ capability to assist in stabilising the provinces. In addition, the QRF provided important support for Afghan security forces. The military and the Ministry further stressed that Norway had few forces and that it was important to concentrate them in a single area.

From the outset, Norway had declared that – unlike many ISAF countries – it had no national caveats restricting the use of Norway’s military contributions throughout Afghanistan.73 NATO headquarters, however, perceived Norway’s most recent position as precisely that: a caveat on certain ways of using the Norwegian forces formally assigned to the ISAF Commander (COMISAF). ISAF was facing a combination of geographical expansion, a shortage of forces and a worsening security situation, and COMISAF therefore needed complete flexibility to relocate forces wherever needed. Norway’s caveat was viewed as a complicating factor in planning Alliance operations, so NATO asked Norway to withdraw it.74

The perception within NATO that Norway was saying one thing and doing another was politically detrimental to the Norwegian government. In the view of the Ministry of Defence, repeated refusals to accommodate requests for military contributions in the south could erode NATO faith in the Norwegian authorities. Reports from the Norwegian Delegation to NATO also reflect frustration among Norwegian diplomats at not having clear answers for allies who found Norway’s position confusing.75 The Ministry of Defence thus recommended that Norway attach a formal caveat to the QRF. This would provide clarity for the Alliance and COMISAF would also know what he was dealing with.76 Since NATO would see a formal caveat in a negative light, the Ministry recommended offering other kinds of forces to compensate for rejecting the relocation of the Norwegian QRF.77 The deployment of special forces or F-16 to southern Afghanistan was suggested.78

In September 2006 the UK asked for Norwegian contributions to Helmand province in the south, where their forces were engaged in fierce combat. This request was the prelude to the most serious internal conflict in the coalition government regarding military contributions to the south.79 The Chief of Defence felt that the Norwegian special forces would be a relevant contribution – they had the capacity NATO was requesting and were available – and so advocated their deployment.80 The Labour and Centre parties viewed contributions to the south as a reasonable obligation to the Alliance and most of the opposition parties shared the same position.

Among the Socialist Left, however, there was great unwillingness to deploy forces to join what they considered to be a war of aggression in the south. At the time, the party had just endured a defeat to its environmental agenda for a full-scale CO₂ capture and storage facility at the Mongstad natural gas-fired power plant. Many believed the Socialist Left should have left the government in protest over this decision. Therefore, the UK request to deploy soldiers to the south, which attracted widespread attention in the media and within the Socialist Left, became a pivotal issue for them.81 It would cause substantial strain to remain in the government if it was forced to accept yet another defeat. On 18 October 2006 the government announced that Norway would not be accommodating NATO’s request to deploy forces to the south. Norwegian media portrayed this as a great victory for the Socialist Left.82 The Labour Party emphasised that the decision was not taken on the basis of principle, but rather on an overall assessment of the Norwegian effort. Later that same year, a government document stressed that Norway in principle still attached no caveats to military contributions to ISAF.83

The government’s discussion on deploying forces to the south did not end there, however. In the spring of 2007 the Norwegian authorities received several requests for military contributions to the south, including one to relieve Dutch forces in Uruzgan province, where the Netherlands led a PRT. The Ministry of Defence advised against this, citing operational considerations such as incompatibility between the Norwegian guidelines for civil–military separation of activities and the Dutch PRT approach.84 Later that year, further requests were made for military contributions to Uruzgan.85 Now the Ministry strongly recommended accommodating the request. Within the government, the Socialist Left vehemently, and successfully, opposed this. Although no formal decision was taken to introduce caveats based on principle, in the autumn of 2007 the internal debate on military contributions to the south ceased. The decision to continue with the special forces contribution in Kabul that same year – which the Socialist Left also wanted to terminate – may have eased the pressure from NATO requests for contributions to the south.

The government’s decision to decline the allied requests for contributions to the south fuelled criticism from the political opposition. Many believed that Norway was damaging bilateral relations with its most important allies, especially the US and UK. However, the Commission has found no evidence that the decision had any significant ramifications for bilateral ties, but the Norwegian refusal did entail some short-lived friction at the political level in relations with the UK and the US.86 The Norwegian view was that US authorities quickly put the issue behind them, while the displeasure of the UK authorities appeared to be somewhat more long-lived. The Commission’s UK sources have refuted this, however.87 In both the military and civil service in the UK it was understood that domestic politics set limitations that were difficult to change. Norway compensated by providing special forces in Kabul, in addition to carrying out an important effort in the north. This softened the impression that Norway was being especially risk-averse or cautious.

In the overall NATO context, Norway’s self-imposed caveats did not have long-term repercussions either. Nevertheless, NATO countries active in southern Afghanistan – primarily the US, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark – formed an ‘inner circle’ regarding decisions on Afghanistan. Some of the academic literature has made a point of this.88 Terminology such as ‘a multi-tier NATO’ and a distinction between the countries that were ‘willing and able’ and those that were not have been employed. According to these interpretations, the lack of Norwegian forces in the south relegated Norway to a marginal position in the Alliance. The significance of this distinction is exaggerated, however. The group of countries that were active in the south was important, but it also reflected a specific need for coordination between those countries. Similar groups for the other regional commands quickly arose as well. Norway was an active advocate of establishing a group comprised of the countries contributing forces in northern Afghanistan (RC North group), with Germany at the hub. This group never attained the same standing as the southern group. The significance of the RC South group applied specifically to Afghanistan and did not signal the emergence of any new inner core within NATO in general.

3.5.4 New US strategies: civilian losses, COIN and regional dimensions

The increase in the number of battles from 2006 was accompanied by reports of rising civilian casualties. NATO members were concerned that this would undermine support for ISAF among the Afghan people and in the countries contributing to ISAF.89 Steadily closer cooperation between OEF and ISAF also led to media portrayal of the two operations as one and the same, despite their having distinct mandates and missions. Many ISAF member countries did not wish to be associated with the US counter-terror operation OEF.90

In June 2007 COMISAF General Dan McNeill issued the first tactical directive aimed at reducing the civilian toll.91 But it was the US airstrike in Azizabad, Shindand, in August 2008 that truly put civilian losses on the international agenda.92 The incident attracted a great deal of attention, and UNAMA, headed by Kai Eide, harshly criticised the international military engagement.93 The incident raised awareness in ISAF of the repercussions that civilian casualties had on the operation in the form of increased resistance from the population it had promised to protect.

At the same time, Eide’s criticism led to a collapse of UNAMA’s balancing act between President Karzai and ISAF. A new initiative was needed, and it came with the inauguration of President Barack Obama in 2009 and a US administration that had not been involved in the strategic choices taken after the September 2001 attacks on the US. This was also an administration that had to answer to a war-weary US public. The new US administration quickly drew up a fresh Afghanistan strategy, presented first in the US, then at the NATO summit in April 2009 and finally at a conference in The Hague in the same month. The strategy focused on winning the Afghan people’s trust, promoting state-building, fighting corruption and sealing the border to insurgents. Within this framework, General Stanley McChrystal, who was to assume command of ISAF from June 2009, introduced a new counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy.

McChrystal’s approach was not a new one, but it was launched at a time when ISAF needed to burnish its reputation and demonstrate success on the war front. The strategy, approved by NATO in October 2009, was based on core principles of modern western thought on COIN. Its main premise was that insurgency is best combatted by convincing the broad majority of the population that their interests, in the long run, are best served if the authorities win. In theory, when the insurgents lose the popular support (which they need for concealment and supplies), they will eventually lose the war.

McChrystal’s assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and the new COIN strategy highlighted two flaws in particular that the operation had to overcome in order to succeed: the strength of the insurgents and the lack of public faith in the central Afghan government. ISAF was to redouble its efforts to address both. Rather than letting civilian actors support military operations, the strategy revolved around integrating and coordinating the military operation with other actors in a way that took these weaknesses into account.94

The COIN doctrine, however, is based on a critical presumption that was inadequately met in Afghanistan: a counter-insurgency operation will never be better than the regime it supports. If the Afghan authorities were perceived by the people as a larger problem than the Taliban, the western military forces could do little to convince them of the opposite. In retrospect, there are many, particularly in the military in Norway, who have claimed that the inability of civilian actors to establish good governance in Afghanistan undermined the military side of COIN and caused the overall counter-insurgency effort to fail.95 In other words, the main problem lay with civilian actors who proved themselves incapable of carrying out their part of COIN. Others say that the relatively short-term, externally driven state-building upon which COIN was predicated was impossible to implement and thus the doctrine as a whole was unachievable in practice.96 Studies have concluded that short-term development aid efforts carried out by or in close collaboration with military forces have not had the anticipated stabilising or trust-building effect.97 Instead, such aid often fans the flames of local conflicts, rekindles old conflicts or ignites new ones. The belief that international actors with little knowledge of local power alliances or local political economy could win the people’s trust on behalf of a central government that had next to no legitimacy among its people was misguided from the outset.98 The studies recommended, among other things, better coordinated and less comprehensive stabilisation activities in areas that require deep insight into local political and legal realities.

In addition, the insurgents had external support, particularly from Pakistan. This further weakened the foundation for successful counter-insurgency efforts based on the criteria described above. But the COIN strategy did help to achieve some positive results: greater focus on the population’s views made military commanders more aware of the significance of civilian casualties. ISAF tactical directives placed restrictions on the use of air power and searches in private residences, which helped to reduce the number of civilians killed by international and Afghan forces.99 This shift in military activity was part of McChrystal’s broader initial assessment and the desire for an integrated campaign in which military operations would be framed in a larger diplomatic context.

The close link between civilian and military instruments clashed with Norway’s policy. The ‘Norwegian approach’ stipulated a clear separation between civilian and military activities, something that was to be compensated for through close coordination of both activities, without one setting the terms for the other. This became an important political guideline in Faryab.

COIN was formally introduced and approved at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Slovakia on 23 October 2009.100 Evidence suggests that Norway and other allies were unapprised of the fact that COIN would be on the agenda.101 COIN was introduced as an initiative by the US and it had already been implemented by the new COMISAF. Although the Norwegian authorities approved COIN on a strategic level at the meeting, in practice they declined to carry out COIN activities on the ground. This meant that Norway was not following the ISAF counter-insurgency strategy in Faryab, and thus the Norwegian PRT leadership was squeezed between the ISAF chain of command and Norwegian political guidelines. Chapter 8 discusses this in more detail.

Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Parallel to the introduction of COIN, McChrystal requested an increase in the military effort. This could be seen as paradoxical, given the importance ISAF was now attaching to civilian efforts in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. President Obama was willing to increase troop numbers significantly and to employ more drones and special forces. He balanced this by setting a specific date for drawdown and withdrawal. Obama’s new strategy stressed the objectives of the Bonn Agreement to promote the responsibility of Afghans for their own development. Instead of relying on a long-term presence based on a comprehensive civil–military strategy, Obama chose a shorter transitional phase, when responsibility for security would be transferred to the Afghans. This decision was one of the factors that led ISAF to intensify its war effort in the time that was left. The downscaling of ambitions for state-building began in 2009. In November 2010 these were formalised at the NATO summit in Lisbon with the decision to terminate ISAF by the end of 2014.

Obama’s strategy was in lieu of the politically impossible alternative: a strong US presence for an open-ended period. The truncated amount of time undermined McChrystal’s approach, as well as the faith of Afghans in the international community’s long-term commitment to their country. Obama’s announcement of the exit strategy was viewed by many as a strategic blunder that gave the enemy the upper hand. The Afghan people had little confidence that the government in Kabul could stop the Taliban on its own.

3.5.5 Pakistan and regional dimensions

Alongside the new counter-insurgency strategy, newly appointed US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke presented an approach in the spring of 2009 that emphasised the interconnections between developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US ‘Af-Pak’ strategy emphasised that both Pakistan and other countries in the region had influence in Afghanistan, but it laid out few specifics as to how the downward-spiralling security situation should be handled.102 Both Pakistan and Afghanistan were highly sceptical of the new US scheme.103 It became difficult for the US to adhere to its stated intention of Afghan ownership while at the same time seeking a tighter grip on the region’s political development. After harsh criticism from its own ranks (including the US Congress), Pakistani authorities and others, the Obama administration stopped using the term ‘Af-Pak’.104 The shift in US policy, however, did focus greater international attention on the significance of the regional dimension, not least the existence of Taliban bases in Pakistan.

Like many other countries, Norway appointed a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan who could participate in the group headed by Richard Holbrooke.105 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had emphasised from the start of the international engagement that Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan, were crucial to peaceful development.106

In 2008 the Ministry established a Section for Afghanistan and Pakistan to coordinate policy vis-à-vis the two countries and to strengthen regional expertise.107 From 2009 it began a more systematic review of the need for a strategic approach to the regional dimension and the possibility of a Norwegian role in a broader regional political process. It sought to obtain an overview of regional cooperation projects, commissioned research reports on the regional dimension and organised several seminars in the region for employees posted to the embassies and in the Ministry in Oslo.108

The suggestions for Norwegian regional engagement included serving in an advisory capacity on regional dimensions in Afghan energy policy, promoting cooperation between the region’s civil society actors (e.g. journalists and human rights activists), facilitating religious dialogue and promoting the importance of the regional dimension, such as in the discussion about UNAMA’s mandate.109 Norway’s engagement in a regional context is discussed in Chapter 9.

3.5.6 Elections and increased doubt about the democratic project

Relations between President Karzai and western leaders, particularly President Obama, gradually deteriorated. This was due in part to Karzai’s pressured situation on his home turf, with deepening domestic criticism of his leadership style and his dependence on western support. The growing civilian casualties meant additional strain. More and more Afghans came to view the international presence as a form of occupation. Doubts as to whether a successful state-building project was even possible spread among the countries engaged in military and civilian activities in Afghanistan.

Every election in Afghanistan has involved major security challenges, practical problems and accusations of rigging and fraudulent electoral institutions. Some have asked why so many resources were invested in elections before institutions that could foster democratic development were in place. Elections were a key component of the Bonn Agreement. They took place quickly and the very fact that they were held at all added to the impression that development was proceeding in the right direction. Many western governments viewed it as politically untenable not to hold them in such an ambitious state-building project. Elections were considered the litmus test for success and donors were therefore generous in their financial support. In fact, a great deal of international capital and energy was tied up in the elections.

In a setting with unclear electoral rules and a resistance by Karzai to election reform, electoral institutions that were supported by international donors were exploited by political actors to manipulate election results in their own favour. The UN and other international actors were caught up in these complex power struggles and the UN was forced into negotiating between various candidates. Thus, electoral processes driven by a western, short-term agenda exacerbated ethnic lines of conflict and eventually increased distrust in both the international community and in elections per se. The Norwegian authorities, like many other international authorities, were largely spectators to the abuse of the electoral rules by Afghan actors. The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul reported on these conditions and participated in many donor meetings and coordination meetings to find ways to seek solutions. In the end, however, only the US could impose any requirements.110

3.6 Fourth phase: Afghan ownership, exit strategy and attempts at reconciliation

In the fourth phase (2010–2014) the international community tempered its ambitions. Serious fatigue was affecting many allied forces. The populations of ISAF-contributing countries were weary of war and the 2008 financial crisis in Europe had led to major cutbacks in European national budgets. These factors, along with President Obama’s decision to gradually withdraw troops up to the termination of ISAF in 2014, led to accelerated efforts to build up Afghan security forces. These personnel were to take responsibility for safeguarding security in their country, thereby facilitating further state-building.

The donor-country meetings in London and Kabul in the summer of 2010, together with the NATO summit in Lisbon in November of the same year, marked the start of the transition process. This process was intended to transfer responsibility for Afghan security and development to Afghan authorities. The NATO members and ISAF countries decided to terminate ISAF at the end of 2014. The US stressed the importance of a ‘strategic partnership’ established through more formalised cooperation with Afghan authorities.111 Even though the declaration from the NATO summit in Lisbon stated that ISAF’s drawdown should be based on certain criteria and not the pressure of time, the primary factor driving the process was the ISAF termination date set by the US.

Building up the competence and abilities of Afghan authorities, both militarily and on the civilian side, was the main focus at meetings held by the NATO defence minister and at the major donor conferences. This was nothing new: the Bonn Agreement of 2001 stressed the importance of Afghan ownership with regard to security; NATO’s role in training the Afghan security forces had been highlighted as an Alliance priority at the Riga summit in 2006; and at the summit in Bucharest two years later, the Alliance had once again agreed that training Afghan forces was a key priority. Nonetheless, large-scale training processes were not started in earnest until President Obama had set a withdrawal date and the US itself took the main responsibility for it. Among other activities, NATO launched its own training effort, Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), which took over most of the US training programme, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Time constraints did not allow for adequate transfer of knowledge and training, including on the civilian side. The general level of education in Afghanistan is low. Many of the recruits were illiterate, making training even more difficult. Success soon came to be measured in the number of soldiers, and the training for the common soldier lasted only a few weeks (see Chapter 8).

3.6.1 Norwegian exit

In his 2010 address to the Storting on Afghanistan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Støre emphasised the need for realistic expectations and a long-term civilian presence. Norwegian objectives for Afghanistan’s development were tempered. Minister Støre said that since the Norwegian authorities had been regularly pointing out the many challenges to be faced in Afghanistan throughout the engagement period, the changes entailed in Obama’s exit strategy presented no big surprises. Norwegian policy continued much as before, with some adjustments. The major changes were primarily on the military side, involving the gradual withdrawal of Norwegian soldiers.

The Norwegian military drawdown in this period was carried out in two rounds. The first, in 2010–2011, saw a reduction in Norwegian participation in combat operations. This was in keeping with ISAF plans and was the result of a new distribution of tasks to Latvian forces in the PRT. It also reflected Norway’s desire to take fewer risks. In 2010 five Norwegian soldiers lost their lives in Faryab. This was half the total number of Norwegian fatalities for the entire engagement in Afghanistan. Norwegian presence in the unstable Ghormach district was also withdrawn. During this time, the Norwegian military emphasised mentoring and training of the Afghan security forces.112

The second round of military withdrawal, which took place in 2012–2014, was mainly a geographical drawdown, first from Faryab and then from Mazar-i-Sharif. Norway’s military presence was limited to Kabul from the summer of 2014. As was the case in many other PRTs, the Norwegian withdrawal from Faryab was carried out more in response to time pressure than to the suitability of the conditions themselves. Nor did Norway have any desire to remain alone in ‘its’ province if the surrounding PRTs were shut down.

The Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab, was disbanded on 1 October 2012. Norway’s principal remaining contribution in 2014 was the special forces in Kabul. The police advisory team in Mazar-i-Sharif was disbanded in mid-2014, at which time the Norwegian Camp Nidaros was closed down. A small national command and support element was transferred from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul in the first half of 2014 and Norwegian forces continued to train Afghan security forces in Kabul throughout 2015. In addition, Norway contributed various small-scale support functions. When the ISAF operation was terminated at the end of 2014, it was succeed by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). Norway provided roughly 75 personnel to RSM, with activities concentrated in the Kabul area.

It was important for the Norwegian authorities to stress that even though the military effort was being curtailed, the civilian effort was to be maintained at the same level. Norway committed to providing long-term development aid in the strategic partnership agreement it signed with Afghanistan in 2013. The agreement included a Norwegian pledge to maintain its allocation of NOK 750 million (USD 119 million) in aid annually until 2017, while Afghan authorities took on a greater responsibility for the administrative follow-up of Norwegian development assistance in Afghanistan. Chapters 6 and 7 describe this in more detail. It was important to signal the political will to assist Afghanistan in order to prevent further political instability in the country. There were concerns, however, regarding how civilian support could continue if Afghan security forces were not capable of providing protection. Although Norway’s development aid allocation remained at NOK 750 million (USD 119 million) after 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began planning for reduction of its embassy staff as early as 2011.

The withdrawal of international troops was the backdrop for the downsizing also of most of the international embassies, including Norway’s. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reduced the size and competence of the staff on the ground, as discussed in Chapter 6. This made it even more difficult to follow up Norwegian-funded projects and programmes and to influence the development aid agenda at the local level. It also meant reduced Norwegian engagement in Kabul. Afghanistan was no longer being given political priority in Norway or in other western countries, and other security policy challenges, particularly in the Middle East, took precedence on the political agenda.

Photo: Stian Lysberg Solum/Norwegian Armed Forces

The transition period gave Norwegian authorities an opportunity to refine mechanisms and processes for a political dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Norway had been working since 2007 to facilitate a potential peace process. This is described in more detail in Chapter 9. After the January 2010 London conference and ahead of the Kabul conference in June of the same year, Minister of Foreign Affairs Støre called upon the British, French, Dutch, German, Danish, Icelandic, Swedish, Turkish and Finnish foreign ministers to establish a dialogue with Afghan authorities and regional actors towards peace.113 He asked the UN to lead this effort while the Norwegian authorities worked behind the scenes. The Afghan High Peace Council, consisting of leading warlords, tribal leaders and others who had agreed to negotiate with insurgents, was associated with many, albeit mostly failed, attempts to bring the parties to the table. At this point, peace talks were also a subject that Norwegian diplomats brought up frequently with the US administration. In 2010 the signals from the US were mixed, but in the wake of a counter-insurgency strategy that did not work and a war-weary public at home, US authorities became increasingly interested in finding a negotiated end to the conflict.114

The rest of Norway’s civilian effort in the period was largely focused on consolidating an aid portfolio that was spread across very many areas. In addition, Norwegian diplomats were working to concentrate activities in order to strengthen the control of Afghan authorities over aid funds. In the lead-up to the Tokyo (II, see chapter 6) donor conference in 2012, Norwegian diplomats sought a greater role for Afghan authorities in designing a joint plan for future development aid than had been the case at previous conferences of this nature. The agreement reached in Tokyo stressed mutual obligations between the Afghan authorities and international donors more widely than before. The Afghan authorities committed to implementing reforms in free elections, public financial management, the banking sector, women’s and human rights, and development. In return international donors were to ensure better aid effectiveness and donor coordination by channelling 50 per cent of aid funding through the Afghan national budget and 80 per cent of their aid in accordance with Afghan national priorities.115

3.7 Afghanistan at the end of 2014

2014 marked the conclusion of the transition process. ISAF was terminated at the end of the year and responsibility formally transferred to Afghan security forces. The new NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was to train, advise and assist Afghan forces, but not participate in combat. Afghan forces themselves were now responsible for security.

From a peak of 130,000 ISAF troops in 2011, roughly 12,000 RSM soldiers remained. International strategic and operational support for Afghan security forces was also substantially reduced from January 2015 onwards. However, the security forces at the end of 2014 were marked by weak leadership, corruption, inadequate funding and divisions based on ethnicity or interest group solidarity. The security sector was still politicised, with unclear distinctions between militias and official Afghan security forces.116 Corruption cheated many soldiers out of their pay and added to problems of desertion and defection to insurgency forces. Coupled with the high casualty rate, this weakened the will to fight and raised questions about future recruitment.117 Yet Afghan security forces have made significant progress at the tactical level, despite being poorly equipped. Certain units, such as the Crisis Response Unit 222 (CRU 222) discussed in Chapter 5, function well, although their leadership structure and logistics are fragile.

In 2014 the insurgency was stronger than at any time since 2001. The Taliban carried out large-scale ground offensives and increased their territorial control. At the same time, however, the insurgency was becoming steadily more fragmented, with different local and international groups participating. The UN counted over 10,000 killed or wounded civilians in 2015, the highest tally since the UN began keeping statistics in 2008.118 In 2015 over 150,000 Afghans fled the country due to high levels of conflict or threats, and over 800,000 Afghans were listed as internally displaced.119 According to a survey carried out by the Asian Foundation, two out of three Afghans said they feared for their own safety.120

In 2014 Afghanistan held its third presidential election since 2001. Afghans were entirely responsible for all aspects of the election, including security. As with previous elections, this one was also beset by accusations of fraud, as well as major security challenges. After months of impasse between the two principal candidates, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, the US Secretary of State intervened and put heavy pressure on the parties to agree a solution. Ashraf Ghani’s accession to the presidency on 29 September 2014 was the first peaceful transfer of executive power in modern Afghan history. Abdullah Abdullah assumed a newly established position as Chief Executive (effectively, Prime Minister, although this position does not exist in the Afghan constitution).

The 2014 presidential election can be viewed as a step towards democracy. However, it was also an election that once again revealed institutional weaknesses, such as electoral fraud and corruption.121 The establishment of the National Unity Government prevented political collapse, but at the same time created a new power structure with unclear divisions of responsibility and without a constitutional basis. This immediately resulted in internal power struggles for positions in the government and on policy.122 It also paved the way for a renegotiation of the principles for power-sharing. According to the 2014 agreement, a Loya Jirga would be held in the course of 2016 to decide whether the position of Prime Minister should be constitutionalised, thereby limiting the presidential powers as defined by the constitution adopted in 2004.123

Thirteen years of development aid have yielded some results. As pointed out in Chapters 5 and 6, the infrastructure, as well as access to health care services, education and food, was vastly improved by 2014 in comparison to 2001. Life expectancy and literacy skills had increased and maternal and child mortality were significantly lower. Economic growth had lifted many Afghans out of poverty. However, the growth was unequally distributed, and much of it was due to the western presence. The withdrawal of international forces, together with the political instability, led to a dramatic drop in economic growth in 2014 to under two per cent.124 From the middle of the previous decade to 2014, the proportion of the population living below the poverty line increased from 36 to 39 per cent, and the gap between rich and poor widened.125 Pressure on the labour market grew, due in part to an extremely young population (half of Afghans are under sixteen years of age). There are still large differences in development and living standards between urban and rural areas, and life in the villages is marked by poor infrastructure and a lack of fundamental services.

In 2014 Afghanistan had an active network of civil society organisations working for human rights and a free press. Women participated in politics, civil society and working life. Progress could be easily derailed, however, and there were concerns throughout Afghan society about the ramifications of the comprehensive international military withdrawal and diminishing aid funding.

Afghanistan at the end of 2014 was still one of the world’s most aid-dependent countries. Reduced economic growth further weakened the state’s capacity to collect revenues. The abundance of international development aid had created new lines of conflict and elites and gave rise to serious corruption. The formal institutions, including the legal institutions, were weak.

Nearly two years after the end of the period assessed by the Commission, the situation remains highly uncertain. The National Unity Government is fragile and the political opposition is increasingly fragmented but still openly critical. Economic growth remains low, although improved follow-up by the tax and customs authorities has increased revenues. At the same time, some 70 per cent of government expenditure is still financed by international donors.126 Unemployment is rising and roughly four million young people will be entering the labour market by 2020.127

In many parts of Afghanistan the security situation is so difficult that international and local aid workers, diplomats and Afghan government officials cannot reach the people. The Afghan security forces sustain losses daily and are unable to maintain their desired strength. To face the growing insurgency, the authorities are expanding their cooperation with armed militias.128 The Taliban have taken control of several areas. Al-Qaeda is still present and the so-called Islamic State (IS or Daesh) has established itself in the country, although its extent is unclear. At the same time, some international actors and Afghan authorities are working to promote dialogue with the Taliban.