2 The challenge picture1

Risk analyses show that measures are needed to reduce risk in cruise traffic. Cruise traffic has been increasing and will probably continue to do so, both in terms of the number of ships and passenger capacity. At the same time, the sailing season is being gradually extended into the winter season. Climate change in the form of more extreme weather such as wind and precipitation is an additional factor of uncertainty. At the same time, there are wide variations in emergency preparedness capacity related to rescue within the Norwegian rescue responsibility area, also when it comes to the capacity to handle large numbers of injuries. It will not be possible to dimension an emergency preparedness and response system for rescue and other handling that can take into account a worst-case incident with a large cruise ship. In sum, this triggers a need for measures to reduce the overall risk associated with cruise traffic.

2.1 What is the problem?

Risk of serious incident with cruise ships

The committee has based its assessments on the ALARP principle («As Low as Practically Possible»). The ALARP principle aims to reduce risk as much as practically possible, and means that risk-reducing measures shall be implemented unless the measures have disproportionately high costs or disadvantages.

Several studies have looked at the risk of incidents with cruise ships, and the conclusion in these studies is that the risk is in the ALARP area, which emphasises that there is a need to consider risk-reducing measures.

Cruise activities in Norway

Cruise activities in Norway have been trending upward in recent years, both in terms of the number of ships and their size. However, cruise traffic has been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, and in 2020 and 2021 there was little activity globally as well as in Norwegian waters. The committee assumes that cruise traffic will pick up again after the COVID-19 pandemic has subsided, but it is uncertain to what extent and pace this will happen.

The report from DNV2 states that it is expected that older cruise ships with a capacity of 1,500–3,000 people on board will be replaced by larger ships, so that the average size of cruise ships to Norway will increase. With regard to expedition cruise ships, DNV expects in its report that this segment will double its capacity over the next six to seven years. Here, too, we are seeing a trend with increasing ship sizes accompanied by increasing average passenger capacity. DNV also points to an increasing trend towards the building of new luxury cruise ships, where the average size is also increasing in this segment. In its report, AECO3 also points to trends that expedition cruise ships in the Arctic will increase, both in number of ships and passenger capacity, over the next 1–3 years.4

In recent years, the sailing seasons have, according to DNV5, also been extended. This is especially true in early spring and late autumn (the «shoulder seasons»), but pure winter operations have also increased. The report shows that this trend has been evident both along the mainland coast and in Svalbard. The winter season is defined in this context as the period from 1 October to 30 April.

Cruise traffic is also characterised by a coastal sailing pattern. According to the report from DNV, coastal sailing increases the probability of unwanted incidents. At the same time, people are often closer to rescue resources from shore than if they are far out at sea. Furthermore, cruise ships often call at several ports, and disembarkations from cruise ships outside ports are also occasionally made.

The DNV report shows that cruise ships are becoming more and more advanced, with complex systems for controlling machinery and propulsion. This increases safety in many ways, but at the same time increases the likelihood of blackouts, in addition to making recovery following errors more complicated. The committee notes that this disadvantage must be seen in the context of the safety benefits of increasingly technically advanced ships.

The largest cruise ships sometimes have significant amounts of heavy oil on board, while many of the smaller ships run on marine diesel or similar. Cruise ships also often enter vulnerable natural environments such as fjords and Arctic or coastal waters, which intensifies the negative consequences of acute oil spills. Shipwrecks in themselves, and their salvage, also represent a possible threat to the natural environment.

Climate change

In recent decades climate change has led to a reduction in ice distribution in northern sea areas (especially multi-year ice and ice thickness) along with a simultaneous increase in ice drift and the length of the melting season. This trend is expected to continue.6 This opens up the possibility of sailing in northern areas over longer periods, at the same time as increased ice drift can lead to a greater risk of serious incidents.

Norway has challenging and unsheltered waters. Climatic conditions and long distances to emergency preparedness resources are challenging, especially in the north. Reports from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describe a development with an increased incidence of extreme weather, such as wind and precipitation. This will constitute an uncertainty factor that must be taken into account in the planning and implementation of cruises, and also in the assessment of the measures that must be implemented. The committee has not had a basis for going into more detail on the consequences that climate change could have for cruise traffic.

Dimensioning of Norwegian emergency preparedness

Preparedness against accidents, and other serious incidents with (cruise) ships, varies along the Norwegian coast and in our northern sea areas. This applies not only to emergency preparedness related to towing and evacuation, but also the reception apparatus on shore and handling of injured people. Emergency towing and staying on board usually constitute the main strategy on the larger cruise ships, and evacuation is the last resort when towing is not feasible. Emergency preparedness is not dimensioned to be able to handle any serious incident involving a cruise ship. In general, it can also be said that the farther north a serious incident occurs, the greater the challenges can be due to climatic and weather conditions, long distances and fewer available resources. Farther north, capacities are more limited, including when it comes to rescue, reception on shore, the health service’s capacities and repatriation of foreign passengers or crew. Northern and Arctic waters are also particularly vulnerable to environmental impacts.

From a socio-economic perspective, it is a question of whether it will be justified to dimension the emergency preparedness and response system based on a serious incident involving a cruise ship. It will also not be practically possible to have an emergency preparedness and response system that can handle any incident involving a cruise ship. As an example, the current rescue ambition that served as the basis for the acquisition of Norway’s new SAR Queen rescue helicopters, is that the helicopters should be able to start rescuing up to 20 people in distress at any point 150 nm straight out from the baseline within two hours. In addition, it must be possible to rescue two people in distress towards the very outer edge of Norway’s rescue responsibility area.

Organisation of the Norwegian authorities

In Norway, the responsibility for maritime safety and emergency preparedness is shared between several ministries.

With shared responsibility, it is particularly important to ensure good interaction between the agencies. The Maritime Safety Report7 did not identify a need for changes in the division of responsibilities between the ministries or changes in the collaboration model. Nevertheless, there may be reasons to look at organisation and interaction in the light of what is particularly characteristic of the cruise industry. This should be done to deal with the cruise industry in a more comprehensive way, both with a view to setting the necessary requirements and frameworks, but also to facilitate even more constructive cooperation.

Regulations as a tool – opportunities and limitations

Maritime activities are regulated through extensive international and national regulations. New technological systems, and increased management and control, have meant that the barriers against accidents at sea have been strengthened. However, safety still depends on the ship’s technical condition and the crew’s competence and capacity. Despite detailed requirements for competence, rescue equipment and new technology, much will still depend on operational assessments by humans. The safest possible operations in Norwegian sea and coastal areas require competence in the special conditions that are or may arise there, combined with experience. The Polar Code sets some requirements for competence, but the question is whether it is sufficient, and in any case these requirements do not apply along the Norwegian coast with the exception of Svalbard.

Norway works continuously on a national and international level to ensure that vessels and equipment are suitable for operation in various waters, and that masters and others who work on board are trained to handle the challenges they may face. Given the rapid speed of developments in technology and markets, current regulations will not always keep pace with continuous developments.

It is the committee’s impression that few large cruise vessels operate with safety levels that are higher than the minimum requirement for the ship in question.

Norway has experienced incidents with passenger ships in recent years. Some have ended well without the loss of human life, such as Viking Sky, while others, such as the Scandinavian Star, have had catastrophic consequences. From an emergency preparedness perspective, it is not a question of whether incidents will occur, but when and where they will occur, the contingency resources that are then available, and how the incident is handled.

Assessments must be made of when there is a need for regulatory action, and when other less intrusive measures are more appropriate. A balance must also be struck between the comprehensiveness of special national rules that Norway should and can introduce compared with the need for predictable international regulations.

2.2 What do we want to achieve?

An accident involving a cruise ship will result in many injuries and deaths. In addition, it will lead to a high risk of damage to the natural environment. In many cases, an accident involving a cruise ship will exceed the capacity of available emergency resources. More demanding weather conditions will both have the potential to increase the probability of an accident occurring, and make rescue work more difficult once an accident has occurred.

The overall goal of the recommendations in this report is to reduce the risk of serious incidents with cruise ships that could lead to the consequent risk of the loss of many lives.

The committee is primarily concerned with finding measures that reduce the overall risk of a serious incident with cruise ships from occurring. It is not possible to dimension an emergency preparedness and response system for an accident involving a cruise ship with several thousand passengers on board. This applies not only to evacuation and rescue of people from the ship, but also the further handling of a high number of seriously injured people. The committee therefore primarily emphasises probability-reducing measures to reduce the risk of cruise traffic. However, consequence-reducing measures are to be considered where necessary. In this context, the committee emphasises quality improvements of existing emergency preparedness rather than a significant expansion of it.

The committee wants the proposed measures to balance considerations of maritime safety and emergency preparedness against the cruise industry’s need for a predictable framework.