4 Risk, development and follow-up

The petroleum industry is an industry with the potential for major accidents. Investigations from Norway and abroad show that major accidents often have a complex and complicated course of events, and that organisational factors can be strong contributors to the accidents.

In addition to the risk of major accidents, the petroleum activity on the shelf also faces challenges when it comes to working environment. The physical working environment is characterised by sometimes difficult weather conditions, shift systems, chemical exposure, noise and ergonomics challenges. The work is organised in complex operator-supplier chains, there is extensive cooperation between offshore and onshore, and many groups of employees rotate between different facilities, and between work onshore and offshore.

This chapter discusses risk, development and follow-up as regards major accidents and working environment in the petroleum activities. There is a link between safety and working environment. A good working environment is important in its own right, and is also important in maintaining low risk of major accidents. Chapter 4.6 also includes a more detailed discussion of risk, development and follow-up in a number of key areas.

4.1 Risk concept in the petroleum activity

The Norwegian petroleum industry has long experience with safety and risk work. Identifying, understanding and managing risk is crucial in the work to prevent accidents, and the industry must have a common understanding of what risk actually is. Traditional risk reasoning often defines risk mathematically as the product of the likelihood that an incident will occur and the consequence of the incident: Risk = likelihood x consequence. However, this approach to risk is not sufficient to manage and handle risk.

The PETROMAKS2 research programme, cf. Chapter 4.2.4, has supported a project aimed at developing new principles and methods for risk management1. Cooperating parties have come from both the authorities and business and industry. A number of serious incidents in the petroleum activities have shown that it is precisely this understanding of risk that has failed, and the project’s research has contributed a new approach towards understanding these incidents. Risk assessments can be based on preconditions and assumptions that may be incorrect, or based on insufficient knowledge. The project has helped to clarify what risk is, and how risk should best be described in order to understand the connection between uncertainty, knowledge and the unexpected. Based on the need for “new“ ideas regarding risk, the Petroleum Safety Authority defines risk as “the consequences of the activity, with associated uncertainty“2. The clarification does not entail any new regulatory requirements.

Uncertainty is about the lack of information, lack of understanding or lack of knowledge. The type of uncertainty, whether large or small, whether it can be reduced or eliminated, are important aspects. Uncertainty and the strength of knowledge must, to a greater extent, be taken into consideration in the risk assessments, and the results from risk analyses must be relevant and useful for those who will use them in decision processes.

The risk concept is connected to consequences of the activity, not just to consequences of a specific activity or incident on the specific facility. Therefore, risk relates not just to the concrete activity then and there, but is linked to how the activity is planned, where it takes place and under what framework conditions.

Risk must be understood and managed in all phases of the petroleum activity.

4.2 Basic data

When risk is assessed, it is important to look at the big picture, and base the assessments on multiple sources, such as basic data, input from the industry and experience from audits. There are a number of sources which, overall, provide a basis for describing and assessing the HSE situation and risk development in the petroleum activity. The most important sources of the information provided in the Storting report are:

• Risk level in the petroleum activity (RNNP)

• Audit experiences, including investigations performed by the Petroleum Safety Authority

• Whistleblowing and notes of concern

• Research results and special studies

4.2.1 Risk level in Norwegian petroleum activity (RNNP)

The project entitled Risk level in Norwegian petroleum activity (RNNP) monitors risk development in the petroleum activity and is organised in a cooperation with the companies, the authorities, the trade associations, the unions and relevant research communities. The development in the petroleum industry is monitored with the aid of a number of indicators for safety and working environment. A report is prepared each year showing trends in the risk scenario over time, and this is intended to provide a joint understanding of the risk scenario. The foundation for the RNNP work is the cooperation among the parties through the Safety Forum, which also functions as reference group and main recipient of the results. In the work on RNNP, an advisory group has been established with representatives from the industry parties, which contributes to quality-assuring the RNNP results. A professional group has also been set up with national experts in safety and working environment disciplines, which contributes to method development and quality assuring data and information. RNNP contains information about major accidents, work accidents and other relevant safety and working environment factors on the shelf and on land. RNNP also shows the development as regards acute discharges and emissions.

The ultimate objective of RNNP is to monitor the risk level and measure the effects of the safety and working environment work over time. Measuring such effects is challenging because there are many factors that have an impact on this development. The measurement in RNNP does not cover all aspects of safety and working environment, and therefore provides a simplified picture of a complex reality.

RNNP is based on qualitative and quantitative historical data obtained from multiple sources. Historical data provides an image of the development up to the present, but not how the development will progress in the future. A qualitative survey could, for example, have the goal of discussing and summarising new research on a topic, or analysing investigation reports for a specific period. The quantitative data, which is used in the more traditional indicators, is mainly obtained from the industry itself.

The questionnaire survey in RNNP is conducted every second year, and includes all employees that work on the Norwegian shelf and at the onshore facilities. The questionnaire mainly maps the employees’ perception of the physical and psychosocial working environment, HSE climate and perceived risk, as well as the employee’s perception of own health, illness and injuries. There have been discussions among the parties as to whether the response to the survey is too low (30–50 per cent). Despite a somewhat low response rate, the survey is deemed to be representative, in part because the distribution of responses agrees with other information about the population, such as reported number of hours from operating companies, shipping companies and onshore facilities in total for the period, divided between the respective work areas. Nevertheless, measures should be considered to increase the response percentage and ensure the quality of the questionnaire survey. The Petroleum Safety Authority cooperates with the National Institute of Occupational Health (STAMI) to develop a more effective and user-friendly processing and reporting of the questionnaire data from the RNNP survey. The objective is to improve the quality of the reporting and contribute to increased use of results in the industry, more user-friendly communication, and more active use of the results for improvement work.

The results from RNNP make up a key part of the Petroleum Safety Authority’s basis for carrying out risk-based supervision, further development of the regulations, competence building and advice to the Ministry and the industry. The multipartite work group concluded in the fall of 2017 that RNNP constitutes the most important foundation for a unified industry understanding of and communication surrounding the risk level in the petroleum industry, and that the parties in the industry must continue to support the work and further development of RNNP3. The Ministry’s experience is that there have been discussions among the parties regarding the understanding and application of RNNP. RNNP is a very important basis for the industry’s further priorities and formulation of policy as regards health, safety and the working environment, and a high degree of legitimacy must be ensured for the RNNP results. Consideration should therefore be given to how the RNNP work can be organised and reinforced to ensure a balanced and precise use of results and analyses.

A correct picture of current risk is important for the industry’s follow-up work. In addition to the historical data from RNNP, there is a need for supplemental information about current risk to ensure a better and more unified understanding of trends and challenges. Development and updating of a current risk scenario must be done in cooperation with the parties in the industry, the Safety Forum and the academic community. The objective is to achieve better understanding for change and development based on current information regarding incidents, audits, changes, notes of concern, etc.

4.2.2 Experience from audits and investigations

The risk scenario that emerges through RNNP is supplemented by the Petroleum Safety Authority’s experience from audits, internal and external investigations, reports and notes of concern, and follow-up of incidents. These can contribute to a description of the risk scenario, and can indicate potential trends.

4.2.3 Reports and notes of concern

Issues related to whistleblowing concerning reproachable circumstances in working life have been on the agenda in recent years. The Working Environment Act’s rules regarding whistleblowing cover cases where employees report circumstances in the workplace that are or may be in violation of legislation, the company’s guidelines, or general understanding of what is responsible or ethically acceptable. In January 2016, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs appointed an official committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the whistleblowing rules in the Working Environment Act, and to consider whether there was a need to propose further statutory amendments and/or other measures. The committee published its report on 15 March 2018 in NOU <Official Norwegian Report> 2018: 6 Whistleblowing – values and protection. The Whistleblowing Committee’s point of departure was that it is positive and profitable for society that reproachable conditions are revealed through whistleblowing. With this basis, they have a number of proposals to clarify the regulations and ensure sufficient protection for the whistleblowers. The report will be submitted for consultation before any decision is made as to how the Whistleblower Committee’s proposals will be followed up. In addition, a project has been carried out under the direction of the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority to improve interaction between relevant authorities as regards whistleblowing. The project has proposed a number of measures to reinforce the authorities’ competence and coordination, so that whistleblowers in Norwegian working life can report reproachable conditions without the risk of reprisals.

The Petroleum Safety Authority conducts supervision to ensure that the companies have established whistleblowing routines and in connection with potential violations of the Working Environment Act linked to whistleblowing cases, for example in connection with bullying or harassment.

The Petroleum Safety Authority has received a growing number of notifications and notes of concern in recent years. During the period from 2011 to 2017, there was a total of 150 notes of concern, cf. Table 4.1. In the period 2011 to 2014, about half of the notes of concern came from the safety delegate service or trade unions. For the years 2016 and 2017, several notes of concern came from the employees. If we compare the period from 2015 to 2017 with the period from 2011 to 2014, there appears to be a development in the direction of more notes of concern regarding lack of accordance between tasks and resources, weak/lacking employee involvement, pressure on working hours schemes, lack of a reporting culture and challenges in the areas of training/competence. These types of notes of concern account for more than 80 per cent of the notes of concern regarding psychosocial and organisational working environment. One common feature is that most of these notes of concern are linked to change and efficiency processes. The Petroleum Safety Authority has received more notes of concern within technical safety from 2015 to 2017 than previously. In this area, there are no specific issues that stand out.

4.2.4 Research results and special reports

Since 2002, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs’ sector responsibility for research on health, safety and working environment in the petroleum activities has mainly been organised as part of the major petroleum research programmes in the Research Council – now PETROMAKS2. The HSE research in PETROMAKS is also followed up by a dedicated reference group with connections to the parties in the industry. In 2016, the Research Council of Norway’s R&D efforts in health, safety and working environment were continued and made synchronous with the rest of the PETROMAKS2 programme, and have also been converted into a continuous commitment with three-year programme plans. This research and development has resulted in new technology and knowledge about safety and working environment and more general aspects such as safety culture and regulatory regimes.

The report refers to various projects conducted under the direction of the PETROMAKS programme. The discussions in the report also refer to special investigations, such as the report from a technical expert group which, in 2013, assessed how the supervisory authorities’ follow-up is adapted to current and future challenges4 and an investigation project under the direction of Safetec linked to new operational solutions in the petroleum sector5. A report from the multipartite work group that reviewed HSE status and development in Norwegian petroleum activities was submitted in September 2017, and also forms an important basis for the work on the Storting report6.

4.3 Development in HSE status in the industry

Over time, the HSE level in the petroleum activity has shown positive development, and the authorities and the parties agree that the safety level in the industry in Norway is high. The attention paid to safety is higher in the sector than in many other industries. From 2000, there has largely been a stable and positive development if one looks at most indicators for major accidents. This indicates that the industry has gotten better at managing factors that impact risk.

In recent years, the petroleum industry has gone through a challenging period, with comprehensive changes and adjustments. The major accident indicator that reflects both the number of serious incidents and the potential of these incidents as regards loss of life was at a low level in 2013 and 2014, but was higher in 2015 and 2016. In 2017, the major accident indicator returned to the same level as in 2013 and 2014. The working environment standard in the petroleum activities has mainly exhibited positive development, but the industry still faces a number of challenges as regards working environment. The questionnaire survey in connection with RNNP 2015 and 2017 reveals challenges as regards psychosocial working environment, safety climate and reporting culture, and there was an increase in serious personal injuries in 2017. Over the last ten years, there have been four fatal accidents in the Norwegian petroleum industry. Supervision experience indicates pressure on the cooperation between the parties in the companies. Working conditions and organisation of the work is significant for safety, working environment and health. Systematic work to reduce the scope of work-related health injuries is important to ensure continued good long-term development of the working environment in the petroleum industry.

Helicopter transport accounts for a relatively large part of the overall risk scenario for work on the shelf. The helicopter accident at Turøy in April 2014 in which 13 people died illustrates the importance of systematic risk management work, also in connection with transport of personnel.

4.4 Major accident risk

The design of offshore facilities and onshore facilities, the selection of robust technical solutions, maintaining good technical condition and effective barriers are elements that will reduce the likelihood of incidents with major accident potential, as well as prevent incidents from developing into major accidents. A major accident entails loss of multiple lives, serious damage to the environment or loss of significant financial assets, and can take place both on offshore facilities and onshore facilities and in connection with transport to and from the facility.

RNNP has eleven different indicators for defined hazard and accident situations (DFUs) linked to major accidents on the shelf. As regards to the shelf, Chapters 4.4.2–4.4.6 provide an overview of the total indicator for major accidents and results for the DFUs with the greatest contributions to the total indicator.

Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the number of reported incidents with major accident potential in the period 2000 to 2017. As the figure illustrates, there has been a gradual decline in the number of incidents after a peak in 2002.

Source RNNP 2017

4.4.1 Total indicator

The RNNP report states a total indicator for major accidents on facilities. The total indicator does not express the risk level explicitly, but is an indicator based on incidents that have occurred and near-miss incidents, assessed in relation to a weighted incident potential. A positive development of this indicator shows that the industry has achieved better control over factors that result in future risk. Incidents associated with helicopter transport are reported separately and are not part of the total indicator, cf. Chapter 4.6.9.

The weighting factors used in the total indicator reflect the potential of the incidents to result in loss of life if the incident develops into a major accident. Near-miss incidents and incidents that can lead to major accidents have different potentials. For example, a minor fire has a lower major accident potential than a large fire. It follows from this that the total indicator is sensitive to incidents with a significant potential. It is therefore important to place greatest emphasis on a potential underlying trend over time when assessing the indicator. Figure 4.3 reveals substantial annual variations, but there has been a consistent positive development of the total indicator from 2002, if one looks at average numbers. The relatively high numbers in 2015 and 2016 are mainly due to a few serious individual incidents.

Source RNNP 2017

4.4.2 Hydrocarbon leaks

Hydrocarbon leaks have great significance for major accident risk in the petroleum industry. All hydrocarbon leaks that may have major accident potential are recorded in RNNP. In the 2000–2017 period there has been a clear decline in the number of such hydrocarbon leaks, see Figure 4.4.

Source RNNP 2017

Several projects and studies have been conducted since 2003 with the goal of uncovering the causes and reducing the number of hydrocarbon leaks, both by the industry parties and in an RNNP context. The largest single cause of hydrocarbon leaks is manual intervention in hydrocarbon-bearing systems.

A cooperative effort has been established in the industry to reduce the number of hydrocarbon leaks. The hydrocarbon leak project is e.g. developing best practice documents and manuals that can be used for prevention of hydrocarbon leaks, cf. Box 4.1.

In addition to measures to prevent occurrence of hydrocarbon leaks, considerable resources are devoted to preventing leaks from developing into major fires or explosions. This requires effective barrier functions that detect leaks, prevent ignition and explosion and limit the consequences of a potential fire or explosion. Particular emphasis is placed on maintaining good control over potential ignition sources. None of the leaks with major accident potential (i.e. more than 0.1 kg/s) reported in RNNP in the period 1996–2017, have ignited.

4.4.3 Well control and well integrity

Loss of well control is a major accident risk in every drilling and well activity. Reducing well incidents and greater attention to well integrity are key factors in reducing the risk of major accidents on the shelf. Both the industry and the Petroleum Safety Authority carefully monitor development in well control incidents and well integrity.

In total, there has been a decline in the number of well control incidents in 2017 compared with the three previous years. In general, the number of well control incidents per drilled well has been higher for exploration drilling than for production drilling. Therefore, the last two years with zero incidents in exploration drilling stand out, cf. Figure 4.5.

The well incidents are classified in three levels according to severity (low, medium and high). Since 2001, there have been four incidents classified with high severity. The last of these was the well incident on the Songa Endurance drilling rig on the Troll field in 2016. This was a gas blowout that could have led to ignition and fatalities under slightly different circumstances.

Source RNNP 2017

4.4.4 Leaks from risers, pipelines and subsea production facilities

Leaks from risers, pipelines and subsea facilities have a substantial potential for major accidents. This is due, in part, to high pressure and the large volume of hydrocarbons. Leaks can come up under the facility, thus entailing a danger of ignition.

The indicator covers risers, pipelines and subsea facilities within the safety zone, as well as other leaks that pose a hazard for the facility. Twelve such serious leaks have been reported during the period 2001–2017.

4.4.5 Structural damage and maritime incidents

Structural damage

Major accidents associated with structural damage are rare. Most structural damage is caused by fatigue damage (cracks) or storm damage. The fatality on the mobile facility COSL Innovator in 2015 was caused by a wave that struck the living quarters on the facility. Most of the reported structural damage relates to damage to mobile facilities.

Source RNNP 2017

Mooring systems

Mobile facilities are held in place either with the help of dynamic positioning systems or through mooring on the seabed. If the systems fail, this can lead to serious consequences. As regards drilling or production facilities, the connection to the equipment on the seabed can be destroyed or damaged. This can lead to loss of well control and the danger of a blowout. Loss of position also entails danger of collision with other facilities. A few years ago, there was an increase in incidents linked to mooring systems. Based on an initiative from the Petroleum Safety Authority and measures implemented in the industry, this trend has been reversed and such incidents have been rare in recent years.

Ships and drifting objects on collision course

There have been serious collisions between ships and facilities after the year 2000, although there has been a decline in the number of such incidents. The number of ships on collision course has also declined in the period, cf. Figure 4.7. This development is due, in part, to better monitoring of ship traffic.

Source RNNP 2017

4.4.6 Acute discharges

RNNP-acute discharges are limited to the offshore petroleum activities, and cover all acute discharges and near-miss incidents7 in the period 2001–2016.

Acute crude oil spills

There has been a positive development in the number of acute oil spills in the period 2001–2016, cf. Figure 4.8. This is mainly due to a decline in minor crude oil spills. The annual discharge volume from such incidents is subject to significant variation through the period.

Source RNNP-AU 2016

Acute spills from subsea facilities

Subsea technology is used extensively, and there is a large and growing number of subsea facilities in the petroleum activities on the Norwegian shelf. Figure 4.9 shows the number of acute spills from subsea facilities since 2006.

Over a number of years, the industry has developed technologies aimed at rapid detection of leaks from the seabed. Experience from the Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervision, as well as reported acute oil spills from subsea facilities show that it takes time to discover such leaks, and that they are primarily discovered by visual observation on the sea surface. The companies must prioritise prevention and early detection of acute pollution from subsea facilities.

Source RNNP-AU 2016

4.4.7 Barrier management

Effective barriers are important in reducing the likelihood of incidents, and reducing their consequences. Monitoring the companies’ barrier management is thus a key indicator in RNNP and for follow-up in supervision. Barrier management entails systematic and continuous assurance that necessary barriers are in place to protect against errors, hazard and accident situations8. This applies to both technical, operational and organisational barriers. Experience from audits reveals a positive development in systems and methodology for barrier management, particularly as regards the technical barriers.

A number of supervision activities have been conducted in recent years targeting barriers related to well integrity, well control, hydrocarbon leaks, integrity of structures and marine systems. Several activities have been initiated which, overall, have contributed to new and improved knowledge about the role and function of the barriers in preventing major accidents. The industry has taken the initiative of further developing internal company documents in accordance with regulatory requirements and more detailed requirements in the Petroleum Safety Authority’s memorandum on barrier management, and the regulations have evolved based on experience from audits. It is important that the players in the industry utilise solid technical and organisational solutions that reduce the risk of error or accidents, and that barrier management is established and maintained in all phases of the activity, also in the time ahead and under altered framework conditions.

RNNP collects data on certain selected barrier elements to prevent and limit the consequence of incidents with major accident potential. Data reveals significant variation at the facility level, while positive development has been noted on a general industry level in recent years. Barrier elements that have historically shown weak results, are showing improvement.

4.4.8 Maintenance management and technical condition

Deficient and lacking maintenance can be a contributing cause of accidents and undesirable incidents in the petroleum activities. The objective of maintenance management includes identifying safety-critical functions and ensuring that these functions (including barriers) work when they are needed. Installations, facilities and equipment must therefore be maintained in all phases of their lifetime. Great emphasis is placed on maintenance to maintain technical condition in the safety work in general, and in maintenance of safety-critical equipment in particular.

Corrosion is, in general, a known challenge in the petroleum industry, particularly under insulation and in locations that are difficult to access. Corrosion under insulation has proven to be the cause of several incidents with major accident potential in recent years. The corrosion can occur both on black steel and stainless steel, and can develop rapidly due to moisture, high temperatures on the actual process equipment and pipe systems and in connection with sea air. Corrosion under insulation can be difficult to detect, since the corrosion is covered up by the insulation material. Corrosion challenges are expected to increase as installations, facilities and pipelines age. The multipartite work group in 2017 stated that the industry must follow up corrosion challenges and devote attention to these issues in the time ahead. New competence and technological development is needed in relation to corrosion and maintenance issues.

4.4.9 Onshore facilities

There are eight onshore facilities for landing and/or processing of oil and gas in Norway. Figure 4.10 shows the development in number of incidents with major accident potential at the onshore facilities. As can be seen from the figure, there is no clear trend for the period, but there has been a positive development in recent years. No separate overall indicator is prepared for major accidents at the onshore facilities.

Corrosion under insulation is a challenge for a number of facilities, cf. Chapter 4.4.8. The older facilities have comprehensive maintenance programmes to monitor this, but other facilities are also at risk.

A cooperation arena has been established in which the heads of the eight facilities meet regularly to exchange experience (L-8). This has contributed to good dialogue among all facilities. Results and data from RNNP are discussed for all facilities, under the direction of L-8.

Source RNNP Onshore facilities 2017

4.5 Working conditions, work-related health ailments and work injuries

Working conditions and organisation of the work has an impact on safety, working environment and the incidence and progression of a number of health ailments and illnesses. It is well-documented that there are causal links between working environment exposure and reduced health and work involvement on the part of employees9. The working environment standard in the Norwegian petroleum activities has largely experienced positive development in the period 2011–2017. Nevertheless, the petroleum activities are an industry with a number of working environment challenges.

The technical working environment standard in connection with design and construction has largely had a positive development. However, the questionnaire survey in connection with RNNP in 2015 and 2017 reveals challenges as regards psychosocial working environment, safety climate and reporting culture, particularly for employees on the shelf. These results must be viewed in context with extensive downsizing and readjustment in the activities on the shelf in this period. It is important that the industry and the parties address these challenges and continue their long-term prevention work in the fields of working environment, health and safety.

Systematic work to reduce the scope of work-related health injuries, in part through increased knowledge about the risk conditions, is important to ensure continued good long-term development of the working environment in the petroleum industry.

4.5.1 Personal injuries and fatalities

Work accidents that entail serious personal injuries or fatalities are an important indicator for the risk level in the industry. In the period 2006 to 2013 there was a general positive development as regards serious personal injuries. There have been four fatal accidents in the Norwegian petroleum activities over the last ten years, in 2007, 2009, 2015 and 201710. There was also a tragic helicopter accident in April 2016 where 13 people lost their lives, cf. Chapter 4.6.9.

In 2017, 204 reportable personal injuries were recorded on the Norwegian shelf. Of these, 27 were classified as serious. The frequency of serious personal injuries was 0.8 per million working hours in 2017. This is the highest frequency since 2008. The increase in serious personal injuries from 2016 to 2017 relates to both production facilities and mobile facilities. The total injury frequency applies to both production facilities and mobile installations. The total injury frequency for onshore facilities is 0.6 serious personal injuries per million hours worked. The percentage of people who state in the RNNP questionnaire survey that they have been exposed to an occupational accident involving personal injury has also risen both offshore and on land from 2015 to 2017.

4.5.2 Chemical working environment

In connection with work in the petroleum industry, many occupational groups will come in contact with chemicals, either through inhaling dust and gases, or through skin contact. Health risk resulting from the use of a chemical substance depends both on the substance’s toxicity and the degree of exposure, i.e. how the substance is used.

Chemical health risk in the petroleum activities is primarily found in connection with activities such as drilling of wells and processing of hydrocarbon streams. The companies have reported on serious exposure situations for selected groups of positions. Within drilling, exposure to oil vapour and oil fog presents a challenge, while benzene exposure is the greatest challenge for operations and maintenance personnel. Equipment and pipe systems are opened in connection with maintenance of process facilities, and personnel may be exposed to hydrocarbons and benzene. Chemical exposure also occurs in connection with work such as catering services, mechanical maintenance and repair work, workshop activities and laboratory work, etc. In connection with surface treatment there can be periods of high exposure to dust, solvents and allergenic chemicals. The need for surface treatment grows along with the increasing age of installations and facilities.

Chemical working environment is monitored in the petroleum industry, for example through following the development in the number of chemicals that are used, the number of chemicals with the highest hazard category, and the companies’ management of chemical exposure risk. For offshore facilities, both the total number of chemicals and the number in the highest hazard category have increased in the period 2004–2015, particularly within maintenance. The same trend is evident on onshore facilities, but is less clear. At the same time, it is noted that the companies have a high level of awareness as regards chemical management, and most have their own processes for risk assessment and approval of new chemicals.

Through the RNNP questionnaire survey, we can see self-reported exposure to chemicals either through skin contact or inhalation, as well as ailments that can be linked to such exposure. Up to 2013, there was a moderate but definite positive development in the direction of better working environment and a lesser degree of ailments due to inhalation of and skin contact with chemicals. The results from the survey in 2015 and 2017 indicate an increase in perceived exposure, but a stable level for ailments.

Physicians have a reporting obligation to the Petroleum Safety Authority when it is assumed that the illness is due to the working environment. The doctor-reported work-related illnesses that can be linked to chemical disposure are primarily skin diseases, airway illnesses and tumours. The number of reported cases of work-related skin ailments has declined in the last 20 years. Most of the reports regarding skin ailments have been linked to drilling activity and contact with drilling mud, and the clear reduction in the number of reported skin diseases indicates a substantial improvement of the working environment in this area. The numbers are substantially lower for the other two diagnosis groups, so that it is more difficult to talk about trends.

In recent years, the health hazard linked to benzene exposure has received increased attention in the industry. New research knowledge has emerged indicating that benzene can have a carcinogenic effect through lower exposure levels than the current limit value of one ppm11, and that the substance is linked to more forms of cancer in blood and lymphatic organs than previously assumed. The European Chemical Agency (ECHA) has proposed lowering the limit value for benzene to one-tenth of the current value. Among male workers employed on the Norwegian shelf during the period 1965–1998, for the period 1999–2011, links were found between benzene exposure and several forms of cancer in the blood and lymphatic organs12. These effects are related to the exposure levels for benzene in the industry prior to 1999. In a recently published analysis, the same researchers have found a connection between exposure to crude oil or benzene and skin cancer13. The research shows that oil workers that have been exposed to crude oil and benzene for ten years or more, have up to seven times higher risk for skin cancer on their hands and underarms compared with persons who have never been exposed. The Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervision activity and the companies’ own mapping activity in recent years have identified multiple sources of benzene exposure, e.g. through cold venting and certain types of maintenance work, and there is a need to conduct further mapping to better understand the exposure scenario and risk.

While there is great variation, it is the experience of the Petroleum Safety Authority that the companies’ systematic work on chemical working environment is improved after implementation of the chemical project (see Fact Box 4.2). This applies both to the scope and quality of measurements and risk assessments and operational practice, where chemical use is linked more strongly to formal processes for work permits and safe job performance.

4.5.3 Physical working environment

Noise, vibration and cold are examples of physical risk factors in the working environment in the petroleum sector.

There is a lot of heavy machinery and rotating equipment gathered in small spaces and a dense grid of pipes and valves on facilities on the shelf. These are significant sources of noise and vibration. Noise and vibration are connected, but in the petroleum sector, noise is often the most critical factor. In addition, in line with increasing age, the facilities are exposed to corrosion and an increasing need for surface maintenances, which entails use of hand-held tools that yield high noise levels.

The picture differs in the petroleum sector on land, here there is more room to separate noise sources, build more noise insulation and have more units so that repair and maintenance can take place on shut down and protected equipment.

RNNP’s noise indicator has provided much valuable information about noise exposure. Even though the companies work actively on noise reduction, and new technical measures are constantly reported, there are still many groups that face high noise exposure. For late-phase facilities, it has proven difficult to implement major noise reduction measures. The RNNP questionnaire survey contains several questions covering both noise exposure and ailments that can be linked to noise. Overall, noise is the working environment factor that most employees report exposure to.

New technology and new ways of designing facilities have contributed to reducing noise on newer facilities. Use of the NORSOK S002 industry standard, which deals with working environment design, has proven to yield good results within the area of noise. Over time, the industry has also developed a set of tools and a protective regime against noise, which includes use of advanced hearing protection and limits on length of stay. The petroleum industry has cooperated to follow-up and reduce problems linked to noise exposure, cf. e.g. the noise project discussed in Box 4.3.

4.5.4 Ergonomic risk factors

Ergonomic risk factors refers to factors that can contribute to developing work-related musculoskeletal ailments. Work-related musculoskeletal ailments often have complex causes, where physical/mechanical, organisational and psychosocial factors play a role. In the petroleum sector, physical strain is also particularly prominent in operation and maintenance of offshore facilities. There is a lot of equipment in a limited area, which means challenges in relation to access and material handling. There is also a lot of walking on hard surfaces with substantial friction, as well as walking in staircases over multiple stories. Catering personnel face challenges related to uniform strain, while lifting and carrying are risk factors for scaffolding and drill floor personnel. On assignment from the Petroleum Safety Authority, IRIS conducted an analysis in 2016 of work-related musculoskeletal ailments based on the RNNP questionnaire survey 2011–201514. An increase in self-reporting of all work-related musculoskeletal ailments was reported, and particularly an increase in reporting of ailments in the neck, shoulders and arms. The analysis also revealed a higher percentage of job-related neck ailments for those who had experienced a downsizing or reorganisation process. The results apply both for offshore and onshore employees. Up to 2016, the companies have reported data to an RNNP indicator where different ergonomic factors on installations and facilities are assessed. The data show that drill floor workers have work tasks with most strain, followed by surface workers and mechanics.

Workplace design and ergonomic facilitation are generally good in the petroleum industry, particularly on newer facilities and installations. However, there is still a need and an opportunity for targeted improvements of the working environment to reduce work-related musculoskeletal ailments, particularly among certain groups at risk.

4.5.5 Organisational and psychosocial working environment

Organisational factors comprise structural and formal conditions at a workplace, such as responsibility, size of units and groups, working hours, shift schemes, formal communication channels and changes in the organisation. How the work is organised, the content of the work and interaction between employees and leaders has an impact on many types of psychological and social factors in the working environment. Psychosocial and organisational factors affect the employees’ physical and mental health. Studies also show that changes in such factors affect the employees’ understanding of their situation and their ability to master unexpected situations, and also has significance for major accident risk15.

RNNP measures psychosocial working environment using four factors: job requirements, control (autonomy, tempo), manegerial support and colleague support. For employees offshore, the results from 2013 show a positive level, while in 2015 and 2017 there are reports of higher job requirements, lower control and lower manager support. Support from colleagues, however, shows positive results and is at the same level as in 2015 and 2017. Onshore, employees experience higher job requirements in 2017 compared with 2015, while there is no change in other psychosocial questions.

Reorganisation and downsizing

A study was conducted in RNNP in 2016 to take a closer look at potential consequences of reorganisation and downsizing processes as regards psychosocial working environment, safety climate and health in the petroleum activities. It has been reported that downsizing processes can trigger stress reactions in the employees due to increased work volume, job uncertainty and reduced autonomy. Research on health consequences in connection with downsizing processes shows that the involved parties have an increased risk of developing psychological ailments. Several studies report that long-term absence due to illness among the remaining employees rises, while short-term absence due to illness appears to decline16. The RNNP study showed that employees that have experienced reorganisation and downsizing report a higher risk of injuries, absence due to illness, health ailments and a poorer safety climate and psychosocial working environment compared with employees who do not report such change processes. The analyses indicated that the higher risk of job injuries among those affected by downsizing or reorganisation in the industry, viewed together, can be linked to weaker results on safety climate and psychosocial working environment.

In the RNNP questionnaire survey in the period 2013–2017, there is a substantial increase in the percentage of shelf employees who report reorganisation of moderate or great significance (from 32 per cent in 2013 to 56 per cent in 2017) and downsizing or terminations in the past year (from 19 per cent in 2013 to 69 per cent in 2017). The percentage reporting that the organisation has reduced staffing in the past year has fallen from 2015 to 2017 by four per cent. The percentage of shelf employees who experience significant uncertainty linked to both current and future job opportunities has increased from seven per cent to 24 per cent in the same period. Employees on mobile facilities report a higher degree of job uncertainty and downsizing than employees on production facilities.

For the onshore facilities, RNNP shows that approx. 40 per cent report reorganisation in 2015 and 2017. The percentage reporting downsizing is reduced from 71 per cent in 2015 to 47 per cent in 2017. Perceived job uncertainty is lower at the onshore facilities than on the shelf, but has increased in the same period from 11 per cent to 16 per cent.

In periods of change and reorganisation, it is particularly important that the companies direct focus at preventive factors in the working environment. There is a lot of knowledge-based and documented research showing that participation and facilitating predictability and the perception of control for employees are important preventive factors that can contribute to a good working environment.

HSE climate

The results for HSE climate in the period 2013–2017 reveal a decline in some areas. For offshore employees, this relates particularly to issues related to management’s prioritisation of HSE. For example, certain questions regarding maintenance and whether production considerations take precedence over HSE, show a negative development over a longer time period – both for employees offshore and onshore. The results also show that employees who have been exposed to downsizing or reorganisation score more negatively on these statements than do others.

An increasing number state in the RNNP questionnaire survey that they experience pressure not to report personal injuries or other incidents that can “ruin the statistics”. In 2015, there were 20 per cent who said that they agreed with the statement, in whole or in part, while 26 per cent stated this in 2017. Similarly, there has been an increase from 28 per cent in 2015 to 36 per cent in 2017 for those who say they agree, in whole or in part, that reports on accidents or hazardous situations are “often doctored”. These results comprise petroleum activity both onshore and offshore.

4.5.6 Shift work and night work

Petroleum activity takes place 24-7, and is characterised by shift work, night work and long working weeks. Intensive work periods are often followed by free periods. At onshore petroleum facilities, 31 per cent report that they work in a shift system, 96 per cent of these work continuous shifts with night work. The onshore facilities have less intensive work periods than on the shelf. The percentage that have night work in the offshore petroleum activities has varied in recent years. The percentage on production facilities was 40 per cent in 2017, while the percentage on mobile facilities was 77 per cent.

Workers on the shelf work long shifts where the average work session is twelve hours. Many switch between night and day during the course of a 14-day period (so-called “swing shift“)17.

Shift work increases the risk of a number of health problems and illnesses. In recent years, several studies have shown negative health effects of “quick returns“ (in other words, eleven hours or less between two shifts)18.

Among workers on the shelf, 16 per cent report having worked 15 hours or more overtime during the course of the last offshore period. Moreover, 15 per cent state that they have worked more than 16 hours during the course of a day on one or more occasions during the past year, and 15 per cent report that they were awakened during their free time to perform a work task during their last offshore period19.

Working hours that include night or late evenings or long work shifts can contribute to sleep disturbances, circadian rhythm disturbances and reduced cognitive function, and these are factors that can increase the risk of occupational accidents. Long work shifts in excess of eight hours increase the risk of accidents, while work shifts of more than twelve hours double the risk20. The risk of incidents is particularly linked to night work, and the risk appears to increase with the number of subsequent shifts.

Breaks with the opportunity to sleep can contribute somewhat to restoring cognitive functions. Disturbances in circadian rhythm affect many functions, including the regulation of nearly all hormone systems. The transition between day work and night work, as well as being called out during the sleep period, entails a disturbance in circadian rhythm. The possibility to influence working hours is linked to better future health and later retirement, and adapted working hours planning can change the health risk associated with shift work21.

4.6 Special topics

4.6.1 Development in the petroleum activities

The petroleum industry is a cyclical sector which undergoes change and streamlining processes over time. The changes are extensive and include, for example, downsizing, technological development, reduced investment, reduced activity and changes in how work is organised. The pace of this change can be quite high, at least during periods – such as after the oil price decline in 2014, and several change processes may take place simultaneously. This makes the change processes complex, and it can be challenging to conduct comprehensive assessments of the HSE consequences that may result from the changes.

The business opportunities on the Norwegian shelf change over time. The discoveries made today in the most familiar parts of the Norwegian shelf are consistently smaller than was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, a lot of infrastructure has been established over the last 50 years which has available capacity that can be exploited in the event of new discoveries. This infrastructure makes profitable development possible for many smaller fields as they can be developed with subsea facilities or simple remote-controlled platforms that can be tied in to existing fields. Several Norwegian fields have been developed with subsea facilities connected to production and storage vessels. A common feature of many such operational solutions also appears to be that they use advanced vessels as a base for conducting e.g. structural and maintenance activity.

Knowledge and new technology are thus rapidly developing in the petroleum activities. Technological development contributes to a higher level of HSE and efficiency in the petroleum activities, but can also entail new challenges that the industry must manage.

As stated in the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) on 23 May 201722, the Ministry announced a research and study project in 2017 to map use and practices surrounding multipurpose vessels. The announcement also included an assessment of how the development in Norwegian petroleum activity is expected to unfold, and which solutions may be used in the years to come with regard to new technology, new operational solutions, integrated operations, simpler facilities, etc. The study assignment was awarded to Safetec. Safetec’s report was published on 8 February 2018, and will e.g. be included in the basis for discussing the multipartite work that has been initiated to arrive at a more unified understanding of the realities as regards the use of multipurpose vessels on the Norwegian shelf, cf. Chapter 4.6.2 23.

In its report, Safetec asserts, among other things, that the oil industry will largely follow the development in the rest of the economy. Based on an expected weak positive development in oil and gas prices, and assuming that development and use of new technology will lower costs, Safetec believes that there will be a moderate positive development in the financial framework conditions on the Norwegian shelf in the period up to 2030. Safetec expects a high and rising rate of development up to 2022/2023.

The KonKraft24 project “Competitiveness – changing tide on the Norwegian continental shelf“25 primarily targets measures and recommendations connected to how to ensure an efficient, sustainable and more environmentally-friendly industry, but also touches to some extent on HSE factors and risk. Emphasis is also placed on the need to update regulations and standards to ensure the fastest possible adjustment of the relationship between regulations and new technological solutions, particularly within digitalisation. The report also underlines the need for knowledge, development, testing and implementation of new technology, and the need for a plan to step up the DEMO 2000 and Petromaks2 research efforts. While the Konkraft project does not really address HSE directly, the recommendations include a number of proposals that will have consequences for regulating and influencing various HSE aspects in the petroleum activities. The measures are also marked by a desire to turn the industry in the direction of changes in how work is organised and development of new operations and business models. A greater degree of digitalisation, technological development and cooperation are the most crucial assumptions for realising the recommendations in the project.

How the industry will develop in the years to come, and how fast this will occur, with new operating concepts and solutions, etc. is of great significance for assessing how the industry should be followed up in the future.

4.6.2 Multipurpose vessels

The Working Environment Act applies to “[…] activities associated with exploration for and exploitation of natural resources in the seabed or its substrata, Norwegian inland waters, Norwegian sea territory and the Norwegian part of the continental shelf”, cf. Section 1-3 of the Working Environment Act. The more precise scope for application of the Working Environment Act on the shelf follows from limitations stipulated in regulations to the Act, particularly the Regulations relating to health, safety and the environment in the petroleum activities and at certain onshore facilities (the Framework Regulations). This means that the Working Environment Act applies to all facilities, fixed and mobile, that have direct control over wells. Flotels (living quarters installations) and manned diving operations are also covered, regardless of whether the operation takes place from a petroleum facility or a ship. Supply and standby vessels for the petroleum activities are not covered by the Working Environment Act. However, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has the regulatory authority to stipulate that the statute shall apply for “vessels that perform construction, pipelaying or maintenance activities in the petroleum activities”. This power has never been exercised.

There has been a great deal of attention in recent years surrounding the use of so-called multipurpose vessels on the Norwegian shelf. The Ministry has received descriptions of a situation where an increasing part of the work on the shelf is carried out from advanced ships, and to a lesser degree from traditional petroleum facilities. In this context, it has also been asserted that the employees on such vessels work in a space not regulated by statute, and that which supervisory authority is responsible for this activity is unclear. Moreover, several employee organisations have stated that the described development must entail that the Working Environment Act is given application to also cover multipurpose vessels.

With this basis, among other things, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs asked the Petroleum Safety Authority for a factual and legal description of the situation surrounding the use of multipurpose vessels on the Norwegian shelf. The PSA’s report was complete in September 2016, and confirms that vessel activity on the shelf has exhibited a growing trend in recent years, primarily due to new developments in the form of subsea solutions. However, based on the available information, the Petroleum Safety Authority could not see that an increasing portion of production or drilling and well work is actually transferred from traditional petroleum facilities to vessels. As regards the legal situation, it is the assessment of the Petroleum Safety Authority that “there is no lack of clarity as regards which regulatory regime or supervisory regime applies for the vessels and the employees on board, although it is somewhat complicated.“ The Petroleum Safety Authority thus shows that the vessels are not operating in a space not regulated by statute. The working conditions for the employees on board are governed by the shipping legislation in the country where the ship is registered (“the flag state principle”). These regulations are based on international conventions which the respective flag states must implement. Supervision of the working conditions on vessels belongs, generally speaking, under the flag state, but the Petroleum Safety Authority has the authority to conduct supervision of the vessel activity, to the extent it falls under the Petroleum Act.

In March 2017, a representative proposal was made in the Storting (Doc 8: 61 S (2016–2017) to the effect that “[…] the Working Environment Act shall apply in full for petroleum-related activities (including e.g. construction, pipelaying, maintenance and removal) which take place from vessels on the Norwegian shelf”.

In response, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs pointed out that parts of the proposal were unclear, and that the consequences of this had not been sufficiently studied. At the same time, the Minister stated that the Government would welcome multipartite work with a view towards arriving at a more unified understanding of reality among the parties. Therefore, the parties in the industry were invited to take part in such an effort in May 2017.

Safetec’s report will be one of several elements to consider as a basis for the work group’s discussions going forward. In its report, Safetec assumes among other things that the use of vessels in operations on the Norwegian shelf has increased in the period from 2010 to 2016. According to Safetec, the main cause of this increase is that more and more developments on the Norwegian shelf have been implemented as subsea developments, where both construction and maintenance are largely performed from vessels. Safetec expects continued growth in vessel use toward 2030.

Based on its findings, Safetec’s assessment is that supervision of working environment factors on the vessels should be reinforced.

The multipartite work group will continue its discussions, inter alia with a point of departure in Safetec’s report. The social partners have initially been asked to provide their input as regards the report in May of this year. The work group’s efforts will culminate in a report that is expected to be available during the autumn of 2018.

4.6.3 Petroleum activities in the High North

We have had petroleum activity off the coast of Northern Norway for nearly 40 years, and considerable experience and knowledge has been acquired both in the industry and on the part of the authorities. In June 2013, the Storting resolved to open the south-eastern Barents Sea for petroleum activity. This is the Norwegian part of the previously disputed area between the Norwegian and Russian continental shelves.

There is increasing petroleum activity in the northern areas on the Norwegian shelf. The conditions in the Barents Sea vary from south to north and from west to east. Temperatures drop towards the north and east, while wind and waves decrease in intensity. When planning activity in the Barents Sea, it is important to take location-specific conditions into consideration due to the variations over a relatively large geographical area. Significant knowledge and experience have been collected from when the first exploration well was drilled in 1980 and up the most active year so far, 2017.

The players and the authorities in the industry have devoted considerable resources towards mapping and developing knowledge about uncertainty and risk factors in order to reduce the risk of major accidents in the Barents Sea. This work is aimed at contributing to prevent incidents and accidents. The need for and scope of this work received particular attention in connection with the opening of the south-eastern Barents Sea, cf. Report No. 36 to the Storting (2012–2013) New opportunities for Northern Norway – opening of the south-eastern Barents Sea for petroleum activity and Report No. 41 to the Storting (2012–2013) Supplementary report to Report No. 36 to the Storting (2012–2013) New opportunities for Northern Norway – opening of the south-eastern Barents Sea for petroleum activity.

Some examples of projects and measures that have been initiated:

• Developing standards for Arctic operations

• Cooperation arena for operators with exploration activity “Barents Sea Exploration Collaboration“ (BaSEC)26

• The Petroleum Safety Authority is conducting a number of R&D projects during the period 2015 to 2019

Experience gained from the Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervision activity so far indicates that the activity in the northern areas is prudent, with technical adaptations (winterisation) and operational measures such as stay restrictions, special clothing, etc., so that the risk of hypothermia and physical frostbite can be managed. Low temperatures with wind and precipitation have an impact on the design and outfitting of the facilities, and also affects the working environment on board. Work in a cold climate can e.g. affect mental processes such as alertness – and judgement.

The Petroleum Safety Authority is also involved in cooperation with the authorities in the other Arctic countries through the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum (AORF) and through bilateral agreements with these countries. The Petroleum Safety Authority contributes to the Arctic Council, particularly in the “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response“ (EPPR) work group. The PSA’s activities and cooperation contribute to the exchange of experience among the parties in the industry on both the national and international level, as well as to raise the level of knowledge among the social partners concerning HSE challenges in cold climates and how the activities can be operated prudently in the north. Experience and knowledge from the follow-up activity is used in the Petroleum Safety Authority’s monitoring of the operators’ planning and execution of operations in the Barents Sea. This also entails audits on the facilities, in exploration activity and operations.

4.6.4 Organisational changes

Most companies in the petroleum industry have established change and improvement programmes to increase productivity and to adapt to a lower income and cost level. Such change and improvement programmes are not new in the petroleum industry. However, in recent years there has been a more rapid development in the direction of increased use of operations and maintenance models that combine standardisation with simplification, and more flexible ways of utilising personnel. Organisational changes include, for example, lower basic staffing and establishment of central staff units that can meet fluctuating needs for local personnel or expert personnel, more campaign and activity management, movement of tasks from offshore to central support units on land and assigning more tasks to fewer groups of staff. The changes affect the entire operator and supplier chain, as well as offshore and onshore organisations, and affect many disciplines and groups of employees.

The efficiency and change processes started on the onshore facilities around 2008, i.e. considerably earlier than offshore. Most of the onshore facilities are now in a phase of continuous work on streamlining and cost cuts. Offshore, the biggest changes were first implemented in the operating companies. This, in turn, has led to efficiency programmes for the contractors and the suppliers.

A greater degree of rotation and more mobile employees can entail a need for expertise development and increased facilitation to avoid negative consequences for HSE. At the same time, rotation of personnel can be an effective way to achieve transfer of experience and learning. It can be challenging to understand the significance of complex change processes for HSE, cf. Chapter 4.5.5. Potential challenges depend on how the work is organised and carried out. Good risk and change management, along with well-functioning cooperation among the social partners, is therefore important. Sufficient education and training of employees must be ensured, and the operator must provide predictability for contractors through good planning. The Petroleum Safety Authority follows up how the companies manage and assess the risk associated with downsizing and change processes. Challenges linked to adjustment processes and efficiency are also followed up in the Safety Forum.

4.6.5 Digitalisation

There is a rapid development within digitalisation that will affect the petroleum activities going forward. Digitalisation entails e.g. further development of integrated operations, remote control, automation, robot technology, artificial intelligence and exploitation of the opportunities that lie in analysis of large volumes of data. Among other things, this development can contribute to more efficient work processes, replace manual work, yield better analyses and contribute to better decisions. This could have clear positive effects for HSE, in part as a consequence of reduced exposure, and contribute to greater competitiveness. At the same time, this development can bring challenges, for example in relation to understanding the situation, securing information and incorrect actions. The industry must therefore actively follow up changes in the risk scenario as a consequence of digitalisation.

Both the industry and the Petroleum Safety Authority work to obtain an overview of HSE opportunities and challenges linked to digitalisation, and how these challenges can be managed. The Safety Forum also follows up this work.

4.6.6 ICT vulnerability and security

Increasing use of digital technologies makes the petroleum industry more vulnerable as a consequence of vulnerabilities in ICT systems and advanced digital threats. Both human error and equipment faults can lead to disruptions in operational regularity and financial loss. Cyber-attacks are also growing in scope, becoming more sophisticated and more difficult to ward off. The changes in the risk scenario demand that the players maintain continuous vigilance and improve their ICT security and ability to handle unwanted digital incidents. The Petroleum Safety Authority has also reinforced its resources for supervision of ICT security. The need to boost supervision of the petroleum activities’ ICT security and vulnerability was pointed out by the Lysne Committee, NOU 2015: 13 – Digital vulnerabilities – Secure society and Report No. 38 to the Storting (2016–2017) Cyber security – A joint responsibility.

The hostage action in In Amenas in 2013 and changes in the threat landscape have also led to greater focus and measures to improve security in the petroleum sector. The Petroleum Safety Authority has prioritised follow-up of security and preparedness linked to deliberate attacks and terrorism in the industry. The audit activity has included security and ICT security throughout the entire logistics chain. In 2017, the Petroleum Safety Authority conducted audits of supply bases, helicopter transport and offshore facilities.

Like the HSE regulations, the security requirements are formulated as functional requirements. This means that, normally, no specific requirements are stipulated for security measures. Overall, the authorities believe that there has been improvement in the security work in the petroleum industry in recent years, but that developments require even stronger follow-up in the industry.

4.6.7 Preparedness

Preparedness is an important element in monitoring security in the petroleum sector. Preparedness entails continuous work to be as prepared as possible to handle various hazard and accident situations that may arise. The main objective of preparedness is to prevent or limit the consequences of accidents and near-misses. Many different players are involved in the preparedness work, and clear roles and lines of responsibility are important. It is also important to have clear notification routines for hazard and accident situations. Good communication and good cooperation among the players are also important preconditions. There are rigorous requirements for expertise and drills, and in some cases there are also requirements regarding physical and mental fitness for the personnel who are part of the emergency preparedness organisation. Emergency preparedness systems and competence are further developed through annual drills in cooperation between the industry and the authorities.

In the petroleum activities, the operator is responsible for maintaining effective preparedness and for handling any hazard and accident situations that may arise. It follows from the Petroleum Act that licensees or others that participate in the petroleum activities must, at all times, maintain effective preparedness with a view towards responding to hazard and accident situations.

Quality, and the ability to improve, both as regards organisation, technology and personnel at all levels of the organisation, are important factors in the preparedness work. The need for preparedness measures will vary based on an assessment of risk, including geography, climate, etc. The most important preparedness work is done by the players themselves, and encompasses measures of technical, operational and/or organisational character.

Pursuant to the Civil Protection Act, the onshore facilities are also subject to supervision from the Norwegian Industrial Safety and Security Organisation (NSO) and preparedness measures must be designed pursuant to the regulations relating to industrial safety. Several of the onshore facilities also participate in various forms of preparedness cooperation.

The Petroleum Safety Authority supervises the operators’ preparedness work. In the event of incidents, the Petroleum Safety Authority will continuously assess the measures the operator plans and implements, and will contribute factual information, situational understanding and impact assessments.

The Petroleum Safety Authority has established an emergency preparedness duty scheme which ensures that the agency is notified regarding hazards and accident situations, and can in turn alert other involved authorities pursuant to established agreements and notification procedures. This may include the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, the Norwegian Coastal Administration, the Norwegian Environment Agency, the Norwegian Maritime Authority and the relevant police district. The Petroleum Safety Authority also notifies other nations regarding incidents that may have an impact on their petroleum activity. During the period 2015 to 2018, notification was provided for around 500–600 hazard and accident situations per year.

If required by the situation, the Petroleum Safety Authority can decide that other parties must make necessary emergency response resources available at the licensee’s expense, or implement other measures at the licensee’s expense to obtain necessary additional resources. Such interventions will only be relevant in the event of hazard and accident situations that can entail loss of human life or personal injuries, pollution or significant material damage.

The Petroleum Safety Authority can also establish temporary exclusion or hazard areas, if this is deemed necessary to prevent or limit certain serious harmful effects. Such areas have been established for example in connection with gas leaks to prevent vessels from coming in contact with easily ignitable gas.

The authorities’ responsibility and roles in connection with non-deliberate incidents on the Norwegian continental shelf

In December 2015, a serious near-miss occurred when the unmanned Eide Barge 33 broke loose in the North Sea and drifted toward the platforms on the Valhall field. The incident showed that several of the involved players had room for improvement in their handling of notification and coordination. After the incident, measures have been implemented to improve dialogue and how information is shared between the various authorities.

In the wake of this incident, cooperation was initiated between the affected ministries under the direction of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has a coordinating role in the public security area when the issues involve multiple sectors. A report will be prepared on the roles and responsibilities of various Norwegian authorities in connection with non-deliberate incidents on the Norwegian continental shelf. This could be floating objects or other situations that pose a hazard for life, health, the environment, security or significant financial assets in the petroleum activities. The report will describe the ministries’ and the agencies’ areas of responsibility, and can function as a reference for similar incidents. The objective is to improve the Norwegian authorities’ knowledge of each other’s roles, the expertise of the various players, and which means and instruments they have available in the event of similar incidents on the continental shelf. These elements are important in a robust crisis management system that is based on good cooperation and dialogue between the affected players, in line with the cooperative principle. The report will also refer to the players’ lines of communication during extraordinary incidents, and identify potential areas for improvement. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security aims to finish the report in the spring of 2018.

4.6.8 Diving

The HSE regulations apply to diving as for other activities in the petroleum industry. Since 1985, there has been a consent scheme for all manned underwater operations. The purpose of the consent scheme is that the operator shall document to the authorities that diving operations are carried out in line with the regulations. The Petroleum Safety Authority obtains assessments from the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision in connection with processing the application for consent.

In 2017, 15 568 staff-hours were reported in connection with saturation diving on the Norwegian shelf. The figures entail a reduction of about 65 per cent compared with diving activities in 2016, and is the lowest activity level since 2002. No injuries or hazardous situations were reported in connection with saturation diving in 2017. There have been few cases of decompression sickness after 1991, when the authorities introduced a joint framework for decompression tables for saturation diving. The last fatal accident in connection with saturation diving on the Norwegian shelf took place in 1987.

For surface-supplied diving on the Norwegian shelf, 406 staff-hours in water and no undesirable incidents were reported in 2017. The activity level for surface-supplied diving is generally low and has remained low over the past 20 years.

Follow-up of the North Sea diver case

Former divers have sued the Norwegian state in multiple rounds and demanded compensation for injuries as a result of diving in the North Sea during the period 1965–1990. The case received a final political conclusion in the Storting’s decision of 16 June 2014, which concerned the processing of Proposition to the Storting No. 88 S (2013–2014) Changes in the 2014 national budget under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs relating to follow-up of former North Sea divers. In line with the Storting’s decision, a settlement was agreed upon between the State and divers. The settlement e.g. entailed that the divers were offered an additional 25 G (basic amount) in compensation in return for a commitment that they would not pursue the case before the courts. The compensation scheme for the pioneer divers was concluded in 2015, and the Pioneer Diver Board was phased out during the same year. Through these schemes, the State has made compensatory payments to 270 divers and their survivors. Only two former divers did not accept the offer from the State.

The settlement also entailed that a work group comprised of the authorities and parties would be appointed to more closely examine the divers’ current working conditions. Furthermore, it was concluded that Stiftelsen Kontakttelefonen for pionerdykkere (Dykkerkontakten) <diver helpline> would be continued. It was also pointed out in the proposition that there should be more research environments that could shed light on issues related to diving.

Working conditions for divers

The agreement to more closely assess the divers’ current working conditions was followed up through the establishment of a multipartite work group under Safety Forum. The work group has found that it would be appropriate to include diving personnel in the RNNP survey, which relates to questions concerning working environment and perceived safety. With this measure, diving personnel will be included in RNNP from 2018 on par with other personnel in the petroleum activities. The Ministry believes that this is a good measure that could provide useful information about the divers’ working conditions. This knowledge would e.g. be important in the continuous work to prevent injuries and accidents.

Dykkerkontakten

Dykkerkontakten was established in 2003 to help former North Sea divers in a difficult situation. The foundation runs a 24/7 helpline, among other things. The foundation has three employees and has also accumulated relevant competence within debt counselling and other counselling in order to assist divers. Dykkerkontakten also contributes seminars, discussion groups and information online. Dykkerkontakten has a good reputation and has provided excellent medical, psychological, social and legal support to the divers for many years. However, the need for Dykkerkontakten’s services is apparently diminishing, and the work is entering a final phase. The Ministry therefore expects that Dykkerkontakten will eventually be phased out and that potential further follow-up needs will be met in the ordinary health and welfare system.

Diving-related research

The risk of delayed injuries in connection with diving has been highlighted in several contexts. For example, through PETROMAKS and PETROMAKS2, the Research Council of Norway has supported research where emphasis has been placed on HSE in diving activities on the shelf, and references results which indicate that biochemical factors are affected by diving2728. This research is e.g. significant for procedures that can increase the safety of saturation diving. As a step in the continuous safety work, the National Institute of Occupational Health (STAMI), on behalf of the Ministry, has conducted a mapping and review of the knowledge regarding health effects of occupational diving. Both national and international studies have been assessed in connection with the work. In its report from 201729, STAMI concludes that no certain serious health injuries have been proven from saturation diving or surface-supplied diving in the petroleum activities under normal circumstances, i.e. when the diving is carried out with a sufficient safety margin against known harmful exposure. Based on the knowledge review, STAMI’s assessment is that there is no documented occurrence of serious chronic health injuries related to diving to depths deeper than 180 metres, which is in practice the limit in the Norwegian petroleum activities today. This presumes that the divers have a certification which takes into account the special conditions that apply for such dives, good work organisation, good quality control regimes and good working environment conditions. It is also important that thorough health examinations of the divers are carried out both before and after the exposure, in line with applicable regulations. STAMI also references its study from 2010, which e.g. concluded that, compared to health monitoring of employees on land, divers appear to be safeguarded well30. In the report, STAMI points out that the current scheme with assessments before and after dives and health checks every three years, indicates that the divers are protected well with regard to health monitoring. Annual certificate verifications (or every two years) come in addition as an added safety factor.

STAMI otherwise believes there is a need for additional studies of saturation diving and potential health effects, with particular emphasis on psychological effects and effects on the central nervous system, as well as cardiovascular effects. The review will form an important basis for the authorities’ further follow-up within the area, and in the work on preventing injuries and illness as a result of occupational diving. As regards the need for additional research, the Ministry has signalled through the letter of award to the Research Council of Norway in 2018, that the Ministry expects research related to occupational diving, among other things.

4.6.9 Helicopter safety

Helicopter transportation is not in and of itself a part of the petroleum activities, but is closely related as a part of the total offshore activities. Helicopter risk constitutes a significant portion of the total risk exposure for employees on the shelf.

Helicopter operations on the shelf take place in challenging circumstances. The flights are over vast open sea areas to landing sites on fixed or floating installations that can be challenging to use. There are often no emergency landing sites apart from the actual sea surface. This entails some very significant demands, firstly as regards the aircraft’s reliability, equipment, procedures and flight crew training, but also for rescue equipment and for example evacuation training for passengers. In addition to these challenges, the climatic conditions in Norwegian coastal and sea areas, with frequent inclement weather and icing during winter, make the operation even more challenging.

Despite the high inherent risk of the helicopter operations, the safety development for helicopter operations in the Norwegian petroleum activities has had a clear positive trend since 1990. However, an EC225 helicopter crashed in April 2016 on the way from Gullfaks to Flesland, and 13 people died. The accident is being investigated by the Accident Investigation Board Norway. A preliminary report has been published. The direct cause of the accident appears to be a fatigue crack in a gear in the main gearbox.

Figure 4.11 shows the number of incidents with a small or medium remaining safety margin, i.e. that there is no or one remaining barrier, respectively, against a fatal accident.

Source RNNP 2017

The Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority supervises helicopter operations in the petroleum activities on the Norwegian shelf. In order to be allowed to conduct such helicopter operations in Norway, the helicopter company must be established in Norway and be certified with a licence and Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued by the Civil Aviation Authority. The Civil Aviation Authority supervises all helicopter operators that conduct offshore operations in the Norwegian area, as the audit responsibility falls to the state that issued the AOC certification31.

Over several decades, the helicopter companies, operators on the shelf and the employee organisations, together with the Norwegian authorities, have developed a good safety culture that contributes to the high safety level in helicopter operations on the Norwegian shelf, cf. Chapter 2.3.1. A tripartite HSE forum has also been established for the aviation industry. Participants include representatives from the employer side (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise – NHO), employee side (Parat, Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), Norsk Kabinforening, Norsk Flygerforbund) and representatives from the Civil Aviation Authority.

The oil price drop in 2014 led to cutbacks to reduce the costs associated with helicopter transport. Staff cuts and a reduction in the number of helicopters in the helicopter companies have required more efficient utilisation of helicopters and crews. One outcome of this is that flight crews often perform more flights per day than before. The increased exposure time for helicopter noise and vibrations can lead to challenges with regard to the crew’s working environment. This situation is being closely monitored by the Civil Aviation Authority.

Increasing oil and gas activities in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea and in the Barents Sea will entail an increased need for transport of personnel by helicopter to and from the relevant areas. The challenges in the north include a long winter season with darkness, and weather conditions characterised by fog, precipitation as snow, icing and polar low pressure. This is also a challenging weather forecasting area with few observations and vast geographical distances. Increased helicopter activity in these areas will therefore require close follow-up by players and the supervision authority.

4.6.10 Late phase

Facilities and associated infrastructure on the Norwegian shelf are normally designed and constructed with an estimated lifetime of approx. 15–30 years. About half of the fixed facilities are more than 20 years old, and the oldest facilities on the Norwegian shelf are now more than 40 years old. Figure 4.12 shows the age distribution of the operational fixed facilities on the Norwegian shelf, in number and percentage.

Source Petroleum Safety Authority

In order to use facilities beyond the original design lifetime, consent from the Petroleum Safety Authority and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate is required. The application for consent must be submitted one year before the planned lifetime expires. In the application, the operator must document that continued use of the facilities safeguards the requirements for prudent operations and the principles for risk reduction. As of 1 March 2017, 29 operational facilities on the Norwegian shelf have received consent for extended lifetime.

Use of facilities and infrastructure on the Norwegian shelf beyond the originally calculated lifetime requires attention on a number of factors. The operator must ensure that the safety level and technical integrity are maintained and safeguarded in an ageing facility. Changed use as the result of new or changed operational solutions, changed reservoir or drilling and well conditions and application of new technology, are all important elements that must be safeguarded.

On older facilities, the combination of new and old equipment and systems often poses a challenge. Modifications and changes can make it challenging to have an overview and understanding of the function of important safety barriers, and how they are correlated. The Petroleum Safety Authority has seen in recent years that certain incidents can be linked to deficient understanding of the interaction between old and new. Older equipment can also entail that the safety management is more operational, i.e. that there are less automatic processes to prevent and handle potential incidents. For “tomorrow’s“ barrier solutions it is therefore very important that the technical condition is good and that the personnel have good competence and understand the systems and equipment on the facility.

There is no basis for claiming that the general safety level on late-phase facilities is lower. Nor do figures from RNNP indicate that late-phase facilities stand out. In recent years, the industry has increased its understanding of ageing and late-phase problems and the Norwegian Oil and Gas association has issued guidelines concerning lifetime extensions, which were recently revised. However, the safety authority finds that the maintenance on late-phase facilities is characterised by being more corrective than preventative. This is a development that could weaken safety over time, and which the Petroleum Safety Authority is monitoring. In 2016–2017, the Petroleum Safety Authority e.g. cooperated with the authorities in the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum (NSOAF) on a series of audit activities that particularly addressed issues that are relevant for late phase. The goal of the cooperation is to ensure exchange of experience and learning between the member countries in NSOAF.

4.6.11 Well plugging

On the Norwegian shelf there are currently about 2000 active wells that produce petroleum, inject water or gas, or that are temporarily shut down. In addition, an estimated 100 to 150 new wells are drilled each year. Exploration wells have historically been plugged continuously, but there has been little plugging of production wells. Several fields are now approaching the end of their lifetimes and the total number of wells that will be plugged is increasing. Well plugging is therefore expected to constitute a significant portion of the activity level in the next 10 to 15 years.

Wells with deficient plugback can pose a risk to personnel, facilities and the environment. Leaks from such wells can cause a blowout, explosion, fire and pollution. It is therefore important that wells are plugged back in a manner that will prevent leaks from occurring in the future. To reduce the risk and prevent an accumulation of old wells, the authorities are concerned with ensuring the number of temporarily abandoned wells is as low as possible. The petroleum regulations stipulate that the wells that are not in use must be plugged back within a certain period.

One challenge is that older wells are not designed for being plugged and permanently abandoned in a simple and cost-efficient manner. In addition, structural weaknesses or changes in the subsurface may have occurred during a well’s lifetime, which makes it more challenging to plug the wells. Experience from plugback projects, both in Norway and in other countries, has proven that this work can be challenging. In many cases, it has taken just as long to permanently plug a well as it originally took to drill the well.

Today, there is no one method or one tool that can be used to fulfil all regulatory requirements for permanent plugging of wells. Finding safe, good, efficient and reasonable ways to plug and abandon wells is important to prevent unnecessary costs on the shelf going forward. Work is therefore ongoing in the industry to develop new methods and tools that can increase the efficiency of well plugging work. The Petroleum Safety Authority is closely monitoring this development. Established State funding schemes, for example through PETROMAKS2, Demo 2000 and Innovation Norway, have been, and will continue to be important in this development work.

4.6.12 Disposal

A number of facilities are expected to stop producing and be removed over the next ten-year period. Removal of facilities often entails multiple simultaneous activities, which places special requirements on comprehensive risk management of the activity.

In the removal phase, the Petroleum Safety Authority has supervisory responsibility until the facility, or parts of the facility, have been placed on board a vessel. From this date, the responsibility is transferred to the authorities in the country in which the vessel is registered. The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority is the responsible authority for the onshore scrap yard. The Norwegian Environment Agency is the authority and has supervisory responsibility for elements related to the external environment.

The Petroleum Safety Authority’s experience is that the companies’ execution of removal activities has substantially improved from when the first facilities were removed until today. In close cooperation, operating companies and involved contractors have developed equipment, methods, competence and systems which support a high HSE level. The Petroleum Safety Authority also finds that there is a greater extent of facilitation for safe removal of facilities when new developments are engineered.