5 Follow-up of the HSE regime

Today’s HSE regime was developed on the basis of experience gained since the beginning of the Norwegian petroleum activities, cf. Chapter 2.1.3. It is presumed that this regime, which emphasises a functional approach to the regulations and accountability of the industry in the safety work, has been an important foundation for a positive development and a high HSE level in the Norwegian petroleum activities.

Storting Report No. 29 (2010–2011) Joint responsibility for a good and decent working life, pointed out important challenges for the petroleum industry in the future. The Report e.g. pointed out that changes in activity level and the player landscape, with more small and international companies on the Norwegian shelf, could be significant for an active and well-functioning multipartite cooperation. The significance of tackling the challenges so that they do not lead to increased risk and damage to health, safety and the environment, was emphasised. This will require continuous awareness of the fact that authority follow-up and regulations must be designed such that new development trends and challenges are detected and handled in the optimal manner. The Ministry therefore signalled an exhaustive review and assessment of the HSE regime within the petroleum activities. This review was required to potentially confirm that the current scheme was expedient, or as a signal that major or minor changes were required. As follows from Chapter 4.2.4, a technical expert group was appointed in 2012 to review and assess the current HSE regime. In 2013, the expert group concluded that the Norwegian HSE regime for the petroleum activities predominantly works well, but that it has some important challenges. The group e.g. pointed out a need for clearer prioritisation and use of policy instruments on the part of the authorities and to consider a clear practice for cost-benefit assessments when introducing new regulations and administrative decisions. It was also pointed out that the authorities should improve the management of major accident risk through clearer and more detailed requirements for risk acceptance criteria and risk analyses.

In November 2016, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs also invited affected parties and authorities to join a work group for joint assessment and discussion of the HSE status and development in the Norwegian petroleum activities. The background for this was that the HSE development in 2015 and 2016 created a need to focus on the HSE situation in the petroleum activities. An important goal of the work group was to arrive at a representative and unified overview of the status of HSE in the petroleum activities. The group would also assess what would be required to maintain and improve the safety level, in parallel with efficient and commercial operations. The parties’ and authorities’ perception regarding the status, challenges and potential paths to further development and improvement would be included as a basis for this Storting Report on health, safety and environment in the petroleum industry. The work group’s report was presented to the Ministry on 29 September 2017. The work group pointed out that the authorities and parties, through the years, have supported the current HSE regime, which emphasises function-based rules, holding the players accountable and risk-based and dialogue-based supervisory follow-up. The work group concludes that the regime for follow-up of health, safety and environment in the Norwegian petroleum activities generally functions well and should be continued. The HSE regime facilitates innovation and flexibility in development and the selection of good solutions. This flexibility is desirable as the industry is in rapid development and the companies need to use the technology that is best suited at any given time. This flexibility constitutes the latitude in the regime. The latitude allows the parties to challenge each other and the authorities with regard to interpretation and follow-up of framework and opportunities. At the same time, the latitude has limits. The work group pointed out that challenges and testing the limits of the latitude can lead to jeopardising the trust between the players and increased pressure on how the regime is organised.

The work group also agreed that continuous improvement of health, safety and working environment is a precondition and shared goal in the petroleum activities. To ensure efficient operation and continuous improvement, the industry and authorities must always reach for, learn from and utilise new knowledge and new technology. The parties in the work group also agreed on cooperation measures for improved follow-up in a number of areas.

Through PETROMAKS, the Research Council of Norway has funded a project which analysed the unique features of the Norwegian regulatory regime, and compared it with other safety regulations1. The research shows that the safety regulation in the Norwegian petroleum activities has developed in a different manner than corresponding safety regulations on land, largely due to the strong tripartite cooperation. The research shows that the tripartite cooperation is a strength, both with regard to legitimacy, democratisation and efficiency. The project shows that trust is important for a functional tripartite cooperation, but experience also shows that trust-based structures are vulnerable. In the comparative study of the regimes in Norway, the UK and USA, the project shows that there is an important divide as regards whether the regulations are based on prescriptive and detailed rules or on describing the purpose and functional requirements. Prescriptive regulations reduce the ambiguity and number of possible actions and is a good fit where conflicts of interest are “legalised”. Function-based regulations allow for multiple possible solutions when conflicts of interest occur. The preconditions for function-based regulations to work are a high tolerance for uncertainty, high degree of trust between players and a supervisory practice that can be more instructive and dialogue based.

5.1 Follow-up by the industry and companies

Like other parts of Norwegian working life, the companies themselves are responsible for the HSE level in the petroleum activities.

Active and continuous follow-up from the industry itself is required to establish, maintain and further develop a high HSE level. Managers at all levels have a special responsibility to contribute to reducing the risk of major accidents and work-related illness and injury. The current HSE regime requires the industry and companies to be knowledgeable and able and willing to follow-up the expectations and framework that follow from the regime, including cooperation with the employee side, follow-up of the authorities’ supervision, as well as understanding and respect for the regulatory framework.

The HSE regulations impose an overarching responsibility on operating companies to ensure that regulatory requirements are met and that the other players in the activities are following up their duties. This is particularly important during a period characterised by major changes, and when there is uncertainty regarding how changes in work processes, staffing and organisation will affect health, safety and the environment going forward. The operator is responsible for daily operation of the petroleum activities, but does not have sole responsibility. The licensees must follow-up their duty of care and ensure the operator is running the activities responsibly and in compliance with applicable regulations.

Experience from the Petroleum Safety Authority’s audits in recent years shows that operating companies in the operations phase are generally actively following up to ensure that management systems have been established and function as intended, and that the HSE level is adequate. The Petroleum Safety Authority also believes that the companies largely do follow-up the duty of care, but that it can be more challenging to follow-up suppliers further down in the supply chain.

The petroleum industry has a tradition of sharing experience and facilitating learning after incidents, both nationally and internationally. Exchange of experience and learning is facilitated through established cooperation forums at the company level, in the tripartite cooperation and the authority level. This has among other things, contributed to changes in the regulatory regime and organisation of the authorities, further development of regulations, technological development and changes in the companies’ systems.

For many years the Norwegian Oil and Gas association, Norwegian Shipowners’ Association and Federation of Norwegian Industries have conducted joint projects to improve safety on the Norwegian shelf, cf. including the gas leak project, chemicals project and noise project mentioned in Chapter 4. Through these projects, the industry has taken responsibility in situations that have required better follow-up.

Prevention of major accidents has been, and remains, the most important task of the parties in the petroleum activities. Two of the most important focus areas for the industry will continue to be reduction of the number and severity of hydrocarbon leaks and well incidents. For this reason, the Norwegian Oil and Gas association has taken the initiative to revitalise the project “Reduction of hydrocarbon leaks on the Norwegian shelf“ where the trade unions and the Petroleum Safety Authority are also participating. The project aims to contribute to increased learning and exchange of experience concerning the incidents, cf. Chapter 4.4.2. Information packages containing the most important lessons from the various incidents are being prepared as a part of this work. These information packages are used in connection with HSE training out on the facilities. Players in the industry are also cooperating on reducing the number of well control incidents. For example, a dedicated industry forum has been established that will work on preparing learning packages that will be distributed to all rigs, and which constitute the basic premise of the learning material that is used to learn from incidents experienced by other rigs and companies.

The working environment standard in the Norwegian petroleum activities has largely seen a positive development during the 2011–2017 period, but the industry still has several working environment challenges. RNNP shows a negative trend as regards psychosocial working environment and safety culture in 2017, and there was an increase in serious personal injuries. Working conditions and organisation of work have impact on safety, working environment and health. The multipartite work group emphasised that the industry must continue to work to improve the working environment, with particular emphasis on challenges such as shift work and rotation schemes, noise and vibrations, chemical health risk and ergonomic factors. The group also pointed out that, for many years, there has been a positive development in the industry with regard to incorporating working environment requirements at an early stage in the design phase of new facilities and installations. This is cost-effective risk reduction that is in line with the principles of good risk management.

The parties in the work group agreed that night work must be limited to what is necessary and responsible, and good risk assessments must be conducted in connection with planning and execution of night work. Issues related to night work are followed up in a collaboration between the parties and authorities under the Regulatory Forum. The work group also pointed out that further work is required on developing good knowledge and documentation concerning working environment risk in the petroleum industry. The industry must work to achieve better mapping of exposure and risk, for example in connection with benzene, but also hazardous chemicals in general and other defined working environment factors for risk-exposed groups. The parties in the industry also agree that companies should register their own metering data in the national database EXPO2, and the industry associations will encourage the companies to use this database. Use of the EXPO database is highly significant for the development of broad and factual knowledge about chemical working environment in the industry. A collaboration has been established under the Safety Forum as a follow-up of the multipartite group’s recommendations. Through this project, the parties will further improve knowledge and documentation related to noise, vibrations and chemical exposure.

It is well documented that there is a causal link between working environment exposure and reduced health and job involvement in employees3. There is also increasing scientific documentation proving that a poor working environment is very costly to society and companies. At the same time, new research has shown that good working environment conditions have a positive impact on the companies’ results and productivity. And, provided that working environment measures have been means-tested and are knowledge-based, there is also increasing documentation that the cost-benefit effect of such measures is clearly positive. In an industry that needs to cut costs and streamline, there are thus good reasons for improving working environment conditions, beyond the purely safety-related. However, this is contingent upon developing the working environment based on real needs at each workplace, and that the measures being implemented are related to the execution and organisation of the actual work. It has been proven that this is important for the working environment measures to have an effect and this should therefore be a governing factor in the systematic working environment effort.

Joint projects have considerable significance for the HSE work in the petroleum sector. Work carried out in the collaboration arenas has helped challenge the parties, and led to a joint benefit for the HSE work. Surveys and research projects have led to increased insight and knowledge that is actively being used in the work. In recent years there has also been increased contact between the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway and the parties in the industry, which has resulted in elucidation and more focus on different aspects of the HSE work. At the same time, it is important that such joint projects are followed up in the individual companies, and that the effect of the projects is promoted. The multipartite work group pointed out that the parties should encourage assessments and agreements in the tripartite arenas to be followed up and to yield an effect in the HSE work and HSE level in the companies.

Due to the rapid technological development within the petroleum activities, continuous knowledge development is required when it comes to health, safety and the working environment. It is also important that new technology that could affect efficiency and safety is utilised by the companies.

The operators have made major contributions to research and study projects that are relevant for petroleum activity on the Norwegian shelf. The industry’s investments in research peaked in 2013. After this, operators significantly reduced their investments. The operators have made more cuts in external R&D investments than internal R&D investments, and it is thus more challenging for the institute sector to provide necessary research funding from the operators than before. The Research Council of Norway is concerned about this development and is monitoring it in a close dialogue with the operators.

Knowledge and technology development are fundamental prerequisites for the continuous improvement work in the petroleum activities. The industry must therefore ensure that this is prioritised by the organisations and companies. The multipartite group recommended that the industry, authorities and relevant research communities, establish a work group that will examine to what extent HSE-relevant research has yielded results, and how new technology can be put to use. This is followed up in the Safety Forum.

5.2 Follow-up by the authorities

The authorities have different policy instruments for contributing to a high HSE level in the petroleum industry. This applies both with regard to ensuring serious players and cooperating on continuous improvement work in all phases of the activity.

5.2.1 Follow-up of the licensing system

The HSE requirements are followed up through out all phases of the petroleum activity. The framework contributes to giving the authorities good management and control over the petroleum activities, from exploration for petroleum deposits, development and production to cessation of the activity, cf. Chapter 2.1.1. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is responsible for conducting licensing rounds and approval of development plans.

The safety authorities, represented by the Petroleum Safety Authority and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, also give their expert assessments to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in connection with the applications. There is a clear division of responsibility and roles between the authorities in this work, and this division is fixed and continued. However, decisions concerning the HSE regulations can have an impact on efficient operations, and decisions concerning awards and transfers can have an impact on the safety level. The authorities must therefore ensure that we have serious and competent players on the Norwegian shelf.

The criteria for awarding production licences include requirements related to the composition of the production licences and special requirements related to expertise and operational experience for the activity in the Barents Sea, in deep sea areas, areas with high pressure and/or high temperature. These criteria were most recently made more stringent in 2011, as the result of experience after the blowout on Deepwater Horizon.

5.2.2 The Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervision

The most visible part of the Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervisory follow-up is the continuous follow-up of the industry. The supervision covers a broad spectrum of activities from traditional control activities such as audits, meetings with the industry and investigation of incidents through all phases of the petroleum activity. A description of the Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervision strategy and method follows from Chapter 2.2.

The technical expert group that discussed supervision strategy and HSE regulations in the Norwegian petroleum activities in 2013, concluded that the Norwegian HSE regime is generally robust and should be continued. At the same time, it was pointed out that there is a need for clearer prioritisation and use of policy instruments and that the Petroleum Safety Authority should be more clear in exercising its role as a supervisory authority, in the application of the basis for supervision, dialogue-based audits and use of statutory and non-statutory instruments. The Petroleum Safety Authority has followed up this challenge through building and further developing its employees’ knowledge and competence through broad-based technical training services. The expert group also pointed out a need to assess the regulations and the authorities’ follow-up of major accident risk. The PSA implemented different measures based on this, such as regulatory clarifications, risk and barrier management projects and follow-up of the players in the industry. The supervisory authority and the industry have taken a number of initiatives within risk management, barrier management and management follow-up.

In 2017, the multipartite work group also agreed that a system and risk-based supervision model is a key part of the HSE regime, and should be continued. Furthermore, the group agreed on the necessity of strong and clear supervision, with necessary authority. The Petroleum Safety Authority’s supervision strategy is generally based on dialogue and trust, and in order to have the necessary authority, the Petroleum Safety Authority must be competent, clear and consistent in exercising its role as a supervision and control authority vis-à-vis the industry and individual companies. There are different viewpoints regarding whether the Petroleum Safety Authority's trust-based strategy is fully appropriate given the current situation in the industry. The labour organisations in the work group expressed that, in light of individual cases, it can be questioned whether the PSA always has sufficient authority and uses its policy instruments in a satisfactory manner. This particularly applies in connection with repeated findings of undesirable factors and conditions.

In a broad sense, the supervision term can be understood as all activity and use of policy instruments that are implemented to follow-up the intention of and compliance with the regulations. It thus includes all activities that give the Petroleum Safety Authority grounds for assessing whether the companies are taking responsibility for prudent operations, during all phases of the activity. In a long-term perspective, the Petroleum Safety Authority’s ambition is to contribute to prevention and continuous improvement, to support the objective of world-leading HSE results in the petroleum activities.

The Petroleum Safety Authority rarely uses formal sanctions. If use of dialogue is considered to be equally efficient as formal sanctions, this is preferred. The purpose of the policy instruments, including sanctions, is to hold the players accountable and to ensure compliance with regulations. One advantage of cautious use of formal sanctions could be that the responsibility for follow-up is clearly placed with the companies themselves, and one maintains room to send more powerful signals when the PSA does not trust the players’ own follow-up.

In every single case, the Petroleum Safety Authority must assess the use of policy instruments and sanctions with regard to the desired result and effect. The PSA must continuously adapt to changes in the industry and continuously assess its own supervision follow-up and use of sanctions. The supervision role is exercised and perceived differently in different contexts. The PSA must therefore be aware of and clear with regard to which signals and effect result from use of the different policy instruments. A dialogue-based follow-up promotes learning and emphasises the industry’s responsibility, but can be perceived by the industry more as guidance and advice rather than authority supervision. Use of sanctions emphasises the role as a control and supervision agency. A development with changed framework conditions and more challenging situations could indicate that there is a need for the Petroleum Safety Authority to be more clear in its use of sanctions and to verify that orders are followed up, as necessary.

In recent years, the Petroleum Safety Authority has dedicated particular attention to assessment and use of policy instruments and sanctions in all phases of the petroleum activities. Most developments on the Norwegian shelf are carried out within the range of uncertainty for time and costs that is provided in the PDO. However, certain developments have experienced challenges with significant overruns, both as regards costs and implementation time. This could also be significant for quality and HSE in the engineering and construction. Based on this, the Petroleum Safety Authority will review experiences from audits of safety and working environment in development projects in recent years, with the aim of summarising experiences, identifying potential deficiencies in project implementation and lessons learned, as well as propose measures for further development of its own supervision. This includes assessing appropriate use of audits and sanctions at an early phase of development projects.

The Petroleum Safety Authority shall therefore, in an active and visible manner, assess its use of policy instruments and how the entire spectrum of policy instruments is used in the authorities’ follow-up of the companies. To ensure the Petroleum Safety Authority has legitimacy and authority in exercising the regulatory role, the agency must also ensure that it has the competence and capacity to assess future development trends, the implications this may have for supervision, use of policy instruments and potential needs for regulatory development.

5.2.3 Prioritised main topics for supervision

Based on development trends in the industry over the last few years, the Petroleum Safety Authority launched the main topic “Reverse the trend – with the Petroleum Safety Authority initiating and the industry executing“ in 2017. The background for the main topic was RNNP results, experience from supervision activities and incidents and information from different parties in the industry on risk, which indicated a negative trend in the HSE development in 2015 and 2016. The goal was to highlight a few key challenges and to contribute to getting the development on the right track. The three key challenges were multipartite cooperation, robustness and standardisation. The Petroleum Safety Authority conducted audits and carried out several other activities in its follow-up of the industry. There was a good dialogue and a high level of involvement regarding the topics in 2017.

Overall, “Reverse the trend“ contributed to increased attention and knowledge regarding improvement measures in the industry in connection with multipartite cooperation, robustness and standardisation. The main topic also led to a debate and exchange of experience, and has put important topics on the agenda. Although the main topic for 2017 has been concluded, multipartite cooperation, robustness and standardisation will continue to be important topics for follow-up going forward.

In 2018, the Petroleum Safety Authority chose “Safety is a choice of value“ as its main topic. With this, the PSA is emphasising that safety is the pillar of the Norwegian petroleum activities. Without a safe industry, values are at stake. The industry is changing and constantly choosing new solutions, but protecting the life and health of people must still be the top priority. The Petroleum Safety Authority emphasises that the parties have a joint responsibility for strengthening and further developing the safety level that has been developed over many years. In order to succeed, the value of safety must be acknowledged in all decisions.

5.2.4 Investigation of accidents and independent committee of inquiry

When processing Storting Report No. 12 (2005–2006) Health, safety and environment in the petroleum activities it was concluded that it should be possible to establish ad-hoc committees of inquiry when an external investigation of the course of events, regulations and the operator’s and authorities’ role is needed for incidents in the petroleum activities. In 2010, the Ministry entered into an agreement with the Accident Investigation Board Norway relating to assistance in connection with potential inquiries, cf. Chapter 2.2.4. External committees of inquiry have not been implemented after this. The employee side in the industry has requested use of independent committees of inquiry in the petroleum activities. The Ministry finds that use of independent investigations will be important and useful when required, but still does not believe that it is expedient to establish a fixed independent committee of inquiry for the petroleum activities. Based on the current scheme, a committee of inquiry can be established both when necessary due to objectivity considerations and the general trust in the authorities and regime, and with regard to learning and improvement. An external, independent committee of inquiry will therefore be considered, for example when there is a need to assess the authorities’ role and follow-up, and for particularly serious incidents.

5.2.5 Measures to reduce the cost level on the shelf

In the Government’s political platform in 2013 (the Sundvolden platform), the Government expressed a commitment to reduce the cost level on the Norwegian shelf. A review of potential measures to simplify the movement of mobile facilities between different countries’ shelves in the North Sea was therefore initiated, as well as a cooperation between the authorities to prepare a joint guideline for socioeconomic analysis for decisions in the petroleum activities.

5.2.5.1 Easier movement of mobile facilities between different countries’ shelves

On behalf of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the Petroleum Safety Authority prepared the report “Movements of mobile facilities between continental shelves in the North Sea Basin“ in 2015. In the report, the Petroleum Safety Authority identified possible measures that can make it easier to move mobile facilities between the Norwegian and UK shelves and/or reduce costs and increase efficiency, without concluding whether it would be expedient to implement the measures.

On behalf of the Ministry, the Petroleum Safety Authority has continued working on selected measures that were identified in the report. Of these, measures that are not expected to have a negative impact on the HSE level were followed up. These measures include clarifying the regulations in certain areas, as well as certain changes in the supervisory follow-up and regulations for mobile facilities. Other assessed measures have either not been feasible, would not increase efficiency, or are expected to have a negative impact on the HSE level. The Government will not implement measures that are expected to have a negative impact on the HSE level in the petroleum activities.

5.2.5.2 Sector guideline for socioeconomic analysis

When assessing State measures that are expected to yield significant benefit or cost effects, including significant budget-related effects for the State, an analysis must be carried out in accordance with the applicable circular letter for socioeconomic analyses.

To improve the quality of such analyses, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is in charge of a project that will prepare a joint sector guideline4 for socioeconomic analysis for the petroleum sector. The sector guideline will cover decisions in the petroleum sector, regardless of which authority makes the decision. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Ministry of Climate and Environment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, Norwegian Environment Agency, Petroleum Safety Authority and Norwegian Government Agency for Financial Management are participating in the work. The purpose of the sector guideline is to contribute to ensuring a sound decision basis prior to authority decisions. A good decision basis will yield better considerations for resource utilisation and HSE. The sector guideline will e.g. specify how to take into account major accident risk and emissions/discharges that could have a negative impact on environmental values that is hard to quantify. The work on the sector guideline is in the final phase.

5.3 Participation and multipartite cooperation

The two-party and three-party cooperation are major preconditions and important arenas for the HSE regime in the Norwegian petroleum activities. Good cooperation presumes sound and open communication and mutual recognition of roles and responsibilities. A good two-party cooperation in the enterprises is characterised by good processes, transparency and real participation in the relationship between the employer and employee sides. The formal basis and different arenas for multipartite cooperation and participation are discussed in Chapter 2.3.

Employee participation entails that the employees and their representatives are involved in the relevant processes so that their input and opinions can constitute a part of the decision basis, that they have the necessary knowledge and that they are allowed the time necessary to perform their tasks. Through employee participation, the employees’ overall knowledge and experience is used to ensure matters are sufficiently elucidated before decisions are made regarding health, safety and environment, and that the employees are given the opportunity to influence on their own work situation.

Employees in the petroleum activities have important knowledge and experience that contributes to the foundation for good HSE work. Participation is therefore considered a precondition for responsible petroleum activities, and shall be carried out in the various phases of the activity. Audit experience shows that in companies with a good cooperation climate, where real employee participation works, the multipartite cooperation contributes positively to the health, safety and environment work.

The companies shall facilitate real employee participation, and ensure that statutory schemes such as working environment committees and safety delegates are used well in preventive HSE work, and in connection with change and streamlining. The petroleum industry has undergone a challenging period with downsizing and reorganisation. This situation can also be challenging for the established multipartite cooperation. In connection with its main topic in 2017 “Reverse the trend”, the Petroleum Safety Authority pointed out that it has registered increased pressure on the multipartite cooperation, particularly in connection with streamlining the enterprises and downsizing. The multipartite cooperation was followed up through numerous activities in 2017, in audits, status meetings with the companies’ management, the Safety Forum, meetings with trade unions and forums for coordinating main safety delegates. The PSA has found that the multipartite cooperation has varying degrees of functionality in the companies. The perceived pressure on the two-party cooperation can be correlated with the fact that the industry is adapting to changed framework conditions. The development in management and organisation methods, which may entail that less emphasis is being placed on real participation and cooperation, could also affect the two-party cooperation. However, there are nuances between the parties in the industry concerning the perception of to what extent participation and cooperation in the petroleum activities have come under pressure. Audits of employee participation in change processes also show that several players are able to achieve good processes with broad involvement and that there is a good cooperation between management, the safety delegate service and employee representatives.

A study published by the Petroleum Safety Authority in 2016 showed that the employee side was not involved sufficiently and early enough in HSE-critical issues, that the safety delegates experienced challenges related to sufficient time, and weaknesses and deficiencies in training and expertise5. Most companies had formal systems and structures in place, but there was some variation with regard to how well this worked in practice. IRIS and Fafo, on behalf of the Petroleum Safety Authority and the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, carried out a research project on employee participation in the petroleum activities and at major construction sites on land6. The project examined preconditions for and challenges with facilitation for employee participation at the company level and in contract chains. A general impression from interviews with some companies in the petroleum sector is that both the employer side and employee side are active and involved in the HSE work. The cooperation is often described as challenging, but constructive. The companies had many good intentions and experience with employee participation and multipartite cooperation. The companies devoted considerable time and resources to cooperation with the trade unions, and organisation of the safety delegate service and working environment committees.

Trust in the two-party cooperation is a foundation for the tripartite cooperation and a precondition for the Norwegian HSE regime. Around year 2000, there were signs that the parties in the industry lacked a joint point of departure and a joint perception of the risk level, and that sufficient emphasis was not being placed on multipartite cooperation and participation. Concrete steps were taken to improve the tripartite cooperation, e.g. through the establishment of the Safety Forum in 2001. RNNP was also established in 1999 to contribute to a unified understanding of the development in risk level among the employer side, employee side and authorities. After this, the Norwegian petroleum activities were considered a vanguard industry with regard to organisation and cooperation between the three parties.

The multipartite work group from 2017 agreed that the tripartite arenas in the petroleum activities generally work well and should be continued. Important topics and issues are put on the agenda and discussed between the three parties, and the discussions are characterised by a willingness to cooperate. In 2017, the Safety Forum was expanded with members from the Tekna (Norwegian Society of Chartered Technical and Scientific Professionals) and NITO (Norwegian Society of Engineers) employee organisations, and this is particularly relevant based on the rapid technological development and the challenges that this entails for the petroleum activities.

In the tripartite arenas, the parties are largely represented through their organisations, and the discussions take place at a general and principal level, cf. Chapter 2.3.1. The organisations cannot formally require their members to specifically follow-up discussions and agreements in the tripartite arenas, although the organisations’ advice can have a major significance for the companies’ prioritisations.

Joint initiatives and projects in prioritised areas have been implemented under the Safety Forum, cf. for example the discussion in Chapter 4 of the chemicals project, noise project and northern area effort. These are considered positive collaborative projects that have led to involvement and activity in the industry. At the same time, there are situations today where the tripartite cooperation is being challenged to a greater extent than before. There may be a need and potential for better utilisation of the tripartite arenas for reaching agreement on challenges and follow-up. The added value of the tripartite cooperation is contingent upon discussions in the tripartite arenas leading to cooperation on follow-up and measures.

The companies have undergone major changes over recent years and have gained considerable experience with employee participation when implementing challenging change processes. There are examples of both processes where the participation has worked well and processes with deficient participation. It is important that this experience is used for further learning. Based on a recommendation from the multipartite work group from 2017, a multipartite effort has been initiated under the Safety Forum to collect, discuss and compare experience with the aim of learning and further development of the multipartite cooperation. This group can e.g. discuss and define roles and responsibility in the two and three-party cooperation, and discuss various management systems.

5.4 Learning, exchange of experience and prevention

The petroleum industry has extensive experience with sharing knowledge and experience and facilitating learning from incidents. Knowledge and experience are exchanged through established collaboration forums at the enterprise level, in the tripartite cooperation and at the authority level.

Challenges related to learning and the question of why lessons have not been learned, often come up in connection with investigation of incidents and accidents. Both direct triggers and underlying causes of accidents often have commonalities. In connection with investigation of major accidents, it is often found that information and knowledge in the organisations could have contributed to preventing the accident.

However, it is not just undesirable incidents that provide grounds for learning. There is also a lot to learn from why things go well. PETROMAKS2 has funded research that has contributed to increased knowledge about why accidents do not occur, and which preconditions must be present for a work operation to be characterised as a success7. Knowledge has been developed which could help the industry achieve more targeted learning from successful operations. This will in turn contribute to the industry being more proactive in the safety work, so that management systems and procedures and actual work practice can be adjusted before an undesirable incident or accident occurs.

Today, there are many meeting venues and arenas where HSE is being discussed and there is a vast scope of knowledge that can be shared. However, the knowledge needs to be systemised to a better extent in order to yield good learning after incidents. Through Safety Forum, the parties have appointed a multidisciplinary multipartite work group on this basis, which will assess how sharing of knowledge can be made more efficient and systematic in a long-term perspective.

5.5 Organisation of regulations and use of standards

Expedient and up-to-date standards are important for a functioning regulatory regime. From approx. 2005 to 2014, there was a development towards more company-specific requirements in the industry. After 2015, however, there has been a clear development towards using joint standards. The Norwegian Oil and Gas association has also conducted a project with the aim of identifying company-specific requirements, pointing out their unfortunate consequences and proposing measures to move away from company-specific requirements and instead use joint and recognised industry standards. IOGP also has a major project to identify and coordinate company-specific requirements and, over time, promote them as joint industry standards (ISO).

Through the years, the standardisation work has had varying levels of involvement and impact. Among other things, in 2013 this led to a considerable lag in updating standards that are referenced in the regulations. However, extraordinary measures in the standardisation work have contributed to rectifying this situation, so that the NORSOK standards today are largely updated8.

The NORSOK owners (the Norwegian Oil and Gas association, Federation of Norwegian Industries and Norwegian Shipowners’ Association), agree on the following goals for petroleum standardisation:

• Ensure a prudent safety level

• Increase use of international standards

• Reduce use of special Norwegian requirements

• Reduce the need for internal company specifications

• Ensure standards represent cost-efficient solutions

• Contribute to strengthening competitiveness for the Norwegian continental shelf

The authorities also support these goals. The Petroleum Safety Authority wants to contribute to ensuring the industry has relevant standards that fulfil the need for detailed specifications, so that users can comply with functional requirements in the regulations. It is also important that standards are further developed, so that they help maintain a high HSE level and HSE development in line with the technological development.

The development in the industry in recent years with a generational shift, new players, etc. indicates that there is a need to promote knowledge concerning the function-based regulation. One of the multipartite work group’s recommendations was therefore that the Petroleum Safety Authority, in cooperation with the parties in the industry, takes the initiative to assess the established training that is offered in relation to the regulatory regime. The objective of the work will be to further develop the training that is offered and increase the competence regarding the regulatory regime in the industry. This work is anchored in the Regulatory Forum.

5.6 Knowledge development

The industry’s prioritisations are crucial for the knowledge development in the petroleum activities. Investments in research and technology are mainly funded by the oil companies. In 2016, these investments totalled about NOK 3.2 billion for the sector overall. Development in recent years shows that investments in R&D increased until 2013 to a level just under NOK 4.2 billion, and then started declining. After 2013, however, the percentage of internal company research activity has increased. This indicates that the external research communities have experienced the greatest reductions. The Research Council of Norway is concerned about this development and is monitoring it in a close dialogue with the operators.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has overarching regulatory responsibility for research on safety and working environment in the petroleum activities. The publically funded research is generally organised as a part of the Research Council of Norway’s major petroleum programme, PETROMAKS2. This effort has been continued and synchronised with the rest of the PETROMAKS2 programme, and has been converted into a continuous operation with three-year programme plans.