2 Challenges

Following the end of the Cold War there were great expectations that the arms race between the US and the former Soviet Union would come to a halt and be replaced by disarmament and cooperation. There was also a hope that rapprochement between the two former rivals would reduce tension between their allies and pave the way for disarmament, cooperation and development in many parts of the world.

Several developments in the 1990s confirmed this positive trend. Both Russia and the US carried out large cuts in their weapons arsenals and engaged in closer cooperation on disarmament and securing nuclear material. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) achieved almost universal adherence and was extended indefinitely in 1995.

The nuclear tests carried out by France in the 1990s triggered strong reactions all over the world, including in Norway. However, in 1996 the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed, and in 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force. South Africa abandoned its nuclear weapons programme, and nuclear weapons deployed in former Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine were either dismantled or transferred to Russia.

As regards conventional weapons, the 1992 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) led to a 50% reduction in the amount of military equipment in Europe in the course of a few years, and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty) was a milestone in humanitarian arms control efforts. Never before had such extensive disarmament measures been implemented in such a short period of time.

There were, however, also a number of negative developments. The most serious of these were India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, North Korea’s undisguised nuclear ambitions and Iraq’s secret weapons programme in the wake of the first Gulf War. These developments led to increased regional tension and undermined efforts to promote further nuclear arms control and disarmament. They also revealed serious flaws in the international non-proliferation regime.

Alongside these developments, considerable conventional stockpiling was taking place in several countries, due in part to the large supply of weapons from former Warsaw Pact states and increased focus on new markets from the weapons industry in both the East and the West.

The beginning of the millennium has not been encouraging as regards arms control and disarmament efforts. On the contrary, we have seen considerable stockpiling in a number of countries, particularly in the US, China and Russia. In 2007, the total global military spending reached approximately NOK 6 500 billion. This is an increase of 37% compared with 1997.

The fight against international terrorism has also fuelled military stockpiling. The growing tension in many regions, not least in the Middle East, has also contributed to this. So have the strained relations between Russia and the US. China has also increased its armaments considerably in recent years and now ranks fourth in terms of military spending, after the US, the UK and France. Mounting tension, combined with a stronger economy and increased national assertiveness in many countries, indicates that we may be on the verge of a new arms race, as regards both conventional and nuclear weapons.

2.1 Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

Between them, Russia and the US possess more than 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons. The remaining 5% belong to China, France, the UK, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Israel is not willing to confirm or deny that it possesses such weapons.

Although Russia and the US have more than halved their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, they still have about 27 000 nuclear warheads, of which roughly half are operative. A small fraction of these weapons would be sufficient to destroy the world.

There is broad consensus among most politicians and military experts that nuclear weapons are useless except as deterrents, and then mainly in relation to other nuclear powers. Their usefulness as deterrents is gradually declining in the face of terrorism and other modern security challenges.

Nevertheless, there is little indication that the nuclear states are planning further reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Russia and the US appear to be meeting their reduction commitments under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). It is, however, unclear what will happen when these treaties expire in 2009 and 2012 respectively, (see also fact box 2.1).

The future of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which prohibits the US and Russia from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometres, is also uncertain, because Russia has expressed doubt as to whether the treaty still serves the country’s security interests.

The fact that the today’s nuclear powers, and particularly the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, seem reluctant to make further reductions in their nuclear arsenals reinforces the idea that nuclear weapons are important in order to gain international respect and major-power status.

Several nuclear powers are also developing smaller, more sophisticated nuclear weapons, thereby indicating that they consider nuclear weapons to be of military use, and this could lower the threshold for using such weapons.

It is generally presumed that there are nine nuclear weapon states at present. That is an increase of three since the signing of the NPT 40 years ago. However, there are more than 40 countries that currently do not possess nuclear weapons but have a civilian nuclear capacity that relatively quickly could be converted into military programmes. This figure is expected to increase in the years to come. There is therefore justifiable cause for concern that new countries will acquire nuclear weapons.

At present, it is Iran that poses the greatest challenge as regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For many years the country has had a secret nuclear programme and has deliberately tried to deceive the international community.

Even after Iran’s nuclear programme was revealed in 2002, the Iranian authorities have by no means shown sufficient willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nor has Iran acted on the international community’s demand that it suspend sensitive nuclear activities such as the enrichment of uranium and the building of a heavy water reactor. In addition, Iran has an extensive missile programme and is developing missiles that have an increasingly longer range.

The two unanimous Security Council resolutions adopted in December 2006 and March 2007, respectively, which imposed limited sanctions aimed at getting Iran to change its course, seem to have had only limited effect. On 3 March this year, the Security Council adopted a new resolution which further tightened the sanctions.

Iran poses a particular challenge because it is to be expected that a number of other states in the region will want to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran should do so.

Although it is presumed that Iran is not pursuing an active nuclear weapons programme at the moment, there is persistent uneasiness in the region and in the international community that the authorities will build up the necessary capacities to make the development of nuclear weapons possible within a short period of time. It is therefore essential that Iran provides full transparency about its nuclear programme and allows the IAEA to monitor it.

No one is questioning Iran’s right to develop civilian nuclear power. However, the experience gained during the past few decades indicates that there is every reason to be on guard with regard to Iran’s true nuclear ambitions.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme is another main challenge facing the international community. Despite progress in the negotiations generally referred to as the six-party talks, North Korea does not appear to be prepared to terminate its nuclear weapons programme. The efforts to find a lasting solution are ongoing, but previous experience with North Korea indicates that we must have realistic expectations.

A halt in nuclear test explosions is an important means of preventing the development of new nuclear weapons. It is therefore encouraging that several nuclear weapons states have declared that they will refrain from new test explosions.

However, countries such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and the US have not adhered to the CTBT and are thus not bound under international law to refrain from nuclear test explosions. Their adherence to the treaty would be an important step towards preventing the development of new weapons and dismantling existing nuclear arsenals (see also fact box 2.2).

Access to high-quality fissile material is a prerequisite for the development of nuclear weapons. A ban on the production of weapons-grade fissile material would therefore be an important contribution to the efforts to prevent nuclear stockpiling and a nuclear arms race. There has for a long time been international agreement that the next step must be to negotiate such a ban.

There is, however, still no agreement on launching negotiations, partly because the nuclear weapons states that have remained outside the NPT and that have not stockpiled such material are for the time being unwilling to take on binding commitments in this field. A further complication arises from the fact that the US, unlike almost all other countries, is advocating that the treaty should not include transparency and verification mechanisms.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) prohibits the permanent deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. On the other hand it does not prohibit making use of space for combat operations or as a transit area for ballistic missiles. It therefore has significant flaws and should be modernised.

The plans for extending the US missile defence system to cover parts of Europe has led to strong protests, not least on the part of Russia. Viewed in isolation, a missile defence system can provide increased protection against ballistic missiles within a given geographical area, but the Government questions whether such a system would improve security at the international level. We believe that the threats posed by ballistic missiles need to be addressed using a wide range of measures, primarily political and diplomatic.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a key role in the international efforts to uncover secret programmes for the development of nuclear weapons. Its inspection regime is the most important tool in this respect. In 1997 a new mechanism, the Additional Protocol, was adopted to strengthen the IAEA’s inspection regime.

The Additional Protocol is essential to the IAEA’s ability to verify that a given country’s nuclear activities are of an exclusively civilian nature. It is a problem that a large number of countries, including in the Middle East, have not signed the Additional Protocol.

Furthermore, the persistently high price of oil, strong economic growth and the challenges posed by climate change have made nuclear power more attractive as a source of energy for many countries, including developing countries. There is therefore reason to believe that the use of such energy will increase in the future. Since the technology used to produce nuclear fuel is by and large the same as that used for producing weapons-grade material, there is reason to believe that the proliferation risk will also increase in years to come.

All of the 186 countries that are currently party to the NPT have the right to develop and use nuclear power for civilian purposes. For most of the states parties this right is just as important as the two other pillars of the NPT, i.e. nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This underlines the need for comprehensive solutions.

Since 2005, the US and India have been negotiating an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Both the US and India point out that the agreement is important in order to meet India’s energy needs. Others believe that the agreement will undermine the non-proliferation regime since India has not joined the NPT and is not willing to renounce its nuclear weapons. It is still uncertain when the agreement will be finalised. The issue is being debated both in the US Congress and in the Indian Parliament.

Close cooperation on the use of civilian nuclear energy has generally been reserved for countries that have joined – and are therefore bound by – the NPT. It is in any case important to ensure that other countries are not treated in the same way as India. This would seriously undermine the NPT.

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is currently being used in a number of research reactors and to a certain extent also as fuel for submarines and ice-breakers. HEU is also an important input in the production of nuclear weapons. The fear is therefore that terrorist groups could gain access to HEU from civilian installations and use it to produce simple nuclear weapons.

There is also a risk that terrorist groups could get hold of radioactive material and use it to make radiological weapons, so-called dirty bombs. Although the explosive power of such weapons is no greater than that of other conventional bombs, they could cause considerable panic, partly because of the fear of serious health consequences.

The terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia have demonstrated that terrorists have no compunction about launching large-scale attacks on civilians. On the contrary, terrorist actions are today claiming more civilian lives than ever before.

There is little doubt that a number of terrorist groups will be willing to use weapons of mass destruction if they gain access to such weapons. We saw an example of this in 1995, when an Japanese extremist group attempted to carry out mass murder on the Tokyo Underground by means of chemical gases.

Most countries have undertaken not to produce or use chemical or biological weapons. However, one of the challenges that remains will be to strengthen the two conventions that prohibit the use of such weapons in order to speed up progress in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of hazardous chemical and biological substances and destroy existing stockpiles of such weapons in a safe manner.

It is also the case that a large number of developing countries do not have the capacity to enforce the control they have undertaken to carry out. This applies both to the physical protection of hazardous materials and to the control of export and transit of materials and technology that can be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction.

We must recognise that deliberate efforts are being made to circumvent existing measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Both states and criminal networks can be behind such unlawful activities. The “Khan network” in Pakistan was uncovered as recently as in 2003. This network had specialised in illegal trade in technology and equipment for the production of nuclear weapons, and had connections in countries such as North Korea, Libya and Iran. The challenges in this area have led to strengthened international intelligence cooperation with a view to preventing illegal trade in such equipment and technology.

2.2 Conventional weapons

The 1992 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) has played a key role in safeguarding stability and security in post-Cold-War Europe. The treaty has led to extensive conventional disarmament by imposing limitations on many types of weapons, and to greater transparency and confidence through the regular exchange of information and comprehensive verification and inspection schemes.

At the 1999 summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe, it was agreed that the treaty should be adapted to take into account the foreign and security policy developments that had taken place in Europe since the treaty was originally concluded. However, the adapted treaty was never ratified by the NATO countries due to Russia’s failure to withdraw from Georgia and Moldova, and thus never entered into force.

Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty as from 12 December 2007. The suspension entails that Russia no longer considers itself obliged to comply with the treaty and will no longer provide information about its armed forces nor allow inspections on its territory.

There is at present ongoing contact between the NATO countries and Russia with a view to continuing the CFE regime (see also fact box 2.3). But there is a real danger that the most comprehensive and successful conventional disarmament agreement ever may fall apart in the foreseeable future.

Over the years, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation has developed a number of confidence- and security-building measures, which are set out in the 1999 Vienna Document. The purpose of the measures is to enhance confidence, cooperation and security among all of the OSCE’s participating states. The OSCE obligations are similar to those set out in the CFE Treaty, but are not binding under international law and are far less extensive, particularly as regards exchange of information and verification.

The OSCE Treaty on Open Skies (OS), which entered into force on 1 January 2002, requires member states to reciprocally open their air space to aerial observation flights using specially equipped observation aircraft. The OS Treaty complements and underpins the CFE Treaty, as does the Vienna Document. However, neither of these agreements can fill the vacuum created by Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty.

Civilians are being affected by war to an increasing degree. In modern wars, civilians typically account for between 70% and 90% of the victims, who are often mainly women and children. Civilian populations suffer particularly from the effects of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, as these weapons do not distinguish between civilians and combatants, and can remain armed and explode several years after a conflict has ended. Unexploded submunitions are also a major obstacle to development, because agricultural land, roads and other infrastructure cannot be used and refugees and displaced persons are unable to return to their homes until vast resources have been used to clear mines and cluster munitions. Assisting victims puts an additional strain on limited health care resources. As a result, the whole society is affected.

The consequences for the civilian population have led to increased focus on humanitarian concerns in connection with wars and conflicts. The 1997 Mine Ban Convention prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. It also contains important provisions on assistance to victims, reporting, and international cooperation on implementation. The Mine Ban Convention is therefore an important tool for improving the safety of civilians in conflict areas.

So far, 156 countries have become party to the Mine Ban Convention, and the number is increasing.

In accordance with one of the convention’s key provisions, each state party undertakes to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control no later than ten years after the entry into force of the convention for that state party. A number of affected countries are having trouble complying with this provision. Several of them will therefore have to apply for an extension of the deadline. It is regrettable that countries such as China, Russia, India, Pakistan, the US, Egypt and Finland have chosen not to join the convention. Landmine Monitor and other organisations that survey the global landmine situation on an annual basis have reported that there are only a few cases of landmines being used by non-state parties to the convention, and no cases of such use among the 156 states parties. This shows that the Mine Ban Convention has established an international norm, and that the use of landmines is considered unacceptable, also by non-state parties.

The use of certain types of cluster munitions also leads to considerable and unacceptable human suffering. This was most recently demonstrated during the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Countries such as Laos, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia are also severely affected.

Until just a few years ago, reaching agreement on an international ban on cluster munitions seemed impossible. In order to speed up progress on this issue, the Government took the initiative in the autumn of 2006 to launch an international negotiation process aimed at concluding a ban on the use, production and transfer of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. This was the start of the Oslo Process for a ban on cluster munitions, in which 130 countries are now involved. The aim is to conclude a convention on cluster munitions in the course of 2008.

A number of countries that have large stockpiles of cluster munitions are not participating in the Oslo Process. These include Russia, the US, China and Pakistan. These countries are, however, participating within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Like many other countries, Norway is participating in both the Oslo Process and in the CCW, and considers these processes to be complementary. In the Government’s view, it is positive that countries that are unable to participate in the Oslo Process nevertheless recognise the need to address this humanitarian problem by means of some regulatory framework they can adhere to.

Small arms are also a major humanitarian challenge. Most of the victims of wars, conflicts and terrorist actions are killed by small arms, which range from simple pistols and guns to shells and rocket launchers. It is estimated that between 300 000 and 500 000 people are killed by such weapons each year.

The result of the lack of adequate control of the production of, and trade in, small arms is that more conflicts develop into wars and that wars are more violent and last longer. On the African continent, child soldiers are a particular challenge. Their main weapons are almost invariably small arms. Easy access to affordable small arms also contributes to organised crime and terrorism.

In 2001, the UN member states adopted the Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. However, this programme is not binding under international law, and it has proved difficult to reach agreement on specific measures to prevent such illicit trade. Some countries are also concerned that binding international obligations as regards trade in small arms would undermine their national room for manoeuvre and military defence capability (see also fact box 2.4).

Within the UN, preparatory work is being carried out on a treaty regulating international trade in all types of conventional weapons. A large majority of UN member states have agreed to start negotiations on such an agreement, and there is reason to hope that they will be launched in the course of 2009.