15 Summary in English

15.1 The Commission's composition, terms of reference and duties

The Norwegian Law Courts Commission was appointed by Royal Decree of 8 March 1996, and was chaired by Chief Justice Carsten Smith of the Norwegian Supreme Court. The Commission had originally 12 members, but was subsequently enlarged with five members by Royal Decree of 11 October 1996. One member has since withdrawn. The Commission's terms of reference were also extended at the same time as its membership was enlarged. The Commission was given no specific time limit by which to submit its report.

Under the given terms of reference, the Commission was instructed to report on five main subjects:

1. The main subject of the report is the organisation of the central courts administration.Under the current system, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for the administration of the ordinary courts of law, and the Commission was charged with examining «the advantages and drawbacks in principle and in practice of organising the central courts administration under alternative solutions, and if appropriate making substantive proposals for a new organisation.»

2. The appointment of judges. Judges are appointed by the King in Council on the recommendation of the Ministry of Justice, which for their part build, inter alia, on the recommendations of the Advisory Council for the Appointment of Judges. The Advisory Council consists of three members, who are appointed after a process of nomination by the Norwegian Association of Lawyers, the Norwegian Bar Association, and the Norwegian Association of Judges. Based on the experience of the five years in which the Advisory Council has been in existence, the task of the Law Courts Commission is to «evaluate whether the appointments process for judges can be refined and formalised.»

3. New complaints and disciplinary procedure for judges. Permanently appointed judges are ensured special protection of tenure inasmuch as they may not be dismissed with notice or transferred from their positions, and they can not be dismissed without notice - except by trial and judgment. The Ministry of Justice has a certain disciplinary authority over judges, but it is unclear how far this authority extends. Under its terms of reference, the Commission will «evaluate the need, if any, for a change in the complaints and disciplinary mechanisms in respect of judges», and will also examine «how such a mechanism, if any, could be regulated and organised, and what kind of reactions might be appropriate».

4. Temporary judges. Judges, including assistant judges, may be appointed for a limited period of time. As temporarily appointed judges, they do not enjoy the same security of tenure as permanently appointed judges. The Commission will «examine and evaluate and assess the existing arrangements and current practice and, if appropriate, propose changes».

5. Extra-judicial activities. There are few legal limitations on the right of judges to undertake extra-judicial tasks, duties and commitments, and it is quite usual for judges to have such interests. The Commission shall, firstly, «examine the nature and extent» of these interests, and secondly, against the background, inter alia, of the need to ensure the independence and impartiality of judges «assess the need for guidelines regarding the type of tasks, etc. judges should be permitted to undertake, and if appropriate present a proposal for such guidelines. It will also assess whether an official system of registration should be introduced».

The last two points were added when the terms of reference were extended on 11 October 1996.

15.2 Review of the current organisation of the law courts in Norway

The Commission begins by providing, in Chapter 3, an overview of the ordinary courts of law in Norway and their geographical jurisdiction and legal competence. They consist of the Supreme Court and the Interlocutory Appeals Committee of the Supreme Court, six lagmansretter or Courts of Appeal, and 93 District and City Courts. In addition to these three instances are the Conciliation Boards, which are organised within each Norwegian municipality. This is where civil actions commence. Mediation before a Conciliation Board is mandatory, although there are a number of exceptions to the rule, which results in many actions commencing in the District or City Courts.

Conciliation Boards are presided over by three lay judges, elected by the municipal council, and have up to now played an important role in dealing with current debt cases where the parties do not disagree on the matter of the debt. In 10-15 per cent of such cases, the Conciliation Board examines the actual merits of the case and the result is a judgment or settlement. The Conciliation Boards deal with about 100,000 (civil) cases annually.

The District and City Courts and the Courts of Appeal are presided over by professional judges. In criminal cases where the person charged has not confessed - and in some civil cases - lay judges elected by the municipal council also take part. In these cases, lay judges are in the majority in relation to professional judges. In 1998, the District and City Courts dealt with, inter alia, 14,000 criminal cases with lay judges sitting and 12,000 civil cases, while the Courts of Appeal dealt with, inter alia, 1,700 civil appeals and 1,100 criminal appeals.

The Supreme Court is presided over by professional justices only, and in 1998 dealt with 94 civil appeals and 61 criminal appeals.

The Commission goes on to provide an overview of the special courts in Norway, which are the The Labour Court, the Land Consolidation Courts, the Courts of Guardianship (which in practice are a part of the District and City Courts), the separate Courts of Assessment, «superior courts» (where we today have the Commission for outlying land areas in the Nordland and Troms provinces), and the consular courts (which take evidence etc from persons in other countries). The Court of Impeachment is also a special court, but it deals only with matters of criminal liability involving the members of the S torting (parliament), the Government and Supreme Court Justices, and thus falls outside the framework of the Commission's terms of reference.

The special courts play a modest role in the administration of justice, apart from the The Labour Court, the 41 Land Consolidation Courts and the five superior Land Consolidation Courts. There is a strong element of lay judges in the special courts. All the special courts, apart from the Court of Impeachment, the Land Consolidation Courts and consular courts, are presided over by a chairman who is a trained lawyer.

The Commission provides an overview of professional judges and lay judges, their functions, rights and duties (see points 15.6-15.10). The Commission also provides an overview of the central administration of the law courts (see points 15.5 and 15.11).

15.3 International and national courts and judicial systems

In general: Chapter 4 contains a survey of law courts and judges in a number of other countries and in relation to international conventions etc. The chapter also deals with the central international law courts.

The survey concentrates in all essentials on the main topics that the Commission was set up to examine - the organisation of the central courts administration, the appointment of judges, the use of temporary judges, judges' extra-judicial activities, disciplinary measures etc - and on the status of the principle of the independence of the courts and the judiciary. In addition, a brief overview of the international courts is provided as to the functions of the individual courts and their method of organisation. Correspondingly, the account of the judicial system in the individual countries mentioned also comprises the courts system.

In Chapters 6-12, the Commission provides a summarised account and analysis of international and other national (non-Norwegian) systems in connection with the subject of the respective chapters. These summaries build in the main on the facts provided in Chapter 4.

International conventions etc.: The Commission refers to The International Convention on Human Rights (1950), as well as to other, non-binding international instruments such as the UN's Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985), and the Council of Europe's Recommendation R (94) 12 on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges (1991). These international instruments illustrate, inter alia, the importance that is attached to the principle of the independence of the judiciary, including providing judges with satisfactory protection of tenure.

International courts: The survey comprises The International Court of Justice at The Hague, The European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, The Permanent International Criminal Court, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, and The Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Particular importance is also attached, where the international courts of justice are concerned, to the principle of the independence of the judiciary and their security of tenure. It should be noted that the judges appointed to serve in these courts are very limited in the extent to which they are may undertake other extra-judicial activities.

Foreign court systems: In addition to all the other Nordic countries, the survey also includes England, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Germany and the USA. The survey shows that there are some major differences between some of these countries, inter alia as regards the organisation of their central courts administration. However, in all the countries mentioned great importance is attached to the independence of the judiciary and of the courts, and in all these countries judges are without exception afforded special protection of tenure. The survey is concentrated on the ordinary courts and the judges connected with them.

In Western European countries, it is generally quite common for the responsibility for the central administration of the courts to fall under the Ministry of Justice, although the courts or their representatives are often afforded influence in central administrative matters, such as the drafting of budget proposals for the courts sector or the distribution of budget allocations. Several countries - Denmark, Ireland and Iceland - have in recent years carried out a reorganisation of their central courts administration by transferring the administrative responsibility from the Ministry of Justice to a more free-standing body. In Sweden, the courts are administered by the National Courts Administration, which, like other similar administrative agencies operating outside the ministries, has a relatively independent status. In Finland, the courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice. It is also usual in most Eastern European countries to find the courts administered by the Ministry of Justice. In Russia, however, the courts are administered by the Supreme Court; and in Hungary the central administration of the courts comes under the National Law Courts Council, a body composed exclusively of judges. Although Hungary - as far as we know - is the only Eastern European country that has such an administrative system, many Eastern European countries have advisory boards where judges are strongly represented and who take part in the central administration of the courts. In the USA, the relevant body - the Judicial Conference of the United States - is governed exclusively by the courts, and is responsible for the administration of the federal courts (with the exception of the Supreme Court).

In all the Nordic countries, judges are appointed by the head of State or the Government. It is also the most common method of appointment in other countries, although there are exceptions. Italian judges, for example, are appointed by the National Law Courts Council, the majority of whose members are judges. Even in cases where judges are appointed by the head of State or government, it is common to find judges or collegiate bodies, composed mainly of judges, exercising a strong influence on judicial appointments. Some countries have their own special systems for trainee and career judiciaries, which makes it difficult for members of the legal profession outside the system to become judges.

The employment of temporary judges is common, to a greater or lesser extent, in other countries besides Norway. Some countries have a special system involving the extensive use of part-time judges, such as lawyers who carry out a judge's duties alongside their own legal practice.

All the Nordic countries have relatively liberal arrangements as regards the right of judges to undertake other duties or interests outside office, even if these arrangements differ somewhat. A number of countries, including England and France, have a much more restrictive attitude to judges' interests.

Judges in the countries from which the Commission has obtained information on these matters are - like judges in Norway - afforded satisfactory security of tenure. With a few exceptions, judges in all the countries mentioned may be subject to mild disciplinary action. Finland is the only Nordic country that does not have a system for imposing mild disciplinary action. The forms of action may vary, but usually consist of a warning or reprimand etc. In general, it would now appear more common than before for attention to be focused on judges when they misbehave, and in some countries there is a far greater tendency than before to react with disciplinary measures.

15.4 General principles and considerations of public interest

In Chapter 5, the Commission examines its view of the general principles and considerations of public interest that are fundamental to the discussions of the issues contained in its mandate. These principles and considerations are linked, inter alia, with fundamental issues affecting our state constitution and the preservation of Norway as a democratic constitutional state.

The Commission commences by pointing to several circumstances that are important to the subsequent examination of principles and considerations. An international perspective is brought to bear by an examination of the trends of development involving the international courts and supranational bodies and their spheres of influence and - in the case of some courts - their increased political influence. The Commission also draws into the discussion the tendencies to be found in a number of other countries, which involve, inter alia, the withdrawal of certain types of cases from the courts; but which also include, in some countries, the growing influence of the courts as real controlling bodies in relation to the other instruments of state. Major surveys have been made in several European countries of the place of the courts in the constitutional system. The Commission questions whether these tendencies have any relevance for the Norwegian courts.

The Commission also draws attention to the varying functions performed by the Norwegian courts. Their main task is to resolve legal disputes, which also has a regulating effect on the behaviour of other parties than those directly involved in the specific case. The function of the courts is also to develop law, as a supplement to the legislation passed by the Storting(parliament). The courts have a controlling function in relation to the legislators, inasmuch as the courts decide whether a law is constitutional when the issue is raised in a specific case. The courts can also review the decisions of the executive, by checking that the administrative agency concerned has kept within the framework set by the legislation, that the decision is based on valid facts and correct procedure, and that the administration's exercise of judgment is neither improper nor grossly unreasonable. Lastly, the courts exercise social enforcement in the form of imposing penalties and deciding on legal enforcement in civil cases.

The Commission's examination of general principles and considerations includes the need to safeguard the democratic principle, the principle of judicial independence, and the principle of the due process of law in the courts, as well as the need to ensure that the courts have the confidence of the people. Finally, the Commission deals with the duty of the courts to safeguard the interests of the Sami ethnic group in Norway.

The democratic principle dictates that the courts and the courts administration must be in harmony with our democratic form of government, because the work of the courts constitutes an important aspect of the exercise of public authority. It is the Storting which determines the laws by which the courts adjudicate, and it is also the Stortingwhich decides the kind of courts we are to have, the level of efficacy and service on which they are to operate, and so on. There must also be a democratic influence on the way in which we select our body of judges, at least in the form of some subsequent, parliamentary control of the Government's appointment of judges.

The Norwegian Constitution determines that judges shall act independently in deciding each individual case. Neither the executive nor any other authority can instruct the courts as to how they should decide specific cases, and the decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be reviewed by any other authority. This independence builds on the fact that Norway is a constitutional democracy. The Constitution sets limits for what the legislative or executive powers can decide, even if their decisions are based on the will of the majority. There are certain fundamental principles - such as the freedom of speech and the fact that laws may not be given retroactive effect - that the majority must accept will be enforced by the courts, even if it means protecting the interests of a small minority to the detriment of the interests of the majority. The court's judicial independence also builds on a requirement for just procedure in cases that do not involve the protection of minority interests, including cases where there are private parties on both sides. Just decisions demand judges who are independent and impartial in relation to both parties and to the interests they represent.

The Commission analyses the concept of judicial independence, and points out that independence implies primarily the need to protect the courts and the judiciary from any undue or irregular influence on the exercise of their judicial office; an influence which may take different forms.

Undue or irregular influence on the exercise of judicial activity involves three elements or preconditions. Firstly, there must be a factual potential for influence to be exerted. For example, the administrative authority concerned must have at its disposal measures that can be used to exert influence. The principle of the judicial independence of the courts may, according to circumstance, dictate that the potential for such influence should be removed; although there are practical considerations here that should be weighed against whatever real risk there may be of the potential being exploited. Secondly, a person must be willing to exert the potential influence. For example, there must be a responsible member of staff in the administrative agency concerned who is willing to set aside the principle of the judicial independence of the courts, as well as his or her own official duty to respect that independence. Thirdly, the attempt at influence must succeed; the judge in the case must be willing to allow himself or herself to be influenced, and thus act in complete contravention of formal rules as well as the fundamental rules of ethics for judges.

The last two elements call for measures that are able to bring about a change in attitudes; that is measures capable of developing and strengthening respect for the judicial independence of the courts and respect for the fundamental rules of ethics for judges. However, measures designed to prevent close and intimate personal relations developing between the courts and the forces capable of exerting influence may also be sufficient, according to circumstance.

The principle of the due process of law means that the courts and their procedures must satisfy fundamental requirements with respect to ensuring, inter alia, that cases are dealt with within a reasonable length of time and at an acceptable level of costs for the users of the courts, and that they result in professionally sound decisions.

The Commission emphasises that, in today's society, the courts cannot fulfil their tasks if they do not have people's confidence. The authority and legitimacy of the courts are dependent on the users of the courts and the general public as a whole having respect for what they do and being able to trust them to maintain a high professional standard. It is not, therefore, sufficient for the courts to be independent in real terms and to work at a high professional level. It must also be evident for all to see, as the foundation for public confidence in the courts.

The Commission also refers to the Sami dimension with respect to the duties of the courts. Since, under section 110 a of the Norwegian Constitution, the state authorities have a special duty to ensure that everything is done to enable the members of the Sami ethnic group to preserve and develop their language, culture and society, a similar duty is implied on behalf of the courts and their organisation in respect of the competence, knowledge and attitudes required of judges.

Finally, the majority of the Commission's members propose that the principle of the independence of the courts should be fixed expressly in the Constitution. The principle of judicial independence has a secure position in our Constitution, although it is not reflected in any provision contained therein. The other members see no need to give greater visibility to this already securely established principle. This view follows from the traditional view held in Norway on the question of constitutional amendments.

15.5 The central courts administration

Description of the current system: A description of the current system is given in Chapter 6. The central courts administration in Norway comes under the Ministry of Justice. This task was previously combined with administrative responsibility for other government agencies outside the Ministry; but in 1996 a separate Courts Administration Department was set up, which is responsible for administering court personnel, for drafting the courts' budget, for allocating the budget amongst the individual courts, for ensuring that the courts have serviceable premises and appropriate equipment, for training and other competence-building measures, and for developing the organisation of the courts. The department has about 30 managers and executive officers in addition to office personnel. A separate body is organised outside the Ministry: The Norwegian State Court IT-Service. The central courts administration and the courts themselves have in recent years carried out extensive development projects with the main emphasis on the introduction of modern computer technology, management development, enhancing efficiency and reducing the time taken to deal with cases, and professional training for judges and officials alike. Great progress has also been made in terms of modern financial administration, with the extensive delegation of authority to the individual courts.

The Courts Department within the Ministry of Justice also has important functions to perform in connection with the appointment of judges, in addition to being responsible for the employment of temporary judges, for the current limited disciplinary system for judges, and for the practice of current rules governing judges' extra-judicial activities. These tasks - which may be accounted as administration in its widest sense - are mentioned in separate points in the Commission's mandate, and are dealt with separately in the following parts of the report.

Central courts administration in other countries: There are many examples in other countries of courts administration being carried out by free-standing bodies, as well as of administrative responsibility being assigned to a government department, often in co-operation with a more free-standing advisory body. Examples of both these principal solutions are to be found amongst Norway's closest neighbours.

The Commission's proposals

The task of the Commission is to put forward proposals for an organisation of the central courts administration. The local courts administration is not mentioned expressly in the Commission's mandate, although in recent years the importance of local leadership and of delegating administrative responsibility to local entities has become clear. The Commission proposes that important issues attached to the role of the president of the court and the duties and authority of the president of the court should be the subject of a separate investigative project.

The question of a third level of courts administration - a regional administrative level - is not mentioned in the mandate either. The Commission views the addition of a third level of courts administration as of no present interest, on both practical and financial grounds.

The public interest: Based on the general principles and considerations of public interest (see point 15.4 in Chapter 5), the Commission draws attention to the interests that it is essential to safeguard when formulating an organisational solution for the administration of the courts. The crucial element in the choice between the two principal solutions already mentioned is the balancing of certain absolutely fundamental principles and considerations of public interest within a democratic constitutional state: the democratic principle and the principle of the judicial independence of the courts. Of central importance is also the need to ensure high standards, openness and transparency. Finally, importance must be attached to the desire for greater efficiency and better use of resources, increased productivity and better service to the public, and an enhanced ability to adapt and develop.

The democratic principle dictates that the Stortingmust have the final word when it comes to determining what kind of courts Norway should have, how they should make use of their resources, and perhaps also with the regard to important matters of priority as concerns service to the public and the time the courts take to deal with cases. Control by the executive will to some degree be grounded on the same reasoning, since the Norwegian system of government builds on the parliamentarian system.

At the same time, the courts must be independent in the exercise of their judicial activities. Independence is crucial to the ability of the courts to resolve disputes in a credible manner that creates confidence amongst the public, and to fulfil their function as regards reviewing the decisions of the executive and determining whether the laws are constitutional.

The balancing of these considerations has a crucial, indirect importance for the kind of organisational solution that should be chosen for the courts administration. If there is a risk that the Ministry of Justice and the Government's administrative management of the courts may give rise to undue control of or influence on the judicial activities of the courts, greater distance must be created between the courts and the courts administration on the one hand and the executive on the other. If there is no such risk of undue control or influence, the connection that presently exists between the courts and the Ministry of Justice's courts administration can be retained, and greater importance can be attached to whatever advantages of a practical nature there may be in the courts administration entering into a wider professional and organisational context through its links with the Ministry.

As an important question of principle, the Commission also assesses the need for a minister for courts administration who is accountable to the Storting.

Potential organisational solutions: The Commission examines the organisational solutions that would appear to be most appropriate for the central courts administration:

• The «ministry model», which will consist of variations on the current system in the Ministry of Justice

• The «directorate model», which will mean transferring the administration to a traditional central administrative body outside the Ministry

• The «Bank of Norway model», which will mean setting up a new body under the instructional authority of the Government; but where to the right of instruction are attached such procedures and duty of notification in relation to the Storting that the new body will in practice enjoy a very high degree of independence from both the Government and the Ministry

• A free-standing courts administration that has limited connections with the Government; where, for example, the Government is responsible for assessing and submitting budget proposals for the courts, and there is a minister with parliamentary responsibility for the courts administration

• A free-standing courts administration that has limited connections with the Storting; where, for example, it has a similar relationship to the Storting as that which pertains between the Storting and the Office of the Auditor General or the Storting's Ombudsman for Public Administration, which are the Storting's own bodies

• The «court model», which will mean transferring the administrative responsibility and administrative authority for the courts administration to the Supreme Court or to a body or bodies elected by judges.

The Commission is divided between a majority view and a minority view with regard to the choice of organisational solution.

The majority of the Commission's members propose a new administrative system, with a separate Courts Administration headed by a board that is elected in part by the Storting and in part by the Government, and with the actual administration moved away from the Ministry.

The majority stress the importance of the principle that lies at the very heart of the constitutional state, which is that the courts must not be placed under any political steering or control in the exercise of their judicial functions. The reason for wishing to see greater independence in the administrative regard is primarily because it supports the independence of the work carried out by the judiciary. It is not possible to implement and maintain independence in judicial activities solely on the basis of formal rules concerning authority. It is a matter of an attitude to the work of the judiciary that is created and continued - and weakened or strengthened - over time. A separation of the courts administration from the Government offices will be an important element in the continuing task of changing attitudes.

The Government administration, including the prosecuting authority, is a party to a large number of court cases, while at the same time being administratively superior to the courts. This accords poorly with the principles of impartiality and disinterestedness - of distance to the parties - which otherwise apply to the operations of the courts. It also means that the independence of the courts does not appear with full clarity to the outside observer.

There are also a number of tendencies that are strengthening the reasons for wishing to separate the courts administratively from the Ministry of Justice.

The majority would stress, inter alia, the considerable expansion that has taken place in the Ministry of Justice's administration of the courts, and the way in which the Ministry has grown from being essentially a professional department into a department of greater political significance. These changes must be seen in relation to the increase in the overall activity of the state which again means greater participation in court cases, to the fact that public confidence in the legal system is becoming ever more important, and to the fact that a modern, strengthened courts administration is creating a need for full legitimacy in the exercise of control.

Changes are also taking place internationally, with several countries freeing the administration of the courts from government offices.

The majority's proposal involves building up an administrative staff, preferably by transferring jobs and personnel from the Ministry of Justice's Courts Administration Department. The governing board heading the proposed Courts Administration shall consist of seven members: two to be elected by the Storting as public representatives, and three judges and two lawyers to be appointed by the King in Council.

Under the proposal, the Ministry will still deal with the budget and all preparatory work on new laws concerning the courts. The Government, or the Ministry, may instruct the Courts Administration to follow up on any criticisms of the Office of the Auditor General. Otherwise, central administrative bodies may only instruct the Courts Administration by giving general instructions in the form of the same administrative rules that apply to all central government agencies.

As a result, the Courts Administration's governing board will have a very free hand in its administration of the courts. A draft budget will be presented to the Ministry and be included in the Government's overall draft budget in the same way as today, although the Courts Administration's draft budget will appear as a printed annex to the Government's draft budget when it is presented to the Storting. Apart from the usual budget reporting, the Stortingwill also keep a check on the courts and the Courts Administration through the Office of the Auditor General, which, in addition to auditing the accounts, will also be able to audit the administration in the area of the courts.

The majority propose that there be greater access to information by permitting the governing board's decisions directed to the administrative staff to be exempt from publicity only if they fall under special rules on the restriction of the right to information owing to the content etc of the decision.

The majority propose that the governing board should also act as a judicial appointments board; see point 15.6 on the appointment of judges.

The majority see no special problems arising with regard to recruitment and competence- building within the new Courts Administration.

The minority of the Commission's members propose that the central courts administration be organised as part of the Ministry of Justice. They propose setting up a separate external council to deal with the Ministry's courts administration.

The kind of courts the country should have, where they should be located, and how they should be financed, are for the minority questions of a general political nature which should be dealt with by the Government and the Storting, in line with Norwegian government practice. In addition to securing independence and impartiality, the solution must also be to safeguard democratic transparency, debate, steering and control - as well as to advance administrative productivity, efficiency and co-ordination. The minority wish to avoid cultivating any one particular interest in choosing between administrative solutions, and believe that a reasonable balance will be achieved by continuing the administration of the courts by the Ministry of Justice, which has shown both the capability and the will to respect the judicial independence of the courts and has also assisted the courts to keep pace with the technological developments, new management methods etc, which have been introduced into the public administration in recent years. The Ministry has also been conducive to Norwegian courts lying well ahead in comparison with other countries as regards dealing with cases swiftly and expeditiously.

The minority reject the view that the Ministry of Justice's administrative responsibility for the police and the prosecuting authority gives the Ministry any form of interest as a party to the case in criminal actions. The Ministry of Justice is a party to civil litigation in the courts in only a relatively few cases, and that number will be further reduced as a result of anticipated changes to the law.

The minority take the view that when a Ministry is made responsible for decisions as to locating, funding, equipping and staffing the courts, it does not imply any risk of undue control or influence that might threaten the judicialindependence of the courts.

The minority go on to elaborate their view of the principle of national sovereignty and the consequences of the relations between government institutions. The great majority of countries in Western Europe have had - and have - their courts administration linked with the executive (usually a Ministry of Justice), combined with parliamentary responsibility on behalf of the minister concerned.

The minority's proposal will involve only small changes of an organisational nature in the Ministry of Justice's present administration of the courts. The crucial difference will be the establishment of a National Law Courts Council on the pattern of the system used in other countries. The establishment of such a Council will help promote the process of quality assurance in the courts administration through professional teamwork and advice. The Council will supervise the Ministry's administration of the courts and ensure that it does not cause any problems with respect to the courts' judicial independence. The Council will also help to gain the attention and interest of the general public, and the presentation to the Storting of the Council's comments on the law courts' budget will be an important corrective to the Storting's own budget deliberations.

The National Law Courts Council will be composed of two bodies: the Supervisory Committee that the Commission proposes be set up (see Chapter 10 on Disciplinary measures etc), and the Judicial Appointments Board that the minority propose be set up (see Chapter 7 on the Appointment of judges). The Council will thus be composed of members with a very broad basis of judicial competence in the courts, experience of courts administration, and social insight and involvement. Four members will be elected by the Storting, and five judges and three lawyers from outside the courts will be appointed by the King in Council.

The minority attach importance to the fact that, under their proposals, the Ministry of Justice will be able to carry on the administration of the courts without experiencing any increased difficulties as regards recruiting qualified staff, without falling outside the progressive professional environment that exists in the central state administration, and without being faced with the uncertainty that lies in establishing a completely new administrative body as yet untried within the context of Norwegian state administration. On all these points the «ministry» solution - in the considered opinion of the minority - differs from the proposed solution of a free-standing courts administration.

15.6 The appointment of judges

Description of the current system: In Chapter 7, the Commission begins by providing an account of the rules governing the appointment of judges, primarily the rule that the permanent appointment of judges to the ordinary courts is done by the King in Council. (The word «appointment» is used in the report as a collective term that covers appointments by the King in Council as well as appointments by a ministry, other administrative agencies or special appointments bodies under the Civil Service Act.) Judges are senior state officials, and their position in law is described in greater detail in Chapter 10.

After the public announcement of a vacant judgeship, the applicants' qualification are assessed by the Advisory Council for the Appointment of Judges, which is composed of three members appointed by the Ministry of Justice on the recommendations of the Norwegian Association of Judges, the Norwegian Bar Association, and the Norwegian Association of Lawyers. The Advisory Council then delivers its opinion to the Ministry of Justice. The president of the court in question also has the opportunity to deliver an opinion. The Ministry carries out a full assessment of the applicants' qualification, obtains references and conducts interviews, before the matter is put before the Minister. Vacancies for Supreme Court Justices are not dealt with by the Advisory Council, but an oral opinion is obtained from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The Commission also provides a survey of the criteria according to which judges are selected. Apart from age requirements, a law degree etc, there are no special statutory qualifying requirements for judges. In practice, judges must satisfy high professional standards, both with regard to the class of law degree they were awarded and their experience in the legal profession. Judges must also possess certain personal qualities and have a broad background of experience. The statistics of the past 10 years do not give any clear indications of importance being attached one way or the other to particular criteria when judicial appointments are made. The attitude that there should be a «minimum age» for appointments to judgeships has varied somewhat, and no clear conclusion can be drawn as to importance being given to appointing judges from a specific occupational category, such as lawyers, rather than other occupational categories. However, small differences in degree examination marks would appear to be of somewhat less importance than they were some years ago. In slightly less than 90 per cent of all appointments, the Government follows the recommendations of the Advisory Council.

In Norway, it has been a fundamental principle in the recruitment of judges that the judiciary should reflect the broadest possible professional legal background, so that they represent a broad and varied background of experience. For this reason, Norwegian judges - as opposed to judges in some other countries - are not recruited to an internal career in the courts as soon as they qualify. Nor are they recruited exclusively from one particular occupational category.

Chapter 7 also provides a summary of statistical data on the recruitment of judges over the past few years. The average age has fallen during the last 15 years by about seven years, to 50 years of age, although the present composition of the judicial body indicates that the average age will increase somewhat in coming years. The proportion of women judges is 22 per cent, and will probably increase in future at a pace with the increase in the numbers of women amongst the groups of candidates from which first-time judges are recruited. The previous professional experience of judges reflects the distribution of lawyers amongst different legal occupations in a relatively representative fashion: inter alia, 44 per cent of judges were advocates before being appointed as judges, while 32 per cent were employed by the Civil Service, and 12 per cent by the prosecuting authority. The distribution of practising lawyers by occupation shows that 46 per cent were advocates, 41 per cent were employed by the Civil Service, and 6 per cent were employed by the prosecuting authority (if lawyers employed by the courts are not included). In recent years, there appear to have been, relatively speaking, fewer judges appointed from the public sector and more advocates.

The appointment of judges in other countries: The Commission provides an overview of the appointment procedure in a number of other countries. The usual system is for judges to be appointed by the head of State after some form of opinion, recommendation or similar has been delivered by an external body.

The Commission's proposals

The public interest: The Commission examines all the general principles and considerations of public interest on which the formulation of a new procedure for appointing judges should be based. This applies in particular to the need to safeguard the judicial independence of the courts and to ensure a democratic appointment process. Even if the courts are to be supreme in deciding individual cases, judges are entrusted with such an important authority in society that there should be democratic controls on the selection of judges. However, such democratic controls need not be exercised by giving popularly elected bodies a deciding influence on individual appointments. Democratic controls can be carried out subsequent to appointment by the Storting, and by a public debate facilitated by greater openness surrounding the list of applicants and the appointment process itself. The need to ensure that applicants are of the right professional standard and have the necessary personal qualities is important, and dictates that the appointment process should be executed with as high a degree of professionalism as possible. The Commission emphasises that special requirements must be set up for the appointment of court presidents. A crucial consideration for the ability of the courts to fulfil their task in society is that the courts and the judiciary must have the confidence of the people. In the considered opinion of the Commission, people's awareness that there is an open, professional and objective system of judicial appointments is one of the most important factors in maintaining public confidence in the courts. Finally, the Commission points out the need to ensure confidence amongst potential applicants. This consideration also dictates that the selection procedure should be as professional as possible, with the application of known and clear criteria. However, the need to protect personal privacy is also part of the picture. The publication of applicants' names may give rise to problems for some applicants.

Based on these considerations, the Commission has evaluated the various alternatives to the present system. Responsibility for judicial appointments can be transferred in part or in whole to the Storting, with a built-in danger of them becoming a party political issue. Judicial appointments can be brought under the courts themselves, in other words a form of self-recruitment. It is also possible to set up a new state body that is free-standing in relation both to the courts, the Government and the Storting, or to allow judicial appointments to follow the usual system laid down in the Civil Service Act for government appointments, with an appointments board composed of employers' and employees' representatives, in other words according to a corporate system.

In the Commission's considered opinion, none of these alternatives safeguard all the above interests satisfactorily. The Commission proposes, therefore, that judges should continue to be appointed as senior state officials by the King in Council, but after a separate judicial appointments body has given its formal recommendations. The judicial appointments body shall be composed of two public representatives, judges from all three instances, and two lawyers from outside the courts and with a broad range of professional contacts. The public representatives shall be elected by the Storting, while the five other representatives shall be appointed by the Crown. Such a composition will ensure professional competence within the sphere of the courts and will also safeguard the interests of court users and the interests of society in general. The balance of membership of the judicial appointments body will strengthen the independence of the courts.

The majority of the Commission's members who support the proposal that the courts should be administered by a Courts Administration headed by a governing board (see Chapter 6), propose that this governing board should also act as a judicial appointments body. Two of the members of the governing board shall be advocates. In the opinion of the majority, this choice is also a correct one with respect to the treatment of judicial appointments. Priority should accordingly be given to representatives of the users of the courts rather than representatives of the potential applicant groups. The minority of the Commission's members who propose that the courts should continue to be administered by the Ministry of Justice, propose the setting up of a separate Judicial Appointments Board to act as a judicial appointments body. The composition of the Judicial Appointments Board shall provide the broadest possible range of professional contacts with potential groups of applicants and a knowledge of what kind of qualifications the various roles within the legal profession can provide. Of the two lawyer members drawn from outside the courts, one should therefore be an advocate and one come from the public sector.

The Judicial Appointments Board shall deal with applications both to the District and City Courts, the Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. An exception will be made for the post of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The recommendations of the Board shall carry a great deal of weight when the Government makes its final choice. The Government may not choose an applicant who has not received the recommendation of the Board, unless it has asked for the Board to make a special assessment of the applicant in question. The Board's recommendation, but not the reasons for the recommendation, should be made public.

The Commission believes this solution to be in harmony both with the Norwegian Constitution and with our obligations under international conventions.

The Commission provides a more detailed outline of the tasks and methods of procedure of the Judicial Appointments Board. Reference is made to the Commission's proposal in Chapter 8, concerning the appointment of temporary judges, whereby the judicial appointments body should also have the duty of making the final decision in a number of temporary appointments, which is the most important method of appointing experienced lawyers as temporary judges.

The Commission attaches importance to the process leading up to the appointment of a judge being as open and transparent as possible. In addition to the proposal to make public the recommendations of the judicial appointments body, the Commission also proposes that a fuller list of applicants be published than is the case at present. Both the list of applicants and the recommendations should be published as soon as they are available.

15.7 Temporary judges

Description of the current system: Temporary judges are (see Chapter 8):

• Judges who are temporarily appointed for a limited period by decision of the Council of State, the Ministry of Justice, or a County Governor;

• Deputy judges who are appointed by the president of a court for a period of up to two years, with limited opportunity for the renewal of the appointment;

• Extraordinarily appointed Court of Appeal Judges who are appointed from amongst retired judges by the Ministry of Justice for one year at a time, to be called by the senior judge president of the Court of Appeal in individual cases;

• Judges from the District and City Courts who are called to serve in the Court of Appeal;

• Already appointed judges who are appointed by the Ministry of Justice or the County Governor to sit as substitute judges in individual cases before other courts.

The Commission surveys the extent of the use of temporary judges. Deputy judges mark themselves out by dealing with approximately one third of all the cases that come before the District and City Courts, although in some of the Courts of Appeal almost as many of the «working hours carried out in court sittings» are carried out by extraordinarily appointed Court of Appeal Judges and specially summoned District and City Court judges. (In addition to the time spent in court sittings there is also the time spent on preparing cases and writing judgments, where the specially summoned judges and extraordinarily appointed judges are not generally involved.)

Judges who are temporarily appointed by the King in Council are counted as senior state officials under the Civil Service Act and thus benefit from the special security of tenure afforded to judges, although only for the period of the temporary appointment. This means that they cannot be dismissed or transferred, and that they can only be discharged after trial and judgment. All other categories of temporary judge are without this protection.

Temporary judges have in essence the same authority as permanently appointed judges. There are some few types of cases that deputy judges are not permitted to deal with. Specially summoned judges cannot administer the court and do not draft written judgments. Extraordinarily appointed Court of Appeal Judges cannot administer the court.

The Commission has examined the rules and practice with regard to the employment of temporary judges that pertain in other countries. The use of substitute judges is not normally regarded as problematic. The moderate use of supplementary judges is also normally accepted. Many countries have systems whereby temporary judges are employed as part of a programme of internal training for judges and subsequent career in the judiciary, even if there would appear to be no direct parallel to the arrangement with deputy judges that we have in Norway.

The Commission's proposals

Considerations of principle and practicality: The most important problem surrounding the use of temporarily appointed judges is that the judge's position is uncertain and dependent on the employer's attitude to renewing the appointment or to making it permanent. As the employer is the State, represented by the Ministry of Justice, the result will be the same kind of dependency and risk of irregular or undue influence being exerted as described, inter alia, in point 15.4 with reference to the considerations of public interest covered in Chapter 5. In a number of cases there may also be a risk of irregular or undue influence being exerted by others, if the judge has been granted leave of absence or has some other close connection to a private employer prior to taking up the temporary appointment.

If it becomes customary for temporarily appointed judges to apply for and to be given permanent judgeships whilst they are holding a temporary appointment, a considerable number of recruitments to the judiciary may take place via temporary appointments. Advertisements for temporary appointments do not always attract as many good applicants as advertisements for permanent judgeships. Amongst other things, advocates in private practice will seldom leave their firms to take up a temporary judgeship for a limited period of time without the security of a subsequent permanent appointment.

It is the practical considerations in particular which support the use of temporary judges. The courts are obliged to deal with all in-coming cases, and cannot downgrade or completely lay aside individual cases so that other cases can receive a thorough and speedy treatment. The courts therefore have a special need to continually adapt their capacity in relation to the workload, and it is this need that lies behind many of the arrangements with temporary judges. Temporary judges are also needed to cover absences due to illness, leave of absence for other reasons, and to fill other forms of vacancies amongst permanent judgeships. Finally, there can be a need for extra-flexible staffing arrangements where courts are being reorganised.

With the use currently made of deputy judges, specially summoned judges and extraordinarily appointed judges, temporary judges are also responsible for a considerable proportion of the ordinary casework in the courts. If this system is brought to an end, it will create a need for many new, permanent judges. Recruiting so many new judges at once will be difficult, and in any case it is a process that must be carried on over a number of years. Ending the system of employing assistant judges may also have a negative effect on the number of people applying for judgeships, since it is through serving as assistant judges that many skilled lawyers acquire an insight into the workings of the courts.

The Commission's assessment of the individual systems: The possibility of temporarily appointing substitute judges must be maintained, even if some of the need can be met by establishing new judgeships (or judgeships that serve several courts), by drawing on the services of unoccupied judges from near-lying courts, or by appointing judges who can be moved around as needed (to the extent to which it is possible to recruit applicants to such posts). In some cases, however, a substitute judge will have be temporarily appointed if one is to avoid cancelling cases or lengthening the time it takes to hear cases in the courts.

The possibility should also be kept open for the temporary appointment of extra judges to deal with temporary peaks in the workload. However, particularly in cases where the question arises of temporarily appointing a lawyer from outside the courts, there should be stricter requirements set so as to ensure that all other possibilities have been explored before going to the step of making a temporary appointment.

Finally, it should be possible to use the temporary appointments system in cases where courts are being reorganised. It would be practical, for example, to create a temporary appointment in one vacant court president's post where it is planned to merge two courts together under a single court president. The possibility should also be maintained of making a temporary appointment to a judgeship, especially a court presidency, where the reorganisation of a court is being planned or has been adopted.

The current system also permits the temporary appointment of judges in specific, named cases, both as substitute judges and as supplementary judges. In reality, what this system means is that the authority making the temporary appointment - the King in Council, the Ministry of Justice, or the County Governor - decides which judge is to deal with a specific case. The allocation of cases is normally an area for the courts' independence from the executive. The Commission proposes, therefore, that the use of temporary appointments in individual named cases should be barred. The need can be met by a short, temporary appointment for a specific length of time and with the president of the court in question deciding which judge is to deal with which case. Should this solution not be expedient, the case can instead be transferred to another court; as would occur, for example, if all the judges at one court were disqualified from dealing with the case.

The Commission proposes that the authority to create temporary appointments should be transferred from the ordinary executive power (the Ministry of Justice) to the free-standing judicial appointments body that the Commission is proposing should be set up. Some of the longest temporary appointments and temporary appointments in the Supreme Court should, however, continue to be dealt with by the King in Council.

Thus far there has been a distinction between «real» and «unreal» temporary appointments, that is to say in practice a distinction between substitute temporary appointments and supplementary temporary appointments. These designations are unsatisfactory, and the Commission cannot see any need to maintain the distinctions between them. In the Commission's proposal to regulate by law the right to create temporary appointments, there is no distinction made between the differing needs that can give rise to the creation of a temporary appointment; see the outline to the proposed law in Chapter 14, section 9 and 10.

The Commission has not assessed the system of deputy judges in general, only whether the system, owing to the temporary nature of the posts involved, should be brought to an end or severely restricted. The Commission would answer that question in the negative. Neither under the Norwegian Constitution nor the European Convention on Human Rights is the system unlawful to the extent to which it is currently practised. The Commission sees clear disadvantages to such a widespread use of temporary judges. After balancing the disadvantages against the practical considerations, however, the Commission concludes that the system should not be ended, but that attention should be drawn to the extent of the practice. Measures to improve the system should also be considered, such as more systematic training and supervision. The Commission proposes transferring the authority for appointing deputy judges to a local appointments board for the courts.

For all these categories of temporary judges, the Commission proposes that a special security of tenure be introduced which most of them currently lack, and which is regarded as one of the most important forms of protection for the independence of the judiciary. The protection will only apply for the duration of the appointment in question. The Commission also proposes that all temporary judges should come under the common disciplinary system; cf Chapter 10.

The system of extraordinarily appointed Court of Appeal Judges helps to deal both with the ordinary processing of cases through the courts and the peaks in the workload which occur from time to time. The system is inexpensive for the Government. It should, however, be brought to an end out of the need to ensure judicial independence and the confidence of the public. The system will probably have to be wound down over a five-year period.

The system of summoning District and City Court judges to serve in the Court of Appeal is administered wholly by the courts, so that there is no question of a problematic relationship arising with the executive. These judges also enjoy special security of tenure through their existing judgeships in the District and City Courts. However, the system involves judges who already hold posts in courts of the first instance being required to take part in judging appeals against the decisions of other first-instance court judges. The reason for this arrangement is, inter alia, that the appellate court does not have sufficient levels of staffing to permit appeals to be dealt with by the court's own judges. Despite these drawbacks, the Commission has decided not to propose ending the system at present, because of the recurring need to deal with cases as quickly and efficiently as possible, and because of the benefit that first-instance court judges derive from the experience of serving in the Court of Appeal. The Commission proposes, however, that the use of the system be restricted, so that all cases in the Courts of Appeal are dealt with by at least two ordinary Court of Appeal judges. The long-term aim should be to end the system altogether.

15.8 Extra-judicial activities

Definition of extra-judicial activities: As the Commission applies the term 'extra-judicial activities' (see Chapter 9), it includes, in addition to a judge's normal duties, any membership, supplementary duties, tasks or activity undertaken in or on behalf of a company, organisation, association, government agency, county municipal or municipal body.

Description of the current system: According to current law, there are few statutory restrictions on the right of judges to take on other duties or interests in addition to their normal work. The most important provision in this respect is section 229 of the Courts of Justice Act, which prohibits judges from practising as lawyers. The Basic Agreement contains a general provision in section 1.1.4, which also applies to judges, which states that the consent of the competent authority must be obtained if the taking on of supplementary duties or interests is likely to «hamper or delay» a public servant/civil servant in the prosecution of his or her main occupation.

Questionnaire etc: The Commission has carried out a broadly based survey amongst all the judges in Norway, both permanently and temporarily appointed. The main purpose of the survey was to examine judges' extra-judicial activities, both as regards the type of activityinvolved, the number of activities, and any income derived from them. The judges were also asked a number of other questions, including questions about their background. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Annex 2 to this report. A summary of the result of the survey, with regard to the question of other activities, is provided in Annex 3.

The Commission's proposals

The main problem for the Commission has been to assess specifically whether and to what extent extra-judicial activities are compatible with a judge's normal work. Different considerations apply here, which are discussed by the Commission. The arguments against judges having extra-judicial activities include the need to preserve the independence of the courts and the judiciary, and the need to preserve the confidence of the general public in the courts and the judiciary. On the other hand, judges represent an important resource from which society can benefit extra-judicially, for example as members of official committees or other state administrative bodies. Through their other activities, judges can also gain an insight into the workings of society, which will benefit them in their work as judges. The Commission also points out that restrictions on the right of judges to undertake certain forms of duties and other interests may be in breach of basic civil liberties.

Based on a balancing of the various considerations, the Commission has concluded that an overall method should be found of regulating judges' activities by law, which would include all judges. Three forms of regulation are believed to be current - prohibition, approval and registration.

Registration of judges' extra-judicial activities: The Commission is of the opinion that - to an essential degree - a relatively comprehensive system of registration will be sufficient, which will give anyone who wants it access to the registered information. The main purpose of registration will be to create greater predictability as regards the competence of judges to deal with individual court cases.

According to the Commission's proposal, all activities should be registered, apart from membership of political parties, of professional and industrial bodies, and of non-profit-making associations. Duties etc undertaken on behalf of non-profit-making associations that have fewer than 100 members will also be exempt from registration. A minority amongst the Commission's members propose that a special rule should apply to membership in non-profit-making associations where members have special mutual obligations. The reference here is to so-called «fraternal societies» such as the Freemasons. The minority propose that membership in such societies should be registered, irrespective of the number of members of the society concerned. The majority of the Commission's members do not want to see introduced any kind of special rules relating to this type of society. The Commission as a whole proposes that any investments made by a judge in a company or companies should be registered, although registration will only be obligatory for investments above a certain threshold. Judges will also be exempt from registering single lectures, educational talks, addresses etc.

Registration will be based on the requirement that judges who undertake other duties and interests must report them to the entity responsible for keeping the register. Judges will be required to register their name, title, the court in which they serve, the nature of their other duties or interests, the name of their other employer or principal, and the time or duration of their other duties or interests. Judges will also be required to declare whether any income arises from the duty or interest in question, although they will not be obliged to declare how much income they receive. It is proposed that the register should also contain certain information not associated with judges' extra-judicial activities, but pertaining to the occupation or post held by the judge before he or she was appointed to the present judgeship. According to the majority's proposal (see Chapter 6), the new Courts Administration will be responsible for compiling the register and keeping it up to date. The minority propose that this responsibility should lie with the Ministry of Justice.

Prohibition on judges' extra- judicial activities: In the Commission's opinion, there is only a limited need for regular prohibitions on judges having extra-judicial activities. The prohibitions that are advocated by the Commission comprise, firstly, the upholding of the current prohibitions, including the rule which precludes judges from practising as advocates. Secondly, the Commission proposes that judges should also be prohibited from providing legal aid under section 218 of the Courts of Justice Act; and thirdly, it is proposed that a judge may not serve as a member of an arbitration tribunal after being appointed by one of the parties to the arbitration proceedings in question.

Approval of judges' extra-judicial activities: There are certain types of extra-judicial activities which, in the Commission's opinion, can be difficult to reconcile with the post of judge, although without the Commission having found any grounds to prohibit them outright. These activities are in a kind of in-between position, and the Commission believes that the best solution would be to evaluate and assess each individual activity specifically and to subject it to an approval procedure. This procedure would entail a judge being obliged to apply for and be granted approval, before he or she could undertake a particular duty or interest. The approval procedure would encompass all kinds of duties or interests that are likely to entail a judge being disqualified more than occasionally, as well as work-intensive duties that might hamper or delay his or her normal work. The approval procedure in such case would not be linked to specific types of extra-judicial activities, as it is not the nature of the activity involved but the effect it may have on the judge's competence to act, or the effort required of the judge in his or her normal work, that is decisive.

The Commission proposes, in addition, that judges should be obliged to seek approval in connection with activities involving private or public commercial undertakings, appointments to serve as a member of an arbitration tribunal (that is in cases where the judge is not appointed by one of the parties to the dispute in question; see above), and for activities involving collegiate administrative bodies where the decisions of the body concerned are likely to be subjected to judicial review by the courts.

Elections made by the Storting will be exempt from the approval requirement. The same will apply if a judge is appointed by the Council of State to serve as a member of a board of inquiry. In the case of other appointments made by the Council of State, prior consultation will be made with the body authorised to give approval. Under the majority's proposal, the Courts Administration will be the body authorised to approve these matters, while the minority propose that such authority should lie with the Supervisory Committee for Judges; see below.

The Commission also takes the view that judges in general should show restraint in undertaking more prominent political duties, both in political parties and in popularly elected bodies. The same applies to significant duties and the like in typical professional and industrial bodies. The Commission also notes that the authority making the appointment in question should show restraint in appointing Supreme Court Justices as members of private tribunals set up to resolve disputes and as members of administrative bodies making individual decisions according to the Public Administration act, section 2.

Leave of absence. Salary from former or future workplace: Although leave of absence for judges has no direct connection with judges' other extra-judicial activities, out of consideration for the principle of judicial independence the Commission proposes in Chapter 9 that judges may not take leave of absence from their former post when they take up an appointment as a permanent, full-time judge. The Commission does not, however, propose any prohibition on temporary judges taking leave of absence from their former posts while functioning as judges; nor that there should be introduced any prohibition on judges being granted leave of absence from their posts as judges in order to take up another post. The Commission also proposes that a general prohibition should be introduced on judges receiving salary or some other form of remuneration from a former or future workplace.

15.9 Disciplinary measures and judges' best practice

Description of the current system: The Commission makes a closer examination of the legal position of judges in Chapter 10, and points out, inter alia, that the position of judges in Norwegian law is somewhat different for permanent judges and temporary judges. By virtue of the fact that they are senior state officials, permanent judges enjoy a special security of tenure under section 22 of the Norwegian Constitution. They are «irremovable» in the sense that they cannot be dismissed with notice from their post or transferred against their will, and can only be removed after a trial and court judgment. Permanent judges can be suspended, but the decision to suspend must be made by the King in Council, and proceedings to remove the judge from his or her post - either by civil judgment or sentence - must be commenced immediately. Like other public servants, permanent judges can be punished for breaking the law inside or outside office, but the question as to whether charges should be brought against a judge for punishable offences in the performance of his duties must be decided by the King in Council. Permanently appointed judges cannot have disciplinary action taken against them under the rules of the Civil Service Act. A Supreme Court Justice can only be removed from office by judgment of the Court of Impeachment, and there are also a number of other special rules applicable to Supreme Court Justices.

Temporary judges (see Chapter 8) do not enjoy the same security of tenure as permanently appointed judges, and their position in civil and criminal law is the same as for other civil servants. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Temporary judges who are temporarily appointed by the King in Council are assumed to have the same security of tenure and the same legal status as permanent judges.

Chapter 10 contains a brief summary of disciplinary systems and systems of ethics pertaining to a number of other occupations and types of post.

The Commission's proposals

The legal position of judges. Security of tenure: The Commission proposes that the basic rules governing the position in law of judges should be maintained. The Commission proposes, however, that all judges should have the same security of tenure. This means that temporary judges - like permanent judges - cannot be dismissed or transferred against their will, and can only be discharged after trial and judgment. The background for this proposal is the special need to secure the independence of judges.

New complaints and disciplinary procedure: Even if permanent judges cannot be subject to disciplinary action according to the Civil Service Act, it is assumed that the Ministry of Justice has a certain disciplinary authority over them, based on the supervisory authority it has in relation to the courts - and the judges - on behalf of the Government. It is, however, somewhat unclear as to what this disciplinary authority consists in. There are no specific rules in connection with the disciplinary system; for example, there is no formalised system that would entitle the parties to a case, advocates or other persons to bring a complaint against a judge to the Ministry of Justice. Practice would appear to show that the Ministry is on the whole inclined to show restraint as regards tackling professional misconduct on the part of judges. Assertions have been made indicating that misconduct does take place amongst judges, but there are no precise data to show to what extent it occurs.

The question for the Commission is whether there should be introduced a specifically regulated, statutory complaints and disciplinary procedure for judges, which would allow complaints against judges to be brought before a disciplinary body and which would impose on judges a «milder» form of disciplinary reaction, that is to say milder than dismissal, punishment or suspension.

Based on various considerations, the Commission has evaluated the need for such a complaints and disciplinary procedure, including whether such a system could be run alongside the current system for removing judges and for imposing punishment. The Commission has also considered whether there are any other means, for example the establishment of a council of ethics for judges, the development of professional rules of ethics etc, which might replace a complaints and disciplinary procedure. The conclusion is that there is a need for a completely new and well organised complaints and disciplinary procedure that is capable of detecting misbehaviour and ensuring that action is taken against it in the form of mild but appropriate disciplinary measures. An important objective of the procedure proposed by the Commission is that it should not only include the treatment of specific cases of disciplinary reaction against individual judges, but also contribute in different ways to developing judicial ethics and promoting sound professional conduct amongst judges.

Conduct that can lead to disciplinary reaction: The Commission proposes that judges should be subject to disciplinary reaction primarily for professional misconduct in the performance of their office. All forms of professional misconduct should result in disciplinary reaction, subject to circumstances, in the first instance professional misconduct in relation to parties, witnesses etc, and dilatoriness with regard to case preparation and drafting written judgments. This is the kind of conduct that is generally viewed as being contrary to «conduct as befitting a judge». In addition, the Commission proposes that any breach of professional duties arising from a judge's contract of employment should result in disciplinary action.

Considerably more difficult evaluations are involved when faced with the question of how to react to judges' conduct outside the sphere of office, since this is to encroach on judges' private lives. Disciplinary action is only envisaged here in extraordinary situations.

Forms of disciplinary reaction: If the disciplinary body concludes that a judge is guilty of either negligent or wilful misconduct, there are two types of disciplinary measure or reaction that may be employed: the judge can either be issued with a «criticism» or a «warning». Criticism is a milder form of reaction than a warning.

Initiating disciplinary cases/right of complaint: The Commission proposes that any person who has been subject to the misconduct of a judge in the performance of his or her office, such as parties, witnesses, advocates etc, should be able to bring a complaint against the judge to the disciplinary body. The consequence of such a right of complaint is that the disciplinary body will be obliged to deal with the complaint. The Commission proposes, furthermore, that the right of complaint should also be extended to court presidents, the Courts Administration (according to the majority's proposal in Chapter 6) and the Ministry of Justice. Judges themselves will also have the right to bring a case before the disciplinary body, and the body will also take up cases on its own initiative, on the basis, for example, of submissions from persons who do not have the right of complaint. For misconduct outside office, the Commission is of the opinion that it is sufficient that there should be a limited number of persons or bodies with the right of complaint - the court president, the Courts Administration (according to the majority's proposal in Chapter 6) and the Ministry of Justice - in addition to the disciplinary body's right to act on its own initiative.

The general time limit for lodging a complaint will be three months after the misconduct in question took place, although the Commission proposes that certain modifications and exemptions be made to this rule, inter alia as concerns the starting point for the time limit.

The complaints and disciplinary bodies; The Supervisory Committee for Judges: The Commission has evaluated different models on which to base the organisation of a complaints and disciplinary procedure. The Commission regards the courts, or possibly a special court, and a separate administrative body as the only suitable alternatives. Weighing up the merits of these two models has led the Commission to choose the latter - a separate administrative body. The reason for this is, inter alia, that it will be easier for such a body to detect misconduct, and it will also help to promote the development of judicial ethics on a broader basis. The Commission has chosen to entitle this body the «Supervisory Committee for Judges», particularly because it will have a kind of monitoring function with regard to judges' behaviour. The minority of the Commission's members propose that, in addition to the duties of the Supervisory Committee as mentioned above, the Committee should also deal with and decide all cases relating to the approval of judges' extra-judicial activities; see above.

According to the Commission's proposal, the Supervisory Committee shall have five members, and be composed of two public members, and two judges and an advocate, all with personal deputies. The two public members are to be elected by the Storting, while the three professional members will be appointed by the Government. It is proposed that the Supervisory Committee's secretariat functions should be performed by the central courts administration, that is to say by the Courts Administration under the majority's proposal, or by the Ministry of Justice under the minority's proposal (cf. Chapter 6).

Rules of procedure. Judicial review of the Supervisory Committee's decisions in disciplinary matters: With regard to procedure in disciplinary cases, the Commission proposes that it be based on the provisions of the Public Administration Act and the Freedom of Information Act. The decisions of the Supervisory Committee in disciplinary cases will be regarded as individual decisions, which will allow the special rules in the Public Administration Act regarding such decisions to be applied. On some points, the Commission proposes that certain variations from and supplements to the Public Administration Act should be made statutory. As a result of these variations an supplements:

• The rules on competence and disqualification in the Courts of Justice Act will become applicable

• Under the majority's proposal, the judge and the complainant will have a universal right to give oral evidence before the Supervisory Committee, unless the Committee finds it clearly unnecessary for the elucidation of the case. The other members propose that the Supervisory Committee can permit the judge and the complainant to give oral evidence if the Committee judges that it is necessary for the elucidation of the case. The Commission proposes that the Supervisory Committee be empowered to order a party to give oral evidence if the Committee decides that it is of substantive importance for the elucidation of the case.

• The Supervisory Committee can call witnesses, and evidence can be taken from persons at a distance

• The Supervisory Committee will conduct its ordinary work in the form of meetings, although the Committee will be able to conduct its business in the form of written procedure where circumstances allow. The more specific conduct of the meetings, also in the event of oral proceedings, will be left to the Committee itself to determine

• The meetings of the Supervisory Committee will in general be held in camera

• The Supervisory Committee's decisions may not be appealed, although the parties in an administrative case can challenge the Committee's decision in court by bringing a civil action for judicial review. The time limit for bringing such an action is two months. Another majority of the Commission's members propose that the court should only be permitted to review the legality of the Committee's decision, procedure and basis of fact, while the other members hold that the court should be able to review all aspects of the decision. The Commission as a whole otherwise concurs that the Civil Procedure Act should apply by, but not the exemption contained in section 438 first subsection with respect to deviation from the order of courts of instance when bringing a case against a judge - in other words, all actions against judges that are disciplinary actions, shall commence in the District and City Courts. One member wished a special comment to be noted on the judicial review of the Supervisory Committee's decisions.

The Commission believes it is important to create openness around the decisions made by the Supervisory Committee in disciplinary actions, and proposes that these decisions be published in anonymous form.

In conclusion, the Commission considers whether the proposal for an administrative complaints and disciplinary procedure is contrary to the protection of tenure afforded to judges under the Constitution. In the light, inter alia, of the nature of the disciplinary action and the rules of procedure that will be laid down, the Commission has concluded that the proposal is not unconstitutional. It is furthermore the view of the Commission that the Constitution does not preclude imposing disciplinary action on Supreme Court Justices.

15.10 Lay judges, with particular reference to Conciliation Boards

Description of the current system: Lay judges are regarded in this report as those lay judges who participate in District and City Courts, in the Courts of Appeal and in the special courts, as well as jurors, lay assessors, and members of the Conciliation Boards. The Commission provides an account of the current system in Chapter 11 as regards the election/appointment and use of lay judges in the ordinary courts in various types of cases. The Commission also points out that there are no specific rules laid down governing the extra-judicial activities or disciplinary measures that are applicable to lay judges, but that they can be punished for negligence of duty and be relieved of their duties by court judgment.

The organisation of the Conciliation Boards and their function as the first link in the courts system is described separately.

The Commission's proposals

The Commission proposes that lay judges in the District and City Courts and the Courts of Appeal should be administered - as they are now - by the central courts administration as an integral part of the administration of the ordinary courts, that is to say by the new Courts Administration (according to the majority's proposal in Chapter 6) or by the Ministry of Justice (according to the minority's proposal in Chapter 6).

With particular regard to the administration of the Conciliation Boards, the Commission supports the proposal set forth in the report on the future organisation of the civil administration of jurisprudence at the first instance, a report delivered to the Ministry of Justice on 18 February 1997. This report proposed that the State should assume the full financial and administrative responsibility for the administration of the Conciliation Boards, both centrally (by the central courts administration) and locally. As a consequence of this proposal, the municipal authorities will be released from their financial and administrative responsibilities in relation to the Conciliation Boards.

The Commission takes no stance as to how the secretariat functions for the individual Conciliation Boards should be organised specifically, but requests that this be examined. The Commission is sceptical about the proposal contained in the report on the civil administration of jurisprudence at the first instance that would give the police responsibility for the secretariat function, and would like to see other alternatives being considered as well, including the setting up a joint secretariat system with the Municipal Mediation Boards. Three of the Commission's members have jointly entered a special comment on this point.

It is proposed that the regulations governing professional judges' extra-judicial activities should not be made to apply by analogy to lay judges, principally because lay judges do not have the adjudicating function as their (main) occupation. On the other hand, the Commission goes in for the integration of lay judges into the disciplinary system proposed for professional judges, since action must be taken against judges' misconduct if public confidence in the courts is to be maintained - irrespective of which judge has misbehaved.

The Commission makes no evaluation in principle of the actual system of employing lay judges. It is, however, proposed that some aspects of the system be subjected to further scrutiny in connection with the review of current practice in the selection of lay judges that has recently been requested by the Storting.

15.11 Special courts

Description of the current system: The Commission begins by giving an account, in Chapter 12, of the special courts that exist in Norway today, with regard to their organisation, functions, administrative system, system of appointing judges, use of temporary judges, judges' extra-judicial activities, and security of tenure/disciplinary measures. The special courts may be defined as institutions which stand outside the ordinary courts, which are assigned adjudicating functions in a delimited sphere of law, and which are designated as courts in the Courts of Justice Act or other laws. The special courts are few in number and are in general of limited importance compared with the ordinary courts. In many other countries, including Sweden, the special courts play an important role. The most important special courts in Norway are the 41 Land Consolidation Courts and five Superior Land Consolidation Courts, and the The Labour Court. The other special courts are the Courts of Guardianship, the Courts of Assessment, the Commission for outlying land areas in the Nordland and Troms provinces, the Norwegian consular courts abroad, and the Court of Impeachment.

The Commission also provides an account of the various court-like administrative bodies that also exist. These bodies have certain similarities with the courts, and particularly with the special courts owing to their restricted field of operation. They are, however, agencies of public administration and are not regarded as courts.

The Commission's proposals

The special courts contra the ordinary courts: The Commission deliberates in principle on the use of special courts, and concludes basically that all adjudicating activity should be assigned to the ordinary courts. Special courts should only be set up where there are very particular matters or special business to deal with. The background for the Commission's preference for the ordinary courts is principally the consideration for the unification of law. The Commission also takes a sceptical view of the use of court-like bodies in cases where the functions they perform could be fulfilled by the courts.

The Land Consolidation Courts are charged, in addition to their adjudicating tasks, with certain central administrative tasks. This combination of tasks can be inappropriate, inter alia because it clashes with the principle of the independence of the courts. The Commission proposes that the status and functions of the Land Consolidation Courts be examined by a broadly composed committee of inquiry. The investigation should include the nature and scope of the administrative tasks of the Land Consolidation Courts, their relationship with the agricultural authorities, local authorities and any other authorities involved, and - in light of the committee's findings - a discussion of the relationship between the adjudicating functions of the Land Consolidation Courts and their administrative functions.

The administrative system for the special courts: The Commission's point of departure is that, on grounds of both principle and practicality, the control of the administration of the special courts should be given to the administrative body that is responsible for the central administration of the ordinary courts. This should pose few problems for any new special courts that may be set up. The picture is a little more complex where the existing special courts are concerned.

A majority of the Commission's members hold that the viewpoints in principle that are argued by this majority in Chapter 6 in favour of a more free-standing central courts administration, can be argued with the same strength for the Land Consolidation Courts. The majority propose, therefore, that the question of transferring the administration of the Land Consolidation Courts from the Ministry of Agriculture to the new Courts Administration should be considered separately without waiting for the report on the status and functions of the Land Consolidation Courts. The other members agree that the administrative system for the Land Consolidation Courts should be examined more closely, but take the view that this matter should be considered at the same time as the investigation into the status and functions of the Land Consolidation Courts, and be included as part of that investigation. These members refer to the fact that the question of the administrative system lies on the fringes of the Commission's mandate, that the Commission does not have the required composition to enable it to assess the matter, nor has the Commission had the opportunity to collect the necessary facts on which to base such an assessment.

The Commission believes that the administrative system for the The Labour Court should be assessed separately, but provides clear guidelines in the direction of the central courts administration being made responsible for administering this court as well. The The Labour Court is currently administered by the Ministry of Local Government and Labour. The Commission sees no need for any similar assessment to be made with regard to the special Courts of Assessment under the Planning and Building Act, and takes the view that they can be transferred from the Ministry of Local Government and Labour to the central courts administration. Under the proposal of the majority of the Commission's members in Chapter 6, the administration of the Courts of Guardianship and the Commission for outlying land areas in the Nordland and Troms provinces should be transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Courts Administration. The minority propose, however, that the Ministry of Justice should continue to administer these courts. The consular courts do not constitute any permanently fixed and organised law court entities and are an integral part of the Norwegian Foreign Service, for which reason there would be no rationality in transferring their administration to the central courts administration.

The appointment of judges, judges' extra-judicial activities etc: It is the opinion of the Commission that, on grounds of both principle and practicality, the same appointments system should apply to judges in the ordinary courts and in the special courts, that the rules governing the use of temporary judges should be the same in the two main categories of courts, and likewise that the same existing or future systems governing security of tenure for judges, judges' extra-judicial activities, and disciplinary measures should also apply. The Commission presupposes that certain modification rules can be laid down, which will take into account the special nature and functions of the individual special courts.

It is the Commission's view that the statements made above in respect of the appointments system etc should also apply to judges in the existing special courts. The Commission proposes, however, that these matters should be assessed more closely where the judges in the The Labour Court are concerned, and that the results of the assessment should be considered before any further assessments are made regarding the judges who serve in the other special courts. The majority view in the question of the administrative system for the Land Consolidation Courts is that a modification of the rules concerning the appointments system etc for judges in the Land Consolidation Courts should be considered at the same time as the question of transferring the administration of the Land Consolidation Courts to the new Courts Administration. The minority want this question to be assessed at the same time as the investigation into the status, functions and administrative system of the Land Consolidation Courts, so that an overall assessment can be made of all these issues.

15.12 The financial and administrative consequences of the Commission's proposals

In Chapter 13, the Commission provides a brief analysis of the administrative and financial consequences of its proposals.

The Commission puts forward a number of proposals in its report. These involve a comprehensive reorganisation of the central courts administration, as well as a number of proposals relating to specific administrative systems. It is proposed that some systems be changed, primarily the procedure for appointing judges, and that the system with the use of temporary judges be reorganised and made more restricted. Other proposed systems are in essence completely new: these involve a unified disciplinary system for judges and a means of regulating judges' extra-judicial activities, including the setting up of a register of such activities.

A number of the Commission's proposals only imply a small need for new posts to be created or other resources allocated. In some areas it is, for example, proposed that the same functions can be executed under different management, without any extra work being entailed. Other proposals carry with them the need for additional resources. For example, the establishment of a courts administration outside the Ministry of Justice will require several new posts to be created and will mean somewhat higher running costs than is currently the case within the Ministry's own organisation.

The Commission has not perceived it as its task to draft proposals for the detailed formulation and planning of these systems - or for a detailed plan of organisation for the central courts administration or a plan for the organisational development that will be required to implement the new solutions. As a consequence, the Commission has no basis for carrying out an in-depth analysis of the administrative and financial consequences of its proposals. It is not, for example, expedient for the Commission to go into the IT solutions involved and the cost of establishing and operating a central register of judges' extra-judicial activities. Nor have the Commission and its secretariat been constituted with a view to making such financial calculations: these matters can easily be dealt with by the professionals concerned in the follow-up period after the Commission has delivered its report.

The Commission notes, however, that the proposals it is putting forward will not, generally speaking, have extensive financial consequences. The administrative consequences will also be modest, beyond those that lie in the proposals. The reasoning behind the proposals builds in essence on the fundamental considerations and principles that apply in a democratic constitutional state, and the modest financial and administrative consequences of the proposals should not, in the Commission's considered opinion, be an important part of the grounds for decision-making.

15.13 Summary of dissenting opinion amongst the Commission's members

The Commission provides in the following a summary of the issues on which there is dissenting opinion amongst its members. The dissenting opinion with regard to the organisation of the central courts administration has an impact in several contexts, but the summary does not include any dissenting opinion that is a direct consequence of this particular dissenting view.

The summary includes a brief account of the nature of the individual dissenting opinions, identifies the members who constitute the majority and minority views, and provides references to the relevant chapters, including the outline for the proposed law in Chapter 14.

1. Chapter 5 General principles and considerations of public interest

• Statutory establishment in the Constitution of the independence of the courts, see Chapter 5.8 og Chapter 14.2, the Constitution § 89.

The majority (the chairman and members Bergo, Bugge Fougner, Fagernæs, Gjørv, Hermansen, Lorange Backer, Nygaard Haug, Olsen, Overå, Røstad Fløtten, Sundtoft and Ven) propose that the judicial independence of the courts should be laid down in a separate provision in the Constitution.

The minority (members Eidesen, Pavall and Strøm Bull) hold that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to amend the Constitution.

2. Chapter 6 The central courts administration

• Organisational solution for the central administration of the courts;see Chapter 6.6-6.9 and §§ 30-33 in Chapter 14.

The majority(the chairman and members Bergo, Eidesen, Hermansen, Overå, Pavall, Røstad Fløtten, Strøm Bull and Sundtoft) propose that the central courts administration should be organised as a free-standing body, led by a governing board composed both of members elected by the Storting and members appointed by the King in Council.

The minority (members Bugge Fougner, Fagernæs, Gjørv, Lorange Backer, Nygaard Haug, Olsen and Ven) propose that the courts administration should continue to be organised as part of the Ministry of Justice, but with the setting up of a new Council for Courts Administration.

3. Chapter 7 Appointment of judges

• Judicial appointments body; see Chapter 7.5.3.1.1 and §§ 5-6 in Chapter 14.

The majority (who are identical to the majority in point 2 above) propose that the governing board heading the central courts administration should fulfil the function of recommending judicial appointments, and should employ the administrative staff of the Courts Administration as its secretariat. It is proposed that the two members of the governing board drawn from amongst lawyers from outside the courts should both be advocates.

The minority (who are identical to the minority in point 2 above) propose that a special Judicial Appointments Board be set up, with the courts administration in the Ministry of Justice acting as the secretariat. It is proposed that the two members of the Board to be drawn from amongst lawyers from outside the courts should be, respectively, an advocate and a lawyer employed in the public administration.

4. Chapter 8 Temporary judges

• Authority to appoint judges temporarily and to appoint assistant judges; see Chapter 8.4.4.4 and 8.4.4.5.2 and §§ 9-11 in Chapter 14.

The majority (who are identical to the majority in point 2 above) propose that the temporary appointments that are not to be decided by the King in Council, should be decided by the governing board of the Courts Administration. It is also proposed that the governing board should deal with all minority appeals lodged by members of the appointments board for the appointment of assistant judges.

The minority (who are identical to the majority in point 2 above) propose that the authority to make temporary appointments and to deal with minority appeals against the appointment of assistant judges should be the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Board.

5. Chapter 9 Extra-judicial activities

• Registration of membership of non-profit-making organisations where embers have particular mutual obligations («fraternal societies»); see Chapter 9.7.8.6 and § 17 in Chapter 14.

The majority (the chairman and members Eidesen, Hermansen, Nygaard Haug, Overå, Pavall, Strøm Bull, Sundtoft and Ven) propose that membership of non-profit-making organisations should not be subject to registration.

The minority (members Bergo, Bugge Fougner, Fagernæs, Gjørv, Lorange Backer, Olsen and Røstad Fløtten) propose a special rule governing membership in fraternal societies, according to which membership in such societies must be registered, irrespective of the number of members of the society concerned.

• Approval of applications in respect of other extra-judicial activities; see Chapter 9.7.9 and § 16 in Chapter 14.

The majority (who are identical to the majority in point 2 above) propose that cases concerning the approval of applications in respect of other extra-judicial activities should be decided by the new Courts Administration.

The minority (who are identical to the minority in point 2 above) propose that these matters of approval should be decided by the Supervisory Committee for Judges.

6. Chapter 10 Disciplinary measures and judges' best practice

• The right of the parties to give oral evidence before the Supervisory Committee; see Chapter 10.6.3.9 and § 27 in Chapter 14.

The majority (the chairman and members Bergo, Eidesen, Fagernæs, Hermansen, Overå, Pavall, Røstad Fløtten, Strøm Bull and Sundtoft) propose that a party should have the right to give oral evidence before the Supervisory Committee, unless the Committee judges it to be clearly unnecessary for the elucidation of the case.

The minority (members Bugge Fougner, Gjørv, Lorange Backer, Nygaard Haug, Olsen and Ven) propose that a party can be given the right to give oral evidence before the Supervisory Committee if the Committee judges that such evidence is important for the elucidation of the case.

• Judicial review of the Supervisory Committee's decisions; see Chapter 10.6.3.9 and § 28 in Chapter 14.

The majority (members Fagernæs, Gjørv, Lorange Backer, Nygaard Haug, Olsen, Overå, Pavall, Røstad Fløtten, Strøm Bull and Ven) propose that the court may only review a decision of the Supervisory Committee with regard to the application of the law, procedure and the factual grounds for the decision, that is to say in accordance with the usual rules that apply to judicial reviews of administrative decisions.

The minority (the chairman and members Bergo, Bugge Fougner, Eidesen, Hermansen and Sundtoft) propose that the court should be able to review all aspects of the Supervisory Committee's decision and, if necessary, make new decisions based on the merits of the case.

7. Chapter 12 Special courts

• The Land Consolidation Courts: administrative system, appointment of judges, temporary judges, judges' extra-judicial activities, security of tenure and disciplinary measures; see Chapter 12.5.4.2 and 12.5.5.2.

The majority (who are identical to the majority in point 2 above) propose that the question of assessing whether to transfer the administration of the Land Consolidation Courts to the new Courts Administration should be considered separately and independently of the Commission's proposal to investigate the status and functions of the Land Consolidation Courts. The majority also propose that the question of common rules for judges sitting in the Consolidation Courts and the ordinary courts as regards the appointment of judges, temporary judges, judges' extra-judicial activities, security of tenure and disciplinary measures, should be considered at the same time as the administrative system for the Land Consolidation Courts.

The minority (who are identical to the minority in point 2 above) propose that the questions with regard to the administrative system for the Land Consolidation Courts, common rules on the appointment of judges etc, should be examined together with the status and function of the Land Consolidation Courts, and as part of that investigation.

15.14 The Commission's proposals for further consideration

The Commission proposes that further consideration should be given to the following areas:

1. The tasks, duties and authority of court presidents (Chapter 7.5.1.3)

2. The participation of judges in The Special Public Investigation Agency (SEFO) (Chapter 9.7.8.3)

3. The secretariat function for the Conciliation Boards (Chapter 11.3.1.2)

4. Lay judges: qualifications for office, training etc (Chapter 11.3.2)

5. The use of court-like administrative bodies and their relationship with the courts (Chapter 12.5.3)

6. The Land Consolidation Courts: status and functions etc (Chapter 12.5.2.3 and 12.5.5.2)

7. The The Labour Court: administrative system etc (Chapter 12.5.5.2)